 The association of war and the growth of the central government is a commonplace. Randolph-Born's observation that war is the health of the state has become a cliché. Still, as a cause of the development of big government in the United States, war seldom receives its due. Scholars and laymen alike more often trace the origins of our Leviathan to the New Deal. On this score, they attribute too much influence to the New Dealers as such. Franklin D. Roosevelt and friends never would or could have done what they did in the 1930s without the state-building precedents of World War I, which in many important cases they reinstituted with little more than a change of name. But if World War I gets insufficient notice from students of the growth of government, World War II gets even less. Too often, it is viewed as a discrete event, an occasion when government took on awesome dimensions, but then relinquished the new powers after victory had been won, more or less returning the relations between government and civil society to the pre-war status quo. Nothing of the sort happened or could have happened. A political-economic undertaking of such enormous magnitude does not just come and go, leaving no trace. In fact, the big one left a multitude of important, enduring legacies. How the government organized the economy for war determined more than anything else how the central government would grow in the United States in the 20th century, and conscription, more than anything else, determined how the central government would organize the economy for war. In a multitude of ways, the military draft shaped not only the contours of the nation at war, but the course of its political-economic development throughout the past 80 years. Even by those who have studied it, the draft has yet to receive its full due. Like other wartime institutions, it has too often been viewed as transitory, as necessary during the periods of its imposition and as giving rise to no enduring effects. I shall argue otherwise. Early in the 20th century, the federal government remained by modern standards quite limited. But with U.S. entry into the Great War, the government expanded enormously in size, scope, and power. It virtually nationalized the ocean shipping industry. It did nationalize the railroad, telephone, domestic telegraph, and international telegraphic cable industries. It became deeply engaged in manipulating labor management relations, security sales, agricultural marketing, the distribution of coal and oil, international commerce, and the markets for raw materials and manufactured products. Its bond drives dominated the financial markets. It turned the newly created Federal Reserve System into a powerful engine of monetary inflation to help satisfy the government's voracious appetite for money and credit. All in all, contemporaries who described the government's creation as war socialism were well justified. During 1917 and 1918, the government built up the armed forces to a strength of about 4 million officers and men, drawn from a pre-war labor force of about 40 million persons. Of those added to the armed forces after the U.S. declaration of war, more than 2.8 million, or about 72 percent, were drafted. By employing the draft, the government got more men into the army and got them quicker than it could have by recruiting volunteers. Moreover, it got the men's services at far less expense to the Treasury. As the Army leadership had recommended, and President Wilson had accepted, even before the declaration of war, the government obtained its servicemen by following the Prussian model. Men alone, however, did not make an army. They required barracks and training facilities, transportation, food, clothing, health care. They had to be equipped with modern arms and great stocks of ammunition. In short, to be an effective fighting force, a large soldiery required immense amounts of complementary resources. As the buildup began, the requisite resources remained in the possession of private citizens. Although manpower could be obtained by conscription, public opinion would not tolerate the outright confiscation of all the property required to turn the men into a well-equipped fighting force. Still, ordinary market mechanisms threatened to operate too slowly and at too great an expense to facilitate the government's plans. The Wilson administration therefore resorted to the vast array of interventions I have mentioned. All may be seen as devices to hasten the delivery and diminish the fiscal burden of acquiring the resources needed to equip the huge conscript army for effective service in France. Notwithstanding these efforts to keep the Treasury's expenses down, enormous increases in taxes still had to be collected. Federal revenues increased by nearly 400 percent between fiscal 1917 and fiscal 1919, and even greater amounts had to be borrowed. The national debt swelled from just over $1 billion in 1916 to more than $25 billion in 1919. To ensure that the conscription-based mobilization could proceed without impediment, critics had to be silenced. The Espionage Act penalized those convicted of willfully obstructing the enlistment services with fines as much as $10,000 and imprisonment as long as 20 years. An amendment to the Notorious Sedition Act went even further, imposing the same harsh criminal penalties on all forms of expression in any way critical of the government, its symbols, or its recruitment of resources for the war. These suppressions of free speech subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court established dangerous precedents that derogated from the protections previously enjoyed by citizens under the First Amendment. The government further subverted the Bill of Rights by censoring all printed materials, preemptorily deporting hundreds of aliens without due process of law, and conducting and encouraging state and local governments and vigilante groups to conduct, warrantless searches and seizures, blanket arrests of suspected draft evaders, and other outrages too numerous to mention. In California, the police arrested Upton Sinclair for reading the Bill of Rights at a rally. In New Jersey, the police arrested Roger Baldwin for publicly reading the Constitution. The government also employed a massive propaganda machine to whip up what can only be described as public hysteria. The result was countless incidents of insult, abuse, and even lynching of persons suspected of disloyalty or insufficient enthusiasm for the war. Persons of German ancestry suffered especially heavily. The connection of the draft with these official subversions of the Constitution was hardly coincidental. It was direct, intentional, and publicly acknowledged. Consider the statement of a contemporary legal authority, Professor John Henry Wigmore, quote, where a nation has definitely committed itself to a foreign war, all principles of normal internal order may be suspended, as property may be taken and corporal service may be conscripted, so liberty of speech may be limited or suppressed, so far as deemed needful for the successful conduct of the war. All rights of the individual and all internal civic interests become subordinated to the national right in the struggle for national life, end quote. The formula applied again and again was quite simple. If it is acceptable to draft men, then it is acceptable to do X, where X is any government violation of individual rights whatsoever. Once the draft had been adopted, then, in the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, all bets are off. When the war ended, the government abandoned most, but not all, of its wartime control measures. The draft itself ended when the armistice took effect on November 11, 1918. By the end of 1920, most of the regulatory apparatus had been scrapped, including the Food Administration, Fuel Administration, Railroad Administration, War Industries Board, and the War Labor Board. Some emergency powers migrated into regular government departments, such as state, labor, and treasury, and continued in force. The Espionage Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act remained on the statute books. And of course, the dominant interpretation of the war, including the belief that federal economic controls had been instrumental in achieving the victory, persisted, especially among the elites who had played leading roles in the wartime economic management. Economic czar Bernard Baruch did much to foster the post-war dissemination of this interpretation by historians, journalists, and other shapers of public opinion. In the depths of the Great Depression, the federal government employed the wartime measures as models for dealing with what Franklin Roosevelt called a crisis in our national life comparable to war. Hence, the War Finance Corporation came back to life as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the War Industries Board as the National Recovery Administration, the Food Administration as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Capital Issues Committee as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fuel Administration as the Connolly Act apparatus for cartilizing the oil industry, and the Guffey Act apparatus for cartilizing the bituminous coal industry. The military mobilization of young men returned as the quasi-military Civilian Conservation Corps, and the Muscle Shoals Hydroelectric Munitions Facility became the Tennessee Valley Authority. The wartime U.S. Housing Corporation reappeared first as part of the Public Works Administration in 1933 and then as the U.S. Housing Authority in 1937. Along with the revived agencies came many of the wartime planners, including Baruch, George Peake, Hugh Johnson, John Dickinson, and Felix Frankfurter, not to mention FDR himself as advisors or administrators. The temporary wartime abandonment of the gold standard became a permanent abandonment in 1933-34 when the government nationalized the monetary gold stock and abrogated all contractual obligations both public and private to pay gold. Obviously, the wartime precedents were crucial in guiding the new dealers and helping them to justify and gain acceptance of their policies. Notwithstanding the growth of government during the new deal, the federal government during World War II achieved vastly greater dimensions. In many respects, it's greatest size, scope, and power ever, before or since. Again, conscription served as a springboard for the growth of the state. This time, the political pressure to adopt the draft mounted long before the United States entered the war. In mid-1940, the armed forces had only 458,000 officers and men on active duty. After the great German advances and the defeat of France in the spring of 1940, proponents of a new draft, including Grenville Clark, Henry Stimson, and others who had led the charge for conscription before and during World War I, gained greater support. But opponents fought hard and a national debate raged furiously through the summer of 1940. Finally, in September, Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act, which authorized the conscription of 900,000 men. The law was extended and amended in the fall of 1941, and again several times after the U.S. declaration of war. Eventually, the draftees numbered more than 10 million men, or about 63% of all those who served in the armed forces at some time during the war. Obviously, many of those who volunteered for service did so to escape the draft and the consequent likelihood of assignment to the infantry. As before, a huge, conscript-based armed force required enormous amounts of complementary resources to make possible its housing, subsistence, clothing, medical care, training, and transportation, not to mention the equipment, arms, ammunition, and expensive weapons platforms that now included tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft, and naval aircraft carriers. Compared with the previous war, World War II was some 10 times more expensive. Many new taxes were levy. Income taxes were raised repeatedly, until the individual income tax rates extended from a low of 23% to a high of 94%. The income tax previously a class tax became a mass tax, as the number of returns filed grew from 15 million in 1940 to 50 million in 1945. Even though annual federal revenues soared from 7 billion to 50 billion between 1940 and 1945, most war expenses still had to be covered by borrowing. The national debt held by the public went up by $200 billion or more than five-fold. The Federal Reserve system itself bought some $20 billion of government debt, thereby serving as a de facto printing press for the Treasury, increasing the narrowly defined money stock by 183% and cutting the value of money nearly in half between 1940 and 1948. Had the government relied exclusively on fiscal and market mechanisms to marshal the required resources, the expense of the war would have been far greater, probably much greater than the government could possibly finance. Accordingly, the government resorted to a vast system of controls and market interventions to gain possession of the desired resources without having to bid them away from other demanders in open markets. Although relatively few resources were simply confiscated or requisitioned, the effect was similar. By setting prices, directly allocating physical and human resources, establishing official priorities, prohibitions, and set-asides, then rationing the civilian consumer goods in short supply, the war planners steered raw materials, intermediate goods, and finished products into the uses to which they attached greatest importance. Markets no longer functioned freely. In many areas, they did not function at all. The economic system was transformed from one in which the market allocated resources with some peripheral government distortions to one in which the central government allocated resources with market, including black market, influences operating only at the fringes of the command economy. As before, the draft played a key role in justifying the government's imposition of a command economy. The same formula applied. If the draft is acceptable, then X is acceptable. X being any form of government coercion whatsoever. As the eminent economist Wesley Mitchell put it in 1943, quote, after common consent has been given to conscription, civilians are morally bound to accept the lesser sacrifices war imposes on them, end quote. Even the Supreme Court adopted the argument as Justice Hugo Black advanced in a 1942 decision, quote, Congress can draft men for battle service. Its power to draft business organizations to support the fighting men who risk their lives can be no less, end quote. World War II became the occasion for massive denials of human rights in the United States, apart from the involuntary servitude of the military draft. Most egregiously, about 112,000 innocent persons of Japanese ancestry, most of them US citizens, were uprooted from their homes and confined in concentration camps without due process of law. Those subsequently released as civilians during the war remained under parole-like surveillance. Also, the government imprisoned some 6,000 conscientious objectors who would not comply with the service requirements of the draft laws. Scores of newspapers were denied the privilege of the males under authority of the Espionage Act still in effect from World War I. Some newspapers were banned altogether. The Office of Censorship placed restrictions on the content of press reports and radio broadcasts and censored personal mail entering or leaving the country. The Office of War Information put the government's spin on whatever it deigned to tell the public, and military authorities censored news from the battlefields, sometimes for merely political reasons. The government seized some 50 industrial facilities, most of them, in order to impose employment conditions favorable to labor unions engaged in disputes with the management. One indication of the enlarged federal potential for repression was the increase in the number of FBI special agents from 785 in 1939 to 4,370 in 1945. At the end of the war, most of the economic control agencies were shut down, most, but not all. Some powers persisted, either lodged at the local level, like New York City's rent controls, or shifted from emergency agencies to regular departments, like international trade controls moved from the Foreign Economic Administration to the State Department. The military industrial complex, which had grown to gargantuan size during the war, shrank but survived, lobbying hard for new procurements to restore the bureaucratic clout and financial health of its constituents. Federal tax revenues remained very high by pre-war standards. In the late 1940s, the IRS's annual take averaged about four times greater in constant dollars than in the late 1930s. In 1949, federal outlays amounted to about 15% of gross national product. Before the war, they had been about 10%. The national debt stood at what would have been an unthinkable figure before the war, $214 billion, and destined never to be any smaller. The prevailing interpretation of the wartime experience gave unprecedented ideological support to those who desired a big federal government actively engaged in a wide range of domestic and international tasks. After all, the wartime central planners had carried out successfully a complex undertaking of enormous dimensions. They had waged a global war, marshaling, organizing, and allocating the requisite resources to defeat two mighty adversaries while leaving American consumers relatively well off, at least by comparison with the suffering civilians of the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany. Surely, this great accomplishment had occurred because of the planner's knowledge, abilities, and devotion to the public interest. Surely, a central government capable of winning the greatest war in human history could accomplish such relatively simple tasks as stabilizing the business cycle, guaranteeing all citizens a good job and a high standard of living, and regulating the industrial life of the nation to achieve greater fairness than the unfettered market. Surely. In this spirit, Congress enacted in 1946 the Employment Act, pledging the federal government to play an ongoing role as macroeconomic savior of the US economy. Let me now try to pull together the threads of my argument. Within three decades, from the outbreak of World War I in Europe to the end of World War II, the American people endured three great national emergencies, during each of which the federal government imposed unprecedented taxation and economic controls on the population. By the late 1940s, these government actions no longer startled the citizenry. Indeed, many Americans had come to regard them as desirable. Even businessmen, many of whom had continued to resist the encroachments of the New Deal bureaucrats throughout the 1930s, now looked upon the American leviathan with an approving eye. The wartime experience, said Calvin Hoover, had, quote, conditioned them to accept a degree of governmental intervention and control after the war, which they had deeply resented prior to it, end quote. As Herbert Stein recognized, American businessmen tend to regard the regulations they are used to as being freedom. Rather than resisting the government's impositions or working to overthrow them, they look for ways to adapt to them. They try to position themselves so that the government policies will give them a tax advantage, channel a subsidy their way, or hobble their competitors. If even the business class, with its immense resources and political clout, would not work seriously toward the overthrow of the leviathan that had come into being by the late 1940s, there was scant chance that any other powerful interest group would do so. Successful reaction had scant likelihood in any event, because the post-World War II ideological climate bathed an active federal government in public faith and approbation. As Ben Page and Robert Shapiro have documented in their massive survey of public opinion, World War II stands as the most pervasive single influence on public opinion since the mid-1930s. Among other things, it transformed American public opinion concerning virtually all aspects of foreign affairs, opening the way for the imperial presidency and the use of U.S. forces as world policemen. Opponents of global interventionism were smeared as isolationists and appeasers, and thereby completely discredited. In 1953, Senator Robert Taft died, and his followers soon abandoned their old beliefs and political commitments. Domestically, the people's devotion to the welfare state solidified. No amount of contradictory evidence seemed to dent the prevailing faith and the government's ability to create personal and social security and remedy the full range of human problems and pathologies. Nor did the Constitution serve any longer as a bulwark of individual rights. After World War II, as Edward Corwin observed, for the first time in American history after a war, the country did not revert to a peacetime constitution. Instead, the Supreme Court's wartime surrender to the president combined with the cart launch it had granted to federal economic regulation in the late 1930s to enhance federal power in many dimensions. Under these conditions, the only remaining barriers to the relentless growth of the central government arose from partisan and interest group opposition. Time would reveal that these barriers, ever shifting with the winds of partisan politics and immediate interest group objectives, could do no more than slow the onrushing Leviathan. It is not possible, said William Graham Sumner, to experiment with a society and just drop the experiment whenever we choose. The experiment enters into the life of the society and never can be got out again. World War I, the New Deal, and World War II provided the occasions for the greatest experiments in collectivization America had ever experienced. These experiments radically transformed the political economy institutionally and ideologically. The political economy of 1948 bore scarcely any resemblance to that of 1912, and the changes gave every indication of being irreversible. In the process by which this radical transformation occurred, the military draft played a central part. Conscription made possible the creation of a huge armed force, which in turn required massive amounts of complementary resources. To get these resources, the government had to raise taxes enormously and impose a great variety of controls on the market economy. That is, it had to violate traditional limitations on government action and override economic liberties. In light of the apparent success of the policies employed during World War I, the temptation to impose similar policies during the Great Depression proved irresistible. In large part, the New Deal consisted of quasi-war policies to deal with a pseudo-war emergency. Participation in World War II, with its global scale and voracious demand for resources, increased every aspect of the process by an order of magnitude. The draft permitted the creation of a huge army, which gave rise to vast military resource requirements that could be met only by imposition of a command and control system throughout the economy. By the late 1940s, the three great experiments had entered into the life of the society. With all the fundamental barriers to the growth of government having been battered down during war and pseudo-war emergencies, nothing substantial remained to impede their relentless growth of government.