 He told Hubert to clear very carefully what he said in New York with you. He did. Well, I see he's got a good deal of negotiation in it. No, I don't think so. That's not the way I read it. But what text are you working from? I'm just reading the reports on it in one of the papers. It certainly wasn't supposed to be, Mr. President. I don't want anybody while I'm present to talking about it Yeah, we have some indication that some of them might be willing to. That's the first essential of the negotiation. His remarks, obviously, have been cleared in advance with President Johnson. Thus, it signals an American diplomatic offensive. I'm reading from Baltimore Central in a new direction in which the Kremlin has expressed advance agreement in general terms. Wait a minute. He indicated the United States would be very glad to leave the defense of South Vietnam in similar areas to the United Nations. Peacekeeping force, if such a force equal to a job. His wide-ranging speech was prepared for the conference and so forth. The intention of the government to pursue every reasonable avenue toward agreement and limiting no agreement, made clear you had no thing to do with it. Let the explode with the exploded Chinese device. He restated the American commitment to South Vietnam almost to President's word and sandwiched this restatement between points in his discussion of the United Nations peacekeeping machinery. This machinery should be ready to head off conflicts of reconciliation and end extremism by placing whatever kind of peacekeeping forces needed in a position between antagonists so that no sovereign is without potential and an actual protection. No nation may call upon other nations to help protect them. Today he acknowledged we recognize this is not possible. He complimented the United Nations that would have missed the maintained peacekeeping forces and pledged to continue the American support. No desire we should honor our commitment but the space do occur and if hostiles are to be handed the peace must be preserved. There must be some outside force available. There is one sentence there he didn't clear with me. Any cases though, not at all. I would just as soon as stay out of the peacekeeping and negotiating field at this ticklish point so let's just watch him very carefully. I told him that I said you're really the last man to get into the atomic field because he's pretty, he's regarded as pretty level in there. If I were you I'd try to stay on some of these subjects that you're dealing with and not get into negotiating. I just really, I feel very deeply that we, God I want to negotiate more with any man in the world. I'll guarantee you that. But I don't think negotiation, my want to negotiate is necessarily the best way to win the girl. So let's be awfully careful with everybody on them and I'm going to tell them to clear things with you and Bill on these various programs that they're speaking on. I think Humphrey in fact stayed within the lines of policy but your point is that when he says that it's doubly sensitive and I think that's absolutely right. There's one sentence there that I didn't get a quack at that I would not have put in but it's not on negotiation. We've talked about American troops in explosive local disputes. That connects it up to wrong way. It's not just a local dispute. Well, let's watch the negotiation thing pretty generally by all up. Better tell Bill that he's allowed to give out an interview with somebody and let's see that we all write it this time. Did you hear our discussion on negotiation yesterday? With Ike? No, I didn't. I only said that for a year and a half we had been negotiating out there on Korea. He said that now this is from his viewpoint and we don't think this. I just want to give you though the discussion which I thought was... He said when he came in they came running to him and wanted to continue the negotiations and he said, well, that's fine. I'd like to settle it. I said I was going to Korea. I want to do anything I can for him. So he said he got a hold of India. I don't know how he got a hold of him. He didn't say but he said he told Nehru that he was a peace-loving man. He knew he was. The only way he saw that he could bring peace to the world and stop this fighting and slaughtering and it already cost us $138,000 cash. It was to eliminate any sanctuary and he wanted him to know that there's not going to be anything that was off-bounds, off-limits. That everything there was going to be war. If there's going to be war, there's going to be war. When he was sent to Europe he had only one sentence of instruction destroy the German nation. He said he never got any other instruction. They left it up to him and they talked about plans but that was the extent of his instruction. He said centralization is the product of fear and we centralized too much here. He said we ought to tell these guys he's kind of like go-water-gong when the war. I'm just pointing that out. But he says I want you to know that I'm instructing our commanders that nothing is off-limits. There are no more sanctuaries. Second, we've been making all kinds of instruments for good many years, implements of war. So there's no use of making them if you don't use them. There's no better time to use them than when you've lost 138,000 men. And I want you to know that there's not going to be any more restrictions. And the restrictions of Mr. Truman and Mr. Atchison have gone on. The use of weapons is hereby removed. And the sanctuaries are hereby included. He said I figured it would take about a week for Christian men in to get that straight to them. And he said in about three days a re without my knowledge or consent pulled a rug out from under men released 25,000 prisoners. And so I thought that meant everything was gone. But said they were so anxious to avoid what could have been that I had not decided it would have been but could have been. But they came right in and said right here, right quick. Now he said you must not say so because that sounds like you're rattling. But you must not get in to the word negotiation or mention it. And I just could not agree with you more he said because there are two elements that are requisite to a successful negotiation with a communist in my judgment said I know some of your people won't agree with. But the first is they must be willing to negotiate. So there's no reason in the world why they should want to negotiate in South Vietnam. They've got it one, they're going to take it over. They're sitting on top of the world. They've got you on the run. They've got your own people telling you to and everything else. And so there's no real reason until you heat things up for them a little bit. And you've got to get them in the room and negotiate to do it. That's the first reason he said the second you must have something that's self enforcing. Said I don't know what you can do in the self enforcing agreement. But said if you look at the agreements that they've made since even World War II you'll find very few that they've kept. He said they don't feel that they have an obligation to keep an agreement. They don't look upon it as we do. So try to find something that's self enforcing. I thought both of them were worthy of our attention and that anyway a man likes to hear what he said himself. And I feel that way right now because I don't believe that I don't believe that Goldwater has much position to negotiate with me. I don't think I really have to listen to him much. I think I'd be courteous but I don't think I would to make many concessions to what he had to do. I think he's got a few men on the hill that I might spend 15, 20 minutes with him. And I think they look upon us about the same way. I may be wrong, but that's what I feel. There's a dispatch in Hanoi this morning from the Canadian on the North Vietnamese point of view. They're making the condition that they'll negotiate after we withdraw from the South. This inflexibility characterizes present position of regime, illustrates measure of its confidence, considers it holds all Trump cards, world opinion, sympathetic effectiveness of U.S. retaliation limited, steadily crumbling, prospect of private deal between Hanoi and Saigon is growing. They think they're winning. Now this is partly for show, but it's partly real. Now, I think you all set up today, I think we're really not doing our homework. We all set up today some way for us for you to try to sit down with McGovern, who's supposed to be an administration man, but somebody else sit down with McGovern who's taking his cues from church. Neither one of them really fought in many wars and neither one of them are really outstanding experts in this field, but they ought to be told the other side so they can know that the thing that hurts us most is not the hit-and-run compound that's going up our hotels, these goddamn speeches. It's a calmness blow-up that shows that we're about to pull out that's brightens these people into changing governments all the time, and that they just got to quit frightening them and they can think what they want to and say what they want to, but when they do, you want them to know that they're injuring a hell of a lot of people. Somebody ought to tell them that quietly and carefully and I would just have them both. We're supposed to have a meeting with Huber to talk with them as soon as he gets back and I'll get out. Well, Huber just talks and keeps the ball in the air and jumps around. You have to set a specific meeting and I'd ask them to your office at 2.15 or some specific time and I'd have an agenda and I'd have my points written out just like I did at the Security Council and I'd say now we do not want to express any criticism. We're not here to lecture. We do want to make available to you in great confidence the other side of this picture. I had just returned and the President's judgment and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and mine the most, one of the biggest problems we have is to build in government. We've had nine of them and the thing that causes them to just pee in their pants is to read a speech by Morris saying we want to pull out. We ought to run out or a man's deal. Are you? And then get into it that way and let them know that there's no greater disservice they can render. Then if they want to do it then they own their own. They can be a Bora that says that he knows more about it than Secretary of State and that he has better information and just quote that term. Just say now, Bora said he had better information than the President of the Secretary of State. Maybe y'all got better sources but these are our sources and the President wants you to be trusted with him because he sees no reason why you he wants to pee more than you do. He wants to negotiate more than you do. He's the pool bastard that stays awake every night on these things. He's the guy that sends these men to die but he doesn't know how he can negotiate with a fella that doesn't want to negotiate and he doesn't think he'd go out to Phoenix and negotiate much with Mr. Goldwater and he doesn't think they're going to want to come much to negotiate with us because they're in his position. They've been the victor and they've been winning and they've got nine government. So far. We'll do it. In that few but attend your meeting he can do it. He's furnished a lot of funds and stuff but he's supposed to go see these folks and he talks to them in the hall and he gives them one line but they've got to see the cable. You've got to show them that Canadian thing right there. The news from out there is worthy. It's quiet. The actual body count in the last couple of days is favorable. A.V.C. have not done anything violent. Khan is in a great hurry to go bombing. We had to hold him off today on the bomber bridge that whole community is supposed to be dedicating tomorrow. The secretary is engaged in trying to develop a quite different way of handling the diplomatic side of this which is to report our side of the thing and our view of it to the co-chairman that we are the British and the Soviets. There's some disadvantage in going into the U.N. butant himself is recommended to Stevenson against the Security Council as the place for us to make our case because he says that'll just make the Russians act as lawyers for the defense. Well in for God's sakes please try to get Steve please try to get Steve to finish. That's right. I didn't quit going around here saying well I thought all along well I'll be negotiating. I know it Mr. President. You see my memo on Lipman. He's as far aboard as he'll come which isn't very far. I don't believe a fellow like Lipman he understands that they came across the line and progressed from the other side and inspired our compound and he would want us to say thank you. Thank you. Now he's down to thank we ought to take him home. He hates for us and he does need to I had quite a fight with him on just that point actually I don't think I put it in the memo he said you've got to remember this is not Korea these people have not come across the line and I said but they have that's just the problem that they have come across the line I'm showing the stage you can hear it showing the game they hear that he admits that that happened but he thinks that the South has no support and the government has no strength it's all the stuff that's in his column this morning which he'd already written but I don't think his broadcast will be bad do you have any sense of whether you're going to want to talk in or near this topic on Monday or haven't you made up your mind yet this is when you go to Kentucky no I haven't made up my mind I think not much more than I did yesterday I thought that would keep on very well yes I think that you see the Tribune editorial no it says you've said exactly the right amount anybody wants you to say more you should be really saying they want you to say something different it seemed at the time I don't I don't