 So I'm an activist and I turn into a scholar. I did my PhD, or I'm doing my PhD at Leeds University but while doing research, I stayed an activist and I I leave it in the ground initiative and these are just some visuals to give you some ideas of where what we're working on in lingo. Now I'm doing that work in the context of the climate emergency and as you know we don't have much time to decarbonize and stop fossil fuels So my question was what are the biggest chunks that we need to stop and those are the carbon bombs And since we don't have much time, let's just jump right in the definition of a carbon bomb is a fossil fuel project that can emit over a gigaton of CO2 over its lifetime and that is counting only the fossil fuel to be burned and a gigaton you probably have a notion, but if you don't that's about twice the UK emissions annual emissions of the whole country in one single coal mine or one single oil and gas field Those are called projects in our research So we just try to figure out where are those projects how many of them are there and the map probably does not look very surprising for most of you With a big accumulation in China Quite a number in the Middle East in the US You can see a big dot also in Russia and in some other countries about 50 countries in the world have carbon bombs We so these are about out of these 425 projects about half our oil and gas fields half our coal mines and We try to see if this is a significant part of the fossil fuel picture in terms of current extraction and From these projects we get about half of oil and gas and a quarter of the coal that's being burned annually, so it does capture a Good portion of the picture. We compared it to a 1.5 degree carbon budget and just in these 425 projects we have more than double the CO2 that could be emitted under 1.5 budget and one of the interesting things we found was that 40 percent of those projects are new Projects that hadn't started yet in 2020. So that means there is something to be done about it And that's what I'll talk about next some strategic options for where to go with these projects the first one and I Can see Christoph in the room Who talked about it this morning is to say let's not build any new projects That is of course a very important would be a very important contribution of getting that carbon bombs picture more in line with the climate picture and the Paris targets a Second thing is to use what we called harvest mode and I learned that from some oil industry folks who said we're now putting everything in harvest mode And that means you don't invest new capital You just keep the infrastructure that you have keep it going But you don't build anything new and that seems like an interesting Offer also for the investment community that has money at stake in fossil fuels But you know if you're not placing new bets you're not placing I'm spending more capital than You might be much more sure that you're not Suffering at the end of the day financially in that sector So harvest mode is an interesting thing and we did a little analysis of how that would change the picture and it makes it much More compatible with 1.5 and then the third piece is early closure That that has been in recent analyses as well the needs to close things early and Especially for coal. I think it's now quite obvious if you look at the economics of coal versus new renewables plus storage that Closing down coal early before Extracting all that coal and will be one of the things we'll surely be doing in the next in the next years So that's on a more theoretical level, but on a practical level as an activist We take, you know, we take what we can get in terms of pushing back against fossil fuels And there the picture looks a little bit different and the options are first Of course, you have to identify where the biggest pieces are and that's what we did I encourage you to have a look at the carbon bombs list and see if there Any surprises or things that you think you could be working on or making a difference then next you need to understand How these things operate and where the weak spots are and here is a Piece of good news. These are so huge projects that they take many years to prepare and that's what Christoph showed this morning as well and then they take decades to operate and They take a long time to even get to the point of break even where you recover the capital But that doesn't mean you have actually made any money from it. So Basically any carbon bomb any new carbon bomb today is a decade long bet on keeping this dysfunctional situation where we're burning down the house collectively Operating just like that over the next decades and that's really a risky bet In terms of understanding, I think the state-owned enterprises are a really really big part of the picture If you look at the list, you will see that much of that is controlled by those so in these hot spots that the Western climate movement is not looking at we really need strategies. So that is also a need coming out of that analysis and You know because they are so huge they are connected with many different actors in society the machinery Suppliers the finance the insurance and then downstream who's processing it who's turning it into products and buying it and selling it So there's many many different people involved and that also means there are many points we can attack with campaigning and to just take one out the the financing is quite interesting we did an an Analysis together with colleagues from Urgavalt on who is financing the about 40 Russian carbon bombs And we found that there are more than 400 foreign institutions providing financial support for these Russian carbon bombs and there were over 130 billion dollars of foreign support in these So then to diffuse them there's litigation. There was a panel just now on that there is civil disobedience We well, I know that some of us in the room have been on that Active on that and there's also reframing and Keep that relatively short It's about talking about the social cost of carbon the climate death and climate damages that are associated and if it's such Huge projects. It's really really Huge numbers that we're talking about the mortality cost of carbon that has been quantified Means that every single project would kill more people on that list would kill more people than the war in Ukraine And that's quite something and then about fossil gas because it washes out so quickly from the atmosphere It's a good candidate for responding to the climate emergency through a quick phase out And I think that is a reframing that we should be doing to counter the narrative of the fossil gas industry that Methane is the greatest thing for the the climate emergency Because it helps you transition. That's really a Narrative I'd like to to question and then Another option for going towards diffusing and that is one we are not yet seeing is Governments talking between themselves about fossil fuels and climate and shutting it down I mean this conference has grown a lot that's a good sign and We need to get to the next steps where governments are talking about who is going to keep it in the ground Who's going to take it out and that's pending But we have seen traction on the fossil treaty and other initiatives So I'm hopeful that we'll sooner or later get to that stage Thank you very much Okay, hi, it's a pleasure to be here. I'm gonna talk about our ongoing work About non-energy use of oil long-term scenarios for the petrochemical industry and the global energy and materialization So this is all fluid research team two of them three of them come counting me are here and Just to give a brief overview with some numbers of the global petrochemical industry We're talking about here of the non-energy use of oil of non combustion uses. So When you talk about that when we talk about scenarios for the chemical industry, we have to consider the kind of energy use And the CO2 emissions that are that this industry is responsible for so around 60% of all the oil consumed here It's not for combustion uses, but as raw materials as feedstock for fertilizers Plastics fibers and so on second aspect that I want to point out is the applications of this use that the plastic use which is like Roughly 40% is used for packaging Which has a very low very short time Of use so within a year you you you have it disposed with leads me to the third point With which is plastic waste mismanagement. So most of the countries most of the regions don't have like a well destiny for this plastics so we have them going into Marine environments and so on So just to focus here. We have fossil fuels Being transformed to basic chemicals and then the final products But here I'm gonna focus mostly on light olefins, which are ethylene propylene and butadiene and Aromatics and so I'm not focusing on agrochemicals specialty chemicals, but mostly plastics fibers and rubbers So the main research question here is what is the role of oil in the chemical sector? In climate change scenarios considering different final disposal and the men's scenarios regionally so Just a brief presentation of the model that we we use initially presented it today earlier the coffee model is a global integrated assessment model, which is imp for in the IPCC are AR 6 and the research of mitigation Pathway, it's based on a message platform It's a global I am with 18 regions based on perfect foresight and linear programming optimization and It's good to mention that it's completely hard linked the energy and land use systems So it's an important tool to analyze synergies and trade-offs in oil in energy environmental and climate policy so we're looking here at the I'm not gonna go through that that much but are looking at this part of the industry sector the petrochemicals and Just a brief overview. I don't want to get too much in detail here But we have different demands for each one of these basic chemicals I think propylene butadiene and aromatics And I just want to stress the structure of this industry, which is that we have Propylene and aromatics we have All the things we have basic chemicals being co-produced in oil refineries So when we shut down these refineries, where does this? demand How we will supply this demand so we have refinery couple co-production We have multi-product routes which are distinct cracking the basic like the heart of the chemical industry Which produces like has a balanced basket of all of these all the things and we have on purpose routes based on different different platforms We have the technology rich module And we have also ammonia and methanol that I'm not gonna Focus here, but just to stress we have bio-based alternatives fossil-based and we have CCU based through the methanol route here So this is the supply supply side module and when it Considering that the scenarios that we ran we're focusing on a baseline business as usual scenario We have a demand scenario reduction A demand reduction scenario we have a circular economy with more mechanical recycling scenario We have a climate ambitious Scenario with a carbon budget and we have all of these trends all of these strategies combined and we Here we want to see also how did the reduction of demand in packaging in 90% of blacks plastic used for packaging by 2030 how does that impact the Potential for recycling Because we will have less inflow of waste coming into the system and how does that affect the circular economy measures that are being put into place so Basically just going through the scenarios again. This is our scenario for Demand this is the baseline and this is the final disposal scenario Incineration land-filling Recycling for each one of these regions and we consider that just as a modeling exercise We assume that these trends continue until 2060 which is the time frame that are using here and The demand reduction scenario we assume that 90% of the packaging use are reduced Just as a starting analysis, but we don't assume any change in the final disposal scenario climate ambition same thing, but we assume a raising carbon price that is based on That is compatible with a 1.5 degree world And the increase in circular scenarios all of the other variables are Baseline we don't assume any changes, but we assume a higher a higher rate of recycling considering a dynamic stock flow modeling of Demands and waste of inflows and when we have all of these scenarios combined we see that the The potentials for recycling decrease. So when we have the reduction of packaging demand and we have the increase of Recycling we see that the potentials Reduce and we have also a carbon price in place. So just some brief results that we just We just got This is the primary HPC production and CO2 emissions for each one of the Scenarios that we ran. So what we see here is that the production of the primary production in the demand reduction scenario in the period of 2025 and 2045 Reduces so compared to the levels of circular economy, but by the end of 2060 2055 we see that they achieve like very similar Figures, but when we couple all these strategies, this is the this is where we can get like very low or Lower figures of HPC production and when we see the impact of this and CO2 emissions we see that the recycling Kind of surpasses the baseline scenario by 2055 because of the recycling emissions and also that Well the climate ambition scenario it reaches net zero, but it's much easier to reach lower Emissions figures when we have circular economy measures and demand reduction measures in place These are the Impact this is not only for HPC This is the whole energy used in the chemical industry But as you see that the HPC has a huge impact and this is final energy And here we have the use of energy for as feedstock So what we see here is that when we couple all of these strategies, we see there's a reduced demand for final energy compared to the other scenarios and And we reduce also the need for biomass comparing to the climate ambitious scenario, which is here and also feedstock we have a Lot of a lot we use a lot of gas the scenario sees a lot of gas entering the the system it refers gas than NAFTA and We see also potential use of biomass For as feedstock and also so here what we see is that There's there's surplus of ethanol when we electrify the The fleet so it's used for the petrochemical sector and there's also some synergies between Aviation fuels and navigation shipping fuels which are also hard to a big setters So we also in these platforms we co-produce petrochemical NAFTA bio NAFTA so and here we have the the type of feedstock The amount of HVC produced per feedstock we see that CCU is not Doesn't it's not a least cost solution for the model. So we see Biomass entering and but less biomass is needed when we have demand reduction and when we have circular kind of measures and this is the technology profile of the different scenarios and what we see is that We use a lot of On-purpose route and climate ambition scenarios But it's been cracking remains predominant in all scenarios But what we see here is that it decreases and also the use of oil Decreases over time only when we have both of these strategies combined circular economy and demand reduction so The scenarios and this is just a Modeling exercise Oil remains an important feedstock for HVC production alternatives Biobased alternative seeds are preferred over CCU which is also like important to achieve climate goals and both demand recycle demand reduction and recycling are important to reduce both plastic waste and emissions in the sector and also Just finalize we didn't assess chemical recycling or crude oil to chemicals, but these could be game-changers to the industry if they were Successfully implemented or well But well, that's it. Thank you Yeah So hello everyone, thank you for for having me I'm really happy to be here today so indeed my presentation is gonna focus on the The research we've done for an upcoming report that looks at various different energy scenarios and look at what do they what do they tell us about? 1.5 degree compatible energy future so we look at a bunch of integrated assessment model because basically the Influence expectation for energy producer energy consumer investor and also sort of the the policymaker Assessment of the future outlook of the energy system So that significantly contributes to Steer energy producers investment decision and financial actors assessment in the trend in the energy market So so it's important to understand what I am Tell us and how these different mix of policy decision affects the achievability of different climate goal and how Also, the current energy crisis might affect the outcome for how do we go through the energy transition? So since the IPCC six assessment report working group free database came out We've been digging into the all of the I am that were published in there And so we looked at specifically the about 100 scenario that limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius With no or low overshoot and then filter them for their day amount of carbon CCS Well fossil CCS and bioenergy carbon capture and storage that they have Based on the IPCC feasibility assessment for this technology And so we limited the sequestration to about three gigaton per year by 2050 and about three gigaton also for begs by 2050 and look at sort of these so-called feasible 1.5 degree pathway with these With these fossil CCS and and CDR and they would do the same thing for our forest station reforestation so there are threats to overwhelmingly using these These carbon sequestration method for land use Water use also like territorial disputes. So the maximum sustainable potential also needs to be sort of managed to some level that Limit these these risks So then afterwards we look at specifically with this set of about 26 pathway from this 100 IPCC scenario that limits warming to 1.5 So what were the specific oil and gas a phase out pathway and as you all know and as Christopher explained this morning The IA last year for the first time published a net zero emission scenario that limit warming to 1.5 And this is the level of oil and gas reduction in this scenario and its conclusion was that there should be no room for new oil and gas development And so we find that with the IPCC Scenario that we've taken out of the latest assessment report that we find that the same conclusion apply With this assessment there, but they don't make the same policy recommendation because it's outside of the mandate to make policy prescriptive recommendations and so we find that conclusion because basically, this is the embodied emission from the field that are currently developing or Already producing so the embodied carbon emission see here is already enough to consume the entire carbon budget for that sector in the economy and This is how much more Carbon emission could be released in the atmosphere if new fields would be developed and this is our license reserves that that could be that could be developed over the forthcoming years and In terms of the license reserve and the new exploration that could be deployed and see that by 2050 would go to about twice Twice as much of the emission that would be consistent with 1.5 degree pathways so again emphasizing the fact that there's no room for new oil and gas development under both of these scenario and They're new to find sort of the robustness of this analysis and Find what are the other sort of conclusion from other scenario another modeling group And we also looked at what Bloomberg and New England refinance 1.5 degree pathway looked at what arena You also look at the British petroleum scenario, but also other IPCC illustrative mitigation pathway and We find that the result are roughly consistent with the IA in IPCC 1.5 degree pathway for oil and gas And actually we find that even in the Illustrative mitigation pathway from the IPCC so that's the green line at the bottom When if you use much less CCS and CDR then we should actually decarbonize much faster the oil and gas sector and If we use actually zero CCS and CDR just of the OECN model which is the one that was commissioned by the UNEP principle for responsible investor Which has about 99% reduction of oil and gas by 2050 that the curve is is much steeper and The few ones that are above the IPCC and IA scenarios Actually the one from BP which is above which is the top one. She actually has fossil CCS secretion that is above the IPCC feasibility threshold for that that technology and Similarly for the IPCC Ren scenario which actually has coal reducing extremely fast and that's why it is a bit more room for oil and gas In that scenario, but actually if you have a bit more coal in the system then oil and gas should reduce faster And then in the in light of the current Energy crisis think it's important to also look at what specifically Europe gas consumption should look like under 1.5 degree scenarios And and whether we should be developing new field to or not to comply with this with the supply crunch at the moment So this is the the current production and consumption of of gas from existing field within Europe and Then here we see the import from the Middle East and Africa region and from the Asbergen existing fields that are imported for Gas consumption in Europe, which is about 300 billion cubic barrel per year and Then with the alien utilization at 80% from all of the other import Alienly infrastructure at the moment and reach about 500 billion cubic meter per year of consumption and this is the the Russian supply that are being phased out at the moment and So we find that actually with our subset of 1.5 degree pathway from the IPCC so the one that we filtered out for feasibility and and maximum sustainable potential for CDR and CCS and that the gas consumption for Europe alone is Actually within the range of the current import capacity of of gas in Europe So meaning that we should not be developing any new Important for structure and that if we were to comply with the 1.5 degree target, then we should be able to maintain And gas consumption with the existing infrastructure And actually even the Europe consumption under the repower EU plan is also very much aligned with the 1.5 degree pathway. So also indicating that there is sort of a short-term supply crunch in 2022 in 2023 but developing new infrastructure would lock yourself in into Several decades of new import and there will be real challenge afterwards to decommission and create stranded assets over the forthcoming decades and So that sort of emphasize the need to significantly accelerate the investment in Wind and solar technology which have the most mitigation potential also at the lowest cost and from analysis of the IPCC scenarios We need about 800 billion per year in wind and solar alone by 2030 an annual investment to to to be consistent with 1.5 degree Limiting of temperature rise However, we find that there's only about a half of that that's forecasted to be invested leaving an investment gap of about 450 billion by 2030 And then the good news if I may say is that actually the investment in new fields and development and exploration So the CAPEX and OPEX in oil and gas exploration and in new field is actually about 570 billion only by 2030 alone and this would be enough by itself to plug the investment gap in 2030 so actually it's not that there's a lack of money just that it's all being invested in the wrong places and emphasizing the need to remobilize private capital flows from fossil fuel industry towards renewable English sector and Just to conclude So if you're the key messages of this presentation is that developing new oil and gas field is incompatible with limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius and this is the conclusion that we find not only from the AI scenario But also endorsed by the IPCC and a broader set of scenarios So we showed it's actually a robust finding across the wealth of like authoritative or well-sighted models across the the industry and and actually the IPCC scenario that we've looked at which limits the Carbon sequestration to feasible and sustainable level should actually by 2030 we should reduce oil and gas production by 30% already And by about 65% by 2050 which is also what all of the other models show that by 2050 about 65% the minimum that we we find and Also that there's no room for new fossil fuel important for a structure in Europe in the 1.5 degree aligned phase out pathways and Apart from the short-term supply crunch in 2022 2023 then there's the capacity to transition the energy sector in order to not to develop a new infrastructure and then as I just shown that Investment gap for wind and solar is is huge but can be plugged by remobilizing capital flows from the fossil fuel industry towards The renewable energy sector. So thank you very much for your attention Good afternoon everyone great to great to be here again. I was here just before lunch. So Sorry, you've had to put up with me twice. Anyway, what I was going to talk about was a global study that we did and It's basically its use in the UK conversation or the UK debate that's been happening around oil and gas Production going forward. It's been quite a sort of strong debate at different times particularly Proceeding cop, but I just want to reflect a little bit on this global study and and and how we've basically used it to Inform what's going on in the UK? So as I said, yeah much debate in the UK particularly around Proceeding cop 26 around new oil and gas licensing. There was all this stuff about the Cumbering coal mine cambo and so forth and and Whether we needed new new licensing what this looked like in terms of Production phase out and there's some very useful Examples of global analysis of really sort of informed the debate and and Kristoff spoke to that this morning But there's also been the production gap report Had there's been a bunch of international initiatives the non I never say it the non fossil fuel proliferation treaty Boga and so forth which have all provided some momentum here So I want to speak a little bit about as I say a global study that that my colleague down Wellesby led Which James Price was on and he's in the audience and Paul of course was a co-author on And just talk a little bit about the UK context in respect of that paper So our paper is feeding into the debate. This is I hope there's no one from UK government here But this is our paper stuck against the Ministry of Energy In the UK. I think this is much better than citations and downloads. I think This is this is where it's at Be adding your paper sort of put up in in public places. I think it went on the shell building as well, which was great So of course it's feeding in To the debate more generally, but of course we want it to feed in in a more nuanced way we could say through consultations through Public inquiries that sort of thing. So we're really interested in what the paper says in terms of the UK context in particular So just to give you some UK context and know a lot of you are sort of experts in this anyway But the UK is still the second largest European producer, but it's been in decline for some time the black bar The black shaded area here for gas shows a sort of Increase in production that's about two thousand and then the decline And the pink wedge coming in and filling in the the imports making us more sort of import dependent The lower chart shows the show shows what's going on in terms Of in terms of oil so you see this sort of peak in 2000 and then the declines as sort of 2012 2013 and then something of a Stabilization much of the gas as you can see this is the the export piece here You see much of the gas that we produce is used in the UK Whereas a lot of the oil is shipped out to refining capacity across Europe and the and there's the sort of current context I mean what's happening to the sector the UK government as we all know we've got a new administration, which we're all really pleased about But the priority remains maximizing recovery from from the oil and gas and basin And this has been reinforced in recent weeks And and obviously when I looking at new licensing grounds the the sort of reemergence of the fracking debate and so forth There was some attempt to look at moving transitioning was transitioning the sector Through the North Sea transition deal But this is a fairly weak voluntary package that really doesn't do a lot in terms of Really sort of changing the course in terms of production in the UK And then there was a lot of excitement about this announced climate compatibility Checkpoint which was to a bunch of tests that we're going to sort of look and see Which of the oil and gas? Projects that came online in the UK were climate compatible And there's a lot of interest because actually some of the tests were around scope three emissions We're around so the production gap and so forth It's just been released last week and it's a very very weak document that really only focuses on Upstream emissions and is very much advisory. But anyway, just to say this got us into the ideas Motivated by NGO such as uplift around what what could our paper say about any of this? So just to say something about the sort of general insights from Wellesby at all 2021 So basically this paper said and it was sort of McGlade-Eakins mark 2 But it said for a 1.5 degrees limit Almost 60% of oil and gas and 90% of coal reserves must remain Unextracted, but then it did something additionally interesting and Olivia's talks about this, but what was the decline rate in terms of these these different? The oil and gas production and we saw a three on average a 3% year-on-year global decline out to 2050 Broadly aligning with the IEA net zero work But a real strong variation in decline rates between regions and that's the interesting thing from the UK perspective which I'll come on to but then the other thing we really wanted to Sort of contextualize this study around was that we actually think this is an underestimate that if we account for CDR risks and The low probability budget that we used 50% That actually a more rapid transition would be needed and that that sort of language is quite important I think in explaining the study, okay In terms of informing the national discussion So some key points the UK UK decline needs to be more rapid than other regions. That was a key Outcome with decline rates of between six to seven percent per year Pointing to no new investment via new licensing And what this suggested if you were then to do the math in terms of looking at cumulative production out to 2050 was that the cumulative production levels were not significantly higher than the reserves that were already under development Third point I've already mentioned this but that these decline rates were something of what we consider to be an underestimate Of what was actually needed for the reasons I've already mentioned and the other interesting thing about the the the sort of this global analysis was that we were looking at it from a carbon Budget context So if the UK produces above its decline rate or doesn't stick with its decline rate a country somewhere else Cannot produce something so we we we try to reinforce the message that this is something of a balancing perspective based on a sort of a global budget approach But what were some of the limitations to the insights? We're obviously using a global model here There's a limit in terms of granular detail around the UK Specifics and that that that was something that we had to sort of think about when we were using the outputs of this We don't have the grant We don't have the detail in terms of import and export considerations around commodity flows. So how how crude Is exported and how refinery products are brought back in so some of that sort of level of detail is missing And then we don't have the information on the tax regimes political economy Considerations which are so important to the UK debate in the UK situation So final slide We you know what what we also wanted to do as well as using this kind of global Analysis was think about some of the other complementary evidence needed on UK production limits And trying to do that from a context specific point of view for the UK But also trying to tap into what's politically salient, which is not always easy So the first point is we emphasize the resilience to supply shocks so another bit of our research was very much on The focus on reducing demand so it's and that's where the UK conversation has gone. It's about safeguarding supply We wanted to emphasize that actually demand reduction is is critical We also made a point of saying around this investment opportunity in clean technologies Which comes back to earlier presentations today that there's a large and for UK plc sort of in its new Free capacity to Whatever There's a lot we you know There's a large investment and trade opportunity for global That's what I was looking for global Britain with a strong potential for the oil and gas sector in terms of taking forward a clean technology Climate leadership global influence. I'm not sure how important that is now but around cop26 You know, this was a a serious matter or so we thought in terms of contentious fossil fuel projects blemishing UK credentials and then equity considerations I don't know how salient this is but clearly it's it's a really important part of this whole Discussion, you know about the UK's ability to shift its low dependency. It's historical benefits from oil and gas And the historical emissions associated with production and use Thank you very much This is very much work in progress. Actually my co-author we get with egging and I have we have Started over and over with this paper because we found the results a bit frustrating I think you'll see what I mean and how it's the end. I Don't think I have to define stranded assets in this audience here but Maybe let me point to the fact that we are really talking about Yeah Unexpected policy shifts disruptive changes and market conditions and I think we started the discussions on what that means for natural the natural gas sector Nowadays but here in what we do with our modeling We also look at the climate policy side of of new policy of new scenarios essentially for The natural gas sector we have a model that we call the global gas model that we've used for more than 10 years And I want to show you the results for two different scenarios In particular the infrastructure results until 2050 And what we can learn from that for yeah, if you contrast capacity expansions between those scenarios for the natural gas Transportation infrastructure The model is a detailed model with more than almost 200 nodes Globally a detailed value chain analysis and it's run to 2060 and we present results to 2050 It's a it's a partial equilibrium model. So really just guess only and It includes aspects like market power in addition to to really detailed but country Country links in terms of transportation infrastructure. So it's not pipeline by pipeline It's links between country nodes We define two scenarios and That's maybe part of the work in progress still we have one scenario which we sort of think of as Decapitization scenario which essentially has for natural gas a stable demand outlook And we started to discuss this already in the room that this may not be the picture But if you look actually at a lot of the global scenarios that are out there They have decrease in coal decrease in oil, but stable demand for natural gas And we contrast and this was from I said, we've take we've done it over and over again And this is still from the IEA word energy outlook 2017. So that was the Essentially this the sustainable development scenario a demand data in this decarbonization scenario and the stable scenario And then the growth it was what was called the new policy scenario back then so sort of Paris agreement style a scenario and that had global Globally growing natural gas demand so that essentially is this difference between the two scenarios and I plotted the 2020 model result line in there and you see the growth and in the growth scenario about plus 55% and the more or less stable development in the in the stable scenario If we look at the Capacities and this is here what is already in place or what was what was already constructed by the time of yeah 2020 when we did those results or when we started to do this modeling for 2020 data So that's what we call exogenous capacities. What's in place and decided and build plus the expansions So those are the model results then And for the three different types of transportation infrastructure the pipelines the liquefaction of liquefied natural gas and the Reagessification so the import side of liquefied natural gas We find relatively little difference between the scenarios and that's quite surprising if we see almost 50% more demand in the growth scenario by By by 2050 Then in the stable scenario, but we have only a little bit more Liquefaction capacity in the growth scenario, but actually a little more regressification capacity in the stable demand scenario and That's similar actually if we look at pipeline expansion We have relatively similar cumulative expansion so it's not So those almost 720 50 it's cumulative from 2020 on to 2050, but it's almost 700 in both cases so there's At least comparing those two scenarios. There's no generalized as its trending risk In either of the scenarios or in the growth scenario compared to the stable scenario But it might well be that the global aggregation of numbers sort of conceals as a specific developments and regional factors Which is why since we have that 200 node model we decided to look at What's going on at least between the regions? It's still aggregated or our results are aggregated here But it's a first step. What we see is that most of the expansion is going on in Asia or to Asia It's really this is where most of the demand growth is In both in both scenarios actually and this is also where most of the action in terms of Capacity expansion takes place even though Asia is not really a pipeline market, but even In pipelines, this is what draws most of the expansions if we look at some sort of Country-level data, then we see that much of the expansions is actually within countries So that's what most of the expansion takes place and that's not to not to neglect and then we also have more sort of a bit more expansions between regions and Let me without going into the details here and sort of Point to something that I will look at on the following slides We compared the expansion results for One scenario for each scenario actually that we get for 2030 with the numbers in the other scenario for 2030 But also for 2050 so the idea being if in one scenario The same amount of capacity of annual import capacity is being built then in the other scenario Well, then there is probably not a risk of stranding and Then we have this But if actually the numbers are lower the capacity expansion is lower in the other scenario than it's flagged and yellow We don't have the time to look at all of them in detail But the yellow ones are sort of the ones with a potential stranding risk And doing that sort of link by link sort of Yeah, it shows two things first It's it's not a lot of stranding risk and so it's not really large like as a capacities at risk and Second you always find sort of a reason why maybe the model result is a little bit of a deviation from reality take the first one here Russia to China that was without any Boycott or sanction of Russian imports to the EU and we might well see that those larger capacities from the stable scenario to China will actually be used even in a scenario of Yeah, even in a Or in the current scenario with sanctions to the EU for yeah to the EU similar in In the European Union if you look at pipelines within the European Union with a lot of Of yellow flags here, but first those are small capacities That are at risk of being stranded and second they might to a large extent and in this new situation that we have right now serve to alleviate Yeah supply shortages Now that we don't have Russian supplies anymore in regressification similar most Notes that are small capacities that are at risk of being stranded the only larger ones is in China But this looks large to us in Europe But it's actually modest if you compare that to the pipeline capacities And if you compare that to the growth in Chinese demand and import demand that we saw in the last 10 years And a leak of action Yeah, the we have 10 BCM or so on the US side and the largest one is actually a Mozambique But that may be a case where China is just coming in in and absorbing that So I said China quite a lot quite a lot now and that's actually driving a large Part of what's going on between the two scenarios It's really the biggest mark or it's starting to be the biggest import market. So all of those international transport capacities Have a big impact or have a big Largely influenced by what's going on in China interestingly actually that might be a little confusing Non-growth scenario the stable scenario is the one with the higher Sort of global stable scenario is the one with the higher demand growth in China essentially sort of absorbing what's not used in other in other countries and That's probably compensating a lot of the stranding risks that you would expect in the stable scenario because in Yeah, globally and The picture is very much driven by the EU side where we have really the the decrease of demand in the stable scenario Let me just move to this one. We did we've always done in the last 10 years Contrafacture scenarios of Russian sanctions or Russian boycott. So we had some under in the door and put them pull them out this spring So you have some of those boycott results here And what we see so this is basically where there's no Russian supplies anymore on the left-hand side Would we see that there is quite some compensation from US LNG and also an African and North African in particular Pipeline and LNG supplies. So that could also change what will also change the picture I should say in terms of capacity use And that's sort of blurring a lot of the picture and it's there's no clear indication of assets trending on the natural gas transportation infrastructure China plays a big role here We also see that Liguefaction regressification are quite flexible so We know that regressification investments are paying off at relatively low investment rates So it's not actually decades that they need to pay off their investments. It's just a few years And that might even be true for other assets in particular within if you have high price periods You have them developments like more and more floating units on the regress sites already for a while But even on the Liguefaction side nowadays And then of course they have all the discussion of repurposing pipelines and others like LNG assets to Hydrogen or other green gases so We also wondered if our scenarios are wrongly chosen. So we We actually went to the scenarios that Olivier was pointing at But went to the primary source white went to the IPCC scenarios as well as well and we're looking at looking at alternative scenarios But we're a bit puzzled because you didn't show that So we were not really sure if this is something that we wanted to take as data source The alternative one was the this is the last word energy outlook But what we also see that picture of you know, some regions demand goes down for natural gas But other region demand for natural gas goes up So it's not that different from what we have in the scenarios that we have so far and Of course, let me end on that the biggest trended assets that we have today are the four pipelines from Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 in the Baltic Sea and That's not climate policy related. So it's really policy uncertainty that's driving the natural gas sector today Thank you, and sorry for being long Yeah, it's I guess the analysis is focused on the Infrastructure the the transportation infrastructure just curious about the ramifications for Stranded assets on the upstream and the implications that would have on the Transportation infrastructure that in itself might trigger and change the economics of the infrastructure itself. Oh, yeah, absolutely, right. I mean we often speak of integrated projects Really whole value chain, but we didn't look at this at all And I must say that we are not too confident on our results and on that production capacity side, you know In fact, I'm gonna comment on all these years presentation. In fact, it's a clarification My name is Roberto Schaefer. I'm from the Federal Reserve Rio de Janeiro, but I also have another hat I was one of the two coordinated lead authors of chapter three of the IPCC, which is the one that you make reference here It's not correct to say that 1.5 C scenarios No or low overshoot do not see expansion or new investment in fossil fuels The database that not does not allow you to say that the granularity of the models do not see field by field So base what we have done is to show in a volume term What's gonna be the fate of fossil fuels into the future? But in the same line of Alessandro, you cannot say that you're not shutting down a specific oil field in Canada Because of heavy oil and open a new investment or a new oil field in a different region So you cannot say that and that's why I also challenged a little bit the result of net use in scenario by the IEA Because you cannot say that you're not gonna invest in new oil fields. You can say that in volume terms If you invest in a new oil field, you need to shut down another one But you can never guarantee and our result in our models Alessandro showed that today You see new investment in oil fields if you have much higher quality oil Much more appropriate for the refining units that we have today and eventually shutting down a heavy oil from Canada Shutting down oil heavy oil from Venezuela. So this my my comment. Thank you very much Just to clarify clearly it is true that from the the whole set of C1 the 97 scenario from the working group 3 We don't find that conclusion, but it is from the subset of a quarter of these the one that are in line with the Feasibility threshold for BEX and CCS fossil CCS development. So with that 26 out of the 100 That's where we find the kind of oil and gas phasal pathway and it's true that we didn't look at the Sort of fields themselves look at the primary energy that from oil and gas in these in this subset of pathway And then that's what gives us this the kind of this phasal pathway that is roughly consistent with the one from the IEA arena and Several other models that we love looked at and if I may also describe also on the point There was made the last presentation. I mean the reason why there's a huge rebound in in gas after 2050 is because we only filter with these feasibility threshold with fossil CCS Until 2050 so then after 2050 then it's not filtered for fossil CCS in more so then there's a huge uptick in Fossil carbon sequestration afterwards which allow for a lot more Gas power generation after 2050, but then we may perhaps there should be some other threshold built for Hello. Hi. I'm Martin Sokko, Trinity College Dublin and thanks for a wonderful session Really exciting. I have a question for Olivier. You mentioned touch upon finance, which I think is absolutely crucial for Transition to clean energy and you made an excellent point, which is that it's not the lack of money That's there, which is often used as an excuse for not transitioning to clean energy But as you said that's the the money is invested in wrong places. So I continue investment fossil fuels. It is absolutely crucial So I would like to ask you to expand on this a little bit and maybe tell us if you have any ideas How to achieve shifting that investment to clean energy. Thank you Hi, I'm Marty from Marty orta from the University of Barcelona And my question is for you regarding the your presentation on carbon carbon bombs And well, it looks like you are suggesting us to focus on trying to avoid the extraction of these oil and gas and coal from these carbon bombs from these huge projects instead And If we consider all the impacts from oil and gas and coal extraction In terms of local environmental impacts or health impacts It makes much more sense not to extract all the other oil and and gas and coal from Minor projects because we would avoid most of the other impacts So I wanted to ask you how you what would you say about this contradiction? Thanks. Thanks very much Are there any questions for other speakers so they can be thinking about this? So Johnny West Representing carbon tracker with the gas model How do you arrive at the total scenarios of demand in and Are you looking at the Carbon intensity of production in the supply chain at all because everything we see around gas shows that the likely Overall levels of emissions higher than the gasses bridge fuel argument suggests Right, we've got three questions to three speakers. They're thinking of questions, especially for the other speakers What we'll start with over here Yeah, so thank you for your question. And yeah, so indeed it's true that it's quite mesmerizing how much oil and gas investment are still expected to be to be spent in new field in new exploration which we find are incompatible with meeting the 1.5 degree target and So friend, it's about a 450 billion investment gap of annual investment in wind and solar alone Well, there's about 570 billion that are expected to be invested in a new field in new exploration And I'm not suggesting that this exactly this money that should be Reinvested into wind and solar, but I think this should be done for remobilizing private capital flows That's after we stop subsidizing fossil fuel exploration, obviously but I think this can be done through better corporate net zero methodologies and frameworks and establishing more transparency and and Accounting for all scopes of emissions of a more comprehensive reporting frameworks, which allows then the financial Financial institutions to then be able to Channel investments where the they've confined the most potential to decarbonize different industries So having a clear picture on which companies actually have a serious plan for decarbonizing then helps To remobilize capital flows and then investment Investors to put the money where we should go Yeah, thank you very much Mati for pointing to that I totally agree. There are many many other reasons beyond climate reasons why we should be stopping fossil fuels and Couple of years or decades from now people will be working bad at this historic age And we'll be shaking their heads and we're saying you're poising your water your air your food Why why why did you do that and these local impacts? I think they are very real in many places So by no means does the carbon bombs analysis mean to say forget about all the rest it's just that I came to this work from a worry about the climate emergency and I think the big question there is where are the big pieces that we have to go for if we want to win this fight for climate stability and That is what we're trying to point to at the With this analysis, so I do think that it's not to be played off against each other But rather, you know get more people Into action and also to get them into action on the right things because you know many of us have been Tricked by the fossil fuel industry into worrying about our carbon footprints while we're not questioning Their business and I think if you have been worrying about your carbon footprint, that's okay, you know, that's also That's that's also shows that you're thinking about the climate crisis and what what to do about it But I think it's time to start thinking about our carbon handprints and how we're cutting the fuses of these carbon bombs And that's a gigaton. That's a billion times more than the tons of carbon footprint. You may be producing so Yes, local impacts are definitely Something to worry about and a good reason to stop all fossil fuel extraction projects, not just the carbon bombs Yeah, very good question how we derived our scenarios They're based on external sources for the demand. So we don't do any sort of carbon accounting or Even an evaluation if each of the scenarios is really reaching a two degree cells is target or not because it's really just one sector and we don't look at the interaction with other fuels in our Calculations we want to look at the sectoral implications if you want and you have a really good point that there's more than the CO2 emissions There's of course the methane emissions of natural gas and in another extension of the model we start to look at It's not my cell phone We started to look at the effect of some some methane sort of taxation policy Because there is discussion of that in the European Union of some policy framework to address climate Effect of methane and in fact that are the defect that different exporters have different methane intensities essentially of their Of their natural gas exports to Europe But what do you find so far is that you need really high Methane prices in terms of CO2 equivalents of really a couple thousand or so euros per ton of CO2 equivalent To have an effect on the trade flow a visible effect on the trade flows So it's let's say it's a hard one to address with the with the policy Okay, I need your advice. I promise Thanks, and thanks for the presentations. My name is Elias. I'm working for the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action in Germany And I wanted to jump on the question that Brandon had before to you Oliver Have you looked for the distributional systems of gas in Europe in your analysis and I guess I Was going to make a very quick comment rather than the question if I may It does save time because then they don't have to answer it unless they choose to Yeah, it's very short just a couple of people have said in the discussion that Models like so three of the presentations Keal Olivier and Steve all talked about new projects and the impact of new projects and a couple of people have said in the discussion Well models don't say you can't have new projects You can have as many as you like as long as you close down some old projects And I think the same is pretty much true of any climate mitigation Mechanism models don't say you can't build new coal plants increase your emissions cut your carbon prices and everything as long as you do something else But the the I think the the reason that I'm happy to see discussion of of new Projects is because I at least can't see a way of closing down old ones that is economically legally and politically viable I would love to hear from from people the Ways in which they can be closed down so that Other new ones can be opened but to me it looks like the hardest and least viable path to get there And so I think what we're talking about here is more viable paths. I hope Well, I mean it's gonna be pretty short answer because we haven't looked at the distributional impact of the gas phase out in Within within Europe. So we just look at the global import number from different sources of Gas import. So, yeah, fortunately, I can help you there, but Thank you very much