 A very happy St. Patrick's Day to everybody and welcome to this session on the role of Japan and Indian Ocean security. My name is Brynn and Taylor, I'm the head of the Strategic and Defence Study Centre here at the ANU working very closely with Rory Metcalf and the team and congratulations to Rory and the team for putting on such a wonderful event. We're going to be looking at the role of Japan and Indian Ocean security this morning I'm covering four questions in particular. Firstly, what are Japan's security interests in the Indian Ocean including energy security? What are the options for involving Japan and other external powers and regional arrangements related to Indian Ocean security? What partnerships and what security partnerships is Japan developing in relation to Indian Ocean security? And last but not least, what contributions can Japan make to Indian Ocean security? We're joined by a very distinguished panel to address us on these subjects, starting off with Mr Nishi, the former Vice Minister of Defence for Japan. Mr Nishi, it's an honour to have you here on this panel this morning, followed by an old friend and colleague, Dr David Brewster from the National Security College, Commander Yoshigarata from the Japanese Command and Staff College and another old friend, Dr Anthony Bergen, the Deputy Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Each of our speakers will speak as with yesterday for 10 to 12 minutes this morning, leaving plenty of time for questions and discussion. Just a reminder that today's session is on the record. So without further ado, I'll invite Mr Nishi to the podium to address you this morning. Please join me in welcoming Mr Nishi. Well, thank you very much. My speech is rather a short one, but I try to cover the old topics that was indicated on this paper. So the Indian Ocean has been the important route for various type of trade also history. It was a route between China and the Middle East countries, as well as India, for trade in ancient days and was named the Silk Road at sea. The trade through the route went far to Europe. Even today, it is an important route of trade of various issues. For example, it is important route to transport crude oil to Japan, China and other Asian countries today from oil rich Middle East countries. Japan still heavily relies on Middle East countries for crude oil surprise in spite of experiences of oil crisis twice in the past time. Even the Arab Spring did not change the importance of this route. The safety of the route is therefore vital for Asian countries in various ways. Japan, for example, has deployed destroyers and peace reeds in Djibouti for the antipiracy operation in the Middle East for the safety of trade in the region. Though the numbers of assault of pirates declined dramatically recently, however, Japan is going to maintain the deployment for the safety of the maritime transport. Would there be any possibility of the Indian Ocean route losing its importance? If it happens, what would be the most serious conditions changing the meaning of the region? There would be two conditions that might change meaning of the route. First, the development of a new route through the Antarctic is under serious study. If the route is to be commercialized, this will be a shorter route between Europe and North East Asian countries than the route through the Indian Ocean. It should be noted that the ASEAN market may not enjoy the advantage of this Antarctic route. Adding that, there will be cost issue that should be considered. Second, due to the production of shale oil, the United States is now able to export crude oil again. Japan would benefit from this new source of crude oil, and this could reduce her dependence on the Middle East. It should be noted, however, again, that Japan will probably continue relying on crude oil from the Middle East to a certain extent. The route would never be meaningless. Each condition is not sufficient to decrease the importance of the Indian Ocean. The combination of these conditions might shift Japan's security concern in the future to a certain extent if it happens. However, we still have to pay, under the current situation, serious attention to the importance of the Indian Ocean for the Japanese security. This invites us to consider how to maintain the current secure status of the Indian Ocean. India has been the predominant power in the Indian Ocean. However, there are growing factors changing the security environment of the region, Pakistan's nuclear capability, Missouri's fundamental movements as Taliban and IS, China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean, and the recent nuclear agreement with Iran. I am most interested in China's movement. The Sino-Indian border issue has been unsettled for many years, and the most recent conflict happened in 2013. The more important issue is the growing presence of Chinese Navy and the Indian Ocean. There are occasional port visits of PRA Navy ships to Pakistan, including a type of ships AS, a ship supporting the operation of submarines. This indicates the possibility of PRA Navy submarines operating in the Indian Ocean. Submarines are a delicate issue for assessing the threat factor at sea. Anti-submarine warfare capability requires serious investment of money as well as human resources and training programs. It consists of submarines, surface ships, and anti-submarine airplanes and helicopters. It also requires technological advancement and skills of personnel. Japan has developed this capacity since the days of the Imperial Navy. Though there was a time we suspended the effort after the Second World War, we started the effort again after establishing the maritime self-defense force about half a century ago. The recent Japanese initiative of capacity building transferring software of underwater medicine to the Vietnam Navy is an indication of important first steps of Japan's commitment to the regional security environment. The bilateral military cooperation between Japan and India is still limited. However, Japan's participation to the Marlboro exercise at an first important step towards that end, together with the Indian participation to the Japanese Ferrit Review in 2015. The bilateral talks concerning the sales of US-2, the flying boat, will be the next important bilateral security issue between India and Japan. Japan itself currently faces a difficult situation in the East China Sea. The Japanese maritime self-defense forces has about 50 destroyers. However, almost half of them, half of the own operation ships are tied to the East China Sea. There are so many objects for the ISR operation in the East China Sea and most of them are PLA Navy ships. Chinese declaration of air defense identification area in East China Sea is another important issue of security concern. Japan perceives that China would like to control the sky in the announced area, almost like its sovereign area. You have to note that the concept of the ADIA is different from the ADIG, Air Defense Identification Zone, which the United States, Japan, and other countries declare already about half a century ago. The long corridor of navigation from Japan to the Middle East is very important for the Japanese security now and its significance would never decrease its meaning in the future. The concept of the Indo-Pacific covers the whole area that is essential for the Japanese prosperity. Australia is the center of the Indo-Pacific concept and India is the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Japan has already started cooperation with these countries for maintaining the peaceful status of this long corridor and would have more occasion to cooperate with India in the future. The development of bilateral relations between Australia and Japan is a good and meaningful guidance for enhancing India-Japan relations, exchange of people, mutual visit of units of services, concluding bilateral agreement of acquisition cross-subs agreement and JASOMIA, that is about the agreement of the secret of the secret information. There is still a lot that Japan can do for the security and safety of the Indian Ocean. Thank you very much. Good morning. Ambassador Kusaka you spoke yesterday morning about Japan's growing concerns about Indian Ocean security, but indeed until recently the Indian Ocean was not really part of Japan's security agenda. For the last 70 years Japan's security horizons have really not extended too far past Singapore, even if they extended that far. In essence Japan has largely left its interests in the Indian Ocean to be protected by the U.S. Navy and while the U.S. Navy remains the predominant security provider in the Indian Ocean and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future that approach of entirely relying on the United States is really no longer sustainable. The United States has made it clear that it is looking for its allies and friends to play a much more active maritime security role right across the Indo-Pacific and that inevitably includes Japan. Now yesterday Ambassador Kusaka and today Mr Nishi emphasised the importance of Japan's growing relationship with India as a way of safeguarding Japan's strategic interest in the Indian Ocean. And we've also heard a number of times at this conference how Japan and Australia can work together right across the Indo-Pacific. Well this morning I want to explore some important roles that Japan could play in Indian Ocean security either alone or in partnership with countries like India and Australia. But first of all you know the fundamental question is well why should Japan be interested in Indian Ocean security? And this is why. This is the view of the Indo-Pacific slocks from Japan and obviously and rightly so Japan's key interests or most immediate interests are in the East China Sea and South China Sea. But I should also note that even though those sort of the fat slocks that you see in yellow going through the South China Sea are of most immediate importance these the red lines are actually significantly more vulnerable because they point to actually the concentration of shipping. So as this images like this graphically show Japan's Indo-Pacific slocks do not magically end at Singapore. And as we've been talking about the primary one of the primary themes of this conference is that you cannot place maritime security in the Indo-Pacific in neat little boxes. There is an interdependency right across the literal. And that means that a country like Japan has to be an active player in security right across that literal in in one way or another. Now as most of us know Japan has been an active contributor to the international fight against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean since 2009 and that's included ongoing deployments of at least two Japanese destroyers. But now concerns about Somali piracy are receding and it's time in my view for Japan to develop a much more comprehensive strategy in relation to the Indian Ocean. And in my view key objectives of Japan should include increasing its influence within the region, hedging its position through creating at least some some nascent security presence. And just as importantly providing support for the development of a regional rules-based order and that's a real weakness in the Indian Ocean. So I would like to focus on four key areas in which I see India as potentially playing a greater role in the Indian Ocean. One is greater engagement or continuing its trajectory of engagement with certain countries in the Bay of Bengal area. Secondly supporting emerging regional institutions. Thirdly maritime capacity building with poorer Indian Ocean island states. And then I'll just say a few words about the special role of the Japanese Coast Guard could play in all of this. And I should particularly note that all of these things could be all of these areas could be pushed forward by Japan in partnership with regional partners or to some in sometimes alone. So I'll start to talk about these areas in order. So in my view of any of the sub regions of the Indian Ocean, Japan quite possibly has the most interests and can play the most effective role in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal. And we've as I mentioned we've already heard a lot of comments about Japan's growing relationship with India. But in my view Japan can and should play a major stabilizing role with other countries in the Bay of Bengal area such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Yesterday Admiral Akamoto identified the Bay of Bengal as a key strategic area for Japan and his main point was really as a hedge against a blockage of commercial shipping across the South China Sea, Japan should be preparing at least for the potential of the re-routing of shipping routes across the Indian Eastern Ocean through the Indonesian archipelago and then outside of the first island chain. If there was some contingency where the areas inside the first island chain were denied access. I agree with that view but I think I would also take a broader view that Japan can play a very effective regional stabilization role in the Bay of Bengal and in fact it's already doing so. The Japanese aid agency JICA is really playing a very significant role in Myanmar. It's also playing a leading role in terms of developing port infrastructure in Bangladesh and I suspect that we're going to be seeing a Japan playing a much more active role in Sri Lanka in years to come. So that's my first suggestion. The second area is support for emerging regional institutions. Now one of the major strategic weaknesses in the Indian Ocean is its weak institutions. Although we have groupings such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Naval Grouping Indian Ocean Naval Symposium they remain very weak and very underfunded and a lack of regional institutions, lack of a regional identity undermines the ability or capability of Indian Ocean states to work with each other to either provide maritime security themselves or just as importantly speak with some sort of regional voice towards the major extra-regional powers. And these weaknesses only increase the risk of strategic instability in the region particularly as we are seeing changes in the balance of power in the Indian Ocean in the coming years as the relative predominance of the US Navy falls and some countries are even considering the scenario of a wholesale US naval withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. I think we have to see that as a real possibility perhaps less likely than more likely but nevertheless a real possibility at some time in the future as US dependence on imported oil falls and as the US, the United States suffers its own political instability. So Japan, what can Japan do? Japan is already an observer to Iora and Ions but frankly it does not play an active role in either organisation and I believe that Japan could play a much more active role in those organisations and other Indian Ocean regional institutions whether it be financially or just being there and being an active contributor to the discussion. Japan's reputation among Indian Ocean states is seen in very benign terms. It's being seen as a very positive regional player and has very little or no historical baggage in the region. So I'm suggesting that Japan should use that reputation and resources to help build Indian Ocean as a more cohesive region. My third area or suggestion is maritime capacity building among some of the poorer states in the region particularly the Indian Ocean Island states which tend to be very poor, have very few capabilities and have huge EEZs to manage and exploit. Now there's a vast range of potential ways in which Japan could involve itself with these countries basically in the area of helping these countries exploit their blue economy and properly manage and govern their areas of jurisdiction, of maritime jurisdiction. Now one area, one potential area is in fishing. Many Indian Ocean Island states suffer from the effects of illegal or unregulated fishing in their EEZs and in fact I think I would suggest that for most of these island states they would see that as their number one security problem. In my view Japan could play an important role in raising its profile in helping to defend their fish stocks in the Indian Ocean from being preyed upon by unscrupulous fishes particularly from outside the region. Finally I'd like just to have a few comments about the Japanese Coast Guard. Now the Japanese Coast Guard really has a key role to play in being at the forefront of Japan's engagement right across the region and we're seeing that currently in the South China Sea in terms of Japan working with countries to improve their Coast Guard capabilities and the Japanese Coast Guard could play a similar role with selected countries in the Indian Ocean. We've seen the Japanese Coast Guard exercising with the Indian Coast Guard on an annual basis around the Bay of Bengal area for I think 12 or 13 years. So the Japanese Coast Guard certainly has the reach and it's really probably or certainly the most highly capable Coast Guard right across the Indo-Pacific region. So I would suggest that the Japanese Coast Guard should play a leading role in all of this. So I'll finish with my key takeaways. First of all in my view Japan must pay a lot more attention to developing a comprehensive Indian Ocean strategy with the objective of becoming one of the key extra regional players in the Indian Ocean. For those who argue that there is a danger of strategic overreach by Japan being active in the Indian Ocean I would argue that quite correctly Japan has a focus on its immediate areas of East China Sea, South China Sea but it simply cannot afford not to be an important player in the Indian Ocean. Countries like Australia which has a relatively small Navy has long experience in extending our strategic reach right from the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia to the Gulf of Aden and Australia well knows that one needs to leverage limited assets in the best way possible through husbanding naval assets when possible and using financial resources training and various other forms of security engagement. I would suggest that Japan needs to do a lot more thinking about how it can leverage its strategic reach as well. So the key, my key suggestions are providing maritime security capabilities and infrastructure to countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We've seen engagement with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka is a real, is a key country that Japan I think can play a very active role with. Supporting emerging regional institutions to help build a regional identity, a regional voice and regional capacities in providing maritime security. Capacity building among the smaller Indian Ocean states in selected areas and finally the key role of the Japanese Coast Guard and the importance of trying to use white holes in providing maritime security right across the Indo-Pacific. Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Commander Shruota from Japanese Coast Guard and I'm a fellow defense force command and staff college. And I also PhD candidate at National Graduate Institute of Policy Studies in Roppongi and last February I passed the comprehensive examination and principally I have to concentrate my developing my dissertation. But I failed to escape from the bus's order and captured to send to Canberra two days ago. Of course I can receive very good inspiration and stimulation through this conference. So anyway, I want to express my sincere gratitude for my invitation to such a distinguished conference for the professor, Dr. Brunstein and all members of the National Security College and also National Australian University and the Japanese Embassy. So now I move to my discussion and my conclusion is very clear and simple. You can see. So Indian Ocean is a vitally important highway but strategic over extension for the perpetual permanent commitment. That was my conclusion and many of my presentation I think that over so with the vice-minister Nishia and Dr. Brunstein but I am sorry but I continue and this is my discussion on counter-piracy operation. So the Japanese counter-piracy operation has started from March 2009 and two destroyers, two P3C as a cross permanent deployment in the surrounding Indian Ocean. So after 2009 in Melbourne, JMSDF deployed the support forces for the coalition force and the anti-terrorism war and for almost all the time since 21st century beginning. JMSDF always, almost always deploying the surface forces surrounding the Indian Ocean. So I now assess the impact of deploying the surface forces and P3C. So if we deploy the surface vessels in the far seas and we estimate that the low-intensive environment, not so high-intensive, not so counter-piracy, that was a peacetime or low-intensive situation. So in this situation, so the ships should require that the helicopter capable and the sufficient payload, the provision of water, etc. and the G4 infrastructure such as tactical data ring and satellite communication, etc. So now JMSDF possesses about 41 destroyers including Aegis and the helicopter carrier and six more small frigates. But only 26 of them are appropriate when considering these requirements. And 26 is that these ones, so please confirm that JMSDF, JMSDF, JMSDF, something. So and usually surface ships regularly maintenance and repairing. So due to repair and maintenance, around 20 of them, 86, 80% of 26 vessels surrounding 20, around 20, are in service at the same time. And six of them, six of 20, so the approximate rate, about 30% of the active destroyers are placed under discretion. This is a very severe burden for the Japanese JMSDF South Freight. So of course the deployment forces are two destroyers, but in transit two. And more the preparation for the deployment of the two. I think all of the times six destroyers are occupied for this counter-parallel operation. So this is also from the website of Cabinet Secretary Tachin. The distance between the Gulf of Aden and Japan is about 6,500 nautical miles. And it takes over three weeks, maybe 23 or 24 days at 12 nautical miles. So in the way, midway, there are no permanent bases to provide the replacement or repairing, et cetera. That's all. And yesterday some of you argued about China's one-bed, one-road concept. So I think that the China situation is almost the same. So I think that this concept should be discussed on the political or economic issue principally. So sometimes this issue comes to be a security issue, but it is almost impossible to overcome the military vulnerability in this region. So in wrap up my argument from now, so James, this DSP called the DSP, Department of Surface Policy Enforcement, can conduct ad hoc missions on the way to and from the Gulf of Aden. For example, the Humanitarian Assistant Disaster Relief by a multilateral exercise as active suasion for political presence was shown as short of life. This is, it's enabled. But it is almost unrealistic to expand forces which were full-time missions in far seas around the surrounding Indian Ocean. So because the MSDF asset always conducting strategic ISR in the surrounding Japanese territorial water and the East China Sea, and missile defence was some of the various missions. So this phrase is from Paul Kennedy's Ryan Ford of British neighbouring mastery. So Paul Kennedy referred from this phrase by a Bajo Henry Bidzenhardt. So there are too much burdens, obligation invited, so that's a tragic over extension. That is the same situation for not only the Royal Navy, but the MSDF. So by considering our capability and limitation, not only the United States, but also Japan expect much to India as Dr. Bruce mentioned, for a dominant security provider. So I think that only India as a regional power can control the Indian Ocean shelter. And potentially US Navy can deploy the self-conclusive carrier strike group. Only US Navy can deploy and conduct high intensive conventional war in the far seas. No other Navy can such operation. Of course we can conduct low intensive or peace time activities. Only US forces can conduct high intensive conventional force conflict in the far United States. So then I swing back to the Japanese security context surrounding Japan. So these three phrases are referred from the Asia Pacific maritime security strategy published in the last year from the US Department of Defense. So this is the context of the maritime domain surrounding Japan. So this is the A, the safeguard freedom of the sea. And B, deter conflict and coercion. C, promote adherence to international law and standards. This is, I think that the very specific items explaining the strategic context surrounding Japan. And now I think it might be useful, I think about direct impact to high priority for Japan's strategy at once. So this is a core assumption involved. In the multiple world, I think that the nuclear deterrence still affects as in the Cold War era. And next, so I think we have to think about deterrence and the high intensive conventional war. So such as a counter anti-access area general strategy. And the United States, our alliance, maintains a very simple military strategy in the world. So that is called the offensive strategy based on the war deployment and the power projection capability such as the carrier strike group, expansionist strike group. So, and to maintain this power projection capability, US pressing up the air-sea battle or the Matico, the Changi, or the third offset strategy and blah, blah, blah. So this is the alliance's general direction. So we have to deal with the counter-AIS-80 strategy and Japan should establish Japan's a linear strategy to secure the basis of the power projection capability of US forces. This is my key concept of the counter-AIS-80 strategy for the Japanese military strategy. So, and then, but the current world, the trend is the low-level territory disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This is a trend, phenomena. But this is very difficult to deter. I remember that in this situation, so it was same, similar situation was occurred in the Cold War era. In the Cold War era, static nuclear deterrence is effect. And under such an escalation level, so regional conflict and visual conflict level or high-intensive conventional wars often occurred, such as the Korean Peninsula or Vietnam or Afghanistan and etc. So this is called the stability-instability paradox proposed by Glenn Snyder in 1960s. So, and applied to the current situation, this Snyder's argument, it's if the deterrence is effect in high conventional war level. So the low-intensive territory dispute being difficult to deter. This is my understanding of the current security environment of the surrounding Japan. So, and as I mentioned, counter-AIS-80 strategy and Japan's area-denial strategy, etc. But in the highly sophisticated area-denial capability, so the useful asset under the AIS-80 environment is low visibility or underwater, such as submarine, UAV, or UUV, or self-aircraft, etc. So the showing self-combatant ship or showing carrier vessel, carrier, cannot survive under the high-intensive threat in the AIS-80 environment. So the, we, of course, Indian Ocean is very important. So we have to commit and show the flag and appeal the presence, but such assets, surface-combatant ship, cannot utilize in the homeland defense in the surrounding Japan. This is a very controversial situation. This is my understanding. So I would wrap up this, my argument by Endway's mean structure. So to enhancing the Indian Ocean, the Japanese role in the Indian Ocean, so maintaining open and stable sea, this is the flag for national security strategy from Japan. And that situation is affected as a stroke and securing freedom of the seas. And these situations are principally provided by the India and potentially the US forces. And so the way is three phrases. Japan and US are lessons of cornerstone of the security in the Indo-Pacific region. But I think that the resources are not sufficient. So we want to enhancing relationship between India, Indian Ocean, and Australia in the Western Pacific. So, and more, increasing friends and allies, what we call like-minded countries in this region. This is a way. Once at first, we want to make effort for self-help. So utilizing resources efficiently. Appear in maritime superiority outside the air-to-air environment by surface or air assets. And for example, for the shore action such as freedom of navigation operation in the outside the air-to-air environment. But two, we should be conscious of cost imposition. So we have very many friends and allies, like-minded countries in the world, in this region. So this appeal indirectly contribute to the Japan's homeland defense. This is a very important way of thinking. And last, friends and allies. So capacity building in some Asian countries and some of Asia, South Asia countries. So already, I mentioned that I think that Sri Lanka is a very important key of the commitment. And of course, Japan has a historical issue surrounding countries such as China, Korea, and ASEAN countries. And also, India is a regional power and has a historical issues surrounding countries such as South Asian countries. So there are rooms to coordinate between how Japan can contribute such countries capacity building. So this is one of the important means of developing the Japanese role. So I think that for concluding my argument, between 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century, a great game played within the European major powers. But in the 21st century, this is the first time for human being history, so the very global powers, global great game occurred again by global powers, global non-European countries. So such a situation, so I think Japan have to be active and to be active and strategically. This is my conclusion, my presentation. Thank you so much. Good morning and thank you Rory Medka from the Security College and also to the Japanese Embassy for the invitation. I'll focus my remarks on the question that was given of what contribution Japan can make to broad Indian Ocean security. And some of my comments build, complement David Brewster's remarks but I think I've got some fresh points to make. I think the Indian Ocean has enormous potential for harnessing blue economy resources. Fisheries, offshore oil and gas, marine-based tourism, maritime industries are all making a significant contribution to the economies of the Indian Ocean states. I think the blue economy concept has the potential to act as a key catalyst for sustainable development and indeed political stability through the Indo-Pacific. Many of the Indian Ocean Rim countries are, as David said, looking to how to consider how to seize opportunities from the blue economy sector for higher growth. Now Julie Bishop launched the concept of the blue economy in Perth in 2014 at the IAORA, the Indian Ocean Rim Association meeting in Perth. And of course Japan, as we've heard, is a key dialogue partner in IAORA. There's some confusion sometimes I think about the blue economy concept. It's not just the traditional maritime industries like fisheries, shipping in ports but it also includes areas such as aquaculture, renewable energy technologies like wind, wave and tidal, products, carbon sequestration and desalination. The oceans are likely to become an economic force this century. That'll be driven by key technologies that make it economically viable to tap marine resources and indeed demographic trends that are fueling the demand for food security and alternative sources of minerals and energy. By 2030, two out of every three fish on our plates will be farmed, much of it from the sea. Offshore wind capacity is forecast to rise tenfold by 2030. There'll be a surge in investment in coastal infrastructure, industry and tourism as we see global migration to cities and coasts. The blue economy idea is all about the sustainable development of the Indian Ocean and indeed that concept is now enshrined in the Iora Economic Declaration. I believe Japan, like Australia, shares a vision for growth in the Indian Ocean region and both countries wish to make blue economic activity a key driver for Indian Ocean Rim countries. Japan wishes to promote prosperity and stability in the Indian Ocean and seeks to achieve that through maritime security and safety. Of course, Japan here has real expertise and demonstrated its contribution to ensuring freedom of navigation through its contributions to improving navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca. So the blue economy, I think, is really part of a larger trajectory of stronger regional cooperation where Japan can play a very useful role for the collective benefit of the Indian Ocean by growing the region's economic potential whilst at the same time safeguarding the health of the ocean itself. This broad goal requires key expertise, deep expertise in marine scientific research and that's Japan's, one of Japan's great strengths. So let me just in my remaining time give you five examples where I believe Japan can provide through its ocean industry expertise great support for developing the blue economy in the Indian Ocean. First, the Indian Ocean states are looking at alternative non-conventional renewable sources of energy and here it's offshore solar power that's attracting significant interest. Now it so happens that Japan has one of the world's largest offshore solar energy projects. I've been there in Kagoshima City. It's expected to supply something like 20 power to 22,000 households in Kagoshima. Second, while there's been commercial developments to date there is still interest in deep seabed mining in the Indian Ocean. Now Japan is a what's called a pioneer investor under the law of the sea convention for deep seabed extraction of manganese nodules. Japan has registered mine sites in the Indian Ocean and I think Japan can assist Indian Ocean countries if and when that sector comes on stream. There's also now global interest in the development of deep water gas hydrate energy reserves and it's here that Japan is truly at the international leading edge. India in Japan last year carried out a joint survey for gas hydrates using a Japanese drilling ship in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Modi has now listed his work on gas hydrates among the top 10 potential areas of research for India given his country's dependence on imported fossil fuels. The Japanese agency for marine earth sciences and technology can I believe offer great assistance to Indian Ocean or Indian countries in the field of ocean sciences. Third area is research and development in marine biotechnology. That also is emerging as a promising sector of growth in the Indian Ocean. Out of the total of 677 international claims between 1991 and 2009 of marine gene patents 90% of those patents are held by just 10 countries. Japan comes in at third place. So again this is another area in Japan can work with Indian Ocean countries to realise some of the economic benefits. The fourth area which I would like to spend just more than a minute on is aquaculture. Aquaculture is the key driver for the blue economy in the Indian Ocean providing food, nutrition and employment opportunities. Now David mentioned capture fisheries but capture fisheries in the Indian Ocean is significant as he referred to over fishing. So the challenges I think of food security can be addressed through sustained aquaculture production. It's the fastest growing food production system at 7.5% a year growth over the last 20 years. By 2030 aquaculture is going to make up around 65% of fish protein. If aquaculture practices can be refined through technology it will go a long way towards lessening. The impact as David pointed out of illegal unregulated and unreported fishing and so help sustainable ocean resources in the Indian Ocean. A regional approach to skills and technology will be important I believe to foster aquaculture. Now Japan has tremendous skills in this industry, tremendous skills. It has enormous expertise in developing high volume feed that doesn't require on wild fishing inputs. It's got great skill in market demand for farmed fish through pricing, nutritional content and availability. And while you might think it is an unusual topic let me just refer to the fact that and you can go to Dr. Google and you'll notice that tons of articles on seaweed as the new super food. Japan is of course leading the world in the development and marketing of seaweed. Now look let's be honest, most people aren't going to want to eat a lot of seaweed unless it's secured around our sushi and I'm not sure most of us would how to prepare seaweed even if we were given it. I do think that Japan, apart from the technology challenges I think Japan has an enormous ability to guide Indian Ocean countries on the marketing, on the cultural, if you like the cultural challenges involved in the harvesting of sea vegetables like seaweed and kelp. The final area let me just note is the digital blue economy. I think we're all increasingly aware of the growing importance of the network of submarine cables that provide us with internet and phone access etc etc. And that's a key area of development too in the Indian Ocean, developing the digital economy through the development of submarine cables. Japan is one of the world's leading providers of undersea cable subsystems. So that's another area I think Japan can offer. So in summary I guess my argument is that I think the Indian Ocean countries are realising the importance of the oceans for economic development and I think Japan, I've picked five areas but there are others where I think Japan, by sharing its ocean industry expertise, its skills, its technologies can make a very significant contribution to ocean development. Thank you. Thank you very much to all of our presenters for those wonderful presentations. We've got about 15 minutes before the morning tea break so I suggest we just take a very quick round of four to five questions and then give the remainder of the time to our presenters in one or two minutes each to respond. So it seems that David was suggesting that Japan should be taking a more active role in the Indian Ocean security but Mr Shirogata basically pointed out that realistically it would be difficult for the Japanese self-defense force to play that role at least in the near future whereas the answer was suggesting that there are pups otherwise Japan can contribute to the Indian Ocean security. So I was wondering what might be your view Mr Nishi in terms of Japan's future contribution to Indian Ocean security. We have a second question. In the Indian Ocean I'm wondering if there's a useful role that Australian facilities can play while we're just too far south or not suited in some way whether we're talking about Darwin or whether we're talking about Perth. I'm thinking here not just about regular usage of those facilities but also we're there to be a crisis in say the South China Sea and the value to Japan to have recourse to those facilities particularly if it was difficult getting back home. Thank you. Rory Medcalf, head of National Security College and it's a real pleasure to see such a distinguished panel on this session and Brendan thank you for moderating this another sign of partnership between SDSC and NSC. My question I guess is to all the panelists but particularly to the Japanese panelists and also to Mr. Nishi and also to Commander Ushiragata which is about Djibouti and about the Japanese presence there do you call it a base? Do you call it a facility? Do you call it access? I would be interested if each of you could explain what you see as the principal mission of that presence and what potential do you see for that presence to expand and why? Thank you. I think we'll probably have one more question because there's a lot there we could probably convene another panel on these very good questions but just one more question up there. Murray Nitsuravis from the National Security College as well apologies. I was particularly struck by the excellence of the four presentations thank you very much and my question is to Anthony Berg and I wanted to thank you for helping us to focus on the positives given that we've had so many presentations on security risks but you were focusing on the opportunities what I wanted to ask you is what circumstances do you think would need to exist for countries regionally in the Indo-Pacific region to collaborate in a very constructive way to harvest some of those benefits that you've been talking about? Perhaps given that that question is addressed to you and Anthony will give you a first go at response. Wow. Look I concur with I think it was David that said that in the Indian Ocean the institutions are pretty weak. You know the Indian Ocean Rim Association is now making strides. I mean India, Canada, Australia now Indonesia, South Africa is the vice-chair so it has had and will continue over the next four years to have very strong leadership so I think Aiora certainly does have potential to develop some of these areas and as I said the blue economy concept is enshrined in their declaration but look I guess what needs to happen is obviously a regional approach to develop the ocean economy and I think that does come back to David's point we need to think about ways to strengthen those regional institutions and here I would definitely argue that Japan has a much bigger role to play as a dialogue partner in Aiora. I have visited Mauritius twice and spoken to the Secretary-General of Aiora he has personally told me he would welcome a bigger role for the dialogue partners in the Association's work Dr Rifty Mooder, I don't know Rifty's still here, yes he and I are in a group called the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group there's no reason why Rifty Japan couldn't join as the dialogue partner our academic group to develop some of the concepts in this morning so I think there are ways that we can work with and at the moment the only pan in the ocean body is Aiora so I think that would be my focus to try and work to strengthen the Aiora framework. David did you want to respond to any of the questions? I'll just respond to one question about the sharing of facilities I would focus less on port facilities more on air based facilities and in particular I would see the importance of creating a shared maritime domain awareness covering both the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea region and certainly there's a lot of scope for countries like Japan, Australia India and the United States to be working together in trying to develop a regional maritime domain awareness system that could very well include cooperation and use of facilities in countries like Philippines, Singapore and the Man Islands and even the Kokos Islands so that's one sort of suggestion in that front. Ok now I will respond to the strategic importance of the person and the question several years ago US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned that pivot, Asia pivot so I think that if we think about the center of gravity in East Asia so I think that in Japan the very strategic importance that if we change the eye point to the Indian Ocean and in the past weeks surrounding the Marraka Strait or South Asia so I think that also strategy western cost of also really the strategic importance I agree with you. And second so the importance and presence of the dibuchi in my understanding I don't know the long term estimation about how Japanese government think about maintaining the dibuchi base in my understanding the dibuchi base is very far away from Japan and no infrastructure as I explained in the midway of the Indian Ocean that was a very large and huge traffic but no infrastructure so I think that this dibuchi base can maintain and the presence of a stable presence of India or US forces, military forces and stable situation so we can maintain the dibuchi so this is a very tentative existence, this is my understanding of dibuchi base. Commander Ushirozaka personally homework about the jeep space status. The important point is yes it is very far from Japan but at the same time this is a very important area for the Japanese contribution for the anti-piracy. Basically we have two fronts of the anti-piracy operations, one in the Middle East and one near the Maraka Strait and the Maraka Strait area is the response speed or the role of the coast guard side we have a very good division of between the MSDF and the coast guard. The dibuchi is the MSDF's response speed. Commander Ushirozaka pointed out it's very far and it's not easy to communicate there. Logistics line is very long but that is going to give us a good opportunity and challenges to develop relations with Indian oceans, particularly India to have more relations and military relations. We have some increasing numbers of port visits to the Indian side and also the logistical support from the Indian side adding that we have occasions of visiting Gulf states in various ways and it's a very huge occasion for us to exchange experiences and also the closer contact with the American Fifth Fleet. The piracy situation in the Middle East is decreasing. It's like a cat and mouse type of competition. If we are going to increase our presence there, the numbers of piracy is going to grow up. That is the expense we had in the past. So we are going to commit and actually there exists the controversy inside of the cabinet, inside of the governing party whether we should maintain it or not but I think and from the Ministry of Defence's viewpoint I think that is the position that we are going to keep for future. It is the necessary occasion for us of the logistical challenge, operational challenge, also the contribution of the multinational coordination of navies and that is going to give us another opportunity to pay more attention that what kind of capacity building efforts we should extend beyond the ASEAN countries in order to give very good infrastructure for future long distance deployment. That is another challenge. So there will be a lot of challenges that we are going to face and that is quite meaningful for the Japanese security policy for the future. That's what I think now. That brings us right to Tim Puster 11. Thank you very much Mr. Nishi and to all of the other panelists and thank you once again to the ASEAN and to Rory, not only for this particular event but as you say, another opportunity for cooperation. Join with me in very warmly thanking all of the panelists for the wonderful contributions this morning.