 And I mentioned at the beginning that I think Tony's great characteristic is clarity of thought. And I think we've just had a wonderful example of that as we went through that. Very bleak, but I think very stark analysis. We move on to the Q&A, which Tony has agreed should remain on the record. So that I think is a very good thing. Who would like to start? My name is John, and I'm simply a member of this. No, in relation, you did mention one of our negotiating team, Boris, of course. The other two, Fox and David Davies. Simply, what do you think of them? Do you think that they would make a good job? Well, their inclusion in the government was probably necessary, given the role they played in the referendum campaign. And the need for Theresa May to incorporate the most significant strands of opinion in the parliamentary party with such a small majority. I think from what I gather, Liam Fox is perhaps not quite as much as Boris Johnson on the international stage. He doesn't rub people up quite as much the wrong way as Boris Johnson. But there are, one here is a few things to suggest that he can exasperate people a bit. He claims to be particularly well connected in America. But that was America before Trump won the election, so I'm not sure quite. But he's been busy. He's travelled there a lot. I believe he's been trying to set up sort of trade offices, small trade offices around America in anticipation of the time that there would be some serious trade talks. I don't think he's regarded with sort of complete confidence by everybody in the Parliamentary Conservative Party. As regards David Davis, well, he seemed to begin an office with a somewhat more abrasive tone than he's adopted more recently. But he's something of a more, I wouldn't say an unknown quantity in Brussels because he was once the European Minister. I would just have to say, I mean, he's seen, as I say, that ministry is bit by bit becoming something of a power centre in the government. So I think he's got to be taken pretty seriously. Whereas what we can say about Liam Fox, obviously, is that it's hard to see quite what he's doing until the moment comes when you can actually strike these deals. But he has, you know, I mean, the idea that everybody in the world is sitting back saying, oh, we can't do anything with Britain. So it isn't quite right. I mean, there are some countries that have been talking and he's been involved in that. Okay, the sequence is Alan Dukes, firstly, Neville Currie, and then Ron Hill, and then I'll move later on to Brendan. Okay, Alan, please. Yeah, Alan Dukes, a member of the Institute and former Minister of Finance during the Tatchery Era in the UK. One of the ironies of the situation, I think, is that it's been pointed out that Tatchery was a great proponent of the single market. And indeed, I remember Lord Cofield as a UK commissioner, pushing the case at Echo Finn, and it's a shame to see that being turned around. Mrs. May didn't speak about her great reform bill the other day. My understanding of that was that it would import into UK legislation all of the various directives that have been adopted in the last 43 years. Effectively putting regulation standards and so on in the UK at the same level as the European Union. Is there a basis there for at least a discussion about equivalences that would have the effect of maintaining some of the advantages of the single market for the UK? Second, if during the course of the negotiations the UK had the choice path to say once we're out we will offer you complete free trade, tariff free trade if you'll do the same for us, wouldn't it be very difficult for the EU to refuse that? And then linked with those two, I noted you said that you felt that there would have to be a certain parallelism in the negotiations between if you like the divorce agreement and what happens afterwards. It seems to me that we've got hung up about transitions and I recall that when the UK and Ireland joined the EEC we had a transition period for going from where we were before to the stated objective of full membership. It doesn't seem to me to be entirely impossible to imagine the reverse process. And if there is parallelism in that regard in the negotiations does that not give some hope of getting a more rational conclusion to the whole process? Yeah, I mean I understand it in precisely the way you did that you incorporate the laws as they've accumulated over 40 years and then if and when it's judged necessary to alter things then that would happen. But I mean I don't see a kind of storm of immediate changes happening after the incorporation of EU legislation. I mean we'll have to see where the pressures build up possibly from business, possibly from within the Conservative Party itself. But I mean I think one's got to look slightly beyond the initial period. I mean over time there will be changes adopted by the EU 27 to business regulation. And I think my concern would be that it's difficult to see the British Parliament matching those sort of tweaks in the legislation or even entirely new forms. I'm thinking of things like the digital sector and so on. So I think the scope for some divergent is actually quite real. But not in the early stages that's true perhaps so much. On the offer of a kind of total free trade there. Well I think the problem is that you can imagine things getting bogged down particular sectors. You know even something that might seem relatively unimportant from a British point of agriculture. Actually it has the potential for a lot of political friction. I mentioned Aerospace, she didn't in her speech but the scope for one side pushing back against the other and not in the direction of complete free trade has got to be fairly higher I think. It would at a minimum need intervention from heads of government to keep things on track if it was gonna go in the direction you suggest. That's not impossible of course. The parallelism of the talks. Well if as I suggested one of the first things that comes up once the discussion start is this question of the so-called bill for leaving. Well I don't think you can imagine trade talks happening similar to that. I mean it's a funny one the bill for leaving because even before you start talking about a number you've got to start talking about what are the areas that generate a bill and what timeframe are we talking about and I mean I'm not aware that an awful lot of work has been done on this. I mean I hope there are people looking at all this now but so I mean that's the problem I think. But let's say that somehow managed to be less bitter a discussion than is imaginable. Then I think yes there comes a point where you would need to start talking about the future relationships so-and-so because they become entangled together too much. I mean it just doesn't make sense to try and do the one without the other. But two years for it all right no I mean nobody I don't see that at all. Okay never please. My name is Neville Cary I'm a member of the Institute. I'd just like to make it what may seem a very crude and simple point. The more I try to follow this the more I think that Mrs. May has simply two questions in her head. One how can I keep the conservative party together? And two how can I keep it together in a way that will enable me to win the next general election? And I think that's the driving force and the questions she will ask and it's awful that it leads inevitably to the contradictions that you've so set out so well. Well what can you say party politics yes. That's the consequence of being in a democracy I suppose but it's also the consequence of the small majority she has in parliament. I mean it was party politics which partly explained the calling of the referendum in the first place. Was it not with the perceived threat of UKIP which turned out in the end not to be a bit of a phantom. Yes it is a reality it is about party politics and not only of course on the British side I mean it's party politics which will have quite a big influence over the attitudes taken by governments around Europe. And one of the places where huge efforts are made I'm thinking of Germany to have a kind of consensus position on things like attitudes to eurozone priorities or attitude. The way one sees there that this is getting harder and harder to do and that does you know give one pause for concern about whether it would be possible to keep a level head on in the discussions and keep in mind what logically ought to be the common objective which is a close relationship in all areas including trade and investment over the long term. It's not, I didn't want to give you a sort of stark message. I didn't want to sound like I was being pessimistic about this I just think it's, the objective is clear the road there is not so clear but I don't want to suggest that it's all going to fail. I mean in the FT today there is a piece by Wolfgang Matta which is arguing that basically there's enough if you like high politics which require a basic deal to be made and that will win through. Yeah and I think that it's plausible to come back to the point of party politics I mean Theresa May is very, very conscious that it's been the European issue that has destroyed one Tory party leader after another. And she won't want to be the next one in line to be dethroned because of Europe. But even though the pro-remain at segments of the parliamentary party has kind of fallen in now behind the idea well this is what we've got to do. She's not entirely liked or trusted or views and don't chime completely with quite large sections of the party I think. And don't forget you have a king in waiting in the form of George Osborne. Ron, please. And then Brendan, after that. And then Portrick. My name is Ron Hill and I'm a member of the Institute I was a political scientist for many years. The question of the border. It strikes me that much of what Theresa May is up to is pursuing the agenda that she had when she was Home Secretary. Her obsessions are those of the court, immigration, the foreigners, the things that she couldn't allow, wouldn't allow her to do what she wanted to do when she was Home Secretary. Now, only one of her very few salaries out during the campaign, she was supposed to be remanded as she went to Northern Ireland a couple of days before the referendum, I think the 21st. And I distinctly remember her seeing her on television this hasn't been picked up I think very much in the mass media across the water, maybe because it was in Northern Ireland just two days before the referendum. She did say quite distinctly and I checked this on the internet yesterday that the inevitable consequence of Brexit is a border with customs control and all the rest of it. Yet, now she comes up with, I think, item number four wasn't it, not having a border. Which is the real Theresa May? Have you any real sense of where she's, and if the latter, then is there anything we can do about it? Well, yeah, I agree with you that because overwhelmingly her experience of government was in these areas associated with the Home Office that that has shaped her thinking quite considerably. Of course, the longer she's prime minister, the more she will, one imagines, get a more rounded picture of, and I think her apparent interest in redesigning British industrial policy is a sign that there's something there that wasn't associated with her before. So there are some signs she's broadening out of it. On the border question, well, I mean, the remain camp tended to make this point. You know, it would be irresponsible to vote out to be out of the EU because you immediately inject a severe problem into the relations with Ireland. You have a border, which is the last thing we want. She may have just been echoing that referendum campaign point without actually thinking that in practice that would be what happened. I recall the previous Northern Ireland Secretary in Cameron's government saying to me about a month or so before the vote. Absolutely not. We're not even going to consider anything that would jeopardize the common travel area. And so I think it might have been a kind of referendum campaign thing that she said. I mean, certainly the position now is very much not at all. We don't want hindrances to the CTA. Brendan, Lynch, and then Baldrick Murphy, and then Noldor. Tony Blair recently raised the possibility that the UK wouldn't leave the European Union in the final analysis. What do you think of the possibility that there would be no Brexit in the end? Well, I recall about a month or so after the vote meeting the president of Latvia who was passing through London. You might say, well, it's Latvia and not one of the larger EU states. But he said exactly the same thing. He said, I just can't see that this is going to happen. And at the time, I thought, well, you know, there are a number of people from Central and Eastern European governments who really were in the state of shock over this, because they'd seen Britain as a kind of pillar of support for the enlargement and then the defense and security angle. It was a terribly important form. And also the presence of so many citizens from their countries living and working in the UK. So there was a sort of state of shock. And I thought, well, he's just expressing that state of shock. But as time passed, well, you know, I've run into a few American policymakers admittedly from before the November election in the state who said something similar. And as you mentioned, Tony Blair, I mean, I've got to say I find this not very likely. I just can't see it. I mean, if things are driven, as we were saying, by party politics, in many ways, well, the dynamic of the party political scene in Britain is very much towards launching the exit negotiations and leaving. And what are the forces, politically speaking, that would resist this? I mean, they're concentrated in the Lib Dems, a rump minority in the Tory parliamentary party, and some in the Labour Party, although they're demoralized in the Labour Party because they don't know they're going to get wiped out in their electoral heartland the next time there's an election because of the EU's migration. So I can't see it myself. Of course, nothing is static in politics, to form a scene. The landscape could shift in coming years. But from the point of view of the political outlook in Britain at the moment, I didn't see it. Stephanie, I think you wanted to ask a question, and then know after that, please. Party Murphy, a member of the Institute. Well, yes, it's about party politics. Of course, it has to be, but it's about an awful lot more than party politics. And I want to mention particularly the element of Theresa May's speech in which she talks about engaging in cooperation on security and intelligence with the EU. This, of course, can be regarded as a way of giving herself negotiating leverage. But for 43 years, the United Kingdom and the European Union has been saying that security and intelligence is no business of the EU. And has been a proponent of the thesis that to develop a EU capacity in these areas would be to diminish the commitment of the United States to the security of Europe, which was regarded as quite crucial. Now we have a situation where Berlin and Paris are beginning to talk about developing a security capacity for the European Union against the background of a new American president who has said that NATO is obsolete and that, at a minimum, he is not committed to the European project. At the same time, Theresa May, it seems, is intent, and she's going to Washington, is it next week or later this week in order to advance this, to develop further her relations with precisely this American administration, it seems to me there's a kind of circle there that cannot be squared. You're right, of course, that the Prime Minister has been almost scrambling in the last few weeks to send signals that she wants the relationship with the Trump administration to be close. I mean, apart from the fact she's going there in a few days time, there was the very unusual criticism of the Obama administration's Israel policy. I think we've got to separate, when we talk about security, defense, counter-terrorism, intelligence, they don't fall under precisely the same headings. There's the NATO element, of course, which is the collective defense. And one imagines she's going to Washington just to try and make sure that there's absolutely no putting into question of that. Intelligence, well, the so-called Five Eyes arrangement between Britain, America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, I think that is something that they value extremely highly in London. I mean, it's at a level which is beyond anything that goes on between European governments. And again, I imagine she'd want to be shoring up that. But then separately, there is the issue of crime-fighting, which includes counter-terrorism, to some extent, within the current EU. And of course, she's experienced in that area through Europe. And it's been noticeable that, since the referendum, the British government has taken such to keep Britain's place in the EU a problem. One could imagine that in some form or another, continuing, actually, because it is a useful way of pooling efforts to deal with terrorist threats. But that's something distinct from the collective defense of NATO. So to what extent would she find it difficult to knit these together into a coherent stance on what we broadly call security? Well, I think it really depends on what goes on in Washington under the Trump administration. I mean, this is the problem. It may not be the case that all bets are off, exactly. But there's a lot of uncertainty there. But that will be absolutely critical in determining what direction this goes in. No, please. And then, Murphy. I hesitate to intervene because Porig Murphy has asked almost exactly the question I was going to ask. With just a slight, and perhaps give a slight variant of it, his question, and you turned much more to the United States in intelligence and security in the sense of anti-terrorism. I was wondering if, as the talks begin, the UK will need to have cards to play. And one strong card is its armed forces and its defense role in Europe. And I just wonder, granted, the possibility of a hands-off approach from Trump, if that will play into a wish in France and Germany, and therefore a beginning to develop at least one set of links in the defense area that have not been very well developed so far, it will come out of the need for the UK to retain links which do not cut across the economic and migration areas. And perhaps a desire in France or elsewhere to build up the defense role. And I'm just thinking ahead, would that then be a way of building kind of new sort of links, even though Britain leaves the EU? It's a variant only of the question you've just answered, so you may have covered most of it. No, there are extra angles to consider on this. I mean, I know some people have said that the references she made to Britain's defense contribution in Europe and the quality of the intelligence work, the British intelligence services to all this, you out there and the rest of Europe, make sure you appreciate all this, as if it were a sort of card to play. If it is, I don't know, I think it's playing with fire a little bit, because as I say, the fundamental defense guarantee involves NATO and the US commitment to Europe. The British contribution is under that umbrella and to the extent that the American commitment is brought into question or diminished, well, that impacts the effectiveness of the British commitment. So I think one needs to think twice before making any sort of linkage like that. As regards whether all this would stimulate close to Franco-German defense cooperation and putting themselves at the front of some wider European defense initiative. Well, there are two things to think about here. I mean, one is, although we can't predict the outcome of the French presidential election, if we were to assume that Francois Fillon won, I'm not sure he would go down that road of a close to defense relationship with Germany. I mean, he's really a died-in-the-wall gaullist. And he says pretty clearly, one of my first priorities is to reassert France's sovereign role as a defense bar and get a better relationship with Russia. I'm not sure his priority is to defense cooperation with Europe. The second thing is whether modern Germany really wants to be put to the front on an issue like defense and the security of Europe in this way. I know they've produced government papers. Imagine sort of considering this and everything. But you know, overall, the kind of feeling in German society is far from united on this point. And indeed, polls have been done, I think by the Pew Research Centre, country by country, and to what extent do you take seriously the commitment to the collective defense of the Eastern European members of NATO and the support for military action, if one of them comes, I think it's pretty low in Germany. I mean, it's not that high in most of the NATO countries, actually. So I'm not sure that's really there in Germany. And then the third thing is, at a time of pretty severe budgetary strains all around EU member states, I mean, are we really going to see money being diverted into defense in any meaningful way? I mean, I can't say it looks doubtful to me. How much do we need to be concerned by the strand of thought whose ambitions go a lot further than just a good deal, but who would like Brexit to be the beginning of the unraveling of the EU? I mean, Michael Gove, perhaps we had a lucky escape, has talked about the liberation of Europe. And it's perhaps not without significant that the then president-elect, first of all, received Nigel Farage and wanted him to be ambassador and then gave his first important interview to a British newspaper to Michael Gove. I mean, you have the extraordinary situation of an American president who appears, or at least before he became president, appeared to be calling for the breakup of the EU. Well, I mean, yeah, it's very concerning. There's no question about it. I mean, one should keep in mind that, first of all, let's take the situation in Washington. I mean, there are people among the set of nominees for his administration who wouldn't agree with what he said. And then there would be a very, very large body of opinion in Congress that wouldn't agree with it, either, let alone the entire foreign policy and defensible establishment in Washington. So to that extent, one perhaps need and fear that the sky is about to fall in. As regards the British politicians who've made these kind of remarks about sort of setting Europe a fire and liberating it. I mean, speaking as somebody who's spent most of my career on the continent of Europe, I mean, there's no question it comes across as either idiotic or threatening. And it absolutely doesn't go down well at all. Andy, and then I, Mari, and I know Alan wants to go back in again with Andy first. Andy O'Rourke, I'm a member of the institution, former Irish civil servant. Looking on the bright side of things, one might perhaps say that after Lancaster House, the Brexit procedure has clarified itself a little bit and perhaps become a little more simple. In that before Lancaster House, it wasn't clear what the future relationship would be, which needs to be taken account of in the negotiations for Britain's departure. After Lancaster House, it seems clear at this stage, at least, that Britain's future relationship with the European Union will be that of a third country. So let us hope that to be optimistic that these negotiations will go well. The issue now is getting from its present status as a member state to that of a third country with or negotiating for a free trade agreement without any sort of train crash occurring. Mrs. May is going to Washington on Friday next and will be talking, among other things, with President Trump about trade. I just wonder whether a situation where Britain is negotiating trade agreements or talking about trade agreements with other third countries is going to complicate or even give an excuse for further complications in the negotiations taking place during the two-year period from March next. And I wonder, have you got a comment on that? Well, I've both had the occasional contact with people from the sort of countries that the British are thinking it would be relatively, it would be a good idea to do early trailers with them and which might not be too complicated. I'm thinking of places like Canada, Australia. The governments of those countries and the business communities of those countries are conscious that you can't jump the gun. You've got to wait and see how the negotiations between Britain and the EU unfold. That said, I mean, there is some enthusiasm. It's not just Liam Fox's imagination. There is some enthusiasm for doing something relatively soon when it's legally possible. I don't really see it complicating the UK-EU talks because I don't think a trade minister in Canada or Australia or wherever would be, I mean, they'd know there are certain legal processes that have to be followed. So you never know, of course. But I wouldn't expect it to be a matter of friction during the actual talks, no. By the way, I think it would be a lot harder to strike a deal quickly with the United States. I think that's more difficult. Marie Cross, member of the Institute and former member of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Affairs Ministry in Britain seems to be pushed a bit down the pecking order, I'm afraid. Just my question, to come back, we touched briefly on the Labour Party in Britain. And it's almost extraordinary that we're kind of scrubbing it out of consideration because we're talking here of the main opposition party. So my question is, how do you see the Labour Party role in the Brexit negotiations and, in general, the sort of future of the Labour Party at the moment? Yeah, I mean, it's very important this. I mean, the short answer is that they are hobbled, of course, at the moment by the problem that they have a leadership, which is Luke Warren at best, was Luke Warren at best, but you may be in the first place. Tended to see the EU in those old kind of 1970s terms, as well as a kind of monster of, they used to be called multinationals, if you remember, I think we call them something else. But anyway, you know, a kind of evil capitalist machine eating up everything in its past. And the more kind of internationalist pro-EU side of the parliamentary party has been very demoralised by this and slowly but surely it's been losing its hold on the machinery of the party. So changing that quickly is not going to happen. The shadow of minister who is representing the Labour Party's stance on Brexit and the parliament, he's quite a substantial figure in his own right, but he doesn't have the full support of the party leader. So again, he's sort of somewhat hobbled. You know, we have just had the French Socialist Party first primary yesterday in which something similar was visible in a kind of division between a more radical left and a more moderate left. And people are expecting that no matter who the candidate eventually is in April and May, that they'll lose and that in the subsequent parliamentary elections in France that they will be absolutely decimated. And I think there is this very similar fears for the Labour Party in Britain. I'm not entirely convinced that this means that they're going to be to be eaten alive by UKIP. I don't think that is necessarily the case. I think that things change in the course of time, but it seems to me that UKIP has problems of its own in coming across as a sort of responsible, well-laired efficient. I mean, they're not, they're all over the place. And so I think the risk is perhaps more that you'd get a very large Tory landslide. We're coming towards the end and Alan usually wants to get in for a second by the cherry. Yeah, my apologies for that. No, it's okay. Thank you. There's a constitutional issue that seems to me hasn't yet been much examined. Nicola Sturgeon emphasised the fact that a majority of people in Scotland voted to remain. Sinn Fein and the SDLP had the same claim in Northern Ireland. The Welsh don't say anything because, of course, they voted to leave. And I wonder what the meaning is of that. This wasn't a series of simultaneous referendums in the jurisdictions of developed governments. It was a national referendum in a national jurisdiction where the responsibility for the issues involved rests with Westminster and with the government in London. And so the argument seems to me to be, and this trivializes it a little, and I hope I won't offend my good friend, John Connor. And I say this would be like saying that of all the counties in Ireland, Ross Common is the only one that doesn't have to allow same-sex marriage because they voted against it in the referendum. But it seems to me that there is an issue to be looked at there. We have concerns with the border. We have concerns with trade and all those economic relations with Northern Ireland. But it seems to me we do need to look at the whole of the Belfast Agreement and come to some clear view as to what parts of it, if any, would be affected by a Brexit and what parts will not be at all affected by a Brexit. In my ignorance as a simple economist and not a constitutional lawyer, it seems to me that references that I've heard to the implications of Brexit for the constitutional position of Northern Ireland are entirely misplaced because it seems to me that the reference in the Belfast Agreement to how changes might or might not come about in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland relate only to its constitutional position as part of the UK. Is that the case? And in any case, whether it is or not, do we not need to look clearly at each of the provisions in the North Belfast Agreement to see to what extent, if any, they are affected by Brexit? And you will have read the excellent piece in the FT this morning, linking some of these constitutional issues to the Supreme Court pronouncement tomorrow. Well, yeah, I mean, the issue that I think is bound to come up in some kind of legal test has got to be the fact that the Good Friday Agreement is embedded in any EU, it's in a protocol, is it not? A protocol to a treaty, I believe. And... Large with the UN. It was deposited at the UN. But everything about the agreement is predicated on the idea that you have each side in the EU. And it's easy to foresee a moment when there's some sort of challenge to... Actually, it would probably be to the European Court of Justice where somebody says, I have certain rights that call the streets of mind as a citizen of Northern Ireland, but it's within the EU framework. And they take it to the ECJ. And then what does the ECJ do? I mean, if they... So it would be precisely the sort of issue that would rile the forces in Britain who said, well, the whole point of leaving is to stop this sort of thing happening. So I mean, I would expect that to come up. Of course, it could equally well come up, although we're diverging a bit from Northern Ireland here, but it could equally come up in the form of some, you know, an English person or a Scottish person saying, I've got certain rights and I want them up. But I think that, yeah, that's gonna be very, very awkward indeed to sort out. As regards the point about, well, it was a collective vote, you know, in the state of the United Kingdom of Northern Ireland and you can't just start unpicking it, saying this constituent country voted this way and the other way, that way. I mean, don't forget, there was a massive vote in favor of staying in the EU in London. And there's a lot of people in London who say, well, why don't we have some special arrangement? Because, you know, we don't feel anything in common but this is not gonna happen. Well, we've come to the end. It's been a fascinating hour and a quarter, Tony. Thank you. I mean, you did study modern history in Oxford and overlaying on this has, this starting point has been three decades of wonderful expertise about European politics. And all of that has been expressed here today. It's been a great contribution. We're really grateful to you for it and we hope we'll see you back again at some future stage.