 Thank you very much, and I appreciate this opportunity to share with you some of my views about I think one of the major challenges that are going to be facing Africa and the other less developed countries as they go forward. There's a widespread recognition that in East Asia there was greater success than anybody had anticipated. The unprecedented growth, until enclosing the gap in income per capita with the events countries. Back in the late 80s the World Bank asked me to do a study of what made those countries so successful and I visited all the countries and we wrote a report and that eventually in a watered down form got published as a book called The East Asia Miracle. And some of what I'm going to be talking about is the insights I got from that study about at the core of our view was that the government had played a very important role as a development state using industrial policies to promote manufacturing and promote in particular export led manufacturing growth. But the question that's increasingly apparent for developing countries today is that that model that was the basis of the success of East Asia won't be available to the same extent for Africa going forward. The success of East Asia just to re-emphasize was made very clear by the session yesterday that Deepak Naira chaired that Gurna Murdoch 50 years ago, almost 50 years ago wrote the book called Asia Drama where he said the prospects for Asia going forward are just really weak. It will continue to be mired in the poverty for which it had been for centuries. Maybe the important lesson of Murdoch's work is that economists shouldn't make predictions or at least when they do make sure that there are two handed predictions. He was too unambiguous and as always just at the moment that East Asia was about to take off he was saying it would never, never do that. But it did take off and obviously everybody wants to imitate what it did and hope that they can get the same results. The world today 50 years later is different from what it was in 1975-1980 and that means what worked then may not and I'm going to argue won't work today. The reason is that it was the victim of its own success, that there were increases in productivity in manufacturing have exceeded the rate of increase in demand and the result of that is if productivity increases faster than demand employment is going down and one of the main challenges facing Africa is going to be providing jobs for the very large number of individuals entering the labor force. In fact, most of the increase, more than 100% of the increase in the labor force net is going to be occurring in Africa. The globally, just since 2000, the share of GDP that is associated with manufacturing has gone from 19% down to 15% and because employment is going down faster the share of employment is going down even more. Some of this is a way we keep books that is to say there's been vertical disintegration that means we have to be careful about interpreting the numbers but it's unambiguous that there just isn't going to be enough jobs in manufacturing to address the increase in labor force in Africa. In many ways, the problem that we're facing, the world is facing today is similar to that that confronted the world a century ago in agriculture. In the 19th century and in many developing countries today, it takes about 70% of labor force to produce the food that people need to survive. But now in the United States and in Europe, 2% to 3% of the workforce provides more food than even obese societies can consume. So we've had to redeploy the labor, 70%, maybe only 60%, going down to 3%, that vast amount has had to be redeployed in other uses and that was what a large part of that was absorbed by manufacturing. Today the same problem, all these people in manufacturing are going to have to be redeployed somewhere else in the economy and I'll talk about what that means. One way to think about it is even with the newly developing countries taking a larger share of the manufacturing jobs and with the shift of jobs from China to Africa, the new manufacturing jobs will only absorb a fraction of the new interest in the labor force. At the same time, those jobs can have impacts that are disproportionate to size so I want to make it clear I'm not arguing against manufacturing, what I'm really saying is it will not have the central role that it did in the context of the East Asia miracle. And I'll explain a little later, countries may have a natural comparative advantage in some niches, in some cases even be able to create a comparative advantage that is more persistent, but it's unlikely to have impacts that the manufacturing export-led growth model had in China and East Asia. There's one other aspect of this that's important to grasp, the advances in technology in manufacturing have been labor saving, so that labor is becoming a smaller and smaller fraction of the cost of production. And that means, just think of it in the limit, when labor isn't there at all, the relative price of labor doesn't matter at all. So if the share of labor is a really small share of production cost, then relative cost of the savings that you get by having less expensive labor isn't as important. And other things like logistic cost become more important. And that's why you're beginning to see some on-shoring of manufacturing, where they're having robots doing the production, and the real focus is on saving transportation costs. So what I wanted to do then is to, in this talk, what I'm going to try to do is present an alternative strategy to export-led manufacturing growth that will, I think, be the core of the strategies for Africa. But I wanted to set it in the context of what might be called the new thinking about development. So in this next section of my talk, I'm going to describe some of the new ideas and try to explain the ways in which these new ideas really are very counter to the Washington consensus ideas that have prevailed for a very long time. Being here at WIDER, I can't help but reflect on the fact that just a little over 20 years ago, I was invited to give the annual WIDER lecture, and I was the chief economist of the World Bank, and I chose WIDER as the place where I could explain what was wrong with the Washington consensus. And it was about more instruments, broader objectives. And in many ways, this is a continuation of that dialogue that began then. So the first idea is that what separates developing countries from developed is not just a disparity in resources, but a disparity in knowledge and institutions. The disparity in resources was what provided the motivation for the foundation of the World Bank. It was moving capital from developed countries to developing countries. But more than that is required. I argued that development entails a structural transformation. Now there are some countries that have had growth without a structural transformation. Those are countries, small countries that are, have the good fortune of having a lot of natural resources. They discovered the natural resources. Their GDP goes up, but it's not really sustainable development. Because they don't have the structural transformation, all they're doing is producing natural resources. They're not confused and increasing GDP with development. And that kind of growth won't be sustainable. Markets on their own aren't able to manage these transformations very well. And there are a good set of theoretical reasons why they're so. There are critical impediments imposed by capital market imperfections. There are important externalities and coordination failures. Just to give you one example. The sectors that are in decline, the value of their assets, their land, their human capital are less valuable precisely because they're in decline. And yet those are the units of production, the people, the firms that have to make the investment to go into the new economy. But they don't have the resources to do that without public assistance because of capital market imperfections that are now very well explained by standard economic theory. And that is why government needs to play a very important role. And this understanding, these understandings have led to a movement from a focus on projects to policies and then onto institutions. You realize it's not just building a road, but it's a deeper structural transformation of the society. So it's not just physical capital, but it also includes human capital, social capital, and knowledge capital. And a change in norms and mind sex. And that was one of the really important perspectives that was brought out in one of the world development reports that was done under Kaushik that focused explicitly on the change in mind sex and the change in norms within society, bringing in behavioral economics into development practice. And among obviously one of the changes is the change in the mind set that changes possible. A movement away from traditional society towards modernization. And all these ideas, of course, are ideas that are often associated with the Enlightenment. So these have led a group of economists, including a number of former chief economists of the World Bank to get together in Sweden to formulate a set of new principles that would reflect where we provide some guidance to development. And I'll go through them very quickly because I want to get on to the main thesis of my talk, but it's important to put what I'm talking about within this broader context. First is that GDP growth does not end in itself. And there's been a lot of confusion between means and ends. Development has to be inclusive. Environmental sustainability is a requirement, not an option. There's need to balance market, state, and community. And I want to emphasize the last word in that formulation. It wasn't just that the Washington consensus undermined the role of the state, but it also didn't even talk about the role of civil society. And other forms of economic organization. Fifth, one has to provide macro stability. That was one of the longstanding principles of the Washington consensus, but that doesn't just mean balancing budgets or focusing exclusively on inflation. In fact, some of that exclusive focus on price stability was counterproductive in terms of real stability. The sixth was that one had to attend to the impact of global technology and inequality. And then as we think about some of the big issues, concerns about whether trade agreements were fair to the United States, you know, Trump has said that trade agreements are not fair to the United States. I wrote a book about globalization and its discontent. One of the themes was that globalization had not been done, it was done in a way that was unfair to developing countries. So I asked my students, who do you think is correct? Me or President Trump? And my students seemed to agree with me that the problem is not that the global trade agreements are unfair to the United States, but they are actually unfair to developing countries. But the broader view is actually they're unfair to workers in both the developed and developing countries. It was a corporate agenda. And it was done to increase profits. And workers in both developed and developing countries suffered. And of course, as one focuses on problems of inequality, you naturally talk about investments in human capital, creating new instruments of redistribution within and between countries, and getting a better grasp of what determines the market distribution of income, the role of the rules of the game, corporate governance, bankruptcy law, competition policy, labor policy, all in determining the market distribution of income. I've already mentioned the seventh point, the importance of social norms and mind sex, which have proven effective ways of altering many aspects of behavior like fertility. Eighth is that global focuses on global policies and the responsibility of the international community. It recognizes that as we've had globalization, it's resulted in the interdependence of countries. And that means what one country does has effects in others. But there's an asymmetry. The policies of the large, rich countries have large externalities in the rest of the world, which they often don't take into account. And that includes their monetary regulatory trade and immigration policies. On the other hand, the tax havens, which have benefited of the developed countries, have an effect on all countries, both on the developed countries and on the developing countries. Current international agreements cover only parts of the arenas. Climate change doesn't go far enough. And particularly, they do not cover the cost of adaptation by poor countries. So I want to spend just a few minutes talking about the ways in which the Stockholm statement is a marked change from the Washington consensus with its narrow conception of goals, instruments, and participants in the development process. First talking about goals, the goals are not just the GDP, but inclusive growth. And at one time, the idea was that you could just focus on growth because everybody would benefit. And that was the notion of trickle-down economics. There's also been a change in the notion of trade-offs. It used to be thought that if we had more focus on inequality, pursued more equality policies, it would cost society in terms of growth. This is sometimes called the big trade-off. But what I emphasize in my book, The Price of Inequality, and now has become conventional wisdom with even the IMF advocating it, is that greater inclusivity can lead to more robust growth. And actually, the IMF has done some of the best work, sort of providing the empirical evidence that is true. So that actually is derived partly from understanding some of the sources of inequality. If you have large amounts of market power, if you have monopoly power, then that's a distortion that gives rise to inequality, but it also impairs the efficiency of the economy. Employment generation is central to inclusive growth. If you have large numbers of people who are unemployed, you're going to have high levels of inequality. And that's, of course, the problem I mentioned before with the rapid growth of the population in Africa. So today, we have to see growth and equality as complements rather than substitutes. Other goals that are now paramount are climate change and other environmental goals and broader perspective on good macroeconomics. As we come to talk about more instruments in the area of monetary policy that's become very clear, we no longer talk just about changing the short-term interest rates, open market operations, but QE and macro-prudential regulation. But there are more instruments more broadly for macro stability. The IMF has now embraced what is called the new institutional view on capital controls. There are more instruments for development transformation. One of the things that Justin Lin, when he was chief economist champion, was the use of industrial policies. And I'll talk very briefly about that. It's not just about promoting manufacturing but agriculture and services. And there are more instruments for maintaining full employment, including active labor market policies. And in India, for instance, the rural employment guarantee scheme. There are clear distinctions between means and goals. One of the unfortunate things is that some of the development agencies and international institutions took on some of the means as goals and as inks in themselves. They pushed privatization, price stability, as if they were the end product that they were concerned with. But privatization and even markets are not inks in themselves. They are only possibly means to broader goals that I described earlier. And other variables like inflation and budget deficits, current count deficits, need to be looked at through these lands. They are important, but they're only important to the extent that they facilitate the achievement of other goals. So one has to attend to them, but one has to see them as intermediate variables that may or may not be related to the in variables with which we are concerned. And then finally, I want to talk about the greater participation in the development process, the better balance between market, government, and society. And that begins, you could say, the Washington Census focused just on markets. My own work has done a lot to enhance the understanding of the limitations of markets that we need in our society more broadly. Systems of checks and balances and markets check the abuses of government, but governments check the abuses of markets. And media and civil society play a pivotal role in checking both. So I would go further that all the successful development has entailed government, all successful development has entailed the government playing an important role the development state with a multiplicity of roles providing enabling conditions for markets to work. That's one thing that the World Bank has emphasized, but I've talked about three other things, regulating markets, preventing, for instance, negative externalities, promoting development more directly, including learning. One of the things that we know that if knowledge is at the center of development, markets are not good at promoting knowledge. It's a massive market failure, because knowledge is a quintessential public good. So they can't do an efficient supply of knowledge in the production transmission of knowledge. And government plays, I think, a very big role in understanding the big picture, including the challenges posed by large issues of structural transformation, demographic changes, and so forth. So now I want to get into the main theme of this talk. And that is first asking, why was manufacturing export led growth so successful? I call that deconstructing the success of the export led manufacturing model. And then on the basis of that to say, how can we get the elements of that success in another way in the 21st century? So there's a list here of some of the things that manufacturing export led growth allowed one to do. The open economy allowed one to avoid the complexity of material balance equations. All one had to do was have enough foreign exchange. And export growth generated the necessary foreign exchange. For most of you have not had to go through this, but 50 years ago, 60 years ago, planning was all about making sure that you had these material balances, that you had the inputs and the exports, you had enough steel to do what you wanted. You produced it and you used it. But once you go into an open economy, you didn't have to have those material balance equations. In a way, you didn't need to generate the demand to absorb the new supply. In the old world, if you produce something, you'd have to worry about what's going to be a demand for it. But if there's a global market there and you're a relatively small economy, and even India is a small economy relative to the global economy, even though it has a lot of people, you're small in global supply. So you didn't have to worry about the demand constraints in general. Even though there's some small markets you might. What you had to do is worry about how you managed the exchange rate, how you managed openness. And so there were some problems you had to attend to, but it really solved, reduced the nature of this planning problem. Secondly, exports provided the basis of learning. As I said before, key to success was closing the knowledge gap. And as part of export-led growth, in particular part of success in export, manufacturing export-led growth, was the transfer of technology. And that could be accomplished in numerous ways, for instance, foreign direct investment, but some of the countries did not do foreign direct investment. Korea, foreign direct investment played no role. Japan, foreign direct investment didn't play any role. They had other ways of acquiring technology. What they had in common was that there was some way of acquiring knowledge. And you had to do that if you were going to be successful in the export manufacturing role. The transfer of technology then had a lot of spillovers to other sectors. So as you started learning about manufacturing, there was a lot of the knowledge that you got and a lot of the institutions that were necessary for success in manufacturing that had benefit to the rest of society. If you are going to have a robust manufacturing sector, you had to have a financial sector, you had to have an educated labor force. And those institutions obviously affected all of society. So there were important spillovers. Thirdly, exports provided the basis of tax revenues. And development requires resources, public resources, for infrastructure, resources for education, for promoting health. And one of the problems of developing countries in general is garnering resources is very difficult. But when you had these large enterprises, you could tax them. You could tax trade. So it was the basis of generating large amounts of revenue that previously had been very difficult to do. Fourthly, it generated jobs, generating jobs in the urban sector. And that was important in supporting the structural transformation and making sure that there was widely shared growth. And that finally is part of the structural transformation. Because as you move from a rural economy to an urban economy, as you move from a traditional economy to an economy that was changing, you really did change the mindsets of the people. And you began the development transformation that took off in East Asia. As we reflect on the success of East Asia, you have to reflect for a moment on the mechanisms that were used, because I'll talk about that a little bit later. But some of the mechanisms were not just direct subsidies, but things like access to credit at near-commercial rates. And that provided incentives for entrepreneurs, but it limited the direct support and therefore limited the scope for corruption. There were actually a variety of other industrial policy instruments, but it provided a natural system of accountability, because the successful firms, which were the firms that got credit, were the firms that were competing in international market. They weren't successful because they had created a monopoly through lobbying the government. They had to compete in global markets. And that gave a better system of accountability for what was the real basis of success. So the main thesis of this paper is that similar outcomes today in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world will require a multifaceted growth strategy with different facets reflecting different aspects of manufacturing export-led growth. So in other words, it will have to have elements of manufacturing, agriculture, resources, services, all directed at trying to achieve the multiplicity of things that one got out of manufacturing employment growth, tax revenues, employment, learning, foreign exchange. But you're not going to get them all packaged together in one package called manufacturing. But if you do that well, if they do that well, I think they can have success comparable to export manufacturing-led growth. One of the challenges facing Africa was that it places, it confronted, except for from premature deindustrialization, that for instance, if you look at the share of value added by industry was 35% in 1981. And by 2016, rather than having industrialized and increased, it's now down to 23%. So rather than increasing, it's actually decreasing. Some of that has to do with the structural adjustment programs of the Washington Consensus institutions. So a second theme that I'm going to come back to over and over again is that government will have to take an active role if there is to be the structural transformation that will achieve that multi-pronged growth objective. So let me go through very quickly each of those four prongs. First, beginning with manufacturing. As I said before, there's going to be a limited ability to generate jobs. And unfortunately, I think there's going to be limited ability to generate tax revenues. There would be greater ability if there were less tax competition. And Jose Antonio has been heading an international commission to try to reform the global multinational tax regime. But in one aspect of reform would be international agreement to curtail tax competition. But in the absence of that agreement, unfortunately, there's a race to the bottom. And the race to the bottom means that it is very difficult for developing countries to generate a lot of revenue out of manufacturing. And even more so because globalization has generated these tax havens that were illustrated by the Paradise Papers and the Panama Papers where multinational can effectively avoid taxation almost everywhere. Still, I think that appropriately designed policies can play an important role in some of the industrial policy that I'll explain in the next section. Unfortunately, the WTO circumscribes the use of subsidies. And this is one I mentioned before that the international rules of the game are biased against developing countries. They allow subsidies to agriculture, which are the comparative advantage of developing countries. But they don't allow the subsidies for development for industrialization that would allow developing countries to develop. And if you look at other aspects of the tariff structure, escalating tariffs, the existing tariff structure is designed to keep developing countries producing low value added activities. So developing countries will have to take actions to counteract the current structure. And to do it, they have a challenge to do it within the framework of the WTO. And let me just say, even though I'm very critical of the WTO, it's better that we have the WTO than not have it. And the problem is right now there is a real challenge to the WTO itself. I mean, I really think an international rule of law is important, and it needs to be reformed. But that doesn't mean that it needs to be ended. And for the developing countries are going to have to be obviously very careful in formulating their manufacturing industrial policies, for instance, taking advantage of their natural advantage in natural resources. Let me turn to agriculture. I think agriculture for the coming decades is going to be the most important basis of employment. It is currently the most important basis. The fact that it is traditional has led many, many developing countries to say, we don't want agriculture. And one can understand that countries like Korea at the beginning of their development transformation were told, your comparative advantage is in rice, so you should stick to rice. And you can understand why they didn't do that, and that they have benefited from not doing that. But I think the situation in Africa is different, that the task of creating jobs and manufacturing is just beyond the ability of manufacturing to do it. But agriculture, modern agriculture, is not the same as subsistence agriculture. And that's where there's a lot of confusion. One can have a modern agricultural sector in which out of agriculture, you get not only employment, but the other things, many of the other things that you got out of manufacturing, export, lead growth. So it can be restructured in ways that are more dynamic, more learning, learning how to learn, a kind of transformation in situ. In fact, in the advanced countries, modern agricultural culture is actually very advanced. There needs to be a focus on non-labor-saving innovations. And that's really a more general point. The West has focused on innovations that save labor, creating more unemployment among skilled labor. Obviously, in a world where there is a developing country where there's a clear surplus of unskilled labor, you don't want to focus on creating more unskilled labor unemployment. So innovation itself has to be focused on non-labor-saving. You might even say innovations which are labor-using innovations. And those include a different crop mix and fertilizers. Horticulture is an example of growing flowers. It's an example of a kind of agriculture which is very labor-intensive and has been very successful. Interesting, and also in earning large amounts of foreign exchange. You might say the good news is that because of the failure, neglect of agriculture for the last 50 years, there is low productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. And so there is an enormous scope for modernizing agriculture. And as I said, the transformation from traditional practices to modern farming can be an exemplar of the general societal transformation in tailing modernization. A stronger agriculture sector can generate foreign exchange or at the very least reduce the need for foreign exchange for imported goods. And it can reduce migration pressures on the cities, which are a stress in many developing countries. This view, let me say, has been shared by many in Africa themselves. The Africa Center for Economic Transformation in Accra put it this way. Agriculture presents the easiest path to industrialization and economic transformation. Increasing productivity and output in a modern agricultural sector would, beyond improving food security and the balance of payments through reduced food imports and increasing exports, sustained agro-processing, the manufacturing of agricultural inputs, and a host of services upstream and downstream from farms creating employment and boosting incomes across the country, across the economy. So if one exploits all the horizontal linkages and vertical linkages associated with agriculture, it actually can be an important basis for development. There are a number of ways of promoting agriculture. One of the things I didn't have time to talk about was why was manufacturing such a good basis for learning? And one of the reasons is you had large enterprises that can internalize expenditures, the benefits that they get from the expenditures on learning, on research. When you have very small units, which are typical of agriculture, service sector, that's much more difficult. And the response to that is the government and co-ops have to take up that role. And that's, of course, what happened in the United States in that corresponding period. In 1862, the United States, in the middle of the Civil War, created the agriculture universities and the agriculture extension services. And so it did the research and made sure that the benefits of that knowledge was transmitted to all the farmers. I think it's very important, and this is just a list and time is short, for the design of the IPR systems, the current IPR regimes work against having the kind of agricultural system that development countries need. There is a role of government in certifying and providing quality seeds and fertilizer. It's a real informational problem. In providing credit, preventing exploitation, and again, a classical problem in all countries. And providing marketing services, again, a classical problem. So let me very quickly skip over the next thing on natural resources. That's a standard sector. Many of the African countries are blessed with natural resources, but as we know, natural resources often turn out to be a curse, but we now know how to manage that through making sure you have stabilization policies, sometimes through a sovereign wealth fund, making sure that you have well-designed auctions to maximize the revenues that you get from the value of those, and well-designed contracts, so that they manage the volatility and make sure that the developing countries get more of the benefits. But what has not been fully appreciated is that they can be used as part of the development strategy. So they are, too often, natural resources are just viewed as a source of foreign exchange, but they can be part of their comparative advantage and be used as a basis of development. There's some very interesting work of Hausmann where he points out that there are very weak linkages between natural resources and the rest of the economy, but that describes the past that's not inevitable. So when he says that, he often makes recommendations based on that, but the recommendation that I would begin with is change that and explore those linkages, and there are a number of cases of enormous success in doing that. Finally, the service sector. In the Vax countries, the service sectors now play, 70% of the entire economy. In a few of the developing countries, they've managed to make that transformation to a service sector. Nibbibia, for instance, has been very successful in developing, even though it has some natural resources, it's realized that it can also have a high revenue tourism sector. There are many reasons why, if you don't manage the service sector well, you'll wind up with low productivity, but like agriculture, there needs to be a, you might call an extension service. Governments haven't done that, haven't focused on how to improve productivity. Here, the really important point is that if the service sector is a majority of the economy or more, 70% in say the United States, and there are differences in standards of living across countries, it has to do with the productivity in the service sector. And yet we haven't really focused on the sources of the differences in productivity in the service sector and how we can increase the productivities in the service sector in developing countries. One of the advantages, of course, is a modern service sector. Many aspects can be inserted into the global economy through the internet. Now, when we use the service sector, it's a generic term. It includes many different things, education, health, housing, and each of these are different. I just want to spend a word on a couple of these. Housing service, for instance, is an area where there'll be huge demands. The process of verbalization requires large investments, and that means, again, a large job creation potential, including for unskilled labor, but the government will need to take a more active role because the absence of finance is critical. Private financial institutions don't do a very good job. In the United States, more than 90% of mortgages are underwritten by the federal government. So the US mortgage market isn't working. How do you expect a developing country mortgage market to work? So the answer is, there has to be a role for government, and I could describe how to do that, but the point is, it will need to take an important role, and there are huge amounts of market failures in this area, including zoning, mortgage finance, and so forth. Well, let me skip on. I've been told I have two more minutes and make just three more points. The first is the importance of industrial policies and what I call learning industrial and technology policies, explicitly focusing on the role of learning. And here I just make a couple of points. Every country has an industrial policy, whether they know it or not. In a way, the legal framework of a country embeds industrial policy in the United States when we gave derivatives, priority and bankruptcy over everything else, that was an industrial policy to promote derivatives. Because we didn't know it was industrial policy, Wall Street got in there when nobody was thinking about it and said US industrial policy is to promote risky financial products. Government expenditures, government has to decide the structure of the education system, structure of infrastructure, that's going to be decided by government, and how you make those decisions affects the structure of the economy. So inevitably all countries have an industrial policy. One can structure an industrial policy in ways that take care or address market failures. Reasons markets aren't working well. They don't pay enough attention to climate change, to employment, to inequality. So there are very strong reasons for industrial policies. And most importantly, if learning is the basis of a successful economy and there are important learning spillovers, they won't pay attention to that. And that has to be a center of industrial policy. As we think about that, there are some very big issues associated with comparative advantage. And here the important point is that the Hector Aline model for thinking about comparative advantage doesn't work. The Hector Aline model focused on the relative capital to labor or skill labor to unskilled labor in different countries. And the United States has a comparative advantage in capital intensive and other countries have a comparative advantage in labor intensive. What's wrong with that theory is it was a theory that was formulated before we had large massive movements of capital across borders. But if capital moves freely across borders, then capital labor ratio is not the basis of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage has to be based on things that are not mobile across borders. And so one has to think of, what is the real source of comparative advantage? And the real source of comparative advantage are the skills, health, and discipline of the workforce, embedded knowledge, institutions, and norms. What I sometimes refer to as institutional infrastructure, the physical infrastructure, the reputation, the branding, all of these affect the ability to attract and retain talent and to ability to attract and retain capital. It's hard, but I think essential to change these in constructive ways and enhancing these should be central to development strategy. So the final point before summarizing that I wanna make is, how can developed countries help? And there are multiple instruments, fairer, pro-development, global trade regime. Many of you may remember in 2001, the international community decided to have a development round of international trade talks. And in December, 2015, they said, United States and the advanced countries said, oh, that's too difficult helping developing countries. And a very big disappointment to say that you can't have a pro-development trade regime that they were unwilling to think about that issue. You need a pro-development IPR regime, investment agreements, those have become a major impediment to development. Yesterday in the discussion, there was a, Stephanie emphasized the role of the investment agreements in impairing the implementation of modern views about capital controls. You need pro-development and more stable financial markets and regulation. You need to stymie the flow of corrupt money, shutting down secrecy havens, including in London and Delaware, Nevada. So it's not just offshore. A lot of this is very onshore and having fair multinational regime, tax regimes. But the thing I mentioned yesterday, and I'll just summarize it, is that there is another mechanism, which is a global reserve system to replace the current dollar-based reserve system. That would be more equitable, more stable, would increase global aggregate demand of greater global growth. But the annual emissions of these global reserve systems, in other words, every year, some $300, $400 billion is buried in the ground effectively in reserves. If you compensated that by creating new reserves, giving that to the developing countries, that would be $300, $400 billion that could be spent for development that would help compensate for the loss of this important old technology called export manufacturing led growth. So let me just conclude very quickly. Success and development over the past 60 years was greater than anyone anticipated. There is an enormous gap in knowledge as well as in resources that has to be closed. Most of the advanced countries are engaged in the service sector. So if there are disparities in standards of living, it relates to productivity in these service sectors. So we have to learn how to close that gap. The basis of success of growth over the past half century was export led growth. What we've tried to do here is deconstruct what enabled manufacturing to provide this growth spurt, this structural transformation. It won't be able to do so in the future, at least to anything like that extent. And there has to be another strategy that performs some of the essential roles that manufacturing export led development did. And what I've tried to do is provide that. It will need to be an explicitly more multi-pronged approach addressing separately each of the challenges that manufacturing sector export led growth addressed. And they'll have to do with simultaneously. And I tried to show or hint at how a coordinated agriculture manufacturing mining service sector strategy has the prospect of attaining the same success of the old manufacturing export led strategy. But if we're going to have the success, government will have to play an important role. In short, what is needed is maybe an old idea but something called a comprehensive development strategy leading to inclusive growth with inclusive participation in the process of development, including a better balance between markets, government and society. And based on these new understandings of what leads to successful in economic and societal transformation and creating new dynamic comparative advantages. I think it's an enormous challenge for the development community, but I think it is important for us to realize that we will have to come up with these new strategies. And I hope my talk has laid out a broad framework about how best one can go about doing that. Thank you.