 Good morning everybody. My name is John Hamry. I'm a president here at CSA. It's great to have all of you here. And let me just say a very warm welcome to John Hutton. We're delighted to have him here. It's hard to think of a time where problems have been more fertile and we're now having to confront them. Fortunately, we confront them with an ally and a friend and I mean that not just about the United Kingdom. I mean that about John Hutton. He is a very good friend of the United States. That doesn't mean he agrees with us all the time. He's had his very spirited way of telling us when we're wrong and we need that too. But overwhelmingly you know he comes to this exchange between our countries with just a very profound respect and affection for the colonies. So we'd like to thank you for that, John. This is a time of just a remarkable, remarkable set of issues in front of us. Obviously we have a future that we're going to be crafting together about the way ahead in Afghanistan. We've got a NATO 60th anniversary summit that's coming up where we're going to spend a lot of time celebrating what the past was about. But the question is what the hell is the future? We've got to figure that out. And both of us are wrestling with economies that are struggling at a time when we have very pressing defense needs. So this is a time of really quite significant importance for both of us. And we're lucky to have a man of this talent and caliber who is leading the defense establishment in the UK and to help us think through these things together. I'm not going to dwell on John's resume. You can all look at that. It's just to say that he comes to this with a deep seasoning of political and substantive experience in senior levels in the United Kingdom, in the government. And at a time when more than ever in our country, his country, we're needing to find ways to connect the public to the larger defense issues of the day. It's easy for that to get lost. This is why we want politicians to be running our government. Because they know how to connect it. If we were to leave it to bureaucrats like me, we wouldn't make that connection. So it's great, great honor that we have him here today. We've had a great opportunity this morning to have a lively discussion. And I look forward to hearing him now and sharing all of that with you. So ladies and gentlemen, without further delay, I introduced you to the right honorable John Hutton. Secretary, thank you. John, John, thank you very, very much indeed for that very generous and warm introduction Can I start by saying what a very great honor it is and a privilege for me to be here this morning to talk to you all about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. For all of my lifetime, NATO has provided, I think, an absolutely essential shield behind which the freedoms that we all enjoy today could be nurtured and, on occasions, defended. NATO itself was born out of the service and the sacrifice of previous generations, men and women who were prepared to pay the ultimate price to secure the defeat of tyranny and dictatorship. When they needed to, all stood up for freedom and democracy, the values of tolerance, respect for others, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to life itself. NATO was our bulwark. Without it, the freedoms my father and millions of others like him on both sides of the Atlantic fought so hard to defend would have perished from the face of the earth. Throughout its existence, we can say without doubt or hesitation that NATO has been a force for good in the world. The events of the last 20 years in Europe and the end of the Cold War in particular have, as we all know, changed many of the old parameters that have defined our concepts of security. My generation that had it so easy, who benefited so much from the efforts of those who defeated fascism and faced down the threat of communism, today we face a new set of challenges. NATO today must justify itself again to a new generation who have known nothing but peace and a united Europe, but who do recognize, I believe, that our values and freedoms are once again under attack and who want to understand how we can best defend ourselves today from these new threats. Threats at this time do not come exclusively from enemies in hostile countries that challenge our borders, but instead often originate in hostile ideology that now today respects no frontiers and harbors no moral compulsion. A generation that is alive to the danger posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and wants to know how these threats can best be overcome. A generation that wants to make sure that the freedoms we have inherited, that we, I think, at times take for granted, can once again be passed on to those who will come after us. And as we celebrate all of NATO's many triumphs over the last 60 years, I think we must once again make the case for our alliance and the North Atlantic bonds that have kept us so closely together through thick and thin ever since the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949. And one other thing is clear to me when I talk to my own children about these very same issues. The Cold War is as remote to them as the Munich crisis was to my generation. Of course we should never forget the debt Europe owes to the Atlantic Alliance and to the United States in particular for basing a quarter of a million troops on our continent and offering us a nuclear guarantee that at the end of the day was prepared to sacrifice Philadelphia for Paris or Brooklyn for Berlin. Yet NATO's claim to relevance today, and I believe it to be a strong and convincing one, must have its origins not in how we dealt with the Cold War, but in how we adapt and must continue to adapt to the realities of the new threats that we face. NATO adapted first by reaching out and stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe, nourishing a new movement for freedom and democracy, and by beginning the process of engagement and enlargement that has helped mold today's Europe. It is a chapter of NATO's history that it can be rightly proud of, equal I think to many of its great achievements. NATO adapted by using its unique military capabilities as a tool, an essential tool for ending the bloody crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo, and bringing peace to the Balkans, something again that NATO's many critics said it couldn't do. We showed the opposite was in fact the case, that when the right type and amount of force combined with the willingness to deploy it, and clear political resolve when they come together, it is possible to achieve our common security goals. And perhaps most significantly in 2001, NATO came to America's aid on the day after 9-11. Today its missions extend far beyond our own borders, fighting extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan, training security forces in Iraq, and helping the EU and coalition forces counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia. All of these tasks that we are doing today would have been inconceivable 20 years ago. They have required political vision and courage to take on strategic patients, to see them through. And they've taken some Europeans and some Americans even, to parts of the world their forefathers had never been. And they've changed fundamentally and forever, I think, the nature of the North Atlantic Alliance. But as we all know, past achievements are no guarantees of future success. It was right that NATO went out of area rather than out of business. But today it needs a new and more radical transformation still. An ability to anticipate and respond to new threats. An agility to mould its organisation to the times in which we live. NATO has to change because the challenges it faces are changing. Insurgency in Afghanistan or a cyberattack on Eastern Europe require very different responses than an attack from a tank army or a pack of nuclear submarines. Implementing a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan demands cooperation with other institutions from the United Nations to the European Union to the World Bank in a way that Cold War warriors could only marvel at. Building and maintaining consensus on discretionary non-Article 5 operations and ambiguous threats requires diplomatic skills and consultative processes profoundly different from the old certainties of the Cold War. I've been following the debate here led by Secretary Gates about the changing nature of modern warfare and I've admired the ability of the United States military to put new theory rapidly into practice on the ground. This debate is enormously important. I think it must become a transatlantic one that informs, guides and directs NATO's new strategic concept because this perhaps is the greatest challenge for the armed forces not just of the United States but for every member of the Alliance. I know that we all have a long distance to travel on the journey to ensuring that the balance of our own armed forces reflects modern needs. That is why I was pleased to agree with Secretary Gates yesterday that the UK and the US would undertake a joint piece of work to understand the lessons from Afghanistan, what it tells us about the characteristics of future conflict and what it means for our bilateral defence cooperation in the future. Reorientating organisations as large and as complex as the military, their doctrine, acquisition programmes, intelligence and civilian capacity will take a huge amount of focus, leadership and persistence. Now I believe this is the work that must be deepened, accelerated and integrated as a matter of priority into NATO's command and operational structures. But I have a sense too that NATO sometimes does work better in practice than it does in theory. But that is only because we usually rely or have to rely on ad hoc solutions. To deal effectively with the next 20 years problems NATO needs to get the theory as well as the practice right to build consensus for the 21st century in a way that can reflect, in a way that did reflect the 20th century consensus of the Cold War. In the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s building and maintaining that consensus was a two way street. Neither America nor Europe had a monopoly of wisdom and so it should be today. For example it is right that we listen to and respect the views of our allies who live on NATO's geographic periphery. They are also on the periphery of potential instability. Those of us insulated by geography and size from such risks and threats have too often been guilty of paying only lip service to our allies article 5 concerns. We should also listen to our allies who have been living and breathing the comprehensive approach in the front line in Afghanistan and recognize that building civil effect vital though it is, is not in fact always the easy option. Previous strategic concepts have tended to provide a retrospective, almost theological underpinning for a challenge that in fact often has already been met and mastered. The 2010 concept does not need to reopen issues where consensus exists. Let's bank them and move on. It should however provide a blueprint for further continuous evolution so that we can tackle future challenges as well as threats. And here I believe there are four guiding principles that should steer the work that now needs to be done between NATO's 60th Anniversary Summit forward to the 2010 Summit. First NATO needs to be clear about what it's for and in doing so we must stop thinking in terms of the lowest common denominator. It is probably true that individual NATO members have often taken a different view about risks and threats even at the height of the Cold War. But I don't think we can sensibly deal with the crises of today and prepare for the crises of tomorrow without now a common view of the fundamental risks and threats that we face. And that doesn't mean either raw choices. In my view, NATO does not need to choose between article 5, between counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and cyber warfare, for example. Its priorities can and should be article 5 and Afghanistan and cyber warfare. But it should be able to agree a robust analysis of the dangers in all of these areas and what practical action it's going to take to deal with them. Now these are not simply political questions of drafting or of political rhetoric. The current failure to agree on threat and risks is already having a negative impact on NATO today. The NATO Response Force, for example, designed and intended to bridge the gap between article 5, crisis response and modernisation has been hamstrung by this total lack of any consensus about its real role. As a result, NATO today lacks a rapid reaction force. And for the strongest most effective military alliance in history, that represents an extraordinary failure. Britain's recent proposal for a small alliance solidarity force dedicated to article 5 is intended to be a pragmatic way of trying to square this circle. My second guiding principle flows from the first. We should use the 60th anniversary of NATO to put institutional theology firmly behind us, an attempt to build a new cooperative relationship between all of those international institutions that have a role to play in improving global security. Now my perspective is that of a proud Atlanticist, a proud European and a very strong supporter of the United Nations. And I see no contradiction between them and care little for the dogma that suggested they were in competition with each other in the first place. That is why we have been such a strong supporter of President Sarkozy's courageous policy of bringing France fully back into the NATO family. And why the UK will go on looking to develop a role for European security and defence policy that complements the work of NATO, as we did, for example, on the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. We should all focus on delivering effect and worry less about organisational boundaries. And in Afghanistan, for example, it surely must be possible for us to mobilise the collective resources of all of the organisations that I've referred to, all with the same aim to deliver better effect. ISAF needs a much stronger UNARMA mission to bring coherence and cooperation to the delivery of civil programmes and good governance. The European Union must be able to work with and talk to NATO on the ground when our people are under fire, whatever the politics prevailing in Brussels. We can't allow these theological niceties to undermine our ability to tackle the insurgency in Afghanistan. Disputes about insurgency links with narcotics funding or caveats that restrict our ability to give proper training to the Afghan police, for example, are cases of how organisational boundaries are having today a practical negative impact on operational effectiveness. And beyond Afghanistan, we must use every institutional tool at our disposal, working together to the maximum extent possible in the cause of the common good. Now, Somali piracy is not the greatest threat facing us today, but it obviously needs to be dealt with. And if we were starting from scratch without institutional or even national baggage, I think it would be pretty easy to create a single operational model into which all of our naval forces could fit. But politically, of course, this is not where we are. Nevertheless, by building on the welcome flexibility of all of those nations concerned, we are in fact today putting together a structure which may not be perfect in shape and form, but is one that works nonetheless. As a result, coalition forces together with the UN, EU, NATO and countries from Russia and China to India and Malaysia have been able to play a part in securing these vital trade lanes. I think this points to a mindset that abandons of fascination with organisational boundaries and is obsessed about how they can best be patrolled for what works in order to generate the best outcomes. The strategic concept is also a timely vehicle for this change of mindset, but it can't be used as an excuse to put off until tomorrow what we know can and should be done today. My third guiding principle is that NATO must accelerate its practical transformation. And this too today has an obvious economic dimension. In the depths of a recession that is already affecting the ability of some member states to take on these new challenges, who amongst us can afford unnecessary headquarters or unusable non-deployable military forces? Who amongst us can justify the over 300 NATO committees or the people who are necessary to staff and attend them? Who can argue against giving the Secretary General of NATO the ability to run the Alliance efficiently and effectively? I don't think NATO can afford to indulge in the luxury, for example, of informal defence ministers meetings that achieve nothing but contribute to organisational lethargy. When we meet, it should be for a purpose, and that is to make decisions. Our troops on the ground, I think, have an absolute right to expect nothing less from us. We need to build an Alliance for Change within NATO. Your new administration here in the United States, I think, has the leverage and the vision to do this. There is an appetite out there for greater efficiency, greater effectiveness and real change. Many European nations feel the same as you do. Now, I'm a fan of deadlines. This is work that should be completed at the same time as we agree the strategic concept to bring theory and practice into harmony. Now, my fourth and final guiding principle is that we absolutely must renew our collective commitment to success in Afghanistan and set out clearly to our people why this mission is an essential component of the security interests of all our Allies. As the British Defence Secretary, I am very acutely aware of the need to be clear why at any one time I am asking over 8,000 brave young men and women who wear the uniform of my country to pay the ultimate price in the service of the United Kingdom. Just last week, the 152nd member of the British Armed Forces in Afghanistan died on active service and many more still have paid the price in life-changing injuries. What each member of the British Armed Forces is doing in Afghanistan is first and foremost about safeguarding our national security and that of our Allies. That is the reason why they are there and no other reason can justify that level of enduring commitment. We cannot take the risk that Afghanistan becomes again the safe haven and the inspiration for terrorism and extremism. President Obama calls this our good war and he is absolutely right. For NATO, Afghanistan is without doubt its greatest test since the Cold War. The Alliance is in Afghanistan by consensus. Taking on the ISAF mission sent the most powerful message possible about the determination of the transatlantic community to protect its people, its interests and above all its values. Since then, some NATO governments have faced very serious political difficulties as a result, yet none has left. Where we have been less successful is in translating political commitment into a fair and effective sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities on the ground. Many of you will recognize that phrase sharing roles, risks and responsibilities. It has its origins in the Cold War. I believe it is no less relevant today in confronting this even more insidious threat. And like everyone else in this town, I am waiting eagerly for the outcome of the administration's strategy review. And I'm pretty sure it's going to be welcomed right across the NATO family. The test for NATO will be how the Alliance acts upon it. Now, does that mean in simple terms I think some Allies could do more? Yes, I do. We need more combat troops in order to improve security. But we also need to extend the operations of those who are already there. We need to do more to train the Afghan Army and police. And yes, we need to do more to inject more civil effect. Yet, you know, we are in the very fortunate position that we are able to determine our own exit strategy and that lies entirely in our own hands to do. The Afghan Army and police are that exit strategy. So the question is not whether we can succeed in building an Afghan capability that can take responsibility for their own security, but how quickly we can do it. Imagination is also key to how we deal with Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan. Treating the two countries as a single challenge is going to be politically difficult for some of our Allies. But we cannot ignore reality. Neither can we be like 11-year-old soccer players chasing the ball to every corner of the pitch, shifting from Afghanistan one day, swinging to Pakistan the next. We need to demonstrate consistent political and, yes, where necessary, military focus on both these challenges in equal measure in the coming years. We all have a common interest in helping the Pakistan government to tackle its problems, and those spreading across its borders now into Afghanistan. NATO may not be the best vehicle. Some of us have closer ties than others. But when you visit Pakistan, it is striking, for example, how many Pakistan Army officers were trained not at West Point or at Sandhurst, but in Germany and in the military academies of many of our NATO Allies. Now, that constitutes invaluable influence that I think we have so far failed to properly harness. And I want to conclude my remarks today, Stephen, on Afghanistan. NATO and its international partners and Allies, as we all know, are involved in major combat operations in that country. The lives of tens of thousands of our young men and women depend on the decisions that we take together now at this critical time. It is a war we did not choose, but it is a conflict that we must win, not just because the future of NATO depends upon it, although it does, but because the security of every NATO member and all of our ISAF Allies is inextricably linked to it. It is a war that will typify the very nature of future conflict for this generation and the next. My argument to you today is simply this. We need a new NATO to fight this war successfully, one that demonstrates more of a campaign mentality when it is engaged in combat operations as we are, one that is much more agile and decisive, one that can deliver military as well as civil effect on a sustained basis. Our 2009 can be the year that we build this new NATO. French reintegration into the military command structure. The new US administration's strong and very welcome commitment to multilateralism. The appointment of a new Secretary-General and NATO's 60th anniversary provide all of us with a unique backdrop, a unique opportunity to make this change. 60 years on from its inception, I believe a transatlantic security alliance is as vital to dealing with our common security challenges today as it was back in 1949, but the new NATO is needed to respond to new threats. Now this will not be without many significant challenges and all of the contributions of all of NATO's members to this reform and regeneration process will be welcome and important. And even though we rightly emphasize the importance of civil effect and a comprehensive approach for securing our objectives, a new NATO depends on Europe having an equal stake in that future. And this will come with a price. It must share an equal burden of the hard as well as a soft military effort. And for America, the creation of a new NATO based around a partnership of equals is not going to be without its challenges either. For the truth, I suspect, has been for much of NATO's 60 year resistance that America has liked to lead just as much as Europeans have liked to be led. And I want to finish if I may, Stephen, on a personal note. Later today I'm going to be visiting Frank Buckles in West Virginia. At 108 years of age, he is the last surviving US veteran of World War I. My own grandfather, who was born in California, the son of Irish immigrants, served alongside Frank Buckles in the US infantry in the First World War. They served bravely, like so many of their generation, to protect the freedoms that we all enjoy today. And in all of the difficult challenges that we face together today, Mr. Buckles and my grandfather Bill provided this generation with a real and powerful reminder of the deep and enduring bonds that continue today to link our two countries together. And the strength of those ties, I believe, will stand us all in good stead for the challenges that today we must now face again together. Thank you very much indeed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Hutton, for those clear and compelling and indeed even moving remarks at the end there. So we thank you for joining us this morning. We have, ladies and gentlemen, about 30 minutes for discussion. I'm Stephen Flanagan, Senior Vice President here and Kissinger Chair, and delighted to have this opportunity to chair this session. We'd just ask if you would identify yourself and wait for a microphone. And yes, this gentleman in the midsection here. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your excellent speech. My name is Dritan Misto, Political Secretary of the Embassy of Albania, in charge with NATO integration issues. We know that a very crucial issue of NATO, of organization now, is the enlargement. In April, two countries, Albania and hopefully Croatia, are going to be a member of the organization bringing new energy to the organization. In this point, I want to say that Albanian government have undertaken a great reform to deserve the invitation and the full NATO membership. So what's your opinion on the process and Albania full membership, sir? Thank you very much. We will pull a few questions. There's a couple right here on the front, please. Actually, why don't we just go right down the front row here? Sir, honor de Borgeros, CSIS, could I ask you a question about FATAP? It seems to me that success or failure in Afghanistan depends on very large degree on what we can do and not do to end those temporary sanctuaries that the Taliban enjoys in the federally administered tribal areas. Can you view on all of this? It seems to be ambivalent at the very least. I'm Karlan Ulman, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your comments. If I could respectfully take issue with your view about an exit strategy from Afghanistan being based on the Afghan army and police, it would seem to me that what would make the difference to create a successful exit strategy and a retreat is really governance, it's really putting in place a juicing system, property rights, civilian sector reforms, all those kinds of things for which NATO has not been really employed and NATO was not the solution. So how do you make sure that the governance side really works, because it seems to me that would be the measure on which Afghanistan's success or failure would be measured and whether we have an exit strategy or a retreat to China. Thank you. Aulou from Shirak Report. In terms of your general characterization, Mr. Secretary, of the need of the NATO to be publicly engaged and the task at hand is clear, the Afghanistan is clear. Clearly in the US there is a perception that Europe in general, Great Britain and others excluded, is not doing very much. I mean, this is the crux of it, so I think it was last year the Secretary of the States under old management that expressed openly his dismay saying, are you really serious about this? This was his compensation of his remarks. There is no follow-on. So the question is to the extent that indeed the alliance is premised on the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty. If you can watch it, it says on the preservation of our common values or our civilization, indeed this is an existential threat, radicalism and the festering of this crisis in Afghanistan. What can we expect in terms of more effective contributions from other members of the alliance and is that a crucial element in your judgment or the United States taking the lead as President Obama has done with the preparation of the 17,000 official troops and the others that will follow? Is this going to be fundamentally US-led operation with some support from allies from Great Britain or is it going to be scaling up a significant scale and have to reflect the political seriousness with which European leadership is taking? Okay, I think that's enough to load up your plate now. I'll let you... Let me take those in the sequence. Those questions are asked. Albania, well, we're looking forward to welcoming Albania into the NATO family. It'll be a great day when that happens in Croatia or also, I think the process has gone pretty well. I think it's been well organized and I think we will all look forward to the NATO summit where we can welcome Albania around the table properly. So it'll be a good day for Europe when we welcome Albania into our family. The other questions were largely about Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think we do Pakistan a great disservice if I can be really frank, sir. If we caricature their involvement, really, is one of ambivalence. I don't think that is true. I think the Pakistan democracy, the government of President Sadari, who lest we should ever, ever forget, knows directly at his own personal costs the evil that al-Qaeda and this violent extremism are responsible for, they murdered his wife. I don't think we should ever assume that Pakistan cannot be, is not, a good and trusty ally in the fight against extremism and terrorism. I think what we've got to do is help the Pakistan military become more effective in that operation. And we can do that. I think we can do that across the NATO alliance. We have experience and capability and insights that I think we should make available. I think we shouldn't forget either that the Pakistan military endured very, very significant casualties up in the tribal areas in the Northwest Frontier area in trying to deal with this problem of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, who I agree absolutely strongly with Paolo's view that they do represent an existential threat not just to us in the NATO alliance but to democracies everywhere and a direct threat to the Pakistan democracy. So we've got to support Pakistan in this struggle and we've got to ensure greater security effect can be delivered along the border area, up in the tribal areas, down towards Balochistan where more and more American servicemen will be operating from this summer. And we've got to do this together. So I think that the challenge for us is to support Pakistan in delivering greater military and security effect against the insurgency that is operating now in many parts of Pakistan. I don't think there is a justification in describing Pakistan's position as ambivalence. I think we've just got to make it more effective. I agree also and I don't think that I hope I didn't imply any difference of emphasis here on delivering better governance in Afghanistan as part of what we can leave behind when we go. And I believe that too to be very important in sustaining the progress that we make. I think there are two points I'd make about that. I think we tend to over exaggerate exactly the legacy of powerful central government in Afghanistan, creating civil effect in institutions that can operate in the way that you described in the country. There has never been such institutions in Afghanistan. So I think we've got to be pretty practical and realistic about that set of expectations that you've begun to describe. But I think it's an important part of what we've got to do. But I don't believe that those institutions that you've described, vital though they are, are likely to be sustainable unless there is proper security in the country. I think one is an absolutely essential precursor to the other. And right now the requirement is clearly to create more security effect in the country. Now we will have to do that ourselves and later in the ISAF, all the ISAF countries because that is how it is at the moment as we build up Afghan security capability. But that's really got to be absolutely front and center in our strategic thinking about Afghanistan and creating the circumstances where our young men and women can leave with their heads held high having done a proper job that is in everyone's best interest. So governance is important. Security, I think, however, right now trumps that. And that's what we've got to focus on and making sure we can secure. Palo asked about other contributions from Europe. I think we'll see that. I think they'll come in different roles and different types of contributions. It's a big day for us in Europe, the NATO summit. US has provided once again very, very strong leadership. It's our responsibility to step up to the plate as well and that's very much what I think you'll see in which many, many countries in Europe want to do. Thank you, Minister. Maybe if there are any more questions on Afghanistan, I think we also might want to have some time for the other parts of the Minister's agenda that he articulated. Are there any more questions on Afghanistan first before we? Yes, over there. Colonel Dutta, former aide to the President of India and President of Indian Veteran Officers Association here. Where I lived in Bombay, I had in the vicinity of my walk, there was Afghan church where the brave soldiers of McNaughton's brigade was buried and I drew a lot of inspiration and then I joined army. Under these circumstances, when from McNaughton's brigade and on the passage of history till now, would you, with your experience and also keeping in mind that this has been, Afghanistan has been a graveyard of all the superpowers and the history has taught us and also now intervention at this moment when Al Qaeda and Taliban seem to have no boundaries. Al Qaeda definitely lives in the minds of people, maybe through the misinterpretation of what Quran is but Taliban's have got different designs and especially being an Indian, I would be concerned because they are inching towards India. What is your estimation of Taliban's future? Thank you and then maybe one more question on Afghanistan if it is on Afghanistan. Sir, my question again picking up the civilian side in Afghanistan and I must say a minister that one of my dearest and closest friends of a former officer of the Royal Navy who's now serving as an American citizen there is a volunteer at age 61 in the provincial reconstruction teams and I'd just like to ask you to expand a little bit on the civilian side of the events or the battle of the life of the struggle in Afghanistan. Well, I've invited to comment about the future of the Taliban. I think we shouldn't lose sight of one very important factor. I think we're all right to be and you particularly right sir to be concerned about the influence of Pakistan Taliban but I think the mistake sometimes we do make when we when we talk about Taliban is to imagine that they are quite the same sort of terrorist organization in cell as for example al-Qaida. I don't think that's true. There are elements of profound Islamic extremism present in Taliban, we've seen that, paid a high price for that but I think it's a loose alliance of various different groups and I think therein lies its great strategic weakness we must find a better way of exploiting. So I think we need to emphasize always in our discussion of the operation of Afghanistan that it's both military, civil, political, economic in its characteristics and those are the tools that we'll need to undermine this conspiracy which is the Taliban. We can deal with some of these issues in traditional counter-insurgency ways but I think we need to find the answer to some of these problems outside of the current textbooks. This is a new campaign, different frontiers, quite right to describe that in that way and we need to bring together the brightest and the best of our thinkers and strategists to continue to inform the policy about how we can take apart this conspiracy of extremism which the Taliban represents. So I think we should be clear about that in how we develop our strategy. I think we all should be absolutely clear about one other thing that I think there is prospects for progress here in at some point getting to a political reconciliation. I think there will be a hardcore of irreconcilables whose ideology will exclude any accommodation based on reason and rationality with the democracies either in Pakistan or Afghanistan or anywhere else and I think for that group we will have no choice but to continue to wage the campaign against them until we can degrade their command and control operations we can affect their ability to mount operations so that is going to be an enduring task. I don't think there's any realism in pretending otherwise. Big mistake we should make, we should avoid is to kid ourselves that there's some silver bullet some easy strategy that we can pursue. This will be a long campaign against that type of fundamentalist terrorist extremism and we've got to be geared up to deal with that. There's no quick fix, it's not going to disappear over the hills anytime soon. Taliban is different and we've shown in our own operations in Afghanistan up in Musaqala, Gamseh and various other parts that it is possible to reach pretty good deals that can guarantee the sort of results that we all want to see peace, stability, respect for the Afghan democracy, lower levels of violence. Now these are all important things that we should try and work on and I think we can. Kerry's point about the provincial reconstruction teams I think we're learning the hard way as we go along about the capabilities that we need to put these people together. I often reflect on one thing as a defence minister, sometimes it does feel quite hard to generate the forces that you need to run these campaigns we do it because that's the military way. We have great capabilities, we've got great men and women and by the way can we have this Royal Navy officer back he sounds exactly the sort of guy that we need. Well there we are, that's great to hear that. I didn't think we actually wore our swords when we were commanding our ships but we are chasing pirates again so maybe that'll come in handy at some point. I think sometimes it feels to me that it's easier although not straightforward to find a combat brigade than it is to staff a provincial reconstruction team and that tells us something I think about our own strategy and analysis and the way we've prepared or not for these sorts of campaigns and I think there's a lot of merit a very great deal of merit but a lot more work to be done in developing the sort of capabilities that Secretary Gates has been talking about these stabilisation brigades, a fusion of military and civil tradition different skills operating probably within a pretty tight chain of command and within a security bubble that is absolutely essential too if we are going to call upon civilians to support this type of effort. So I think within all of that there is really really promising areas for us to develop and work together and that's some of the territory that Secretary Gates and I will be working on ourselves over the next few months but I think the commitment of some of these people that certainly the teams I've seen in Afghanistan really are quite breathtaking when you see what these young people in the main are doing you've got to take your hat off to them but I think we need to develop that as a capability we've got to accelerate the ability to deploy that type of expertise and I think they're in line as one of the very very important ways forward in this campaign Thank you. We have a couple of questions up here and I hope we can turn to the other part of the Minister's NATO agenda, NATO Transformation Agenda You mentioned the need for radical changes within NATO including its defense acquisitions or acquisitions strategies and there are of course several pressing concerns for the European nations at this point among them the biggest defense project they've won and it's running very very late and we understand that Britain is considering either reducing its purchases and or you know has already been talking with U.S. manufacturers such as Lockheed and going to offset some of that need for air lift I wonder if you can speak about that and then I also wanted to ask you in the kind of scheme of the U.S. reassessment of its defense programs there's going to be there are expected to be some cuts coming in both 2010 and then beyond the Pentagon has tried for many years now to kill the second engine fourth and joint strike fighter and one suspects have given the cost-cutting mood at the Pentagon that that will happen again could you speak to that and whether you address that with the Secretary Gates and what your views would be eliminating that kind of movement Maybe one or two other questions on on the NATO rest of the NATO agendas there one in the back there yes sir Christopher Chivis Rand I was wondering if you just comment briefly on how you see the future of the NATO-Russia relationship or at least how you'd like to see it go over the course of the next five or ten years and if I could just maybe just add one myself as ministry you mentioned that the need for the development of the NATO response force and your proposal for Alliance Solidarity Force and suggesting some need to balance the NATO capabilities in the expeditionary area with capabilities for executing defense of Alliance territory should that be necessary and I wonder we hear some allies complain that they well they can't provide they're having enough trouble providing forces for current missions so they can't really step up the NRF fully but even the even the even the Alliance Solidarity Force might be might be an issue and I wonder how you see the the challenge or pathway ahead for balancing that kind of commitments to both maintaining capabilities for Alliance defense and the expeditionary missions okay well Alliance Andrea raised a number of questions about procurement issues I don't with great respect I want to get into the detail of much of what you've said it's too tricky but I I I think a little bit of some some more general observations about this rather than looking in particular programs because it's too early to really comment about A400M or only the other projects you refer to I think the economic reality is pretty clear I think we need to do more together when it comes to procurement I think we'll need to plan more together about the sort of capabilities that we'll need in the future Europe's been doing this Europe US I think we'll need to do more of it so I think that's a very general observation I know but I think that's a very simple reflection of the economic times in which we live I think interoperability is fundamental particularly in the context of the NATO Alliance and I think all of this can help we should talk more to each other about procurement but it's got to be two-way street so I think that's probably all I want to say today I have raised a number of issues with Secretary Gates but they're between the Secretary and myself and that's how they're going to stay Chris there was a point about NATO and Russia again Chris I think probably today there's only a few general comments I can make about that rather than specific comments because again I don't want to get into that today I think the events last summer with the Russian aggression in Georgia and continuing problems for example around energy supplies coming in through the Ukrainian infrastructure so these raised really serious issues for us in the NATO Alliance that have got to be addressed and they are being addressed I think we've made a very clear position in relation to both Ukraine and Georgia which is the right position to take but we should always always be clear that NATO is a defensive alliance it doesn't pose a risk to Russia or anyone else period it's for NATO to decide who its members should be no one else period but I think in all of this we we want a good and we should have it's perfectly possible to have good strong positive relations with Russia we want that it has always been our ambition our desire to have that the end of the Cold War was such a great moment Europe came together we should never lose sight of how we all felt at that time and that's what we've got to continue to strive towards but it does take two to tango this is I'm afraid a simple statement of the obvious and when partners behave in a way that's not acceptable use force in a way that's not acceptable there has to be a consequence otherwise the credibility of the alliance's posture and position becomes under under direct attack and we can't allow that there are big strategic issues at stake here missile defense is such an issue there needs to be discussions I'm glad that there are about the future of that particular policy but I think it is not beyond the ability of NATO and Russia who share basically I think a profound common sense now of securing European peace and stability to find a way through these problems and we stand ready always we always have done to engage in that in that discussion with Russia and we've got an opportunity to do that I think some of the initiatives that present has been describing I think will help Steven's point about the alliance well okay if we if we can't find a way forward on the nrf I mean that would be a pretty poor advertisement for the ambition to really face up to some of these new challenges this is absolutely our core task when fundamentally the article form five obligations to go right to the heart of the NATO treaty require an effective ability to defend the European homeland to defend European territory and it's a I think a standing indictment that we have not found a way forward yet to fully resource the the nrf and you're quite right there are those of us who feel that the nrf should have a deployable capability outside the NATO frontier who are not going to see their their limited military combat resources tied up in a force that cannot deploy and similarly those who feel really really strongly about the need for European homeland defense will not commit if they feel their their forces will go elsewhere and won't be available the alliance solidarity force is not a big force it's a it's a battle group plus enablers and I don't think that is an impossibility to put together if we can't put together a force like that which is minimum it's a political demonstration of solidarity that's really what it is so that we can free up the rest of the the nrf forces to do the deployable out of areas stuff well I would be pessimistic about our future ability to deal with some of the other challenges that I've described today this is right the guts of of what NATO needs to do just to take over this is basic stuff and if we if we find this a struggle we're going to find everything else a struggle I think we might have time for one truly brief question yes sir if you could be succinct uh yeah this kind of inductee we're in your guiding principles uh is the fact that uh asia and the pacific have assumed the larger importance particularly in economic uh risks and opportunities and the fact that the majority of the atlantic alliance countries are countries that are sluggish and slow compared to asia where there's a lot more competition between us and your well I think we've we've got to deal with these issues in the way that I I tried to describe at the beginning of my remarks or it might have been halfway through I can't remember exactly where about organizational boundaries between the security institutions we all have a variety of defense and security alliances involving asia and pacific countries I think they can complement overall the the policy and direction of where NATO is going I don't think we need to obsess about this however I think we are perfectly capable we've shown an ability the five powers defense agreement for example is a very very obvious example of how we can work effectively in that area but we need to be agile we need to be we need to be flexible I I don't think there's anything fundamental in the shift in the in the economic balance of trade that we've seen in the last 20 years that we can't rise to when it comes to security challenges and operations but I think the fundamentals are flexibility between security organizations focus on deployability which is absolutely fundamental uh because NATO's interests now rightly so extend far beyond our own territorial frontier that's the way to for us to deal I think sensitively and sensibly with some of those challenges security challenges in asia and pacific well mr hunton I want to thank you this morning you uh certainly I think in your comments and range of issues that you addressed demonstrated exactly what dr. hammery mentioned in his opening that that her majesty's government is blessed blessed with a a number of politicians who have a great ability to to articulate clearly and understandably why the alliance remains important why the usuk relationship remains important and how we should move ahead together on some of these difficult security challenges so I hope that when you're in west virginia you also have time to talk to some of our public I'm sure the state department would love to sign you up for for some public speaking and articulating why we need to continue to move ahead on these difficult challenges sincerely sincerely we wish you the best of luck both in moving forward on the agenda you've articulated for the alliance and and for your work together with secretary gates on on other aspects of learning the lessons of agnesty and so thank you mr minister for joining us