 I want to thank our witnesses for being here and their service to our nation. I know it takes a lot of time to prepare for these hearings and we really appreciate the fact that you do that and you make yourselves available. The Indo-Pacific is home to the greatest threat we've faced in generations. In North Korea we have a madman who would rather build an illegal nuclear arsenal than feed his starving people. The world is set by, while Kim has lobbed ICBMs over his neighbors, rebuilt his nuclear testing facility and expanded his inventory of warheads. Last week's announcement at North Korea tested a solid-fueled ICBM as the latest extremely troubling news. It eliminates the time-consuming liquid-fueling process, making it much harder for us to detect the missile and neutralize it before launch. That's why it's so imperative for us to invest in missile defense and accelerate the next-generation interceptor program. A strong missile detect and defeat capability is also critical to our deterrence of the Chinese Communist Party. We've talked a lot this year about the growing threats we face from the CCP. They've tripled defense spending in a decade, and that's what they admit to, rapidly modernized and expanded their conventional forces, made unprecedented advances, advancements in space, hypersonics, AI and quantum computing, and increased the number of launchers, missiles and warheads in their nuclear arsenal at a dizzying rate. The CCP's extraordinary military buildup is certainly concerning, but what's most alarming is the increasingly provocative actions President Xi has taken in recent years, pushing out China's borders with new defense agreements and military bases in foreign nations, illegally building militarized islands and trying to limit freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, threatening our allies in the region when they work with us, and cozying up to Putin and the Itola and other tyrants, and attempting to coerce Taiwan with military exercises, simulating a blockade and invasion of the island. It's gotten to the point where Xi's foreign ministry is now seeking to intimidate the Speaker of the House and other members of Congress just for supporting democracy and self-determination for the people of Taiwan. This is not how responsible nations act, especially not nations armed with nuclear weapons. We have no choice but to take Xi's threats seriously, and we have to be resolute in our response. We need to accelerate our own military modernization. We need to enhance training and readiness in the region. We need to better distribute logistics throughout the Pacific, but we won't prevail in any conflict with the CCP on our own. We need to expand and strengthen our partnerships in the region. We need to better arm our allies with agreements like AUKUS, and we need to expedite the delivery of arms and training to Taiwan so they can better defend their own democracy. But most importantly, we need to take action now. China is not going to give us 10 or 20 years to prepare for conflict. We simply cannot procrastinate further. I look forward to hearing from my witnesses on their assessment of the threats and what they support and what they need from this committee to deter China. And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the ranking member, for any comments he may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you did an excellent job of outlining the threats and the concerns that we have in the theater in North Korea and in the Indo-Pacific theater as well more broadly. It is a very challenging part of the world and one that contains a lot of threats to our national security and to global security without question. We have our, as the National Defense Strategy says, the pacing threat in China. Clearly our largest competitor both economically and militarily. And right next door, we have our most unpredictable rogue threat in North Korea as you outline their development of nuclear weapons. In the way they are closed off from the rest of the world that puts us in a position to not exactly know what the leverage points are to deter them or work with them makes them a significant threat as well. I appreciate both of our witnesses being with us today to help us walk through that. On North Korea, there is no easy answer to the question, but what is our best deterrent strategy? We contain that threat given the nuclear capabilities that North Korea is developing and the unpredictable nature. How does one reach a country like North Korea that is so isolated from the rest of the world? And China is a much broader threat. We will talk a great deal today about Taiwan and certainly that is the biggest flash point. China's militant attitude towards Taiwan, their increasingly aggressive language about particularly possibly reunifying China through military means, something that we must deter, a conflict there would be devastating for the entire world. We need to figure out how to deter China from taking that aggressive action. But it is also important to point out Taiwan is but the largest flash point. As the chairman alluded to, China is aggressive in bullying across the world in countless ways. As mentioned, they are claiming territory in the sovereign nations of at least a half-dozen other countries, but also the best way to think about the threat that China puts to the world is you cannot criticize China without them launching an economic war against you. And there are a number of examples of this, but Australia is perhaps one of the best. Back during the pandemic, I think it was sometime in late 2020, Australia dared to suggest that China could perhaps be ever so slightly more transparent in how they were dealing with COVID. In response to that mild criticism, China literally launched an economic war against Australia. Now, one of the possible outcomes of that was Australia woke up and said, wow, doing business with China is going to be problematic. We better find other allies and partners to deal with that. But it happens across the world that Lithuania said something about Taiwan that China didn't like, same thing. But even in industry, if anybody in industry says something that China doesn't like, they will use their economic might to pummel that country or entity. There was, I think it was the GM for the Houston Rockets who said something pro-Hong Kong. And the NBA was instantaneously cut off by China. If you're going to make a movie in this world and you want to sell it in China, China has to approve the script, literally. And if they don't, it doesn't get sold there. The level of aggression that China has to restrict the freedoms of the entire world is, I think, far greater than most people realize. We need to present an alternative. Key to that is our presence, us being actively involved in the Indo-Pacific region. I applaud the efforts of the people before us today to make clear that we do that. President Biden's national security strategy prioritizes China. We are present there. We will continue to be. We need to have that adequate deterrence. But we also need partners and allies. I'm going to look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about those partners and allies. Obviously, Japan, Australia, South Korea, India, the Philippines, Thailand, these are some of the most important, but all the other players, as well as struck by Indonesia as a place that's just, they're trying to get along with both. How do we work with them to help us in this fight? Because ultimately, and the final point is, our goal with China has to be peaceful coexistence. Sounds weird, given everything we've said about the problems and threats that China presents, but we are not going to defeat China. China and the U.S. are going to be major global powers for as far as the eye can see. How do we find a way to nudge China back in a more positive, less aggressive, and less bullying direction? That's ultimately what we have to do. Conflict with China is not inevitable. 100% not. We need to figure out how to peacefully coexist with them and deal with the threats that they present in a way that keeps the world at peace. I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses, and I yield back. I thank the ranking member, and now I can introduce our witnesses. We have the Honorable Jed Royal, who is the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Admiral John Equilino, the commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, and General Paul Kamra, is the commander of the United Nations Command, Korea, and the U.S. Combined Forces Command, the U.S. Forces Korea. I welcome our witnesses, and Mr. Royal, we'll start with you for five minutes to outline your state. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on what the Department of Defense is doing to safeguard the interests of the American people, our allies, and our partners in the Indo-Pacific region. I would first like to acknowledge the tireless work of those who serve the U.S. in uniform across the Indo-Pacific, as well as those who serve in the civilian workforce across the department. The very first words of the Biden-Harris administration. Mr. Royal, could you pull the microphone a little closer? Yes, sir. There you go. The very first words of the Biden-Harris administration's Indo-Pacific strategy state that the U.S. is in Indo-Pacific power. And Secretary Austin has been clear about our commitment to seeking transparency, openness, and accountability, freedom of the seas, skies, and space, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. That vision and that commitment continue today. The department does not take this vision for granted. We have seen the PRC increasingly look to the People's Liberation Army as a tool for coercion and support of its global aims. The PLA has continued to conduct inherently risky intercepts against U.S. ally and partner assets in the air and at sea, increasing the risk of an accident. And the PLA continues to conduct coercive military activities in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Seas, and beyond. The PRC high-altitude balloon that violated our airspace earlier this year exemplified the PRC's disregard for the basic principle of sovereignty at the heart of peace and stability. This is why the national defense strategy identifies the PRC as our pacing challenge. At the same time, North Korea also continues to engage in provocative and destabilizing behavior. Climate change will continue to place downward pressure on peace and prosperity across the region and violent extremism continues to require cooperation with our partners on counterterrorism. The Department of Defense is doing more than ever to strengthen deterrence and to ensure we can prevail in conflict if necessary. We are deploying the right capabilities now. Investing in the capabilities we need in the future in our budget request shows it. Efforts like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve show how we're quickly delivering promising prototypes to warfighters. And the B-21 Raider, which the Secretary unveiled last year, is a clear example of a new cutting-edge capability. Here's the bottom line. Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is real and strong today because the U.S. military remains the world's most capable and credible fighting force. Major investments like these will help keep it that way. And the U.S. is not alone in upholding peace and stability in the region by investing in greater capability and connection. We have supported Japan's decision to increase substantially its defense budget over the next five years and to introduce new capabilities, including Counter-Strike, that will strengthen regional deterrence. We are taking clear, meaningful steps to modernize and strengthen our alliance with the Republic of Korea. We are working together with the Philippines to accelerate our allied capabilities. We are making major investments in our defense ties with India and maturing our immensely beneficial security relationship. The Aukus Security Pact exemplifies our collaboration with highly capable allies to expand our combined capacity. Finally, we continue to fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, which has formed the bedrock of peace, stability, and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait over the last four decades. When it comes to modernizing our force posture in the Indo-Pacific to be even more mobile, distributed, lethal, and resilient, the Department of Defense is delivering historic achievements. In December, the U.S. and Australia announced a series of new force posture initiatives, including increased rotations of U.S. bombers and fighters at Australian bases. In January, the U.S. and Japan announced a series of force posture improvements, including the first forward deployment of a marine littoral regiment in Japan. Weeks later, the Secretary visited the Philippines and our governments announced the U.S. forces will have access to Philippine military bases in four new strategic locations. These announcements add up to a historic improvement of our regional force posture. We are operating with allies and partners like never before, with bilateral and multilateral exercises growing in scale, scope, and complexity. We have deepened our trilateral security efforts with our closest regional allies. We have broadened our initiatives with multilateral partners to deliver real results for peace and security, especially with ASEAN and the Quad. States across the Indo-Pacific region are investing in their own capabilities, their connections with regional partners, and their relationships with us. Over the past decade, our five regional treaty allies have increased their military expenditures by double digits. That is what delivering on our shared vision looks like. In closing, I appreciate the work of this committee, both members and staff, in continuing to sharpen our edge in the face of many challenges. In the past several years, we have witnessed the growth of a strong bipartisan consensus around the scale and scope of the China challenge. We are working toward the transformation of that consensus into a coalition built around solutions. The Department of Defense is deploying the capabilities, driving forward the force posture, and deepening the alliances and partnerships we need to meet our pacing challenge. Thank you for your time and attention today. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Mr. Royum. Admiral Aquilin, you're recognized. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. First, thank you for the opportunity to be here today, discuss the Indo-Pacific region. First, just let me say that I appreciate and need your support and your continuous support for the service members, their families, government civilians, and all who operate in the Indo-Pacific command. And it is my distinct honor and privilege to serve alongside these brave men and women who execute our missions of deterrence and for defense every day. I can't thank you enough for all of your support. It's instrumental in our ability to accomplish these missions. But there's more to do, and we must act with a greater sense of urgency. Every day, Indo-Pakom works tirelessly to prevent conflict, not provoke it. War is not inevitable, and it's not imminent. However, this decade presents a period of increased risk, and I say that for the following reasons, and they're real, the illegitimate illegal invasion and the war in Ukraine. The military buildup and malign behavior of the PRC, including a no-limits relationship articulated as a partnership with Russia. Continuous missile provocations and nuclear rhetoric by the DPRK and the constant threat of violent extremism in this theater. Our national defense strategy identifies the PRC as the most consequential strategic competitor of the United States, and it's the only competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities to mount a sustained challenge and an attempt to displace the United States in the rules-based international order. Seize the initiative as Indo-Pakom's approach to execute the national defense strategy and accomplish our priorities. Defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression, and build a resilient joint force. By design, this approach prevents conflict through integrated deterrence, and it ensures we can fight and win should deterrence fails. Lastly, it provides the Secretary of Defense and the President options for any contingency. There are four key elements to seize the initiative. First, a robust theater posture. Second, a joint operations campaign comprised of lethal, persistent forces forward. Third, technologically superior capabilities to maintain our warfighting advantages in the near, mid, and long-term. And fourth, an enhanced network of allies, partners, and friends with common values and goals. We respectfully request your continued support for these focus areas. Recognizing that any delay in one area directly affects the others and puts the overall success of our deterrence efforts at risk. I say it again, conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not inevitable, but we cannot rest on our past accomplishments to secure a peaceful future. Security challenges threaten our very way of life, as well as the peace and prosperity that the rules-based international order has enabled for nearly 80 years. The investments we make today will allow future generations to enjoy the same legacy of liberty our ancestors entrusted to us. But we don't have the luxury of time. We must act now to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific. Thanks, Chairman. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Admiral. General Le Camera, you're recognized for five minutes. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, the distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you as the Commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command of the United States Forces, Korea, to discuss the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. Korea is as important today as it was in 1950 when the international rules-based order was first challenged and successfully defended on the Korean Peninsula. Located on the Asian continent, the Republic of Korea's crucial regional and global security. When North Korean Communist Forces invaded South Korea with the blessing and assistance of the Soviet Union in China, the United States, along with 22 members of the United Nations, stood together with the South Korean people to expel the aggressors. The Korean War taught us that we must always be ready and forward postured with our allies. To ensure continued peace and stability on the peninsula, I have five priorities that are nested within the Indo-Pacific Commanders, which sees the initiative approach to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. My first priority is to defend the homelands, the United States and our allies. The Korean War has not ended. We're an armistice and the Kim regime has developed capabilities that reach beyond Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, D.C. and the Capitals of the United Nations Command sending states. By defending forward in this strategic location, we better protect our people and the Korean people. Defending forward reinforces our ironclad commitment to the Republic of Korea. My second priority is to strengthen the United States and the Republic of Korea alliance. We must never take the alliance for granted as our center of gravity in deterring the Kim regime. The alliance has effectively deterred the Kim regime's resumption of large-scale aggression for almost 70 years, allowing security and stability to flourish and the Republic of Korea to develop into an economically prosperous, vibrant democracy. In contrast, the Kim regime ignores the needs and rights of the great majority of its population and continues to invest its resources in developing weapons that it uses as leverage. External leverage coerces concessions from the international community. Internal leverage maintains control of the people and ensures Kim regime's survival. My third priority is to prepare for combat. This is decisive. Our alliance alone cannot deter aggression. Our power of resistance deters. Maintaining the highest state of combat readiness is our main effort, because readiness is perishable. We must continue realistic training in order to respond to aggression and defend our homelands. My fourth priority is to build coalitions to dissuade aggression in the region. Our network of allies and partners with common interests on the Korean Peninsula represents our greatest asymmetric advantage. My fifth priority is to ensure our personnel are taken care of and prepared to execute our mission on the Korean Peninsula. Mission first, people always. Our people serving on the Asian continent have the extraordinary responsibility of providing security and stability throughout the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. Our focus remains taking care of the mental, physical, and spiritual needs of our service members, civilians, and families. Since 1953, the United States and the Republic of Korea remain ready to deter and respond to North Korean aggression. Our mutual defense treaty expresses our common desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. It also expresses our common determination to defend ourselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the impression that either the United States or the Republic of Korea stands alone in the Pacific area. While the United States and the Republic of Korea Alliance began out of military necessity, it has evolved to become the lynchpin of stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and contractors are proof of our ironclad commitment to the Alliance and ensures that the authoritarian regimes of North Korea, China, and Russia cannot un-make the international rules-based order. Should the Kim regime resume hostilities with your continued support, we are ready. I'm proud to serve with them and an honor to represent them before you. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, General. Thank all the witnesses. We are now gonna move into the question period. I want to emphasize to the members, but also to the witnesses, we have a five-minute time limit. You should have a clock in front of your microphone. At five minutes, I will cut off any answer, so you might wanna be succinct. I don't wanna be rude, but I wanna treat everybody the same when it comes to answers, questions and answer period. And that applies to the chairman and the ranking member as well. So I'll recognize myself first. Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilina, what actions do we need to take in the near term to improve Taiwan's self-defense capability? Congressman, thanks for that question. The interest of the department is very strongly connected with the ability of the United States to meet the Taiwan Relations Act. The Taiwan Relations Act has been the foundation of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait over the last 40 years. We need to make sure that Taiwan is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, so able to defend itself. And we're looking here, sir, at the opportunity for Taiwan to understand what threat is posed against the Taiwan Strait. In this regard, ISR, command and control, battle management systems are absolutely critical. Taiwan also certainly needs to be able to make sure that any invading force is caught dead in its tracks in the Strait as it comes across, to be able to defend at the beaches and to be able to be resilient in depth on island. Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Chairman. Every day we execute our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, the training that's required, the capabilities that have been identified by the Honorable Nelson are critical and getting them to the island as soon and as fast as possible is critical. Great. I think the ranking member would agree with me that we are very confident that we will get a NDAA, a bipartisan national defense authorization passed not only out of committee in a timely fashion, but out of the floor and in a conference report. There is more dialogue in the Congress about the difficulty we're gonna have in achieving appropriations bills in a timely fashion. And the consequence of Congress not achieving a timely and fulsome appropriations bill would mean a two-year CR possibly. And my question is this, Admiral Aquilino, you have said repeatedly in the public and talked about your need to go fast to help prepare us for conflict in your command in the end of Paycom. If you were to have a two-year CR, would you be able to go fast in trying to prepare for conflict in your theater? Chairman, CR of any length is devastating to the Department of Defense, specifically for Indo-Pacific Command. Maneuvering in the industrial space, providing those capabilities we just talked about at pace and at speed, any new starts, loss of buying power, there are critical disadvantages to a CR. Again, my assessment is it would be devastating. Okay, so I would take that as a no. Yes, sir. Great. Ranking members recognized. Thank you. Just two questions. One general, the camera, what role do you see China playing in the North Korea challenge, both positive and negative in terms of containing that threat? Thanks Congressman. I don't see anything on the Korean Peninsula that does not involve Chinese and Russian involvement with DPRK and quite frankly with the ROK. They have put economic pressure on the Republic of Korea in the past and they also have their own people that are stationed in the Republic of Korea. So in a neo operation, getting them off the peninsula I think would be in their best interest. What would they do to put pressure on North Korea to not do nuclear tests, to not to continue development? Are they just going to monitor it or is there something where if North Korea did this, China would leverage North Korea to try to get them at least somewhat under control or is China just going to go, not our thing? No, they are a treaty, they're their only treaty ally. The borders are back open. So there's goods that are coming back and forth across the border. I think you can put pressure on DPRK in that respect. Okay, and Admiral Aquilino, when you look at the broader China threat in terms of our allies and partners, can you sort of walk us through that world of those partners? I believe we have five treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, but then you also have a lot of other countries that are navigating the world between the US and China and Russia. And that's the piece that I find most interesting about the way this plays out. If we're going to be successful in both containing the threat from China and Russia and hopefully nudging them towards a more cooperative rules-based approach to resolving differences, we're gonna need the India's, the Indonesia's, Vietnam. So what does that look like and what is your strategy for trying to get as much help as possible out of all of the countries in the region? Yeah, thanks Congressman. Certainly foundational to our strategic deterrence approach and integrated deterrence is the allies and partners and it's an asymmetric advantage. Let me just say that the strategy and approach is competition, not containment. And the five treaty allies of Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand are foundational, right? Those are mutual defense treaties that stand through Senate ratification and are truly important. But our approach is to pull in as many additional allies through a set of layers of many and multilateral engagements, operations and work we do together for a variety of reasons. Number one, we are like-minded nations with common values. We have deep people-to-people ties and that's beyond just the treaty allies. Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, all the nations in the region and we operate and exercise with them frequently. 120 exercises a year, deep engagements in the form of key leader and other events. So pulling that layer together, Congressman is really important and it is the asymmetric advantage because it's the one thing China doesn't have and that's partners. Thank you very much. I yield back. Chair and I recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lambert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. Thank you all for being here. Admiral Aquilino, one of my top priorities is accelerating our work on offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities. China's significant investments in their hypersonics, which they view as an important element of their regional warfighting strategy, are extremely troubling. Their progress is undeniable. In 2021, they did an around the world fractional orbital bombardment demonstration. They have intermediate range hypersonic capability that can hit targets thousands of miles away and possibly penetrate our defenses. And by contrast, our progress has been slow and has lacked urgency. And I think we need, if not quantitative parity, at least qualitative parity, can you share the challenges you face in deterring China based on their current superiority in hypersonics and what is your best military advice on the need for the U.S. to field these hypersonic capabilities? Thanks, Congressman. So again, in alignment with the theme that I've started here today, we need to go faster. All right, the concerning part about the PRC is both the pace, the speed, and the advanced capabilities that they continue to deliver and demonstrate. And to deliver a credible deterrent, we certainly need the ability to counter and or exceed. Currently, our military far exceeds anything China can deliver. In this particular lane, we need to go faster. Thank you. What can you tell us here in open session about what you know about their plans for hypersonics in this decade? I think we'd have to take that in a classified here in Congress. Okay, we'll follow up on that. Also, Admiral, the pace of China's strategic nuclear breakout has been as former stratcom commander Admiral Richards said, breathtaking. We've learned recently that they have three new intercontinental ballistic missile fields. They have more mobile and land-based launchers for ICBMs than the US. They're working with Russia to produce plutonium now. So how should we respond to China's nuclear ongoing nuclear breakout? Well, so, sir, the speed at which the Chinese are delivering nuclear capability is certainly concerning. And Admiral Richards and now General Cotton and I have had multiple conversations. One thing we ought to be concerned about, the Chinese narrative is that the United States is beginning a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific. And the only nation that's delivering a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific is China. You just articulated the foundation and the speed and capabilities they're delivering. So for the United States, our best strategy is to ensure that our force is modernized and that we are able to hold superior nuclear deterrent as required. Thanks, Admiral. I'll also point out, as you would agree, that the US and Russia have engaged and are entering into, have entered into nuclear treaties, but not China. General Le Camere, can you describe the challenges you face to maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, given the North Korean regime's ongoing missile testing and capabilities? Thanks, Congressman. Our focus is on building readiness and focusing on all the war fighting functions in all the domains, making sure that that we're bringing in joint combined. So the focus is peace through strength and focusing on combat readiness, but also working with the interagency because it's not just a military solution. Okay, thank you. Now Assistant Secretary Royal, given the discussion we've just had about Chinese and North Korean nuclear ambitions, I'm amazed that the administration's fiscal year 2024 budget request, once again, attempts to cancel out funding for the nuclear sea launch cruise missile. I'll call it Slickham Inn. I expect and hope that Congress will once again overrule that impulse and continue the funding and research on this critical capability. So stepping back, how is the Biden administration going to address the growing Chinese nuclear threat? I hope it's not by canceling out of the programs. How are we gonna address these growing threats and North Korea as well? The nuclear posture review is quite clear eyed and it's approached to these challenges. We understand them fully. In the president's budget submission, we included $38 billion to modernize the nuclear triad and we continue to look hard at our overall force posture, nuclear force posture and readiness. Gentlemen's time has expired. Chair would like to recognize one of our former colleagues, a long-term member of this committee, John Klein, the Colonel Klein. Good to be with you, have you back with us. Now we'll go to recognize Mr. Courtney for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. Just one quick point regarding the sea launch missiles. Last year's budget, we actually included $25 million to have a fully thorough investigation by the Navy in terms of just the costs as well as the benefits of that program. So whatever sort of is out there, we did not kill that program, but we really need to understand with our eyes wide open what the operational impact will be for our ships and submarines if we start installing nuclear warheads on attack subs or other ships. Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you inventoried all of the new cooperation that's going on with allies in the Indo-Pacific region over the last year and I'm very impressed, even just within the last few months. It's really quite striking in terms of how quickly things are moving out there. Last month at Naval Base Point Loma, President Biden, Australian Prime Minister Albanese and UK Prime Minister Sunak released what they called the optimal pathway to implement AUKUS, which will include transferring to Australia conventional arm nuclear powered submarines. Congress has worked to do in terms of enabling that execution of the agreement in terms of just dealing with export controls and other issues there, but from your standpoint, can you state what the strategic benefit of this arrangement is in terms of sharing these precious assets? I mean, we're recapitalizing our own submarine fleet at the same time, but again, can you just sort of talk about what you see as the value of that arrangement? Yes, Congressman. Well, we articulated the concern for the strategic environment, right? As the PRC takes more aggressive actions, I think all of our partners are seeing that same activity and it's got them concerned. So our work with both Australia and the United Kingdom, as it applies to sharing some of our most sensitive technology in the form of nuclear propulsion and nuclear powered submarines is a really large step. So as it applies to deterrence effect, additional nations with the capabilities that we have, being completely interoperable at any point over the globe, brings a strong deterrent value to the problem. Thank you, and I think, as you know, I mean, the last time we did this was with, and we've only done it once, was with one country and that was in 1958. So I mean, obviously this is a huge step. And again, can you just talk about Australia's position regarding stewardship of these submarines, which is gonna require obviously some training up for their Navy, but also just again, their commitment to again, complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but in also having their own sovereign control over that fleet. Congressman, so as we know, Australia is one of our strongest partners and allies. They have shared blood and treasure with us for over a hundred years and every conflict we've ever been in. Again, when you talk about people, the people ties, they're deep. Our values, our interests. So having the Australians as a part of this program, I have no worries at all about losing that technology elsewhere. They will treat it at the highest level. We also treat other technologies with the Australians as it applies to space and cyber in the same kind of vein. So I have no concerns about Australia taking this on and being able to be successful. And from my position, we're taking actions every day to ensure that we can deliver it as soon as possible. Well, thank you. And again, your comments about moving faster, I think also applies to Congress in terms of really getting these authorities aligned so this thing can really move at the speed it requires. Mr. Royal, you also mentioned the AUKUS agreement in your testimony. And one other part of the president's budget that came over was new funding, additional funding, 640 million for submarine industrial-based capacity. Last year, we actually put 750 million. That's, again, workforce, supply chain and facility. Again, can you talk about really how this is a critical piece of making sure that both our Navy and also that the AUKUS agreement can have the capacity it needs? Congressman, your point is spot-on with respect to resilience of the submarine industrial base. We believe that the budget submission there represents a sense of urgency with respect to maintaining the readiness of that force. I'm also proud that Australia has now committed to invest in the defense industrial base for submarines as well to the tune of $3 billion. And we're very confident that they will deliver on that. This represents a historic opportunity for us to be able to put increasing assets in the undersea domain and strengthen the interoperability with our closest allies. Thank you. Thank you gentlemen. Chair, I recognize gentlemen, Virginia, Mr. Whitman for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. Admiral Aquilin, I want to begin with you. First of all, thanks so much for your leadership there in the Indo-Pacific Command. That is an incredibly challenging time. We want to make sure we continue the effort to deter the Chinese Communist Party and make sure we can continue to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. We also want to make sure too that the CCP and for that matter, Beijing don't test our determination to make sure the Indo-Pacific stays as a free and open place in the world. I always think back to your predecessors testimony here in 2021 when Admiral Davidson said that he believed that China would make their move to reunify with Taiwan forcefully by 2027. So I want to revisit that a little bit and I want to ask in your best professional military judgment, do you anticipate that Beijing will attempt to by force seek reunification with Taiwan before 2027? So Congressman, after having worked for Admiral Davidson I know he came up with 27 was based on what Xi Jinping said, which was the challenge to his military to be prepared to execute a task by 2027. That was foundationally the approach of his comments. Now, for me, it doesn't matter what the timeline is. The secretary can give me this mission today. So I'm responsible to prevent this conflict today and if the turns were to fail to be able to fight and win. So the timeline, everybody will have an opinion on when it is. I think everybody's guessing the intent and need for the, for the depart, for Indo Paycom, the department industry and everybody to go faster will help prevent this conflict. Let me ask this then, in your best professional military judgment based on the buildup of the Chinese Communist Party and all their military assets and where we are today with what we bring to the table across the joint force. Do you believe that the threat today is greater than it has been in the past? I believe that the trends for the threat are in the wrong direction. There's no doubt about that. But I will tell you, Congressman, that the United States military is ready today for any contingency. As you see the future of where China's going, where the United States is going, when do you think the balance of forces will be such that it could, it could motivate China to say, here is our opportunity? Yeah, I'm not sure that it's a balance of forces issue. I think there's a ton of variables on what might motivate President Xi Jinping to take that action, Congressman, and it's our job to convince him every day that it would be a bad choice. What is the most effective thing that we as United States can do across the spectrum, strategically, economically, you name it, that has the greatest chance of deterring the Chinese Communist Party from forcefully reunifying Taiwan? As I stated, I think the PRC has taken on a whole-of-government approach to achieve their objectives. Again, diplomatic, military, informational, economic, and I think it's worth, now for me, I own the military peace and support of the Secretary. I think our approach and what we've laid out delivers a deterrent effect. The entire whole-of-government approaching it the same way would be good, and some of those things have occurred. The CHIPS Act, supported by the Congress, was extremely effective. The ability to protect technologies that are sensitive and important to the United States is important, so we just need to compete across the entire spectrum, understanding that our security challenger will. Based on your best professional military judgment, do you believe that with everything that we are doing, that we will be able to effectively deter China, not only now, but also in the future? I do. China is a near, mid, and long-term challenge for us, so we need to deter today, tomorrow, and the next day, and I do believe we're doing that, sir. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I thank the gentleman. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Gary Mindy, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, for your work, and for your commitment. Two lines of questioning. We've discussed the Allies in the Pacific in some detail, and thank you very much for making that clear and the importance of it. But we've not yet discussed another set of potential Allies in the area, and these are the freely associated states, Pellew, Marshall Islands, and Mike Winesia. Mr. Royale, could you please talk to this issue, what we need to do in that regard, and then at Equilino, if you could follow up. Congressman, thank you. We enjoy a substantial relationship with the freely associated states. I think that we have been extended some very favorable military terms. We have just completed some memoranda of agreement with these states for future access basing with the U.S. military. This is an extraordinary relationship that we share with them, and in fact, I would just point out their participation per capita in the U.S. military is higher than anywhere else, any other part of the United States. And so we're very grateful for their service involved here. We have a funding package that we've put forward onto Capitol Hill here to make sure that we can continue this arrangement going forward and would ask for Congress' support with that funding package. And that's also Palau, Marshall Islands, Mike Winesia. Yes, sir. Very good. Edmle? Yes, sir. So I just got back from Yap and Pompeii, as was stated, that the amount of people who have served in the United States military, I met with about 25 people. I think 15 of them had service. Really impressive. That said, we defend the freely associated states as if they're the U.S. homeland. So that history goes back. They were critical to our success in World War II. They are critical, and they're strategically located. So it's really important we get this agreement done. Very good, thank you. I'd like now to turn to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. 11.1 and a half billion dollars authorized in 2023 of Edmle. If you could bring us up to date on the usefulness of that, what else you might need, or how you are deploying that 11 and a half billion dollars. Thank you, sir. So as you know, this body has passed a law that requires me to submit an independent assessment, identifying the capabilities and the needs from INDOPACOM to support both the deterrence and defend the nation mission. And as a part of this year's 1254, we identified the requirements as needed. That language articulates that INDOPACOM should provide that input to inform PDI. And as PDI is calculated inside of the department, my needs were identified and recognized. In the upcoming NDAA, do you have recommendations for enhancement, modification, changes in the language or authorities? I don't, sir. I think that the articulation as it applies, I think meets both the intent of this body and I'm glad to provide my requirements. Thank you, I yield back. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott for five minutes. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for being here. Ranking Member Smith started talking about China and partnerships and how they conduct themselves. And it's pretty clear to those of us on this committee and paying attention that communist China operates in the best interest of communist China without regard for who they hurt or any of the rules. And I have every faith in the world that if a situation kicked off with Taiwan, between the United States and our partners, we could win that. I'm concerned as the PRC has this whole of government and whole of world approach though, that they're embedding themselves into the U.S. economy in such a way that even if we win the war, it would destroy our economy inside the United States. And Admiral Aquilino, are you aware that less than 15 days after communist China flew this bi-balloon over the United States, that Ford Motor Company announced a multi-billion dollar deal with communist China to purchase their battery technology? I did read something about that Congressman. I think that we have to be very careful when we use the heavy hand of government. But I will tell you, if corporate America is going to less than 15 days after communist China does that to the United States, announce a multi-billion dollar partnership with communist China, I do think that the DOD needs to reach out to corporate America and say, you know what? If you buy that technology from China, the DOD is not going to buy that technology from you. And I just think this is one of those few instances where we're going to have to use that heavy hand to press back on corporate America and how deep they continue to embed themselves with communist China and the financial ties there, every faith in the world and our ability to beat China in a war. Not sure how we do it if corporate America continues to get in bed with them like that. But I want to, with that said, Mr. Royal, I'm concerned, Admiral Eccalino said that the trend was moving in the wrong direction. I'm concerned it's moving in the wrong direction. I was a little taken back at the President of France with everything going on between Russia and China right now in their alliance in Ukraine. I was a little taken back that the President of France went and sat down with Xi Jinping. Is he trying to protect France's investments in Africa? What's going on there? Congressman, we were in touch with the French counterparts during the course of that visit and we've been in touch with our European allies very closely about the challenges that we see the PRC representing in the Indo-Pacific region. We're very much impressed with the nature and the trend of the NATO strategic concept and the way that it describes the PRC challenge to Europe. We're also seeing progress in the EU's new white paper and the way that they talk about China as well. So we believe that the conversation with Europe is advancing with respect to the nature of this challenge and we also appreciate the fact that the French are sending surface combatants into the region and sailing where international law allows in the Indo-Pacific region. But he did take, I mean, Europe is one thing. France is a part of Europe. But what Macron did seemed to be selfish and individualistic and not in the best interest of what's happening in the world at this stage. Are you defending him? Congressman, I'm not defending President Macron or any other European leader. I'm telling you that our relationship with Europe is strong. We continue to advance the dialogue and the discourse about the nature of the PRC threat and we're seeing positive trend lines there in our engagement throughout Europe. Okay. Well, I just, I want to, I want you to know I have every faith in the world and our ability to handle China militarily. I'm very concerned about what I saw. I think Ford Motor Company is the best example for less than 15 days after the Chinese flew a spy balloon across the United States targeting U.S. military installations. Ford Motor Company, and for the record, I drive an F-350, I'm a Ford guy, partners with Communist China on their battery technology. And I think that we have to bust those alliances between corporate America and Communist China up. With that, I yield. Thank the gentleman. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Guy, you go for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Royal, in your written testimony, you highlighted the increasingly provocative conventional military activity that the PLA is conducting. I'm also concerned about the threat in the gray zone and believe that the regular warfare training in the region, and especially in Taiwan, is crucial. Do you believe that the department has the authorities in need for special operation forces to collaborate with allies and partners in the regular warfare? And where can we further deepen or expand the regular warfare programs with allied and partner forces in the Indo-Pacific? Thank you, Congressman. Our special operations forces amount to a real strategic advantage for the United States. They complement and enable the strategy that we have articulated through the national defense strategy, and our budget reflects the importance and the value that they bring to the Indo-Pacific region. It's important right now for us to focus on how we modernize our special operations forces, making sure that they are well connected to the other components of the department, and that they focus on that enabling capability going forward. But we believe that that is well captured within the budget submission. Thank you, Mr. Rosa. A follow-up. I also want to ask you about Chinese disinformation efforts in the region. Have you seen a change in the approach to how the CCP conducts disinformation campaigns since the start of Russia's second invasion of Ukraine? And what lessons do you believe China is drawing from Russia's example in the disinformation space? Congressman, I think some of that discussion is best left to a classified session. I will say that the PRC has demonstrated a significant appetite in its coercion campaign, and that's certainly inclusive of a misinformation, disinformation effort associated with that. If we look at the high-altitude balloon, to me that is a very good example of the kind of intrusion that you're looking, that the PRC is undertaking in a variety of domains right now. Okay. Admiral Gallino, thank you for your testimony. I want to ask you about the no-limits strategic partnership between Russia and China that you referenced in your written statement. Can you talk about what this enhanced relationship means in practice for military forces in the region, and is there a tangible effect on the security situation in the Indo-Pacific that we have noticed or we will be noticing? Thanks, Congressman. This kind of ties to a couple of your questions here to Jed because this is a different space, right? Two large authoritarian nations coming together in an attempt to change the world order in ways that are beneficial to authoritarian governments vice-terrest of the world. That's a pretty concerning space to be in, whether it's impact into the UN or ability to stifle any agreements that go forward. That's the approach. They have no friends. They have identified that it is better if they're together in order to achieve their strategic objectives. That's a concerning world. It ties directly to the misinformation, disinformation question. The PRC has been echoing Chinese, or excuse me, Russian disinformation in direct support articulating that the war was, their war against the Ukraine, against Ukraine was derived from an expansion of NATO. Just not true. So misinformation, disinformation in today's day and age is concerning, weaving through that mess and the PRC have a million-man propaganda arm to generate it. Thank you. And I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. Chair now recognize, gentlemen from Tennessee, Mr. Dr. Desjardins for five minutes. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Royle, on three separate occasions, we have seen President Biden commit the United States to the defense of Taiwan in a potential conflict with China, only to see his comments walk back by those in his administration. So I would ask, who is driving policy in this administration on China and Taiwan? Is it the president of the United States or unelected bureaucrats and appointees within the State Department, Pentagon and White House? Congressman, the department stands by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques and the six assurances as the foundation of our relationship with Taiwan. We continue to believe that our relationship there is aided well by the relationship we have. We've maintained it on a variety of levels with key leader engagements and tight cohesive understanding of one another's defense requirements. And we spend a lot of time talking about the PRC pacing challenge as we're observing it operate in the region. Okay, well, we like to talk about strategic ambiguity. Do you think President Xi has been ambiguous at all in his intentions on Taiwan? Congressman, we agree with you that President Xi has been very assertive in his approach to conducting a counter coercion campaign against Taiwan. We believe that he does intend to build a capable force that could stand to threaten Taiwan over time. And would you agree that our commander-in-chief has been pretty clear in his position on the United States' commitments to the defense of Taiwan? Congressman, I believe that the president has been clear with his intentions. I certainly wouldn't want to speak for him. I will say again that the Taiwan Relations Act continues to guide our engagement with Taiwan, including supporting their self-defense and making sure that we are in a position as United States military to counter any coercive activity in the region. What I struggle with on this committee when I go back home and talk to constituents, and I've heard other members say the same thing, is how do we message things like China, Taiwan? How do we message Russia and Ukraine? And it seems when we don't really know what the end game is, it's hard to do that. We've asked specifically what's the end game in Ukraine and there's not a clear answer. Is there a clear answer for what the end game would be if China invades Taiwan? Congressman, I won't engage in hypotheticals on future invasions. I will say that invasion is neither imminent nor inevitable, and the work that we are doing in the department every single day is to focus on deterrence, and we do that by increasing our lethality, our posture and our readiness. We'll continue to operate by the Taiwan Relations Act, and we'll continue to work on counter-coercion readiness within the US military to do that, and to ensure that we are supporting Taiwan and their ability to defend themselves. We seem to be struggling within the military on recruiting and other issues and morale, and I think maybe a lot of it is due to strategic ambiguity and nobody really knows what's going on within our military. We seem unclear about what our strategy in Ukraine is. We're getting mixed message from our Commander-in-Chief and our State Department Pentagon on China, Taiwan. In the past, I remember presidents going on TV and addressing the nation. We can only reach so many people from within this committee or Congress, and you guys have the same challenges. I mean, would it be important for the president to go on TV and maybe address the nation on what's happening in Ukraine, what our strategy is there, and what our strategy would be, and let President Xi know clearly where the United States stands, and maybe some of our allies would come along. Congressman, I'll defer to the White House on the President's on-air time. Again, I think that the President is asking us to do the daily job of deterrence and that he has submitted a budget that represents a real qualitative investment in our ability to maintain deterrence in the region. Okay. Well, the saber rattling about blockades in the Taiwan Strait and certainly China's aggression in the South China Sea, we know that half the world trade goes through that area. It seems like as Representative Scott mentioned a minute ago what corporations are doing financially with China may be the best way to get their attention, and certainly they can have a blockade of things coming in. Is it possible we could have a blockade of things going out? And it would impact all of us financially, but the best way to win this pending war is to not fight it. So I guess I would just like to see more unification of our allies, more talk from Japan, Australian people who are committed, and maybe a better strategy economically to help deter China, but deterrence did not work with Russia, and I hope we can do better moving forward with China, Taiwan. And thank you for you all being here today. Jim was times expired. Chair, I recognize Jim from California, Mr. Connor for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral Equilino, thank you for your leadership. You've spoken about the importance of the strategic relationship with India. I chair, co-chair with Michael Walts, the U.S.-India caucus. And on April 26th, we have a major summit with Secretary Mattis, the ambassadors, others I hope if you're in the country, you may be able to participate or send someone, but I would like you to reflect on the importance of the relationship. Post-colonialism, India and China had a relationship to emerge as the Asian voice, but that relationship now has really soured with a concern that there should not be a hegemon in Asia and that China is treating other countries as junior partners. It seems to me that gives us an opportunity to ensure that China doesn't emerge as a hegemon to strengthen the relationship with India, and I'd like to get your thoughts. Thanks, Congressman. So we value our partnership with India and we've been increasing it and doing a lot more over time. They have the same primary security challenger that we do, and it's real on their northern border. Two skirmishes now in over the past nine or 10 months on that border as they continue to get pressurized by the PRC for border gains. So we have the same security challengers. We also have the desire to operate together based on the world's largest democracy. We have common values and we also have people to people ties for a number of years. I met with General Chauhan, my counterpart, at the Racina Dialogue not long ago. I've been to India five times now in the past two years. So the importance of that relationship can't be overstated. We operate together frequently with the Quad Nations. Again, the Quad is not a security agreement. It's diplomatic and economic, but the Quad Nations come together often to operate together in multiple exercises. So we continue to work to be interoperable and to expand the relationship. I appreciate that, and we'll follow up with your office if you are in the country or have someone for the April 26 summit. One question, I was out with a representative, Mike Gallagher, who chairs the China Select Committee and we were out at Stanford. And I was struck by Oriana Scholar-Mastrow, who's a professor there, and she wrote in the paper, the Taiwan Temptation and Concern, that are we deployed enough to we have the capability if there was a blockade or an invasion of Taiwan? And in this article, she makes the argument that we don't, that we don't have enough long-range missiles to actually shoot down Chinese ships and that this makes our deterrence weak. I mean, I'm not summarizing in all detail, but that was the gist of it. Do you have a sense or anyone on the panel, if that's accurate, do we need more capability to make sure we have effective deterrence? So today, Congressman, let me just articulate that the Indo-Paycom Command is ready and prepared for any contingency. That said, as we talked about before, the challenger is moving fast, experimenting and delivering additional capabilities. And I think that the department's budget, as it applies. And again, I've given my 1254 report to articulate the capabilities that I think I need. So the delivery of those, and again, at speed and as fast as possible, I believe would continue that deterrence both today and into the future. Yes, sir. Congressman, I would add that we are deeply interested in seeing increasing responsiveness from the U.S. defense industrial base. This budget puts a lot of money in to making sure that our defense industrial base is even more competitive, including $30 billion towards munitions, Tomahawk, El Rasm, SM-6, and others, and $11 billion towards hyper and subsonic weapons systems as well. So we're building, including through the multi-year procurement authority that Congress has now provided to the department, a deeper stock of munitions within the defense industrial base to meet the challenge you described. Thank you. I would just say that from my perspective, the more we can do to have effective deterrence that China understands, the better in terms of avoiding war, and so I would be interested in hearing how we can have the most effective deterrence possible. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the gentleman. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the FY23 NDAA directs DOD to conduct war games, tabletop exercises, and most importantly, operational exercises with Taiwan's armed forces. I sort of view this as the least expensive way to build operational expertise and create a force capable of deterring an adversary. When can we expect to see the first exercises between the U.S. Navy and Air Force and their Taiwanese counterparts? So Congressman, thanks. I'd like to talk to you in a classified hearing about the schedule for our operations. I think that'd be most beneficial. When you, I guess in an unclassified setting, when you wargame these scenarios, put aside the operational exercises, are you assuming some level of interoperability with Taiwanese forces? Absolutely, both. As you know how wargames work, right? You can pick the time. We can wargame what does today look like, what is two years from now, what was four years from now look like. So we look at all those in order to ensure that we got a broad view and we leave no holes in our understanding and analysis. While we're on the subject of wargaming, tomorrow night the select committee on the Chinese Communist Party is gonna be conducting a wargame. And I think for a lot of our members will be an opportunity to participate in a wargame that haven't done that before. It's gonna be Taiwan focused into Pacific focus. Usually when we run these wargames, one thing quickly becomes apparent. We go Winchester on critical weapons systems. We run out of long range fires in particular. I would be curious to get your view on that. What worries you about the stockpiles of long range fires that we have west of the international dateline and what do you think is our best way to start replenishing our stockpiles and make sure that you have what you need in theater prior to the shooting starting? So thanks Congressman. First let me just make sure, I wanna make sure how you know I look at wargames, right? Wargaming is a learning objective. So when people talk about hey, who won, who lost, wargaming is not about that. It's about learning and understanding vulnerabilities, strengths and helps you go forward and figure out how to adjust and what you might need. So when you go into this event, I hope they're looking at it in the same way. With regard to the munitions piece, again I like to talk in a classified setting over the specific issues. That said, I'm not too worried as it applies to our ability to deter and then deliver effective contingency operations if required. You're not too worried, you said. I am not worried. What I would like is the acceleration of those things identified in the budget and then in my 1254 report I've made those requirements be known. Interesting. So even in a scenario that goes kinetic, you're not worried about the sufficiency of our stockpiles and our magazine capacity right now. I'm not worried about the United States ability to respond. Again, we can talk about specific munitions in a classified setting. Okay, I got, I mean that surprises me. I guess it goes counter to what little I know from playing a few wargames here and there, but I'm not living it in the Indo-Pacific every day like you are. Quickly general, I believe this year at the end of July, we will celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This is referred to as America's Forgotten War. The irony is that in China they have not forgotten it. In fact, they celebrate it. The highest grossing Chinese movie of all time is the Battle of Lake Changin, which is a sort of a creative retelling of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, sort of an oddball historically focused question, but what lessons do you believe that this Forgotten War offers for contemporary national security strategists and planners? Well, thanks Congressman, be ready. I mean, that's, you know, this kind of war, you know, we weren't prepared. So what this has for us is my main effort of being prepared, combat readiness, and evolving as the enemy evolves and looking at it through not just a land fight, but making sure that we can fight in all the domains and we have the capabilities to be able to do that. And so it'll be the 73rd anniversary of the beginning of the war and the 70th anniversary of the armistice, which we're gonna celebrate throughout, we've been celebrating throughout the year, but it'll culminate in the fall time with the Koreans. I believe that you mentioned this kind of war. Can I assume that's on your reading list, such as it exists? The Farrenbock book. When I was a captain, I read it, yes. That's fantastic. All right, I yield. Chairman, I recognize Jen from California, Mr. Carbohal for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. IndoPaycom hosts a broad range of challenges, most notably the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but also the increasing effects of climate change and building on relationships with several allies and partnerships. The PRC is steadily building up their space and anti-space capabilities. In 2022, they executed 64 launches alone. Admiral Alcalino, can you speak to the importance of maintaining space superiority in the IndoPaycom AOR, especially as the PRC, our pacing threat, is making advancements in this domain? And can you speak to how maintaining fiscal year 22 funding levels would impact our superiority? Thanks, Congressman. So as it applies to deterring and it should deterrence fail being able to fight when space is critical as we integrate all domains, undersea, honesty, above the sea in space and cyberspace. The synchronization of those effects happens every day in IndoPaycom and the space layer is an enabler for the terrestrial force. We absolutely need to maintain our superior advantage and continue to invest as we expand in space. If we were to reduce the investment, I've already identified in my 1254 report some shortfalls that we believe are beneficial, but if we were to fall back, that would also be impactful. Thank you, Admiral. The second item on your unfunded priority list from this year is to operationalize near-term space control. Can you expand on what factors contributed to this ending up on your UPL? I'd rather do that in a classified setting, sir. Thank you. Admiral Alcalino, it seems that a majority of space programs and development in the IndoPaycom AOR are protected at the highest levels of classification. I think we all share the goal of wanting to prevent any escalation in the region and believe strategic deterrence is key. Strategic deterrence is only possible if the deterrent is known to our adversaries at some level. Is IndoPaycom thinking through what space programs we should declassify as a strategic deterrent to the PRC ambitions in the space domain? Yes, sir. We do that all the time. Certainly there is the ability for the security challenger to understand what we do in space. There are capabilities that can do that for him. We treat all of our capabilities. We look at them in a way such that we protect what we need to protect. And for those that we don't believe we need to protect, we allow those to be seen. We do that with thoughtfulness to ensure we get it right. But we have to protect those things that are critical for the United States defense. Thank you. We know that the IndoPaycom area of responsibility is on the front lines of climate change, experiencing increasingly frequent disruptive storms and sea level rise that is already encroaching on military installations and training ranges. While these weather events lead to demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, they also directly impact defense infrastructure in the region. The Army Commission has studied in 2018 that showed that many Pacific islands, including Coagula and Atoll, Homo Ronald Reagan's ballistic missile defense test sites are at risk of experiencing significant climate impacts by mid-century. Secretary Royal, how is the department planning for and seeking to mitigate these risks as we look at forced posture in the region? Congressman, thank you for that question. The climate change does fold into the national defense strategy. It's a growing challenge that we understand. It's certainly one that we spend a lot of time talking to our partners in the Pacific, particularly Pacific Island nations, where we see the effects of climate change occurring rapidly. Part of our strategy here is to not only recognize it, but to make sure that we're thinking about areas to mitigate the impacts of climate change, including greater energy resilience, better infrastructure that protects against the erosion of rising sea waters, et cetera. So I believe that we have captured that well and we certainly are funding against that in the president's budget submission. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gates, for five minutes. Days ago in the Washington Post, in Washington military planners are realizing that China has surpassed the United States in hypersonic military technology. Does anyone seated at the table disagree with that assessment? Congressman, I think in terms of assessments, we should probably take that to a classified discussion. Well, it's been sort of unclassified without our consent. We had this leak that showed that China could launch one of these hypersonic glide capabilities, 2100 kilometers, that it could get there in 12 minutes. And I actually don't think it's, that can't be too classified because it was a year ago, Admiral, that you were before the Senate Armed Services Committee and you seem to be giving the warning at that time that we saw manifest in this leak. You said, quote, the hypersonic glide vehicle threat poses a serious threat to the U.S. and allied forces in the region and we require a near-term initial defense capability to meet this challenge. I read in between the lines of that to say you require the capability in the near-term because you didn't have the capability when you gave this testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, not on a classified setting, but in open hearings. So I guess my question to you, because I sense you are the truth teller on a lot of these things. Have you acquired the capability since this testimony? The department is working on the ability to do hypersonic defense, Congressman. Again, I stand by what I said, I am concerned about it and we do need to defend it. And it's still true today. That statement that you made to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, you wouldn't revise that or change that. That is true as we sit here today. It is. And so what I observe about our posture in Indo-Pacom is that for the last 30 years, the United States has been building aircraft carriers that will never get into the fight. And we've spent years building littoral combat ships, Mr. Smith, that will never get into the fight. And while you have been giving us the accurate information, you gave it to us now, you gave it to the Senate a year ago, the truth is we have not made a sufficient investment in hypersonic defense in order to ensure that we have this credible deterrent threat. Isn't that right, Admiral? Sir, if you look at the report, as it applies to our warm defense system, we have identified the need for that capability. Right. And so, I guess, how do our littoral combat ships ever get into the fight in a China-Taiwan scenario? Well, again, I think that'd be better in a classified setting. I didn't think it's not gonna happen. I think it's whether it's classified or not classified. Can we hit a moving target with our hypersonic offense? Again, sir, I think we ought to take those capabilities discussion to a close. Well, okay, so if I represent to you that China can hit a moving target and we can't hit a moving target, do you have any basis in this setting that you can share with me to rebut that assertion? I disagree that we can't hit a moving target. Oh, you think with our hypersonic capability? I didn't say with a hypersonic capability. Okay, but that's what I'm talking about because of course we can hit moving targets, but with a hypersonic capability, it changes the deterrence analysis because the time window shortens considerably as this leak of classified information tells us, kind of as you told us a year ago. And so I know that there'll be great bloodlust to go after the leaker of this information. It is never okay to leak classified information, especially when it could potentially put people at risk. Like what I wonder is who's gonna be punished more? The knucklehead who leaked this information or the generals and admirals and so-called experts who have sat before this committee and the Senate for decades saying that these capabilities that we were funding with gajillions of dollars were going to sufficiently deter China. And what you said last year, what you've confirmed now is that we need a capability in the near term that we do not have. What this leak shows is that China has it and we don't. And yet we continue to build ships that'll never get in the fight. We continue to support these endeavors that don't enhance deterrence, but if the right senator or congressman or lobbyist is for them, we do them. And I think that's, while it is never okay to leak classified information, I think that's what animates the concern among some of our even youngest and most inexperienced service members that we are not really positioning to win this fight. And we got too many grifters who roll in and out of the Pentagon, two defense contractors, and some of them even become secretary of defense thereafter. And I think it is disgraceful and it's not worthy of a true Pacific power like the United States. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure why the gentleman kept looking at me throughout that whole thing. I actually had the amendment on the floor last year to defund the littoral combat ship. I'm not sure how the gentleman voted on that amendment. I thought it wrong. Okay, well, that's good to know, interesting. I will say it. I know we can't talk about it in detail. There are massive investments in the president's budget in hypersonic missiles. There is no question that we were behind. And by the way, we were behind under the last administration as well. And in the last couple of years, we have made massive investments into hypersonics. You know, when we don't get in details what works or not, but we recognize the threat. And I would urge this time, the gentleman to join me when we try to move money away from those platforms that aren't going to be as useful and into those platforms that are useful. I just wanted to be clear. I'll be sure to do so. Thank you. May I yield back? Chair would advise members not to display classified information whether it's been leaked or not in open hearings. Chair, I recognize a gentle lady from New Jersey, Ms. Cheryl, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Royal Admiral Aquilino, did you want to say anything about our classified information? How important it is that we protect that in our military despite any arguments about where we need to move in this committee? Congresswoman, I'll offer that this appears to be a disgraceful criminal act that has occurred and it's very serious that the department is taking it with the highest degree of seriousness. We, every single day, have a responsibility to protect information and make sure that our classified information remains ours. We're supporting the Department of Justice. We've been very clear in offering every bit of support that we possibly can to help them in their investigation. We're conducting outreach with allies and partners to make sure that they are also understanding what the position of the department is in this process. I do want to be clear on this point. This will not knock us off of our strategy, off of our campaigning approach with integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is exceptionally unfortunate situation that does come with national security consequence, but it will not knock us off of our approach. Thank you. I think the gentleman from Florida raised some very good points, but I just wanted to highlight that people put themselves, their lives, their families' lives in danger to bring us this information and it's really important to me that we understand how dangerous it is to people working very hard for the United States of America around the world when these things are leaked. Thank you very much. I'd also like to thank you for your service and commitment to keeping our nation and our troops safe, especially as our country and the world grapples with a variety of complex and non-traditional threats, including the increasing aggressiveness and nuclear posturing of North Korea, aggressive and coercive transgressions from China in the region, cyber security threats and disinformation campaigns, climate change and increases in natural disasters as well as supply chain shortages. So Indo-Pacom, the region is not an easy one, but thank you for your service. So Secretary Royale and Admiral Aquilino, we are currently conducting our largest ever joint exercise with the Philippines. With the new leadership in the Philippines, how does our renewed relationship impact our freedom of navigation operations for sea lanes in the South China Sea? Congresswoman, we are enjoying strategic convergence with the government of the Philippines in operating in a manner that's stronger than ever. Training, exercises, information sharing and our ability to respond quickly to any kind of contingency that may arise right now. I was really proud when we were able to secure access to four new strategic locations through the EDCA sites with the government to the Philippines. These will offer the opportunity for opening the aperture of our ability to respond with the Philippines in a timely fashion and responsive fashion to any contingency, particularly humanitarian affairs and disaster relief have already been identified there. We believe this relationship has a lot of wind in its sails. It's definitely moving forward in the right direction and we're seeing the outcomes of that every single day. Thanks, Congresswoman. So again, the mutual defense for you with the Philippines is critical. They're a great partner. General Santino is my counterpart and a good friend. Minister Galvez, who just recently took over is a wonderful partner and they're facing some challenges, right? The PRC has claims that are inside the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. Those claims went through an international tribunal. They were articulated as they were not legal in the international world order as defined, yet the PRC continues to pressurize our Philippine counterparts. So it's really important that we continue to maintain support. We operate with them. As you said, Balacatana is going on right now. We do combined patrols and we support our Philippine partners everywhere. And I think traditionally we've struggled a bit to get support from our allies in the region on our freedom of navigation exercises. Can you talk a little bit about the support we're receiving from our allies today? Yeah, thanks. So let me start by articulating. So the freedom of navigation events that we execute are designed to demonstrate what the interpreted international law and order looks like. We don't fund countries. We challenge excessive claims and it's supported by our partners in a nation, in the region. Thank you, and I yield back. Chair, I recognize General from Nebraska, General Bacon for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all three of you for being here today. These are very important discussions and your perspectives are vitally important. We've been talking for about eight years of pivot to Asia. We've talked about China being the pacing threat, near peer competitor threat. But I don't know that I've seen the talk. I've seen the strategy documents. I don't know that we've actually seen as much physical movement. So I'd ask you, Admiral, if I may, how much has the Navy increased its size or presence in the Pacific the last couple of years? Thanks, Congressman. So the Navy is postured. 60% of the maritime force is in the Pacific. 40% is on the East Coast. Has that been an increase over the last two years? That's been in place now for at least three years. Three years. Before that. How about the Air Force? Because I've seen some units being withdrawn from the Pacific. As we align and execute the national defense strategy, the positioning of those forces certainly would be beneficial to be maintained inside of the first island chain where they're postured are forward stationed air forces. I have supported those forces to remain in place and or be replaced by equivalent capability and numbers. But would it be accurate to say we've seen that actual decline in air order battle in Asia? I just, I just, I see the talk, but I don't know if I see the actual physical presence. Yeah, I'd have to go back and take a look at that, Congressman, overall the force has gotten smaller, right? There's no doubt about that. So whether it's distributed or where it's been pulled from, I have to go look at. One of the concerns that we have is over the next, or over the fight up, the Air Force will shrink by about 400 fighters. What kind of concerns does this give you? Yeah, thanks Congressman. I'm concerned about any removal of combat power from the Indo-Pacific theater. Yep, I would be too. Thank you for, thank you for that. The B-21s and the Navy long range precision weapons seem to be very significant for your theater. There's a lot of talk from the Army about long range surface to surface missiles and positioning them also in the Pacific. But one of the problem areas is where do we station those and can you, do we have good options where to put these weapon systems? Yes, Congressman. So I believe we do, right? With the service concepts, the Army has delivered the multi-domain task force. The Marine Corps shifted to the Marine Latoro Regiment. When the capabilities deliver for anti-air and anti-surface, both land and sea, those land forces will be capable and directly aligned to what I need in this theater. From the air perspective, their agile combat employment approach to be able to be survivable and continue to deliver effect, those capabilities are needed and the posture required to do that we're working really hard on. Thank you. General, if I may. I know North Korea just tested a solid fuel ballistic missile. How does that change the threat in your perspective? Our ability for indications of warning. So in other words, we'll shorten your indications of warning. So you may get more surprise. Yes, sir. Okay. One last thing for you, if I may, sir. It was reported that some of the leaked information involves South Korea. Have you seen any pushback from our allies regarding this? Or has that impacted your rapport? It has not. No, sir. Okay. With that, I thank you for your time and Mr. Chair, I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. Chair, I recognize Ms. Jacobs for five minutes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to our witnesses for being here. I wanted to talk about Taiwan. Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you stated that Beijing significantly increased its military pressure against Taiwan in 2022 in response to, quote, a perceived policy shift in the US, Taiwan, political and military ties, end quote. I think it's important to recognize what kinds of US actions are actually shoring up Taiwan's defenses, such as the training and weapons the US has provided over the years, versus the kinds of things that are symbolic, but actually don't help the Taiwanese in their fight, like calls to rename embassies, high-profile visits, et cetera. I was hoping you could talk Admiral Aquilino or Mr. Royal about the ways in which the department is ensuring that we're not unnecessarily escalating tensions and how we're maintaining open lines of communication with the PRC. Thanks, Congresswoman. So let me just start by articulating the US policy as it applies to Taiwan has not changed, despite what may be believed in Beijing. Second, we do not see conflict. Everything we do is designed to prevent conflict, to maintain the peace and stability in the region. So that's where we sit. I can't tell you what they believe. Now, additionally, on your point of ability to have conversations and engagements with my counterparts, I've had a standing ask to meet with the Eastern Theater Commander and the Southern Theater Commander from the PLA for my entire time in this job, and they have yet to accept it. Second, we do, the Chiefs of Defense in the region do a about a quarterly virtual meeting of which the PRC has been invited to and of the, I think, five we've done so far, they've shown up at one and they sent a very low-level individual. Additionally, we meet annually in person once a year. They have not shown up for the last two years. We will, working through the process to invite them again in August. So the theme here is we continue to try to engage with our partner, but there's a different opinion there. Thank you, Mr. Ryle, do you wanna add? Sure, Congresswoman, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, we continue to support Taiwan's development of their own self-defense. We talked to them consistently about their defense requirements. We have $54 billion in implemented for military sales with the government of Taiwan, including $27 billion in new contracts that have been put on order since 2017. And so we believe that consistent with the law of the United States that this is important to maintain their defensive requirements. At the same time, we certainly call on the PRC to maintain open lines of communication, particularly at moments of crisis. And we have made a handful of requests, including during the transit of the high-altitude balloon, overflying our sovereign airspace. And we have not seen the responsiveness that we would like to see from Beijing in terms of answering our phone calls. Thank you. And as we consider our military presence in the Indo-Pacific, I think it's incredibly important that we prioritize civilian harm mitigation, especially in our ability to convene our partners and build coalitions that we need to do. And as you guys well know, DOD's civilian harm mitigation and response action plan provided critical guidance on how to minimize harm. I think implementing the recommendations outlined in the plan, such as enhanced training and better communication with local communities, will be really important. Admiral Aquilino, could you talk about how implementing the CHIMRAP will change how military operations are conducted in the Indo-Pacific region? Thanks, Congresswoman. So we are certainly always operating in accordance with the new guidance that's out there. We have taken that on. That said, we're currently not in a kinetic theater, but even in our peacetime operations, we are always focused on ensuring that the rule of law is followed to ensure we protect life of all participants in the region and that we'll always operate that way. I appreciate that. And I think as you know, the CHIMRAP requires combatant commanders to develop theater-specific training, especially that addresses cognitive biases and especially as we are working with partner forces in the Indo-Pacific to make sure that they too are addressing the civilian harm concerns and human rights. Thank you, I go back. Thank you, General Lady. Chair now recognize General from Florida, Mr. Walts for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we've had some discussion on this committee, a lot of debate actually on whether this conflict or conflict with the PRC is inevitable. And I would just comment to my colleagues that Chairman Xi has said that reunification with Taiwan one way or another, including the use of military force, just said it to the 20th party Congress, is inevitable. He said that he's not going to pass it on to the next generation. Basically said he's gonna do it on his watch. So I think we've got a lot of wishful thinking going on, just like we had wishful thinking going on in the run-up to Ukraine that force won't be employed. And with that context, Amrakulino, thank you so much for your hosting of various congressional delegations. It's been incredibly informative. Thank you as well, General LeCamera. And one of the key takeaways I continue to take is the ambiguity amongst our allies from these trips, key allies, allies that if we don't have use of their airspace, of their ports, of their basing, that I don't see how we effectively come to the aid of the defense of Taiwan. And so I guess my question for you is would greater clarity on our end, on the US's end and our intentions help drive clarity with our allies? And I'll just tell you one quick anecdote. In this last trip and in previous trips, we've been asking our allies, will you help us in the defense of Taiwan should it come to that? And the continual pushback is, well, when you tell us what you're going to do, we can make the top political decisions what we're going to do. So again, do you think clarity on our end would help Allied clarity, much like it has in Europe? Thanks, Congressman. Again, I'm not the policymaker, but what I can tell you is for the past 40 years, the policy has been successful. That's just historically accurate. I think you'd have to ask the allies and partners. What I hear when I talk to them frequently is that war is not desirable for anyone in the region. Of course. As that applies, what I read into it is they are supportive of our approach. They recognize that we're looking to prevent this conflict and that's what's keeping us together. In the event that deterrence fails, like of course, poverty is not desirable, war is not desirable, got it. But in the event that deterrence fails, as it has in Europe, you have to have those basing and overflight rights. Whether it's Japan, Philippines, we can go down the list. You have to have those operationally, correct? As operational commander. Yeah, the need for access and basing and overflight? Can you assume today, tomorrow, and the near future that you have them? We don't assume those are choices of sovereign nations whenever the time comes. And I think it's reasonable then to say if the United States was clear we're coming to the defense of democracy in Taiwan, then it would drive clarity in the region. I mean, clarity in Europe, for example, has deterred Putin in many ways from going beyond Ukraine. So would clarity in the Pacific help you having that basing and access? Yeah, I think we'd have to ask the allies and partners, Congressman, I don't wanna speak for them. And I'll just tell you another concern of mine, which we've talked to quite a bit about, is clarity here amongst the American people. And one of the lessons that the PRC has learned from Ukraine is if they decide to do it, they have to do it quickly. We can't decide here in Congress where the bathrooms are quickly. And so I think we need to have that debate now, not when amphibious ships are being loaded. Secretary Royal, why does Admiral Aquilino have a three and a half billion dollar unfunded list? Things like the defense of Guam, the defense of Hawaii, secure communications. Why if this is the number one threat according to multiple administrations as a man sitting next to you may be responsible for the greatest conflict in American history, have three and a half billion dollars out of a $850 billion budget that you can't find to support that warfighter. Congressman, first thing I'll say is there is no daylight between Indo-Pacific command and the Department of Defense. There should be no unfunded priorities for our number one threat. When we think about the prioritization of the region, there's absolutely no daylight between us. We prioritize and they're fully up and appreciate. Just in the interest of time, why does it take two and a half years from Congressional notification to contract award for harpoons for Taiwan? Two and a half years, why? Congressman, I'm happy to follow up with you specifically on the harpoon discussion, if that's helpful to you, the contracting. We have to move more quickly if the theme of today is we're running out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sure, I recognize the gentleman, Mr. Kim, for five minutes. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chair. Actually, I just want to kind of pick up where we're left off. Admiral Aquilino, you just said that the policy we've been implementing has been successful over the last 40 years or so. What policy were you in referencing there? Our one China policy and our alignment in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, six assurances to re-communicate. Is that a policy that's also being implemented right now through that strategic ambiguity approach? Congressman, yes, this is the approach that we have taken with the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques and the six assurances. So if we're saying that this has been successful for the last four years, do either of you see a need to change that policy at this point? Congressman, I would say that this policy has served us well, continues to serve us well. It allows us to be able to conduct all of the deterrence operations that we're currently conducting in the region, and it allows us to be able to maintain the cohesion with our alliances and partnerships throughout the region that serve us very well. I understand the desire about clarity, and I understand how that could very well prompt some conversations that we aren't having right now, but I can also see how that could be sort of a double-edged sword. So I guess I wanted to ask the admiral and then Mr. Royle, would that strategic clarity at this moment, do you think that would help or hurt our ability to build coalitions with other partners? Congressman, I'll jump in first on that one. I believe that we need to maintain constant contact with allies and partners about how they see stability in the region. We need to listen to them. We're doing that regularly. I would also just add one point on clarity. I think what is clarifying here is the results that we're seeing in terms of our engagements with allies and partners in the region. Tremendous amount of progress in terms of our posture, our readiness, our ability to inter-operate with allies and partners. To be very clear, that is the clarifying element of our strategy in the region right now, and we're investing in all of those areas and our allies and partners are with us. Admiral, anything you'd like to add here? Sorry, I'm not a policymaker. So again, as it applies, I'll execute in accordance with. One thing that I do hear from a lot of allies and partners in the area is about their concern regarding cybersecurity. This is a place where I feel like we have a lot of opportunity potentially to be able to engage and build that up as we're thinking about what we have to offer other countries. So I guess, Admiral, I want to just turn to you first and then I'll turn to the general here, but is there more that we could be doing here to be able to help lift up the cybersecurity capabilities of different partners in the region and use that as a way to be able to further our relationships with them? I wonder if there's something here we can press on the gas. Yeah, Congressman, it's absolutely a field that is needed. We need to expand with our allies and partners. That said, their responsibility goes to General Nakasoni at Cybercom. Now, he and I coordinate all the time. I've identified the areas, priorities, and needs. He has taken them on full board, but protecting both the United States networks as well as our ally and partner networks is critical and it drives us together. Yeah, thank you, Admiral. And that is something that I raised with General Nakasoni and something that he pointed out is important as well. So I hope we can follow up with both you and he to try to figure out how we engage in that way. General, I wanted to just kind of get your thoughts from that from the Korean Peninsula side. A lot of concerns about cybersecurity there. What else do we need to be thinking about on that front? And is there more that we could be doing with our partners in the ROK to be able to engage there? Especially as we have a state visit coming up, I'm trying to think about what are the priorities we should be trying to push the ROK on to be able to strengthen our relationship and partnership on cybersecurity and other issues there. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. Yeah, the focus is on that, protecting our information, not just cyber, but the other domains. And working with General Nakasoni and his folks, but also working with the Koreans and the commands that they're standing up to make sure that we can protect this information. We've seen some developments, promising developments between discussion between South Korea and Japan of recent Mr. Roy. I guess maybe I'll just ask you, is there an area there that we can try to, again, kind of push on the gas and try to see if we can help strengthen that kind of relationship there, but also see it as part of the kind of security architecture that we're trying to build? Congressman, just a couple of days ago, we were able to see Japan and the Republic of Korea operate just off the waters of South Korea together. These are the kinds of instances and examples where we're watching growing convergence and the strategic interests and growing convergence in their willingness to work together. Gentlemen's time has expired. Chair, I recognize the gentleman from the great state of Alabama, Mr. Dale, a strong for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before my question, I'd like to say for the record, any leak of classified documents related to the national security of America is unacceptable under any circumstance. Admiral Kilineau, my first question, I want to echo the remarks of the Chairman Rodgers in saying thank you for being so candid. Your unfunded priorities list might as well be a highlight reel of what North Alabama does best. I know you have a close partnership with the Missile Defense Agency, SMDC, both call Redstone Arsenal home. The number one Indo-Paycom unfunded priority is for the Guam defense system. The FY23 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior DoD official to be responsible for the development and deployment of a Missile Defense system for Guam. Giving your expertise, which DoD official, do you believe would be best suited for this role to reach the objective? Thanks, Congressman. Again, that current debate is going on. I'm not sure I know exactly who, but I think that might be better for Jed to take as it's working through the building. Okay, let me rephrase it. What would you want to see their expertise be going into this role? What would be most beneficial to execute this? Yeah, I think it's somebody who could direct budgets, who could direct priorities, and then work towards both delivery and sustainment. Thank you. Your number five unfunded priority, all-domain missile warnings and tracking architecture would provide upgrades for the THAAD software to assist with integrated air and missile defense protections. Can you speak to the importance of this provision and the repercussions if Congress does not find a way to fund it? Yeah, thanks, Congressman. So foundational, again, as we built the requirement to defend Guam via 360-degree threats from all capabilities, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and other capabilities, the end state is this hybrid architecture of integrated capabilities. And the shortfall identified in my list would slow down or delay the integration of those different sets of capability, whether it be the AGES portion or the Army sets of portions that are linked together, THAAD, Patriot, IFPIC, along with the AGES piece. So it pushes that later. Thank you, Ed. Well, both the Navy and INDO-PACOM both have the SM-6 missile on their unfunded priority list. The final assembly and testing of the SM-6 takes place at Redstone Arsenal, my district. I am aware that there have been delays with production and the manufacturer is working to get back on track within the year. Can you give the committee a perspective of why the SM-6 is critical within the INDO Pacific? Congressman, it's an extremely capable weapon, has both an anti-air capability, it has an anti-ship capability. So when you deliver it out into the fleet, or whether it comes in some other form, it's certainly proven itself to be critically lethal and capable. Thank you. As you shared in your testimony in the 2022, China completed 64 successful space launches. This is concerning at face value, especially considering that we're only 87 launches in 2022 from American carriers. I'm proud to say that the DOT's top launch provider, which manufactures in my district, ULA has 100% mission success rate. Speaking to your number two unfunded priority, which specific resources does your command need to ensure a national defense space architecture is reliable and resilient? Yeah, Congressman, if we could do that in a classified setting, that'd be helpful. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chair and I recognize the gentleman, Mr. Ryan, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being here. Thank you also for your in-depth written testimony. It was appreciated and comprehensive. So thank you. In the last few weeks, growing concern, certainly from me and many, to see more and more cozy relationship between Xi and Putin, and even more willingness to be overt and blatant about what we know has been obviously happening behind the scenes for a while. With that context in mind, as we look at the lessons over the last near decade, looking back to 2014 in Ukraine, what we did in terms of some of the actions and response there with training and embedding with Ukrainian forces, both Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilino, could you talk about those lessons and how we're trying to apply those in Taiwan to be more specific? Can you speak to their readiness, both in terms of capability and intent and the urgency, is the urgency there and what can we do to bolster that? I'm happy to share a few initial thoughts with you and happy to follow up later on. First is I think that it's a real lesson for us that the rules-based international order cannot be taken for granted, that there is naked ambition that continues to exist in the world and we're watching that play out in Ukraine. So that's, I think the first thing we need to be vigilant about the fact that our international order is under duress. Secondly, we need to make sure that we are understanding what the real defense and capability requirements are of those that might be put under pressure by revanchist powers. And so we maintain a strong capability, requirements, relationship and discussion with the government of Taiwan. And as I mentioned, we continue to service those defense requirements through the foreign military sales program and direct commercial sales. And finally, in terms of training, proficiency is absolutely necessary here. You pointed to a relationship that we had with the government of Ukraine that was very productive in terms of its training outcomes since 2014. I believe that we need to be able to think about how we can support Taiwan's proficiencies with the weapon systems that they are ordering. Admiral? Yeah, Congressman. So again, I'll just leave it as this. We have done a lot of work understanding the lessons learned from Ukraine and what's occurred. And we are certainly integrating all of those into our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. Thank you both. Building on that, and our ranking member addressed this in his opening statement, I've heard both from you all and others who have come before us, the importance of our alliances as one of our, I believe, strategic differentiators and strengths vis-a-vis our PRC adversaries. Admiral Aikulina, you also touched on this in your testimony. Can you speak a little bit more about where we're at with India in particular? And I know that's a broad question, but are there authorities or requirements that we can help you all on to advance and bolster that critical alliance? Thanks, Congressman. So again, India is a critical partner, as we talked about, aside from the cooperation that we're doing in the military, right? So the exercises like Malabar, Utobias, the fact that we're providing assistance as it applies to coal weather gear and other capabilities that they might need as they defend their border on the northern side. But additionally, we're expanding our cooperation in the form of production as India tries to work to develop its own industrial base. So C-130 critical components made in India, helicopter critical frameworks made in India, that is expanding the partnership and moving them towards certainly self-sufficiency and increased partnership with the United States. Thank you. Oh, sorry, did you have something to say? Just offer as well that recently we kicked off what we call an initiative for critical and emerging technologies that was announced by the two national security advisors of the United States and India. We're already delivering offers under the context of the ISET arrangement. This is a real moment of convergence for the United States and India and we're looking to take full advantage of it going forward. Thank you. Just very briefly, General Kamara, how do you assess growing velocity from the PRC changing Mr. Kim's calculus? Is it likely that they sort of feed off each other, essentially? Yeah, I mean, they're passing congratulatory notes back and forth and I've stated in the past that I see nothing on the Korean Peninsula that won't involve China and Russia, both providing lethal and non-lethal support. Thank you. Thank you. You'll back, Mr. Chair. Chair, I recognize General from Indiana, Mr. Banks for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, when did you first become aware of the spy balloon before it entered our airspace over Alaska or after? It's certainly to take that in a classified setting. A Washington Post story over the weekend said that there have been several Chinese balloons that have operated in the Indo-Pakom AOR over previous years. What are we doing about it? So as we posture in the Indo-Pakom AOR, sir, I'm responsible for Defense of Guam, Defense of Hawaii. We have aircraft on alert. Our systems and our architectures are looking to ensure we can identify those in a position in place where we could respond if required. So the story also notes that the spy balloons in your AOR often fly over US carrier strike groups and over the South China Sea. So are we concerned about this or is this something that we too easily dismiss as the President seemed to have done when the balloon flew over the entire continental United States? So, sir, I'm responsible and always concerned about force protection for our assets. So the network of sensors that exists, we understand where they're going and when and whether or not they're threatening. That said, if they fly over the South China Sea, in accordance with the rules-based international order, if that's international airspace, then they should be allowed to fly there. That's the way we would see it. That's what we do. That's what it means to adhere to the rules-based international order. Okay. Can you explain to the public or at least members of the committee why you want to, why you can't answer the question of when you became aware of the Chinese spy balloon before it entered our airspace in Alaska or after? Certainly the means of that. For the record, why would that have to be divulged in a classified setting? Certainly the way we identified it and how we knew where it was and when it was is something I'd rather keep to ourselves. Okay. At a, let's see, Admiral, at a March hearing, I questioned North Com Commander General Van Herk who told me that President Biden, quote, could ask under special authorities for the military to do more to prevent fentanyl trafficking at our southern border. Could President Biden use such special authorities to help Indo-Pakistan block the export of Chinese fentanyl analogs coming into the North America from your knowledge? I'd have to go back and see, and sir, as I understand it, or those precursor chemicals are actually illegal to be shipped. So currently I don't have any authorities to interdict or stop or prevent legal chemicals from being. Mr. Roy, what would those authorities be? The President Trump or President Biden could enact that he's not enacting that President Trump did use? Congressman, I can't speak to the specific authorities that you're referencing right now. I will say that we believe that the fentanyl problem that we're facing is a serious one and a serious threat to our society. The administration does have a strategic implementation plan that is shared by members of the interagency and DOD has provided enabling support to that strategic implementation plan, including through the provision of aircraft radar and intelligence to support arresting this threat as it continues to move forward to our country. So just to clear this up, those special authorities do exist. Sir, I'm not entirely sure which specific authorities you're referring to. Right now we have the authority to be able to support our interagency partners and we have done that under the rubric of the strategic implementation plan. Admiral, can you talk about the joint interagency task force West that's used to interdict the flow of fentanyl into the United States? Yes, Congressman, so that's my organization assigned towards counter drug, counter transnational crime and taking on that aspect of what the PRC might do. We track any of those shipments in accordance and in conjunction with Northcom, Southcom and the interagency to provide an understanding of where that may be going so that if it does end up turning into an illegal chemical, then it can be interdicted. So my organization is directly connected. We track those whenever we can. Okay, thank you. I yield back. Thank you gentlemen. Chair, I recognize General Lee from Texas. Mrs. Escobar for five minutes. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony and your service. I represent, I have the privilege of representing Fort Bliss, Texas which is in Texas 16 El Paso. And my questions are going to focus on the importance of resilient infrastructure, logistics and mobilization capacity. We have to make sure that we are increasing our logistics capacity and force adaptability in the theater where China is, not only maintains the advantage of proximity but owns a vast arsenal of capabilities unlike that of the insurgent forces the US spent the last 20 years fighting. Admiral Aquilino, my first question is for you, sir. I'd like to highlight the critical importance of multi-domain operational training in a contested environment, especially as it pertains to the Army. Can you talk about how Pacific Pathways and other initiatives are integrating this element to prepare our Army for a potential conflict in the theater? What challenges if any do you foresee affecting our ability to conduct joint training with partners and allies on a large scale while emulating a highly contested logistics environment? Thanks, Congresswoman. So from the Indo-Pacific position, right? This is going to take the whole joint force and synchronizing and integrating that joint force to be able to deliver effects is a strength the United States has that no other nation can do to include the sustaining of that force across half the globe. So Pacific Partnership or Pacific Pathways is critical because it's a mechanism to maneuver the land component to places where either we can exercise or operate with our allies and partners or to preset the force in places that we need to operate. That same capability is needed across all of the service components. So what identified in my report was a need for increased campaigning dollars that does exactly that. It allows for the transportation, sustainment and support for forces forward to deliver that a turn effect. Thank you so much. Mr. Royal, any large scale operations or increased deployments in the AOR would require development of key infrastructure. However, the need for this infrastructure to be resilient to climate disasters cannot be overstated. What are the biggest challenges impacting your ability to take environmental factors into consideration in making assessments required for mil-con needs in the AOR? Congresswoman, I will just add to what Admiral Aquilino has said by reinforcing that deterrence occurs in this region based on two things. One, it's having the right capabilities at the right level of readiness in the right locations. And secondly, because our allies and partners are with us. And there, this question of posture brings those two together, the capabilities and the allies and partners. And we're seeing some really terrific progress being made with respect to how we are able to posture alongside our allies and partners. In terms of climate concerns, we do have a non-growing dialogue with partners throughout the region, allies throughout the region on how climate change is affecting their ability to be able to withstand and support U.S. military movement through the region. USERPAC has a terrific war game series called Unified Pacific War Gaming Series. And they are testing out their ability to maneuver through a contested environment in the region, including with respect to the potential effects of climate change moving forward. So we have addressed that in the national defense strategy and we're addressing that in the budget submission as well. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you, General. I'd like to share that. I'll let you from Michigan, Ms. McClain, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here today. I appreciate it. Admiral Ecolino, I want to make it clear that I have some serious concerns with the priority of the White House when it comes to our national defense. I also want to make sure that we understand that I have some serious concerns on how our taxpayers' dollars are spent as it pertains to the military to make sure that we are ready. And I think there are a lot of issues that we need to cover. I think prioritization of these issues are extremely important. Like you, I'm gravely concerned about the CCP and the PLA's aggressive modernization timeline. While you have almost 3.5 billion in unfunded priorities that you've deemed as vital to our defense against the PLA, 3.5 billion, the President's budget over the past several years has been focused on a woke garbage, in my opinion, agenda that has nothing to do with deterring the CCP. So let me just give you some numbers as I see them. In 2021, Chairman Milley admitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the DOD spent almost 6 million man-hours on woke training. Six, it's right here, 6 million man-hours on woke training. May of 22, the DOD spent $91,000 on diversity and inclusion for the Air Force Band. Okay, last year we found out that Kallisa Wing of the former Chief DEI officer at the Defense Department School was pushing her book on white privilege in those schools. Okay, last month the Air Force launched an effort to hire a diversity, equity and inclusion manager, manager, excuse me, and pay them upwards of $180,000 a year. I'm curious as to what their outcomes would be because when you hire a diversity, equity and inclusion manager, I'm curious what their outcome is because if they achieved their outcome they'd be put out of a job. But that's a different discussion for a different day. FY23, the President requested 86.5 million for dedicated diversity and inclusion activities, 86.5 million. Now remember, you have 3.5 billion of unfunded priorities. This year, the President wants 114 million more, right? These ridiculous instances of wokeness and sends an embarrassing message, I think, to our friends but more importantly to our allies on what we prioritize. Now, I'm not here to say that diversity, equity and inclusion is not important but on the list of priorities, I gotta tell ya, I think we have some other funded projects that we could spend 6 million more man hours on. So I know you don't have an exact number but I would like to hear your opinion on how much do you think the CCP spends on diversity, equity and inclusion? Or do you think they might prioritize like their hypersonics a little bit ahead of diversity, equity and inclusion? I don't have that number, ma'am. I'd have to look at it and get back to you. What's your gut feel? I think they spend like 6 million man hours talking about diversity, equity and inclusion and are you think they spend maybe use those hours to develop some hypersonics to use against us? Well, what I would say is it's certainly not a diverse culture by design. I would agree with that but I'd like to know what you think of our prioritizations. You have billions of unfunded mandates and we're spending taxpayer dollars and a lot of those taxpayer dollars on stuff. Do you think that helps our readiness? Oh ma'am, what I would say is as you clearly identified and looked at the report, I've submitted, it's clear what I've identified as priorities. I think I'd turn that over to Jed to take on. Congresswoman, I think that the health and... Mr. Royal, please, you're very soft spoken. Please pull the mic close. We really can't hear you. Sorry, Congresswoman. Congresswoman, I would say... I too, I'm soft spoken. Yeah. The health and the wellbeing of the department's workforce both in uniform and civilian is of the utmost importance. It's one of four key priorities in the national defense strategy and we are looking comprehensively at how we're going to support our workforce going forward. I appreciate that. My time's up. I yield back. Thank you. Chair now recognizes Ms. McClellan for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith for convening the hearing today and to our witnesses for being here. I wanna focus a little bit on our regional alliances. It has been heartening recently that our treaty allies, South Korea and Japan have been working recently to resolve their diplomatic tensions and to cooperate more effectively. How is Indo-Pac-com working to encourage similar breakthroughs to strengthen ties between U.S. allies in the region so that we can present a stronger united front in the face of increasing Chinese aggression? Thanks, Congresswoman. Again, 120 exercises a year with partners across the region. So through the military landscape, we spend a lot of time ensuring that we know how to operate together, how we can be interoperable as best as possible, how we can protect the rules-based international order. And that's on top of all of our operations outside of exercises. Continuous coordination with my counterparts. My staff always directly involved and linked with both country teams as well as our partner nations. So that'll continue and it takes, we spend a lot of money there or we spend a lot of effort there. Thank you. And this is for Mr. Royal and also you Admiral. Recently the United States, the UK and Australia announced pillar one of the AUKUS agreement that will allow Australia to obtain American manufactured nuclear power submarines and eventually make similar vessels indigenously. Is the U.S. military supplier base ready to expand its capacity to address increased demand? And if not, what steps can we take to ensure that we can meet our stated production goals for AUKUS and for naval forces? Congressman, I would just take one step back and offer a complimenting comment to what Admiral Aquilino just stated. You referenced Japan and Korea in your question. I would also note that with Australia in particular, we have agreed to increase U.S. rotational presence, including with bombers and fighters and defense and industrial base integration is occurring at this very moment. Just looking at the level of exercises that we're conducting in the region, Talisman Saber, Balikatan, Cobra Gold, Garuda Shield, each of these are seeing the highest levels of engagement in their history. And so in terms of the overall picture of how healthy the alliances and partnerships are in the region, we're really seeing some historic steps forward. On AUKUS, we do believe that the industrial base can perform at the level that we have proposed in the agreement that we have with the UK and Australia. We know that it will take a lot of work. It'll take a lot of constant conversation with industry partners as well. We're encouraged by the defense industrial base commitment that Australia has already made to our submarine defense industrial base. And so we think things are on the right track. And Congresswoman, for my role, it's to be able to accelerate this capability. And in order to do that, I've sent submarines, U.S. submarines to Sterling for familiarization so the Australians can also look at it. We've done that in coordination with the United Kingdom. And then ultimately, as soon as possible, we're gonna look to get Australian sailors on U.S. submarines. So I get to work diligently to bridge the gap as the industrial base delivers what's needed. Thank you. And we've touched a little bit on how war is not enough. It's inevitable. And I wanna focus a little bit on diplomacy. And our military strength can only go as far as in maintaining powerful alliance systems that concerted diplomacy has to be the cornerstone of those alliances. Are we doing enough to maintain a strong and concerted diplomatic presence that makes the job of our armed forces in the region easier? Congressman, I'm very pleased to say that our Indo-Pacific strategy for this administration is very much an interagency strategy. The role for the U.S. Department of Defense and for Indo-Pacific command in our armed forces is discreet, it's tailored, it's focused. It all fits within a broader context of diplomacy. And again, I think that we're seeing the impacts of that interagency diplomacy led effort. When we look at the progress that's being made in terms of U.S. posture access into the region and the multilateral arrangements that have been established in many cases, smaller trilateral progress that we're seeing right now between Republic of Korea, Japan, the United States, other many lateral settings. Thank you. I yield back. The gentleman who takes us, Mitch Ballin recognized five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very much. And thank you for all the witnesses for joining us. Admiral, is it true that China has doubled their military spending in the last 10 years? Congressman, that's true based on the reports as articulated and presented by the PLA. My belief is that spending that actually goes on in support of their military is much higher than that. And their spending maybe increased year of year, about 7.5%, does that sound about accurate? The military spending. Excuse me? Their military spending has increased 7.5% roughly over the last year. Again, that's their advertised number. I'm not sure it's accurate. So they're focused on improving clearly their hard power. Let's talk about soft power. In your estimation, what kind of threats to our interest and influence in the region does their Belt and Road Initiative present? Thanks, Congressman. I'm not sure it would be considered soft power. I think it's a coercive tool as utilized by the PRC to be able to influence and move nations in the region in directions that are beneficial for the PLA. When the PLA articulates Belt and Road or One Belt One Road as a win-win strategy, that's true. It's a win for the Chinese and it's a win for the Chinese. It is not a win for any nation. Okay. Secretary Royal, can you touch on India's importance in the region and what we can do to kind of wean them off their dependence on Russia for weapons and defense assistance and bring them more into the fold in the Western world? The Congressman, as Admiral Aquilino already stated, India faces the same challenger that we face in the region. And so what we're seeing right now is a moment of strategic convergence in our relationship with the government of India. There's a lot of momentum in that regard. With respect to your question on from whom do they buy their weapons, we believe that they are through a generational process of looking to diversify off of traditional suppliers. We wanna make sure that the U.S. defense industrial base is in the best position possible to be India's partner of choice moving forward. I noted the initiative on critical and emergency. Mr. Royal, please pull the microphone closer. Thank you, sir. I noted earlier the initiative on critical and emerging technologies that has been announced by the two national security advisors of the United States and India. And so it's in all of these areas where we're able to see the kind of progress and the kind of promise for this relationship moving forward. Yeah, thank you. And I guess for Mr. Royal and if the Admiral and the general wanna weigh in on this, how troubling did you find the comments of President Macron of France recently? Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, we're having a really in-depth conversation with all of our European partners on the challenges that the PRC presents both in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. As we look at the NATO strategic document that's been developed, it includes the PRC in a way that it hasn't in the past. I would say the same thing for the latest European Union white paper. So we're taking President Macron's comments within the context of all of those trends that we're watching. I would certainly point to other voices out there. The foreign minister of Germany was recently delivered a speech in which she talked a little bit differently than President Macron. And we have certainly Foreign Minister Wang of Australia who delivered a speech along those lines. I would point to as well as I would say fairly consistent with a understanding and approach the United States has to the PRC challenge. Admiral General, do you have any comments? No, sir. Go ahead, General, sir. No, sir. The thing that it makes it rather obvious to me is the PRC would love nothing more than separate us from the EU. And if they do that, then that's a huge win for them. And I just want to make sure that we nip something like that in the bud because it was very just really shocking that he'd said what he said. I didn't really serve. I don't think Europe's interest, France's interest, are certainly ours. So I want to thank you all again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman, I recognize General from Pennsylvania, Mr. DeLuzio for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, hello. I know it's a long day. Thanks for being with us. Admiral, I want to pick up on a question from Mr. Fallon here about PRC spending and in particular, advertised or otherwise, where is their investment in their shipbuilding relative to ours? I don't think I have the comparison, Congressman, but they are certainly putting out ships at a pace that exceeds ours right now. And that's warships, sea lift, commercial, all of it? All the above. I ask because one of the pieces I'm worried about is they are very aggressively making territorial claims, asserting the power to regulate ships within what is international water that our fleet and otherwise patrols and protects to submit to Chinese command and supervision in those waters. Again, flagrantly violating international law and norms. And certainly against the backdrop of raising their warships or building more warships relative to what we are doing, our sea lift capacity, I worry. I think last month in this committee, the maritime administrator told us, talking about the sea lift fleet, the average age of some of those ships is 44 years old, some more than 50 years old. We're relying on foreign-built ships for our sea lift capacity. And so I guess my question, Admiral, would be whether you think our sea lift capacity is sufficient to meet our needs. And certainly if you could weigh in on where our sea lift capacity is relative to PRC. As it applies to sea lift, we certainly have a distinct advantage over the PRC, both numbers and capabilities. As it applies to what's needed in the future, so General Van Oost, the Transcom Commander, and I speak often, she's aware of the needs required and she's done some good work. And I also thank the Congress for the support to the additional 10 tankers that we've been able to utilize. So as a combined effort, sea lift and airlift is critical, especially when you have to do logistic sustainment over half the globe. And again, in partner with Transcom Commander, we've identified that and asked the services to support it. Mr. Royal, anything you wanna add to, or weigh in on that question? Thanks Congressman. I would offer that DOD has quite a broad range of modeling and analytical capabilities that we undertake. We're looking at this theater as an all domain competitive space. Shipbuilding is certainly one of those domains and we wanna make sure that we remain competitive in that regard. But we're also making sure we're thinking about the position and the presence of US ships with respect to all of the other domains that are necessary to bring to bear the right kind of posture at the right time. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. And I wanna pause for a minute. I was glad the way that Mr. DeLuzio framed that and that is what are they doing compared to us? Because I've said repeatedly, what they spend is, what they say they spend is a lie. But what they spend compared to what we spend is not apples to apples. They don't have an EPA. They don't have OSHA. They don't have NEPA. They don't have a Congress. They don't have any of the things that we have to deal with and interfere with or drive cost up on their expenditures. So it's always healthy to do what Mr. DeLuzio did talking in terms of what is our capability, what is their capability, not how much they spend versus how much we spend because it really is a silly argument. Who? Mr. Moilen from Guam is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel today. The time that you put in and the answers that you've been providing us, very helpful. I also want you to know in the audience we have also guests from Guam, our Guam Chamber of Commerce here. We have six of them that are very supportive of our continued military buildup on Guam and where are they happy? Are they in the chat? Can you kind of stand up please? Welcome. Glad to have you all here with us. Hope we didn't disappoint you. Thank you, and we continue to support our military buildup on Guam. Sir, you made in your report regarding the Guam cluster. Identifying us as Guam is the most forward territory in the Pacific, right? Identifying over 170,000 American civilian citizens. You pointed out with Guam and CMY that we know time in history as such a military buildup and construction being happening. And specifically, you mentioned that Guam is the third highest construction workforce per capita nationally. And the military construction demands require a workforce more than three times as large as what currently exists. So in order to do this, we need a great relief regarding the H2B workers. And right now, these H2B workers are gonna end in 2024. And in your report, you said we need them until 2029. So I'm completely behind you, I trust you, I know what you're doing, and I believe in what you can do. But I need to support you even greater. Congress needs to support you even greater. We've introduced the standalone bill with the H2B visas to extend until 2029. And we're even attempting to include that in the NDAA language. It will be helpful for me if you can further explain. If we don't get this done, and what's the importance of this construction being done in the Guam cluster, and how important it is for you to complete your mission, sir? Thanks, Congressman. So the development on Guam, I think we've invested between 11 and $13 billion to be able to execute the requirements that we believe we need for both sustainment, as well as offensive and defensive war fighting capabilities. It is critical to be able to deliver those at speed and with the sense of urgency that are articulated. So the criticality of extending the H2B visas through 29 would allow us to finalize the investments and the delivery of the posture needed on Guam. The people of Guam have been amazing partners throughout history, all the way back to World War II. So we need to finish our posture initiatives without the ability to get workers, which are mostly from the Philippines. Again, I'd be clear. There's no Chinese workers coming to Guam to do the work that we've asked. It would delay the implementation and push us back years if we didn't have that authority. Thank you, I don't know. Another question, of course, is where our budget was significantly short. You're talking about the Guam defense system, right? The priority mission to defend our homeland with the GDS 360 degree integrated air and missile defense for Guam to include an offensive capability as well. So we understand the budget, the President's proposed budget was 147 million short. You identified that this was the purpose of the Guam defense system, the 360 degree integrated air and missile defense for the island. I want to thank you for making that a top unfunded priority. And I'm gonna do my best to make sure that's a funded priority as well. But again, just reiterate, we're the forward most deployed, right? We keep this as far away as possible. Without this, we're putting in danger, I believe, all the truths we have on island and specifically the civilians on Guam. So please reiterate what you're explaining to us in your report. Thank you, sir. Thanks, Congressman. So again, the funding shortfall identified is my integration with the missile defense agency and the department is targeted at integrating the different sets of capabilities that are identified in the architecture. So ages capabilities tied with army capabilities in the form of THAAD, Patriot, IFPIC, LTAMS, and the other required portions to deliver a 306 degree integrated defense. That 147 would delay the integration of some of those capabilities, and that wouldn't be optimum for the delivery of the defense of Guam. Thank you, I don't know, we'll fight strong to get your HB extended to 2029 and get you that 147 million in order for our nation and for our island of Guam. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Chair, now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis for five minutes. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair. Welcome to the witnesses here today. While the focus of the United States security policy of late has been on the People's Republic of China, North Korea, continues to engage in cyber-rattling tactics in the nuclear weapons domain. General Lecomara, at this moment in time, how do you assess the threat level from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and specifically which leg of the nuclear triad, air, land, sea, capability? Your opinion poses the most immediate threat to the homeland. Now to answer your last question, his land capability is the greatest threat. What he's demonstrated with his ICBM testing. Our focus is on combat readiness and making sure that we can, we have not deterred him in developing this capability. We now need to focus on deterring him from employing this capability. As we saw tragically in Hong Kong, the people at the top of the institutions matter as much if not more than the institutions of government themselves. In responding to the PRC's brazen violation of the one country, two systems regime that governed Hong Kong since its incorporation a generation ago, the US offered little in the way of pushback. Mr. Royal, as we think about our military's posture in the South China Sea, especially as it relates to Taiwan, how can we be sure that history does not repeat itself? Congressman, I agree with your assessment that we're watching a PRC increasingly repressive at home and increasingly assertive abroad. In the South China Sea, the PRC continues to make unlawful claims. And we call on the PRC to abide by the 2016 arbitration on the claims in the South China Sea. We believe that our mutual defense commitments with allies and partners in the region represented demonstrable advancement in terms of being able to resist those unlawful claims as we watch them unfold. And so we're gonna continue to sail, fly and operate wherever international law allows. We talked about freedom of navigation operations earlier in this hearing. We'll continue to share information transparently with allies and partners when we see violations by the PRC in an illicit way along the lines of those unlawful claims. And Mr. Royal and to the Admiral, are you confident that the South Korean allies and other Quad region partners continue to have full trust in our intelligence and military capabilities, especially what we've seen over the last few weeks with the leak of sensitive classification of classified information? Any assessment there? Simply put, Congressman, yes, we believe that we continue to have the full faith and confidence in the partnership in the alliance with the Republic of Korea. Absolutely, Congressman. Thank you so much. We appreciate your presence today and Mr. Chairman, you'll bet. Thank the gentleman. Chair and I recognize the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. Alford for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member Smith and our distinguished witnesses today. I appreciate y'all being here today. I think we're all concerned about what's going on with China and Taiwan and maybe we're not moving fast enough to develop the capabilities to deter communist China. Our military is incredible capabilities, but as we modernize our forces, particularly our Air Force and Navy, we have to ensure that we're putting hard power in place to make China think twice before conducting a naval blockade or full scale amphibious assault of Taiwan. We also need to do a better job of explaining to the American people why Taiwan matters and why the Indo-Pacific region is critical to our national security efforts. More than 50% of the world's GDP flows through this region. Taiwan alone produces more than 60% of the world's semiconductors, more than 90% of the most advanced ones. We cannot allow China to seize control of these critical supply chains, which would impact goods that we use each and every day. This leads to our questions today. Mr. Admiral Kilian, after China's recent military drills around Taiwan, China's military declared it's ready to fight. Can you talk more about what Indo Paycom is doing to deter the Chinese Communist Party from launching military drills and threatening our allies in the region? Thanks, Congressman. So Indo-Pacific command is posture with forces, west of the international dateline that are prepared to respond, executing daily operations for deterrence, operating with our allies and partners, and we're able to respond quickly to any aggressive action. Do we have the sea power that we need to combat China at this point? We do at this point. As we've talked about before, China is moving at a very rapid pace. They're increasing both capability and capacity, and we certainly have to make sure that we always have overmatch against the Chinese. What do you see as the biggest challenge right now, then, Force? Right now, I think it's the speed of urgency at which we're working. As we've come out of 20 years in the Middle East and understanding what this security challenger is posing as a threat, we need to understand how fast it's coming, and we need to go faster. What are the top priorities for munitions and can the American sector meet these demands that we're going to be facing? For INDO Paycom, as a part of my 1254 report, I've articulated the numbers and types of weapons that we believe we need to invest in and to deliver quickly. As it applies to the industrial base, I'll ask Jed to take that. Congressman, on your last point, there were 17 munitions systems identified for multi-year procurement in the latest NDAA. Those are the 17 systems that I would say are most critical right now in terms of our ability to stockpile, to have magazine depth in the Indo-Pacific region. I've heard, we have heard you three talk about the importance of our allies and the critical role that they will play in helping us counter China. Can you talk about some of the capabilities that we need to improve on with our allies, such as cyber and where there might be gaps in that? General, let's start with you, please. We're working with the Koreans. They're standing up a strategic command that has a cyber embedded in it. Working with our cybercom and the National Security Agency to be able to not just look at it from a defensive but an offensive capability going forward. I'd rather talk about the rest of it. Classified setting. Admiral? What I would say is that certainly the shoring up and defense of all of our networks and our partner networks is step one and most critical. Because as we continue to operate with them, the sharing of information and all of that in Indo-Pacom, one of my unfunded requirements as identified is referred to as a mission partner environment. So right now I've got 13 networks to talk to my partners. Maintaining 13 networks and keeping them all cyber safe is a chore. The mission partner environment brings all of our partners into one network and I think single pane of glass that has zero trust capability for cybersecurity for us to be able to operate together. Thank you again to our witnesses and Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I thank the gentleman. Chair and I recognize gentlemen from California. Mr. Yeme Panetta for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that gentleman. Thanks to all of you for being here and of course your service. Obviously a Ukrainian victory is important no matter what your definition is of that. America's commitment and leadership is absolutely necessary for that quote unquote win. In order for there to be peace in the Indo-Pacific region obviously when it comes to Korea, when it comes to Taiwan, America's commitment is essential as a deterrent and if as an ally if that deterrence fails, as you said Admiral. Now what we've seen though is obviously build up on both sides. For the past 20 years as US has been focused on other areas China has built up the world's largest stockpile of precision guided missiles which we've heard a lot about today. And obviously you're seeing the United States have to counter with its own stockpiles and its own long range of precision guided missiles. In fact, I guess certain war games have determined that the US will run out in less than a week if there is a military engagement. And there's obviously other areas as well. One of those is distributed lethality is where the United States has to enter into. And part of that is this strategy called Marines 2030 where we're basically giving up tanks and getting up on littoral forces by putting more on islands kind of a ship to shore or shore to shore as they say. Admiral, if you could expound on Marines 2030 and then also go into the fact that as we work to deter China and a China attack how do we not provoke one? Thanks Congressman. First the Marine Littoral Regiment. Again, General Berger came out of Mar Four pack as you know. I think it was pretty understanding of the threat the scenario and what was needed. So I appreciate his effort to focus on the Indo-Pacific problem set. That said, we need to deliver that organization with the capabilities to deliver effects. Surface to air, air or surface to surface, surface to ship. When that force is armed and prepared in that set of capability it's exactly what we need in the Indo-Pacific to support the fight. To your second question on what do we do to not provoke the PRC? Well, number one, we gotta make sure that they understand. We're not seeking conflict. Number two, we haven't changed their policy. Number three, we don't support independence for Taiwan and then we need to make sure that they can operate inside this international world order in a way that all nations want to inter-operate with them. Economically, diplomatically, and that's the challenge. So first we need to make sure they understand we are not trying to provoke. Great, thank you. Mr. Oil, Taiwan's intelligence community faces constant infiltrations by the CCP including taking advantage of weak espionage laws that can challenge our own ability to coordinate with the Taiwanese. What do you make of our ability to work with Taiwan's intelligence community and what strategies might we consider to create a more reliable intelligence sharing with the Taiwanese? Congressman, this is a topic of our bilateral discussions with the government of Taiwan. I will say they're making improvements in their ability to hold and maintain security over information. And we also are able to have some pretty discreet conversations about what we're seeing in terms of developments in the region. So I would say that this is an area that we are improving in and needs further improvement going forward. Great, thank you. Last question. Admiral, can you discuss what US IndoPaycom is doing to ensure our current stockpiles and military assets remain intact amid a conflict under extreme weather conditions such as a hurricane, such as other types of extreme weather events that we're dealing with. Yeah, thanks Congressman. So certainly I have an organization that's the Center for Disaster, for Excellence for Disaster Management. They are doing a lot of work for me to make sure I understand where those places are that we need that might be at risk based on impacts, whether it be drought, sea level rise, severity of storms. And we ensure that those are structured correctly and positioned to be able to sustain and survive any harsh impact. But the ability to predict and then the ability to take action in advance of the problem is the approach we've taken. Great. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I thank the gentleman from California. Chair now recognized, from New York, Mr. Lalota for five minutes. Thank you Chairman Admiral, General, Mr. Royle. I want to start by thanking you for your service and for being here with our committee today. Admiral, I have to say I'm a bit excited to speak with you on the record today. It's not every day I get to dialogue with a combatant commander who's not only from Long Island, but from my congressional district. And in fact, I understand as you told me earlier that you lived five houses away from San Anthony's high school where my wife and I both attended. So awesome that you're here Admiral. I was a few classes after you at Annapolis and after commissioning I was deployed to the Western Pacific three times and spent 11 months in 2005 attached to a joint special operations task force in the Southern Philippines. And with that experience, I have great respect and appreciation for the role the Indo-Pacific Command plays to our national security. And our nation's most dangerous adversaries, China, Russia and North Korea have a significant presence in your area of operations. And I'm honored to have you and your staff here today to discuss and work with our committee to address national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. And a significant ally in the region is the Republic of the Philippines. And the United States and the Philippines have maintained a deep multi-generation relationship that includes bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, a close people to people ties and many shared strategic and economic interests. And as you're all aware, the Philippines, China and other countries have longstanding disputes over waters and land features in the South China Sea. And as a result, tensions have risen sharply over the last decade as China has enlarged and placed military assets on several disputed features in the South China Sea. Just recently, our DOD has announced the location of four new naval bases in the Philippines to include three on the North Eastern part of the island chain. And I applaud those efforts to keep in check the growing threats of China and I'm optimistic about our efforts to achieve deterrence through strength in the region. And it's crucial that we continue to position ourselves that have regional readiness in the region. And Admiral, my question, first question is for you in your testimony, you discussed how important, how excuse me, how our competitors seek to challenge U.S. dominance in all domains, including space and cyber, sir. And to maintain our warfighting advantage, U.S. Indo-Paycom requires resilient and flexible space and cyber capabilities. And we need to continue to integrate these capabilities into activities and exercises with our allies and partners in the region. And so given these new bases and recent joint training exercise in the Philippines, do you envision any additional resources or manpower that will be needed that are currently unplanned for? And the questions for everybody. Thanks, Congressman. I appreciate the question. It's good to meet with you as well. I just want to one point of clarification. So the sites that we have coordinated with the Philippines will certainly not be U.S. bases, right? So those are Philippine sovereign territory that we will work with them to be able to invest in and build out so that the Philippines and the United States can operate together whenever needed to both exercise and rehearse. That said, those agreements are just going through. So as a part of Indo-Paycom's plan for developing those four places, we have not even done the assessment nor have we identified any planning and design or ultimately coordination with our Philippine partners on what things are best invested in. So we have way more work to do. None of those requirements are in my 1254 report. Those will be for future years, but having the ability to work with our critical ally, the Philippines, we need to build those out as quick as possible. Thanks for your service. The team is still supporting the Philippines down south where you operated from. Great, just to follow up on that, I'm familiar. I'm sure we're using the through-buy-and-with method still with Philippines and some other neighbors and partners in the area. When do you expect to more specifically drill down to this committee to what resources you need to help advance a presence through-buying with our Filipino counterparts? So in my current report, Congressman, there are identified projects that we would like to build out in the current sites that they've agreed with that we have started work on. For the four additional sites, those will show up next year in that report. Thanks, Admiral. I appreciate your time and your efforts. Chairman, I yield back. I thank the gentleman. Chair, I recognize Mr. Horsford for five minutes. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith for holding this important hearing. As the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy stated, the Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of the 21st century geopolitics. The Indo-Pacific theater encompasses over 35 countries, 15 time zones, and is home to over half of the world's population. It is evident to me that success in the region will be a result of multilateral approaches. Secretary Austin has stated that we must use every tool at the Department of Defense's disposal in close collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. government and with allies and partners to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression. The work that we do with our allies and partners plays a crucial part of our ability to deter conflict. As you know, my district includes Nellis Air Force Base, who aligned with the National Defense Strategy, have focused their red flagged exercises on the Indo-Pacific theater and the pacing challenges alongside our allied partners. So, how are we collaborating with our allies and our partners to build an advantage and deter any challenges that we may face in the region? And how are you working with our counterparts and the U.S. government to address issues in the Indo-Pacific? And what can Congress do to further assist in those efforts? Congressman, I'll jump in first here on this one. As you alluded to in your comments, deterrence holds in this region for two reasons. One is because we have the right capabilities postured at the right level of readiness. And secondly, because our allies and partners are standing with us. And in that regard, I would say that we're doing more than ever with respect to advancing our relationships with our allies and partners. In Japan, we're watching the Japanese diet increase the defense budget by over 25% just in the next year. They've supported a counter-strike capability and they are now offering to host a U.S. Marine Latoro Regiment in Japan for the very first time. The AUKUS arrangement is a historic opportunity for us to be able to put increasing capability in the undersea domain into increased interoperability with two of our most capable allies. This is the sort of story that we're seeing repeated throughout the region right now among all of our defense treaty allies, but beyond that as well with all of our partners. And so when we're talking about having the right capabilities and watching defense budgets support that postured in the way that actually does create the right kind of deterrent effects to our adversaries, all of that is underway right now and we're breathing oxygen into that work every single day. Yeah, congressman, as it applies from the training lens, right? So we do it, like I said, 120 exercises, operations. The training aspect of our allies and partners is critical. Some of them come to your state and go to the gold standard, right? Of Nellis for the Air Force, Fallon for the Navy and the intent that we're trying to push in the approach is to take that level of training and connect it from Nellis to Australia to Alaska to Guam to Japan. And if you were to think about a training range that span that size and scope and allies and partners from anywhere in the region could jump in and get high in training like you're used to and the Air Force is used to at Nellis, that's a pretty good path forward. That's our approach. Thank you for the recognition of the great work that our service members are doing at Nellis and beyond. Finally, we know in states like Nevada, many of our constituents are feeling the effects of the climate crisis every day and the Indo-Pacific theater also experiences some of the world's most damaging events. Often they are fast occurring and unpredictable. So what are some of the actions that are being taken towards work around climate resiliency? Congressman, the first thing that we're doing right now is spending a lot of time with our allies and partners in the region talking about what they're seeing in terms of impacts of climate change, in particular for defense and security requirements where our department is most focused. And to that regard, we are looking at ways to mitigate those impacts, whether it's related to infrastructure or energy security. And I do think over time investments that we need to be making into green technologies that support our defense requirements and those of our allies and partners will be absolutely critical in the coming years. Thank you, Congressman. I've provided, my organization has done a 30 year prediction on what each of those nations might be seeing come in their way. And they can use that for understanding preparedness and as we've worked projects and other things, we make sure we're supporting anything through the concerns of climate impacts. Thank you. Mr. Times-Expired, we've been called for votes. We're gonna do one more witness on each side. It'll be Mr. Mills and Mr. Cuda. And then we're gonna call it a day. So Mr. Mills, you're recognized for five minutes at most. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll make this pretty brief. On multiple occasions, we've dealt with people from the Biden administration within the Department of Defense and the Department of State. And as I've tried to offer up many times the recognition of how we view China is very different from my perspective of where we are from an economic resource, cyber, and other types of aspects of warfare that's being launched against us. And unfortunately, for often far too long, we look at everything from kinetic ability. So this question's for you, Mr. Royal. When we're doing all this preparedness to try and identify how we can thwart the efforts of warfare from China's aggression, do we recognize them as anything greater than just a competitor, but as an actual adversary? Congressman, the term that we use in the National Defense Strategy is the pacing challenge for the department. Do we recognize them as anything other than a competitor? Congressman, we can all get into different definitions of what is competitor, what is challenger, what is adversary, pacing challenge is a term that we believe sets our sights on a trajectory that allows us to do what we need to do to be able to make sure that we are defending and deterring every single day. Okay, well, why don't we frame it this way? How does the CCP view America? I'd be happy to talk with you in a classified session about our assessments of the CCP. Well, it's pretty simple. I think that when they're actually trying to go out for us from an economic resource perspective, we're trying to eliminate the US dollar from being a global currency to ensure they throw us in hyperinflation. They're trying to encircle us by utilizing the Roden Belt Initiative as well as economic coercion and Panama and Honduras to control the tariffs and taxation of the Panama Canal when they're actually releasing out of the Darien Gap the fentanyl that's killing tens of thousands of Americans every single year in America when they're utilizing the marriage convenience with Russia to try and advance themselves with the Shavas of Venezuela, Pedro Columbia and the Cubans, which are 90 miles off our, I am fairly confident they don't view us as a competitor or to outpace us, but as an adversary that they intend to utilize things like even the WHO and WEF to try and create this hegemony, which is what Chairman Xi is actually looking to do from the very beginning. In saying all that, let's talk about economic resource capability and capacity. Admiral, you've been very forthright with us even in our closed door session on where we need to be at. In the event of a CCP invasion of Taiwan, what role would the Indian Ocean play in shipping critical supplies and resources to our partners and allies, and could the Indian Ocean supply chains constrain the PRC aggression? Thanks, Congressman. So again, no matter what would happen in the world, a free flow of product commerce to our allies and partners and from the United States, right? It's not only the allies and partners and friends in the region, but it's the EU, it's the UK. We would come together to ensure that free flow of commerce could happen for all those nations, and it's also a vulnerability for the other side. And that's exactly what I was getting to, which is that in identifying and trying to prevent, yes, we can continue to try and be a porcupine so that China looks at it and says it is not a viable option right now, but also I think exposing their vulnerabilities to track them away from the invasion to allow them to try and strengthen up their vulnerabilities, which could bias the precious time that we need to get our industrial base where it has to be to support a war of this magnitude. And so have we looked at how we strengthen the quadrilateral agreements or the quad as it's referred to with India to ensure that we have that capability to try and expose these vulnerabilities? We're certainly working with our Indian partners both to advance our war fighting capabilities together to ensure that we're sharing information that's needed. Again, we do have the same strategic competitor or whatever definition we wanna put on it. And in my time over the, in the theater now for five years straight, it has increased exponentially and against trending in the right direction, they're really good partners. I agree, and I think that our strengthening as we saw under the Trump administration with Modi, it's to their economic advantage to weaken China's aggression from an economic course of stance, but also it's to our advantage to find reliable resource and economic partners that we can conduct not only just trade, but security cooperations in the area to ensure that we have stability and operations that are sustainable for decades to come. Thank you so much, gentlemen, with that I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. Chair, I recognize the gentleman, gentle lady from Hawaii, Mr. Kudor for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. For decades, our country has enjoyed a close relationship with the freely associated states under the Compact of Free Association, especially in my home state of Hawaii, where thousands of FAS citizens live and work contributing to our diverse communities. Ambassador Joseph Yun, alongside the Department of State and the Department of Interior, has been leading the efforts to renegotiate these compacts and send them to Congress for approval before they expire. But to me, the Department of Defense, especially U.S. Indopaycom, remains the primary beneficiary of these compacts. Admiral Aquilino, I think we both agree on the strategic importance of these compacts. Briefly, how important is it for Congress to act quickly to renew these agreements when they're sent to Congress for review and approval? Aloha, Congresswoman, thank you. It is critically important. Ambassador Yun and I have spent time together. I've offered my support wherever and whenever needed. I've hosted him in the headquarters. Again, when we say it's beneficial, it's beneficial to the United States. The largest number of military service per capita comes out of the freely associated states. We defend them as if they were the U.S. homeland, and it's critical that we get these agreements across the goal line. Thank you. I also want to add that the PRC is working aggressively as you know to undermine our relationships with our FAS allies. Last month, President David Panuella of the Federated States of Micronesia wrote a shocking letter detailing the extensive influence campaigns and political warfare that the PRC is conducting in his country. His letter is a bold move to assert that FSM sovereignty through transparency, and I hope this committee will join me in applauding his courage and his service to his country. Now, Indo Paycom's independent assessment for fiscal year 2024 included several military contract construction projects for harbor and port infrastructure in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau. These projects are possible in part because of the compacts and the access they provide. Admiral, what is the importance of these types of projects in the freely associated states? What value are these projects delivering for our FAS allies? In Congresswoman, for the United States to have, we talked a little bit before about access spacing and overflight, those places are critical. They're much needed. To have them in the freely associated states provides a level of defense that's beneficial. And I would say one thing about the President Panuella letter. I'd sat with him just a couple of weeks ago. His letter was far from shocking for me and it's a good read for everybody because it's the model being utilized all across the region by the PRC that he shined some light on. It was well done. Thank you, Admiral. With the remaining time I have, I'd like to expound on our military presence in Okinawa. As a fourth generation Okinawan American and Hawaii resident, I feel more acutely than most the impacts of our presence there and the similarities that exist between my homeland and my home. Like Hawaii, Okinawa is strategically important to our defense posture in the Indo-Pacific and it too is home to a significant US military presence with all the benefits and the challenges that come with it. The planned relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Hinoko Bay has been delayed into the next decade. Significant environmental and ecological challenges to this plan, in addition to local political opposition beg the question of when this relocation will ever be completed and if so, at what cost? In the past seven years, it has been revealed that there is PFAS contamination of waterways, soil and drinking water around the Kadena and Futenma bases. Blood tests conducted by Kyoto University in 2019 found elevated PFAS concentration in residents' blood, strongly suggesting potential exposure to not just Okinawan residents, but our own US service members to PFAS compounds. There is no denying Okinawa strategic importance to our posture in the Indo-Pacific. My two island homes are destined to play a role in the story of this era and I am very proud of that. I only ask that our witnesses here today consider a whole of government approach as we define and strengthen our relationship with both Okinawa and Hawaii. More than just a location for our fleets and our bases, these islands and her people are our allies that should be included in future decision-making as we work to secure and defend the region. Mahalo for your time and I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair. What I would like to do is nobody else is scooted in. Is Ms. Luttre? No, okay. I was gonna give them time, but listen, I wanna thank y'all. I wanna thank y'all for your patience and your service and being here today and with that, we are adjourned.