 Agrair-vos que hagueu vingut, esperem que l'acte us interessei, agraïm molt els ponents que hagin acceptat venir, us dón l'havem vingut en nom del Grens, que és el grup de recerca en estats, nacions i sobiranies, explicar-vos que en la nostra universitat tenim tres llengües oficials, unen la que estic parlant, el castellà i l'anglès, els ponents tiraran les llengües en les quals parlaran, ara ho estaven decidint els ponents i el Joan Paul Rubíez i el Fernando Guirao faran la seva intervenció en català, les preguntes posterioses podran adreçar les llengües que vulgueu i la part que dedicarem a entrar amb el professor Enric Ocelaire de Cal, la professora Johns i el professor Jacobson ho faran segurament en anglès, però torno a repetir que les preguntes es podran formular en l'idioma que ho considereu convenient. No els vull prendre més temps, ah, també vull presentar la moderadora, encara és doctoranda per problemes acadèmics, és la Mariona Lloret, molt aviat serà doctora, i la seva tesi precisament tracta sobre populisme, per tant és la moderadora perfecta per un acte sobre nous populismes, encara que ella estudi populismes que més vells i de... però també nord-americans i covans, dit això dissedeixo la paraula moderadora i moltes gràcies. Molt bé, gràcies Josep, benvinguts a tots i a totes, gràcies per venir avui en aquesta sessió, diria jo que tant necessària, tinc la sensació que tots tenim moltes ganes de tractar aquests temes, bé, aquest any ha sigut particularment singular, com sabeu tots, en els últims mesos hem tingut dos processos força inesperats, això ho podem discutir després, que indiquen uns canvis dràstics de com està organitzat el món, aquesta és la meva interpretació, però les hores el que podem plantejar-nos avui és una pregunta tan generica com i ara què, què representa tant el Brexit com l'elecció de la Presidència Estats Units del Donald Trump, i hem posat en entredit, crec jo que dues institucions, dos pilars, que semblaven estables i d'alguna manera permanents, com són d'una banda la Unió Europea i de l'altra, els Estats Units d'Amèrica, i posen també en entredit la globalització, el procés de globalització, perquè doncs són vots anti-sistema d'alguna manera, això també ho podríem qüestionar. Bé, començarem la primera sessió parlant sobre el Brexit, tenim aquí dos especialistes sobre el tema, tenim el Joan Pau Robies, que és professor i crea d'aquí de la Pompeu Fabra, i bé, tots coneixeu els professors que participaran en aquestes jornades, però els presentaré a tothom li com correspon. Com deia, el professor Robies és i crea de la Pompeu Fabra, i té el doctorat de la Universitat de Cambridge, i ha estat professor a numeroses institucions britàniques, per tant coneix molt bé el cas britànic, entre elles la London School of Economics, i és especialista en història moderna i en història de la globalització, per tant doncs és un tema que domina força. I també tenim el professor Fernando Guirao, que és catedràtic janmoner d'història, aquí també a la Pompeu Fabra, i té doctorat d'història i civilització a l'Institut d'Universitat Europeu de Florencia, i és especialista en història econòmica, europea, contemporània, i en història de la integració europea, que ara potser es convertirà en història de la desintegració europea, ens ho podríem plantejar. Bé, ja quasi bé callo i els dissediré la paraula, el que farem és cada un dels ponents parlarà entre 10 i 15 minuts amb les primeres impressions del Brexit, i després oblirem el debat entre la taula i després el públic, si els sembla. Bé, jo, per llançar així una primera idea, la victòria del Brexit realment representa un challenge, un requestionament de l'Unió Europea, i ha sigut un dels cops més durs que ha rebut la institució, i és el primer cop que un país membre decideix abandonar l'Unió, per tant, tots seran interrogants. Potser representa la desintegració de la Gran Bretanya, no ho sé, o de l'Unió Europea, això són coses que ens podíem plantejar. Bé, ho deixo aquí, comencem amb el professor Robies, així que li s'adeixo a la paraula, i moltes gràcies, els dos. Tal com ha indicat el professor Pik, qualsevol pregunta en castellàvem en anglès posteriorment serà molt benvinguda. Jo sempre dono les classes en anglès, a l'horitzet de punt pel Fabra, i avui aprofito l'oportunitat per l'en català. A vegades ho trobo a faltar una mica també. Doncs bé, el Brexit ha estat un xoc, pels britànics mateixos, ni el David Cameron, ni tan sols els Boris Johnson s'ho esperaven, i penso que, per tant, a part de les conseqüències que pugui tenir, val la pena preguntar-se per què ha passat, i quines són les lliçons del Brexit, en llocs del títol de la meva xerrada, és aquesta, les lliçons del Brexit. Començaré amb una repassada molt ràpida el que seria la sociologia del vot. Val a dir que la informació que tinc no és informació científica, sinó que es basa en les estimacions posteriors, els diaris, les comunicacions més informats. És a dir, no tenim encara una anàlisi sociològica detallada i profunda que s'hauria de fer. Ara bé, tenim unes indicadors bastant clars. Per tant, penso que es pot resumir en molt poques paraules. Van votar a favor del Brexit la gent gran, la gent de les provincies i de les zones rurales, la gent de les zones econòmicament més deprimides, la gent amb menys diners, és a dir, que guanyen menys el mes, i la gent menys educada. És a dir, la gent que se sent... que la globalització els ha deixat enrere. I a més a més van votar pel Brexit les àrees ètnicament més homogèniques d'Anglaterra i que se senten més identificats amb un patriotisme anglès-britànic. Dic anglès-britànic perquè és notable el fet que el Brexit va fracassar tant a Escòcia com a Irlanda del Nord per raons diverses. O sigui, el patriotisme de Sant George, podríem dir. Qui va votar per quedar-se a Europa i no a poca gent? Estem parlant d'un gairebé meitat de meitat, és 48%. Doncs sobretot la gent més jove, la gent que viu a les grans ciutats, sobretot a Londres, la gent més educada, la gent que viu a Oxford i Cambridge, i la gent que participa de l'economia més dinàmica, la gent que està més connectada, la gent que viu en zones ètnicament mixes i la gent cosmopolitana. Clarament tenim una sèrie d'indicadors, d'indicadors bastant clars, de que hi ha unes raons clars. Quan es pregunta la gent quina és la raó principal per la qual van votar pel Brexit, la raó número 1 és l'immigració. És a dir, el rebuig del que ells han vist com un excés d'immigració. Hi ha altres raons, però aquesta seria la raó número 1. No hi ha una lògica de partits excessivament forta. És veritat que més votants toris van votar per Brexit i més votants laboristes van votar per remei, però moltes zones traditionalment laboristes van votar per Brexit, sobretot les zones desindustrialitzades i deprimides. Les elites conservadores sempre han estat a favor de l'Unió Europea per raons econòmiques, per raons a l'accés als mercats, i es van trobar que van perdre el control del procés. D'alguna manera, el David Cameron va fer un error de càlcul terrible, sobretot perquè es defia de les enquestes. Hi ha lliçons de Brexit, lliçons número 1, amb els referèndums no et fis les enquestes. A les accions no gaire, però sobretot amb els referèndums no et fis les enquestes. I, finalment, el gran triomfador, com a partit polític, va ser UKIP, un partit que ningú no votaria mai al govern, perquè són una banda d'inútils i la gent ho saben. I que, a més a més, amb un lideratge completament esquinçat, tenen un personatge mediàtic que és el resum del populisme, que és Nigel Farage, que teníem en aquesta atractiva foto inicial. Doncs bé, el Nigel Farage ha obtingut un triomf espectacular servit en bandeja per David Cameron. Un home que no tenia cap possibilitat de governar ha aconseguit posar la por al cos, no només els tornis, sinó també els dables. Perquè el fet del Brexit i com es va desenvolupar la campanya, en gran mesura, es responen a la capacitat d'un individu que tenia un sol diputat que no era el seu propi escó, el Parlament britànic va aconseguir canviar la gent de política. Això, a mi sembla un any una altra lliçó, que a vegades no cal estar al govern per dominar la gent de política. Mai un home que tampoc gent hauria votat ha aconseguit, en una situació seriosa, aconseguit una impacte tan gran. És un cas molt especial. Molt bé, allò en les lliçons quines serien? Ja he explicat que ha estat un gran error de càlcul de David Cameron. Molta gent diu que els referèndums es fan servir com a vots de protesta. Jo penso que en aquest cas no només hi va haver un vot de protesta, també hi havia una aspiració profunda que havia estat cultivada durant dècades. Penso que cal buscar causes profundes, no només a curt termini, per aquest no. I en aquest sentit cal començar per l'impacte mediàtic de dècades de propaganda negativa. El Regne Unit a Europa són males notícies. Des de fa 30 anys. No hi ha un discurs positiu, hi ha un discurs que pot ser més o menys negatiu, però els que defensen Europa sempre ho fan com amb excuses. És a dir, no ens agrada, però és millor que ho necessitem. Econòmicament és útil. Sense la Unió Europea, Europa pot caure amb nacionalismes competitius que poden creure en seguretat. És una solució a la Segona Guerra Mundial i a la Premia Guerra Mundial. És una solució a una sèrie de dècades de conflicte europeu. Però el que domina és no ens agrada, és un problema, és una pèrdua d'inès, és burocràcia, és una pèrdua de soberania, és una pèrdua de control democràtic, és una imposició. Això és el discurs que ha dominat durant 30 anys. Llavors, d'alguna manera, la estructura de la campanya va reflectir una càrrega profunda i costinguda. Com es va penjar la planta ja a la campanya? Bé, evidentment va ser molt complexa, no la puc resumir molt temps que tinc, però sí que es pot dir una cosa important, que és que la gent que defensava el remei tenia un discurs defensiu i molt poc engrescador. Venien a dir que cal sacrificar la democràcia barrejant el concepte democràcia amb la soberania, és a dir, cal sacrificar la seva ironia, identificar-la amb democràcia, per tal d'aconseguir beneficis econòmics. Aquest és el gran argument que validarà, que liberarà el remei. Hi havia gent que deia, no, no, és que es voten i ser cosmopolistes, està connectat, tal i qual. Però aquest és el discurs minoritari. El discurs majoritari és hem de sacrificar la democràcia i la soberania per aconseguir avantatges econòmics, o per no perdre avantatges econòmics. Tu planteges tota aquesta gent que hi ha descrit al principi que va votar el no, les zones rurales, les zones provincials, la gent sense educació, la gent amb problemes econòmics, i els grans problemes de desindustrialitzar. Els dius, heu de sacrificar la democràcia i la soberania i el control de les fronteres a canvi d'uns beneficis econòmics que no teniu? I allò ens què votaran? És a dir, que estava cantat, en el fons. Si no els dius, és que realment us convé, per moltes altes rons. Però, òbvitament, estrobrant amb que el Brexit tampoc els funciona, però aquest serà el problema futur, què feré amb el Brexit? Bé, què m'ha après sobre referèndums a partir de l'Exit? Una cosa que m'ha après és que un referèndum tàctic, és a dir, un referèndum per treure de sobre un problema a base de càlculs tàctics és un enorme perill. Jo no diré que els referèndums no siguin mai legítims, a vegades són necessaris. Sí, però, que penso que el Brexit demostra que un referèndum que divideix de població en dos meitats i que no ve companyada amb un discurs que pugui crear consens pot crear més problemes que solucionar problemes. El gran repte de 3 a meia ara no és només negociar, que és una negociació molt difícil, perquè ha d'intentar aconseguir l'impossible, que és mantenir el mercat al màxim possible, però, a l'hora, mantenir el control de la imigració al màxim, és la gran debat que té 3 a meia, el gran repte és com aconseguir allò que els europeus diuen que no pots tenir, que és separar l'accés al mercat comú amb la negació del dret a la llibertat de moviment dels treballadors. Aquesta és el gran repte de 3 a meia a nivell negociador, però el veritable repte polític és un altre, és comunificar el país. I serà molt difícil trobar una solució que no creïs la sensació, o bé que ha traït els que van votar brèxic, o bé que ha traït la gent jove, la gent cosmopolita, la gent econòmicament més connectada, els empresaris, les universitats... És a dir, aquest és un repte realment molt profund. Llavors, jo acabaré, és el que he anat bastant de pressa, he complert amb el meu deure, que és no passar als 15 minuts. Jo acabaré dient que un referèndum útil, si es pugui generalitzar i tothom té altres referèndums possibles en men en aquests moments, un referèndum útil és aquell en el qual el referèndum és el resultat d'un procés polític que creu consens, o un referèndum quan és absolutament impossible arribar a cap consens, és a dir, que l'alternativa és violència. Però, si pot haver-hi una fórmula de consens polític, un referèndum que divireix la població d'una manera molt profunda, crea més problemes que no pas solucionar problemes. Aquest referèndum no era necessari. Aquesta és la gran tragèdia. Molt bé, moltes gràcies. Donem la paraula al professor Girao i després preguntarem. Gràcies. Hola, buenos días a todos. Me llamo Fernando. El comentario inicial de Pau, me ha hecho de Joan, perdón, me ha hecho... De Joan Pau. Joan Pau. Uno no se equivoca nunca. Nombres compuestos, uno no se equivoca nunca. Me ha hecho reflexionar sobre la lengua en la que utilizaremos. Y de pronto me he dado cuenta de que efectivamente lo que él dice tiene razón. Yo llevo 25 años en la Pompeo y llevo 25 años hablando en catalán en los actos públicos. Y por lo tanto, como él ha marcado la pauta, si hubiera empezado yo, yo hubiera empezado en catalán, como él ha marcado la pauta, pues voy a tomar el lujo de seguir la misma pauta. ¿Quieres hablar el idioma? Mi lengua materna, que es el Casellano, con lo tanto lo haré en Casellano, con lo cual tendremos efectivamente la práctica, lo que es la política lingüística de esta universidad. Son tres idiomas utilizados indistintamente y sin ningún tipo de problemas. Yo soy historiador. Y yo llevo 35 años estudiando la historia de la integración europea. La historia de la integración europea no es, como decía nuestra moderadora, una historia en la cual nosotros explicamos básicamente cómo los países se juntan para alcanzar algún tipo de meta. No. Y esto es uno de los grandes problemas que tenemos en la vida de la integración europea. Es decir, hemos tenido un discurso teleológico que simplemente nos marca nuestras reflexiones, marca la manera en la qual miramos los asuntos europeos. Para los historiadores de la integración europea, el Brexit no es ningún drama, no es ningún drama. El Brexit era una cosa que formaba parte, formaba parte de lo que era el horizonte posible de la integración europea. Porque la integración europea no es otra cosa, más que encontrar soluciones colectivas para aquellos retos que los estados de nación consideran que no pueden resolver de manera aislada. Y, por lo tanto, lo que hacen es que encuentran soluciones comunes que, en algunos casos, estas soluciones comunes implican cesión de soberanía. Pero no siempre, no siempre. Y, de hecho, la Unión Europea en la actualidad tiene un núcleo de cesión de soberanía y la mayoría de las cosas que salen en los diarios hoy en día tienen que ver con simple cooperación intergovernamental. Pero la integración europea nace inicialmente con la transferencia de soberanía. La transferencia de soberanía es exactamente esto. La transferencia de soberanía es un acto político. Es un acto político que necesita el respaldo popular en el que, en un momento determinado, un gobierno que detenta, legítimamente, unas atribuciones determinadas decide, a través de sus sistemas constitucionales, ceder parte de esa soberanía a unas instituciones comunes. I la integración europea conlleva també la posibilidad de la desintegración europea. Porque, en un momento determinado, esos mismos gobiernos, que son absolutamente legítimos, siguiendo mecanismos constitucionales propios, deciden que esa cesión de soberanía ya no se produce. Y, por lo tanto, exactamente la misma legitimidad. La misma legitimidad tiene la cesión como la retrocesión. Sí, de simple. Y esto forma parte del escenario de la integración europea. Solamente aquellos que consideran que la integración europea es una historia feliz donde vamos todos hacia los Estados Unidos de Europa, la Federación Europea. Yo que sé qué consideran todo esto como un drama. Y, de hecho, Europa en la actualidad se divide entre aquellos que ven el Brexit un drama, aquellos que ven el Brexit como una oportunidad. Yo veo el Brexit exactamente como esto. Yo veo el Brexit como un hecho dado, sobre el cual no hay que dramatizar, sobre el cual no podemos utilizar, de alguna manera, en situaciones muy conflictivas como estas, hay que mantener siempre la cabeza muy fría. Siempre la cabeza muy fría. Y, por lo tanto, yo quisiera, de alguna manera, en mi exposición actual, combatir una idea. Y la idea es fundamentalmente que estamos mejor si los británicos. Es una idea muy extendida. Los británicos, como ha explicado Joan Pau, de alguna manera han sido unos socios antipáticos desde el principio y, por lo tanto, estamos mejor sin ellos. Es una equivocación garrafal. Y una parte de la solución del Brexit, una parte de lo que podría ser la respuesta colectiva contra los populismos, seguramente la respuesta será equivocada. Seguramente será equivocada. Y lo que haremos es acentuar aún más el populismo. Por lo tanto, lo primero que tenemos que entender es que es absolutamente legítimo. Cuando el voto nos favorece, pero el voto es aquello que nosotros esperamos que sea, nadie discute la calidad de ese voto. Nadie discute si ese votante es instruido o no es instruido. Si ese votante es educado o no es educado. Cuando el voto nos conviene, el votante nos conviene. Nos gusta. Cuando el voto no nos conviene, hay un elemento justificativo que significa que, claro, esos votantes se han equivocado. Yo recuerdo perfectamente en las últimas elecciones generales que el líder a Podemos en Galicia vino a decir que los votantes gallegos no sabían lo que querían. ¿Por qué? ¿Cómo era posible que votaran Pepe y no votaran Podemos? Bueno, es un problema. La democracia, como decía Churchill, cuando hablas con el votante medio, la odias. La democracia es esto. Por lo tanto, lo primero que tenemos que hacer es intentar eliminar este tipo de análisis, que es un análisis que no nos ayuden al absoluto. Porque lo que hay, y lo que tenemos que entender, que hay en Estados Unidos, que hay aquí, que hay en Inglaterra, que hay en Francia, que hay en Italia, y que hay en la China con China, es básicamente todo un segmento de población absolutamente decepcionada. Decepcionada porque aquellos réditos que teóricamente la globalización tendría que producir y que está produciendo, desde hace 25 años se distribuye mal. La diferencia fundamental entre el crecimiento económico hasta hace 25 años y el crecimiento económico a partir de los últimos 25 años es básicamente la capacidad de distribución de esa riqueza. Esa riqueza se redistribuía de una manera más equitativa de cuánto sucede ahora. Y lo que sucede ahora es que hay grupos de población que desde hace 20-25 años se sienten, se perciben, perdedores. Y lo son, no sé qué se perciban, es que lo son. Es que lo son de verdad, es que las condiciones de vida de una parte de la población, aquella que está más vinculada a la economía real, se ha estancado en los últimos 20-25 años. Y en un momento determinado se forman coaliciones que permiten cambiar las reglas del juego. Por tanto, lo que tenemos es un elemento de crítica, sistémica, a un modo de hacer las cosas. Y esto es simplemente lo que tenemos que hacer, es entender que esto está pasando y, por lo tanto, tenemos que ser capaces de implementar las políticas necesarias para revertirlo. Punto número uno. Punto número dos. Inglaterra, en Gran Bretaña, ha sido un socio extraordinario en la integración europea. Es el país que más ha contribuido a formar la Unión Europea en la actualidad. Tenemos 15, de alguna manera, contribuciones por parte de Inglaterra. La primera de ellas tiene que ver el sistema de recursos propios. Gracias a la incorporación de Inglaterra, la Unión Europea se duda del elemento que le hace diferencia de conjunto de las organizaciones internacionales, que es los recursos propios. La Comunidad Europea, la Unión Europea, tiene recursos propios. No tiene recursos cedidos, como pueden tener en los demás países. Las Naciones Unidas, la OTAN, lo que ustedes quieran, lo que dependen son de las contribuciones nacionales. Entonces, un país de Estados Unidos depende de decirme usted, lo que hace cocianán, voy a no pagar la cuota que corresponden las Naciones Unidas y condicionan la política de las Naciones Unidas. Aquí, la Unión Europea y la Comunidad Europea tienen recursos propios. Y, por lo tanto, tienen autonomía para llevar a cabo aquellos que son sus atribuciones particulares. Esto se debe a Gran Bretaña. Es la adhesión de Gran Bretaña lo que permite a la Comunidad Europea adquirir el sistema de recursos propios. Que es el sistema que permite la financiación permanente y la financiación permanente de las políticas comunitarias. En segundo lugar, la incorporación de Gran Bretaña hace de la Comunidad Europea aquello que es más importante, que es el bloque comercial más importante del mundo. Sin Gran Bretaña, la Comunidad Europea no lo sería. En tercer lugar, lo que hace es que, gracias a los británicos, tenemos el mercado único europeo. El mercado único europeo es un proyecto de Magre Zacher, es un proyecto liderado por Lord Corsair, que es el comissario del Mercado Único, que es el que va a llevar a cabo todo el programa del Mercado Único Europeo. El Mercado Único Europeo es el activo más importante de la Unión Europea. No hay otro activo en la Unión Europea, otro activo que no esté sujeto a discusión. Cualquier otro elemento de la Unión Europea, el que sea, siempre hay alguien que lo discute. Cualquier otra política comunitaria, cualquier institución comunitaria, cualquier elemento vinculado con la Unión Europea, está sujeto a crítica y a discusión con la excepción del Mercado Único. Mercado Único es producto británico. Es gracias a Magre Zacher, tan denostada en nuestras tierras, obviamente, Magre Zacher y gracias a Lord Corsair. No a Jacques Delors, sino a Lord Corsair. Por otra parte, lo que tenemos es que gracias a la diplomacia británica. La política exterior común de la Comunidad Europea se sustenta fundamentalmente en los diplomáticos británicos. Cualquier capacidad defensiva europea dentro o fuera de la Unión Europea solo puede gestionarse a través de la contribución militar británica. Sólo los británicos tienen capacidad militar para gestionar un tipo de política defensiva común. Francia, como sabéis, la tiene perfectamente ocupada entre las tierras excolónias y Alemania. Es un enano político desde el punto de vista militar. No hay otra capacidad. Inglaterra concede lo que es la lingua franca. La lingua franca de la Unión Europea es el inglés. Si siguiéramos textualmente los preceptos constitucionales, la salida de gran prantaña significaría que tendríamos una batalla lingüística. O tendríamos una lengua que no es oficial de la Unión Europea, pero también es oficial de la Unión Europea. En Irlanda es oficial también. Sí, pero es cooficial. Sí, pero tiene razón. El problema que tenemos es que los islandeses presentaron el gaélico como la lengua comunitaria. ¿Por qué? Porque tenían el inglés por Gran Bretaña. Están tratadas de ser de gran... No lo puedes cambiar. Tendrías que renegociarlo. Para renegociar esto, si Irlanda quisiera renegociar esto, para renegociar también la política fiscal. De Irlanda, que es excepcional. La terra también contribuye a todo lo que son las principales instituciones académicas que nosotros podemos contar. Están accesibles a todos nosotros en igualdad de condiciones. Por otra parte, lo que tenemos es que los británicos son de las grandes potencias de la Unión Europea, son los únicos que implementan regularmente todo el acervo comunitario. Son los que tienen menos recursos en el Tribunal de Justicia. Es decir, los ingleses protestan mucho, mucho, mucho, mucho. Pregunta, pregunta. ¿Y por qué, por qué, por qué, por qué? Una vez que acuerdan, lo implementan. Nosotros no preguntamos. Acordamos y no implementamos. Bueno, es que hay europeísmo de diversas características. El británico es el que a mí me gusta. El británico es el que pregunta por qué. ¿Por qué? ¿Lo habéis pensado bien? ¿Por qué? Y una vez que están convencidos y se aprueba, lo implementan. Nosotros, ¿qué hacemos? Más Europa, más Europa, más Europa. Si sabéis exactamente qué quiere decir. Y una vez que lo tenemos, luego no lo implementamos. O lo implementamos a medias o a cualquiera sabe. España es uno de esos países que tiene más incumplimientos en la aplicación de las directivas y de los reglamentos comunitarios. Es un desastre de la impregunta. Y por otra parte, el gobierno británico tiene un elemento que es fundamental. Clarifica las cosas. Y os voy a poner un ejemplo. Mira, cuando se hace el acuerdo especial hacia Gran Bretaña, aquel que se hace en febrero del 2016, es el acuerdo del Consejo Europeo, hay en primer lugar lo que es un draft, es un primer borrador, y hay lo que es el acuerdo definitivo. El borrador es del 2 de febrero, el acuerdo definitivo es del 16-17 de febrero. El borrador dice lo siguiente. En relación a lo que es la unión cada vez más... Un ever closer union. Aquí esta clauça que forma parte del acervo comunitario. Un ever closer union. Los ingleses dicen que esto qué significa. Dice Cameron. Un ever closer union. ¿Qué implicaciones tiene? Entonces la primera de los borradores, aquella que se hace de manera genuina, se establece una cosa muy sencillita. Dice, un ever closer union. Es básicamente un compromiso permanente de colaboración de los políticos de los países europeos. Bueno, es bonito. Ella decía que la integración europea debía de ser alguna cosa como... No, no nos poníamos nada de acuerdo. Tú coges a los daneses, coges a los suecos, a los españoles portugueses y le dices qué quiere decir un ever closer union y cada uno sale por pateneras. Cada uno dice lo que le da la gana y no coincidiríamos. Por tanto nunca lo definimos. ¿Por qué? Porque era mejor dejarlo así. Era mejor no definirlo. Porque si tuviéramos que definirlo no lo definiríamos. Y la definición su géneres es básicamente ever closer union significa un espíritu permanente de colaboración entre todos los pueblos democráticos de Europa. ¿Verdad que sí? Suena bonito. Venga, eso es el 2 de febrero. En el acuerdo definitivo del 16 de febrero, lo que se establece es que ever closer union dice... Lo que dice el acuerdo es ever closer union no es A, no es B, no es C, no es D, no es E y no es F. Y no es ni un solo gobierno europeo, ni uno solo de los 27 que se acaba de introducir que es ever closer union. Por lo tanto tenemos un problema los europeos. Los europeos tenemos un problema y es que, claro, queremos de alguna manera, y es uno de los problemas que tiene el Brexit en la actualidad, de alguna manera lo que queremos es retener a un grupo de países de poblaciones democráticas dentro de algo que no sabemos bien qué quiere decir, ni sabemos bien qué quiere hacer, ni sabemos bien por qué lo queremos construir. Y este problema de indefinición es un problema que empieza a tener este tipo de impactos. Vallamos al Brexit, ¿qué podemos hacer con el Brexit? Joan Pau decía que uno de los problemas de Theresa May es que vamos a hacer ahora con el Brexit. Bueno, nos equivocaremos obviamente, porque llevamos 25 años equivocando, la Unión Europea ya 25 años de equivocación, es una detrás de otra, 25 años. No hay aquellas no cometidas por los británicos, como sabemos perfectamente. Por lo tanto, ¿qué podemos hacer? Hay una solución muy sencilla, sencillísima, sencillísima, que es dejar las cosas como están. Porque Gran Bretaña tiene un Brexit en la actualidad. Gran Bretaña tiene todo un conjunto de exenciones, protocolos y situaciones especiales que la escullen de todo aquello que le resulta antipático. Todo. De todo lo que le resulta antipático. Por lo tanto, ¿podemos perfectamente mantener la situación actual? Simplemente lo ponemos negro sobre blanco y decimos Brexit means Brexit. Con todas las estaciones, añadiendo obviamente la salida de Gran Bretaña de todas las instituciones, es decir, el vacío institucional. Si nosotros mantenemos el Brexit, la situación de Gran Bretaña es exactamente igual que está. Exactamente igual que está. Cogemos a todas las instituciones y la vaciamos de británicos. Oganse en nueva lástima. ¿Lo vaciamos de británicos? Lo vaciamos de británicos. Y lo único que hacemos es la libre circulación de personas, que es uno de los elementos fundamentales, porque mercados únicos son cuatro libertades y una de ellas es la libre circulación de personas, las cuatro libertades están sujetas a una serie de elementos. Todas ellas pueden suspenderse, todas ellas legalmente pueden suspenderse en casos de emergencia. Por problemas de salud nacional, de defensa nacional, emergencia nacional. Hay una serie de elementos que permiten la suspensión de las libertades. Podríamos perfectamente hacer que la suspensión de la libertad de la libre circulación de personas pudiéramos perfectamente esto, que es una cosa que es una nota pie de página, lo pudiéramos sacar de la nota pie de página, lo pudiéramos colocar al principio, de manera que Londres tendría la autoridad de suspender la libre circulación de personas, en el caso que Londres y dos británicos lo consideraran que de alguna manera ponen peligro lo que vosotros queráis. Esto sería completamente legal, pero tenemos un problema. Y el problema es fundamental, que la Unión Europea se gestiona vía Twitter. La Unión Europea se gestiona vía Twitter. ¿Cómo explicamos esto a la población? No lo podemos hacer. Nuestros líderes políticos intentarán hacer lo que siempre han hecho. Es decir, gestionar la Unión Europea mirando hacia atrás, mirando hacia su electorado. Esto formará parte y es una de las causas en las cuales explican el Brexit y pueden explicar el grado de desafección que tenemos en muchos países en relación con la Unión Europea. Por lo tanto, ¿qué quiero decir con esto? Es que efectivamente hay un problema. Gran Bretaña lo que ha hecho es, como siempre, ponen evidencia lo que es un problema fundamental. Y es el problema que nosotros tenemos que ser capaces de interiorizar y necesitamos interiorizar lo que es que la Unión Europea puede desintegrarse, puede desintegrarse, puede desintegrarse. Gran Bretaña lo pone sobre la mesa, nos obliga a tener que redefinir, de alguna manera, buena parte de las políticas de los objetivos de la Unión Europea. Y luego, por otra parte, tenemos que entender que el Brexit puede ser una oportunidad, una oportunidad y quizás la última de hacer una Europa mucho más inclusiva, mucho más democrática, mucho más que interese fundamentalmente a la mayoría de la población y no solamente a una parte de la población. Gràcies. Bien. Muchas gracias, profesor Guirao. Dos intervenciones fantásticas porque nos dan dos perspectivas muy diferentes, con lo cual es perfecto para el debate, mientras que Rubíes afirmaba, literalmente, que el Brexit no era necesario por todas las repercusiones. Guirao pues desdramatiza el análisis del Brexit. Por tanto, yo creo que empezaríamos por... No sé si profesor Rubíes tiene respuestas por alusiones obvias. Bueno, jo penso que, respecte a esto, bueno, tornar al caràcter de fet, hi ha dos conseqüències, evidentment, diferents del Brexit. Una és la interna pel Regne Unit, que és el punt de vista que jo he adoptat en la meva intervenció, com a semi-ciutadà, que sóc amb una dona i família, que som britànics, i l'altra és la perspectiva externa, d'una vista, quines implicacions té per a Europa? Evidentment, estic d'acord amb el Fernando, que representa un pari i una oportunitat per a Europa, el que està passant. Des de punt de vista britànic, penso que està de minimitzar d'anys en aquests moments. És a dir, no veig un benefici possible. I veig d'anys enormes o d'anys menys enormes. Aquesta és la situació que veig. Per... A nivell econòmic, el Brexit significarà majors déficits i menys inversió. Una pèrdua inicial de potencial de creixement. A curt termini no han vist això. Els catastrofistes que es pensaven que amb 10 minuts hi hauria un col·lapse de l'economia britànica s'han vist desmentits. Hi ha hagut, però, una pèrdua clara de... Diguéssim, de nivell de la lliure, bastant substancial, respecte a l'euro i el dòlar, que és una pèrdua que té també efectes positius. No és purament negatiu. També podem comentar la competitivitat de l'economia britànica a curt termini. Ara bé, el que sí és cert és que, segons com es negocia, segons com es trigui a arribar a un acord, i segons el tipus d'ambient que es creï durant les negociacions, els costos pot ser bastant elevats. I un altre tema important, que és respecte a la migració, és que penso que a l'economia i la societat britànica els hi convé a un nivell de migració, potser no tant en el com a l'àntico dels últims anys, però bastants. Més els ha anat bé. Entenen els hospitals plens de gent a fora, les universitats plenes de gent a fora. Una capacitat de fer que les universitats no només es fundin en fons europeus, sinó que, a més a més, puguin tenir molts estudiants internacionals. Tot això no és només perquè són Oxford i Cambridge, i les universitats britàniques, són universitats molt globalitzades amb connexions. Fem de por entre Estats Units i Europa, a nivell acadèmic. És a dir, la posició privilegiada que té l'Universitat Anglèsa es ressentirà del Brexit i no sé que facin excepcions. Han de crear excepcions a nivell d'industries concretes, a nivell d'hospitals, a nivell d'universitats. Dic una altra manera. No els hi convé a tancar les fronteres. Per tant, el guany que ho puguin obtenir de tancar les fronteres és un guany de relatiu. És un guany molt relatiu. I, en canvi, els perills que puguin tenir són enormes. Això és el que té la punta divisa britànica. It's a lose-lose situation, però no són tontos i intentarem buscar la solució que faci, que creï menys d'anys. Bàsicament, les avantatges no es veig per enlloc. El tema és que això no tingui avantatges. El tema és que això ha passat. Ha passat. El que hem de fer ara és intentar, d'alguna manera, aprofitar el fet per millorar tots plegats. I una de les coses que hem de fer per fer això és treure tot allò que són aquestes concepcions errònies que tenim uns als altres. I hem d'evitar tot això de manera que puguem, d'alguna manera, anar per business. Aleshores, en aquest anar per business és un interès col·lectiu tocar en menys possible. I l'únic element que cal tocar, l'únic element que cal tocar, l'únic element que és conflictiu, perquè per la resta no hi ha conflicte, si vosaltres exigiu, que és interessantíssim, el que és l'informe oficial sobre les alternatives al membership, que és l'informe oficial, aprovar per el Parlament Britànic, si exigiu la pàgina... Quina pàgina serà aquesta? Quina és la pàgina 3? Si exigiu la pàgina 3 i li canveu el títol, això podria ser Brexit Means Brexit. Està explicant la situació britànica i l'actualitat. Si tu agafes exactament aquesta pàgina i li canves el text i poses Brexit Means Brexit, aquests que han votat Brexit diran, oh, que bé, fantàstic, això és el que jo volia. Això és el que jo volia, a una diferència. Que has de treure el que és una línia que diu, i a part d'això, no és, a part d'això, estem seguts a la taula i decidim el que ens convé, el que ens convé i fem el que ens dona la gana. Seguts a la taula. Aquesta frase les he de treure. Està molt bé, però ja no està segut a la taula. Què hem de fer? No empillorar les coses? I com no empillarem les coses? Si nosaltres estem convençuts que això ha sigut un error, si nosaltres estem convençuts que l'Unió Europea mereix la pena, si nosaltres estem convençuts que els anglesos haurien d'estar amb nosaltres, els britànics haurien d'estar amb nosaltres, el que hem de fer és no empillorar les coses. I per no empillar les coses, el que haurien de fer és, d'alguna manera, donar l'oportunitat durant 10 anys, per exemple, un període d'ancitori de 2 anys, en el qual tu no toca absolutament res, tothom surt de les institucions, deixes al britànic aquesta fase, que aquesta nota el peu de pàgina, vagi al text principal, no toca res, de manera que els anglesos puguin tenir ja d'aquí a 10 anys una visió molt més real realista de quina és la seva situació de l'Unió Europea, quines són les ventalles inconvenients. I queda aquí a 10 anys, tu l'hi posis. Escolta, 10 anys torneu amb el vostre sistema constitucional, ja sigui el Parlament, ja sigui a través d'un referèndum, i ja ha decidit definitivament què voleu. I aleshores, en aquest moment específic, nosaltres ja podem decidir que al Regne Unit ha de sortir absolutament de totes les mecanismes, però és completament ridícul, perquè formant part del mercat únic, hi ha un munt de països que no tenen res a veure amb l'Unió Europea, que no són membres de l'Unió Europea, perquè no podien ser membres de l'Unió Europea, és que no t'he sentit, és que l'Unió Europea no són les seves institucions. I el mercat únic és un mercat que no està limitat a l'Unió Europea, és un mercat únic que s'amplia, que s'amplia, Turquia forma part del mercat únic, Turquia forma part del mercat únic, Turquia forma part del mercat únic, sense la lliure circulació de persones. Per tant, hi ha moltes maneres de fer-lo. És que si nosaltres el que volem fer és lliçons morals, el que volem fer és lliçons morals, que és el que Europa està fent des de fa 10 anys, aleshores, clar, si entres en la moralitat i a les coses són més complicades, perquè, dius, no ve tot, i és complicat. Però, si deixem aquestes coses i agafem el que és l'Unió Europea, a través del seu sentit original i únic, que és bàsicament un instrument que serveix per recursar aquelles polítiques que els Estats decideixin, aquelles que li donen més garantia de recursament popular, aquelles que donen més capacitat de gestió per solucionar els problemes que afecten a la seva població. Si som capaços de tornar a la idea original, aleshores, el Brexit seria una oportunitat. I d'aquesta manera, en la Terra o el Regne Unit, tornaria a l'Unió Europea d'aquí a 10 anys en ple convenciment. Bueno, ja veuríem millorat. Per tant... Bueno, és cert que s'està parlant d'una... d'una fase transicional per guanyar temps, eh? Se n'està parlant fins i tot a alguns heartbreakers. Veuen la dificultat d'una ruptura ràpida. Però, bueno, jo no tinc tantes il·lusions, però... Bueno, és una perspectiva més pragmàtica i, des de luego, seria optimista diria jo, però sí, sí, des de luego és un moment d'oportunitat, es pot llegir com a tal. Tenim uns 10 minutets i el que farem serà oblir les preguntes al públic, perquè penso que per això heu vingut en part. Per tant, hi ha una pregunta allà al fòndum. Hola, moltes gràcies a tots. Les dues xerrades han estat molt suggerents. I per això em veig d'acord també a dir alguna cosa, perquè crec que, arran del que s'ha dit, hi ha, com a mínim, dues coses que jo volia comentar. I una és, suposo que són frases que ha dit el Proso Quireau, el qui admiro moltíssim, i que ha dit una cosa primer, que la integració comporta la posibilitat de desintegració. Però no ha estat així fins ara. Fins ara el que hi havia hagut era una integració que comportava una posibilitat de desintegració, gairebé exante, perquè eren els mateixos tractats en els quals hi havia les excepcions, o millor dit, les diferents nivells d'integració per part dels estats. Llavors, això crec que és una novetat a la qual ens enfrontem ara, com a mínim. I l'altra cosa era en relació a l'aposta que ell fa, sobretot ens ha fet el final, que és més... Això, suggerents, que no som acudeix una altra paraula, sobre la possibilitat de que el Regne Unit dissiureixi voluntària... O sigui, ell mateix, aquest estat mateix, dins del seu propi sistema de presa de decisions, la suspensió de la lliure circulació de persones. Esclar, a mi em sembla que legalment això és possible, legalment això seria una integració que jo, en mi, que forçava la norma, però entenc que es pot fer, perquè la norma, en principi, preveu aquestes suspensions per un pari de temps molt més limitat que el que estem plantejant aquí, però, fins i tot, si forsem la norma fins a aquest punt i es permet això, i això és possible, jo el que em pregunto és, llavors, quan tardarà qualsevol altre estat, que ara mateix també es veu amb una pressió forta o que percep com a forta, a demanar el mateix, i llavors, fins a quin punt la Unió Europea és viable amb un mercat únic sense lliure circulació de persones, o sense lliure circulació de persones per molts més estats que no pas, sí, ja ho sé, al Regne Unit, Suïssa, perquè també estem plantejant això, Turquia, però tota la resta, o molts dels altres que formen part de la Unió Europea, fins ara 28 i potser ara 27 i mig o 27. Gràcies. Això són molt senzilles. No és la primera vegada que això ha passat. Groenlàndia va sortir de la Comunitat Europea en el seu moment. Noruega va signar un tractat d'edició i, a través de referèndum, van rebujar a entrada. Suïssa va decidir un moment específic obrir negociacions i després tancar negociacions. Per tant, el problema que tenim nosaltres és que hem tingut una visió teleològica, i en aquesta visió teleològica, que passava, si vosaltres us recordeu del nostre llibre de text, el que nosaltres estudiaven era la sucessió d'adicions. Primer eren 6, després van ser 9, després van ser 10, 12, 15... us recordeu d'això? I nosaltres sempre estudiaven això, per què? Perquè això està marcant la nostra visió. I mai es plantejaven, mai, per què els més rics queden fora? Per què Suïssa no és membre de la Unió Europea? Per què Noruega no és membre de la Unió Europea? Per què Slàndia no és membre de la Unió Europea? Per què alguns queden fora? Aquesta és una pregunta interessantíssima, perquè aquesta pregunta explica molt més sobre la Unió Europea, molt més que la sucessió d'adicions. Per tant, en aquesta visió que tu dius, és aquesta visió teleològica de que no podem més que anar o es pot anar en una direcció i en la seva contrària. Podem anar en una direcció i en la contrària. I això ho portem 20 anys. El que passa és que, clar, l'història d'integració europea encara la pressió dels mitjans de comunicació, d'aquests que fan d'historiadors que no són historiadors, i que expliquen la història d'integració europea d'una certa manera, perquè jo hi era i per tant jo sé què va passant allà, això és una cosa molt habitual, i per tant tenim una visió totalment distorsionada. L'integració europea és un fenomen... totalment històric. Està encara... encara està amb el nivell mitològic. Encara està amb el nivell mitològic. Encara no ha baixat del nivell mitològic. Per tant, la visió històrica és que són aquelles que ajuden a solucionar els problemes, perquè estic completament convençut que és historiador solucionant problemes a diferència d'altres disciplines, que tenen una especialitat molt gran de generar problemes, perquè després hi ha els segues especialistes per resoldre aquests problemes, els historiadors no. Els historiadors són capaços de resoldre problemes. La resposta de la primera pregunta, ja havia passat. I ens haurien d'haver preparat. El que no podem fer és que un nivell de desafecció per l'Unió Europea, que va arribar a ser espectacular, no parava d'atenció amb això. Diuen, no, és que és un projecte estupendiu, i per tant hem de passar per aquí, no. I el segon error és intentar fer-me una isomoral per espantar la resta. Perquè a mi m'agradaria una Unió Europea més cohesionada. Jo vull una Unió Europea més cohesionada. I ara posar la safada a Benmeia, perquè tots aquests que vulguessin sortir, surtin de mà. Jo sóc sentia cap mena de problema, que surtin de mà, que surtin de mà. De manera que la Unió Europea pugui operar d'una manera molt més cohesionada, molt més coherent. I això no podem continuar amb la situació en la que estem. Per tant, tots aquests que vulguin sortir, que surtin. I després, jo no estic dient que tu li dones als politànics la possibilitat de suspendre el fet de suspendre la llei i la creació de persones. És que no ho volem fer. No tenen cap intenció de fer-lo. Per tant, el que tu li has de donar és la possibilitat de... La possibilitat de... Què fas aquest que tu dius, aquest peu de pàgina? Jo poso el text principal. Londres podrà tancar. La xeta, si això és necessari. S'ha acabat. És la possibilitat de fer això. La gent que ha votat el Brexit necessita. I és el que... Teresa Mai necessita, però el que necessites és posar-lo en una categoria principal, no en una categoria com el que ho veu de pàgina, però per tal de començar a la seva població. Per tant, no es tracta de fer que això sigui la situació normal durant 10 anys, no, en absolut. Això no hauria de passar. I si passa és que hi ha mecanismes de pressió per evitar que això continuïs passant. Però el que necessites és tenir les coses clares, sinó un lío impressionant, que és el que tenim avui en dia. Avui en dia el que tenim és un lío impressionant. Un cos molt concret, molt puntual. De fet, com sabeu, David Cameron va negociar amb Europa precisament sobre aquest punt. I li van donar una mica de flexibilitat. El problema va ser que ell havia calculat que amb això aconseguiria el suport popular per continuar amb Europa i podria enterrar per sempre equip. I la gent que diuen que ha de sortir d'Europa però no li van donar tant com volia. Això que tu dius que algú s'ha de suportar el problema és el que de fet va negociar David Cameron. I el que la gent ha rebutjat. A la campanya això va desaparèixer. Va desaparèixer completament. Perquè això és una cosa que a nivell delits pot funcionar. Però a nivell del discurs popular, que entra en el problema del populisme, quan s'entra la dinàmica d'un referèndum, la gent els va dir i és que en el fons ja tenim una capacitat de control quan ens convenen. Els hi van dir... Això no ho tenia David Cameron. Sí, en la negociació, sí. No tenia això en l'acord. En l'acord era una cosa diferent, que tenia que veure amb tot el que era la política de recuperament familiar i tenia que veure amb els beneficis socials que podria aportar la visió de persones, s'implica això, dels dependents dels immigrants europeus. Que ho van calcular i això era el xocolat del doro. O van calcular, eren 3 milions d'euros, o 3 milions de lliures esterlines al any. Una cosa d'aquestes. Gràcies per aquestes contribucions. Jo queria dirigir-me a la mesa con una actitud algo más crítica, en el sentido de que deberíamos volver al tema del populismo, según mi, y tal vez preguntarnos si, por ejemplo, la manera en que hemos estado discutiendo el Brexit, como representando una manifestación de una inteligencia, voluntad gubernamental. Si esto no es discutible, si, de hecho, las consultas, los referendos, los cuales hemos visto ya varios ejemplos, en Hungría uno en contra del derecho de la Unión Europea de imponerles cuotas de refugiados, por ejemplo. Si el instrumento referéndum se ha ya desvinculado de la inteligencia política, se ha convertido en un fenómeno que se inserta en un mecanismo propio, que ya no responde a una inteligencia política. ¿Cuál mecanismo podría ser este? ¿Por qué ocurre ahora, en este momento en la historia de la Unión Europea? ¿Por qué ocurre el referéndum? Con tema de separación, con tema de desvinculación. ¿Y de qué modo podemos entender esta concentración de referéndums que tenemos ahora, desde el punto de vista del hecho de que la política, en su discurso, en su actuación, frecuenta más los métodos populistas? Por lo menos esa es una percepción que tengo, no sé si es correcta, pero hay un vínculo entre los dos. ¿Y cuál es este vínculo? Y no deberíamos, tal vez, abandonar la idea de que hay una inteligencia política detrás del referéndum. La respuesta a esto sería, básicamente, que los referéndums siempre se han utilizado en Europa. En temas vinculados con integración europea ha habido difíciles referéndums. Lo sucede es que todos han salido bien, menos algunos que tenían que ver con los algunos, y se han vuelto a hacer otra vez y se ha acabado. ¿Por qué eran países a los cuales le podías decir, qué es lo que pasa? El caso que tenemos aquí es un caso muy similar. Si eres capaz de identificar exactamente cuál es la causa profunda, solucionemos esa causa profunda y otra cosa mariposa. Tenemos que hacer esto. Lo que pasa es que la Bretaña no es Dinamarca, no es Irlanda. La Bretaña es otra cosa, es otra cantar. Por esto es mucho más complicado todo este tema. Lo que tenemos que pensar es que, fundamentalmente, el populismo, que es un fenómeno que siempre ha existido, lo que diferencia la situación actual de otras situaciones anteriores, es básicamente su dimensión, y cómo se está vehiculizando a través de alternativas políticas concretas. Antes no estaban mucho más difuminados, no estaban bien estructurados, las nuevas tecnologías han ayudado a estructurar esto. El segmentación o la fragmentación de lo que es la información política, la información ha hecho que efectivamente cada uno se queda en su capilla y se está autoalimentando de sus propias tonterías. Esto está sucediendo. Lo que ha pasado ahora, lo que está pasando ahora, que es una cosa realmente interesantísima, es que se está produciendo un deterioro muy significativo del sistema político en cuanto a la respuesta de aquello que interesa la mayoría de las poblaciones. Y esto es un fenómeno que es un fenómeno relativamente nuevo. Es decir, hasta finales de la década de los años 70, mediados de la década de los años 80, de alguna manera, la mayoría de las poblaciones se sentían representadas por buena parte de las políticas que adoptaban estos gobiernos. Ahora no sucede esto. Esto tiene que ver, fundamentalmente, la financiación de la economía. Una economía que ha pasado en la economía real, la economía financiera, hace que, de alguna manera, la distribución... Fíjate tú, lo que es la economía financiera, es curiosísima, la economía financiera requiere un segmento muy específico de la población, unas cualificaciones muy específicas, por lo tanto, no son restricables aquellos que sean de la construcción o de la industria automovilística, pero es una industria que además no paga impuestos. Y los sistemas de impuestos era aquello que permitía lo que era la distribución. Pero tal velocidad que no es posible la reconversión. Por lo tanto, estamos en un sistema que efectivamente beneficia cada vez a menos gente, y esto acaba en una contestación. Es lógico que acaba en una contestación. ¿Cómo uno podría ser de otra manera? Y lo que tenemos que ser capaces es de, de alguna manera, evitar los agravios de este tipo de población. Tenemos que empezar a pensar que esta gente no son de alguna manera una especie diferente que nos está invadiendo, que somos nosotros decepcionados. Somos nosotros decepcionados. Todos nosotros podemos acabar siendo populistas, todos y cada uno de nosotros. Claro, esto es un reducte de gente de alguna manera formada, etcétera, etcétera internacional. Pero todos nosotros podemos llegar a ser populistas. Buna parte de esos populistas no lo eran hace cuatro, cinco, seis, siete, ocho, nueve, diez años. Y los son ahora. Por lo tanto, ¿qué tenemos que hacer? Tenemos que revertir este tipo de políticas, y tenemos que empezar a pensar de esta manera, ¿qué hemos hecho hasta ahora? Porque pensábamos que esto era un fenómeno de alguna manera transitorio, menor o de otra categoría. Y tenemos que empezar a pensar y esto es la gran ventaja del Brexit, que es, o de Trump, ahora llegará el tema de la planta, demonios, que esto tiene un carter subversivo. Un enorme potencial desestabilizador. Y que el mundo que puede emerger de esto es un mundo, fijaros, que es una situación, a mí, perdóname que os diga, yo ahora mismo situo la situación del Brexit y pienso en la Gran Bretaña de 1931, cuando devalua la libre esterlina, cuando llega a la preferencia imperial, cuando Roosevelt devalua el dólar, y cuando todo sistema internacional que hemos conocido se va al carajo. Pero no quiero hacer paralismos, pero hay situaciones, la historia nos ayuda de alguna manera a esto. Es decir, hay cambios. Y es un cambio en la actualidad muy similar a aquel que se produce entre 1931 y 1934. Del cual aquellos que rompen la globalización en 1931 y 1934, que son Winston Churchill y Delano Roosevelt, tienen que volver a reconstruir la globalización en 1944. Aquellos que la rompen en 1931 y en 1934 son los mismos que la tienen que reconstruir a partir de 1944 con el sistema de Brett Woods. Por lo tanto, poca broma. Quería decir también algo respecto a esta pregunta sobre los referéndums y el populismo. Yo creo que lo que he dicho antes respecto a Nigel Fraage es interesante respecto, porque es cómo conseguir cambiar la agenda política desde fuera. El referéndum es el resultado de una demanda que sale desde un grupo de Tories, pero que era un grupo que inicialmente era bastante marginal y que ha ido creciendo, y luego Nigel Fraage ya se fue haciendo presión sobre David Cameron. Entonces, de algún modo, se crea la necesidad política de responder a este grupo de presión. A partir de esta campaña. Esto es la dinámica que nos lleva al referéndum. Pero hay una lógica de fondo también respecto al Reino Europea, que es muy clara, y es que la cultura política británica cree en el Parlamento y no cree en el Parlamento Europeo o en las instituciones europeas. En vez de aceptar de que Europa es una serie de acuerdos entre Estados Nación, se crea la imagen de que hay algo más. Hay un Parlamento, hay una Comisión Europea, que, sin embargo, hacen cosas que nosotros no nos gustan, no entendemos, no nos convienen. O sea, se crea una cultura política, yo creo, en el fondo, poco en ésta. Si tú votas a un gobierno y este gobierno negoció unas cosas, tú has votado indirectamente estas cosas. Si negocias un tratado internacional, tú lo aceptas. Sin embargo, yo creo que, en el caso británico, se ha creado la idea, a lo largo de décades, dicho que esto es importantísimo, de que lo que sucede en Bruselas es contrario a lo que sucede en Londres, en vez de verlo como algo que Londres ha negociado. Y a partir de aquí, pues, se crea, yo creo, la posibilidad de que la voz del pueblo tiene que ser escuchada. Y una vez así escuchado como ahora, Brexit, es decir, todo lo que sea, un acuerdo entre las élites de Londres y las élites de Bruselas que no respete la idea del Brexit, será visto como una traición a la voz del pueblo. Esa es la gran dificultad de Trista May. ¿Cómo negociar sin traicionar? Perdón que interrumpa, pero no sé si sería mejor dejar el resto de preguntas en la dirección final, que al final vamos a reunir todas las preguntas y dar paso o hacer una pausa de cinco minutos. Es breve la pregunta. Venga, adelante pues. ¿Se oye? Bueno, sí, vale, vale. Pues, a ver, es respecto a una posibilidad que se ha hablado al menos en los medios respecto a la política interna dentro de la Gran Bretaña. ¿Existe realmente la posibilidad de que vía la acción parlamentaria una votación en contra unas nuevas elecciones se revierta de alguna manera el Brexit? El resultado es referendo o es una construcción de los medios? El punto de vista es que el gran debate en el Reino Unido es qué significa el Brexit. Es decir, nadie niega que hubo una mayoría, pero no hubo un plan concreto de Brexit que se votase. No hay un 52% a favor de un hard Brexit o un soft Brexit. Por lo tanto, no sabemos lo que votó la gente, excepto que no quieren lo que tienen ahora y quieren salir. A partir de aquí hay una enorme margen de negociación. Lo que tenemos ahora es un debate, es sobregista en la excepción, es una prerrogativa del gobierno, que es lo que le da la gana al negociar o tiene que obtener un permiso y unos acuerdos en el Parlamento como mínimo. Y luego posiblemente, esto es la segunda fase de la discusión, someter el resultado a votación otra vez. Porque nos podemos encontrar perfectamente, y me parece un argumento muy legítimo, que lo que se ha acordado nos gusta menos que lo que teníamos. Entonces, es el campo de juego que existe. Y aquí ganar tiempo es ganar posibilidades para un soft Brexit. Porque el impacto inicial es que los que han tomado control del negociador son la gente que estaba marginada en el partido Tory, gente como David Davis, que no pintaba nada, era un caso único a lo impuesto al centro de las negociaciones. Boris Johnson lo ha impuesto para hacer el payaso y se lo va a echar cuando ha hecho más payasadas. William Fox es un personaje que tiene muy poco respeto dentro de los círculos intelectuales y académicos y gente que entiende... Realmente creo que aquí es cuestión de ganar tiempo. Y aquí hay una estrategia extraordinaria de Theresa May. Theresa May lo que hace con todos estos nombramientos, de todos estos impresentables, lo que hace es que desactiva el UKIP. El UKIP lo desactiva, el UKIP desaparece. Y eso es lo que Theresa May necesita para que aquello que acuerde no pueda ser desestabilizado a través del exterior, a través del UKIP. Buena parte de su lenguaje, buena parte de su lenguaje de... Brexit means... Todo esto y este tipo de nombramientos, lo que tiene es un objetivo prioritario, que desactivar aquellos que han sido la oposición más activa. Una vez que desestactive esto, la negociación no la hace Boris Johnson sino que la van a hacer los funcionarios británicos que están perfectamente cualificados para hacerlo. Es negociar las condiciones mínimas para cumplir un Brexit. Lo mínimo posible. No pinta nada porque cometieron jaraquídeo el día siguiente, pero eso es otro tema para luego. Luego podemos seguir hablando, por supuesto, perdón por cortar. Les parece que hagamos tres minutos de pausa para que hagamos el cambio de Trump. Vamos al baño y volvemos. Sí? Gracias. Comencem amb la segona sessió d'aquesta jornada sobre populismes amb una fotografia que crec que, amb una imatge ja ho tenim tot dit, estudiem l'elecció a la Presidència d'Estats Units de Donald Trump. Si cinc anys enrere m'haguessin dit que el tema de la meva tési, és a dir, l'estudi d'en Hugh y Long, ara estaria tant de moda no m'ho hagués cregut, perquè realment dona que pensar l'elecció d'aquest personatge. Bé, em transmeto la llengua, perquè em diré que ho faré en anglès. Hola, benvingut per les persones que han vingut. Ara tenim aquí Linda Jones, Enrique Salai i Stephen Jacobson. Linda és investigadora Ramónica Jalquier Pupeufabra, que especialitza en la història de l'ethnica i les minories religioses. Enrique Salai de Cali és professor Emerito, catedràtica emeritus professor aquí a Pumpeufabra, i és especialista en catalanisme i nacionalisme, i història de la Unitat. Finalment tenim Stephen Jacobson, professor aquí a Pumpeufabra, i el president del Departament de l'Institut de la Història, de la Universitat de Jammar Bé Sensebibes, aquí a Pumpeufabra també, i és especialista en catalanisme i nacionalisme i imperialisme. Però eren tots bàsics en l'Unitat, i els seus insets i coments seran molt interessants i molt sugestius. Moltes gràcies per ser aquí. Bona nit, i moltes gràcies per ser aquí. We start with Linda and then professor Jacobson and then Enrique Salai. Thank you. So thank you very much for inviting me here. I have to admit that when I was first invited to speak, I actually didn't want to because it's still very difficult to process all of this. I'm going to focus my comments on three points. In the first place, I just want to point out briefly some... well, brief commentaries on why he won, right, on why Trump won. The second set of comments has to do with the impact of the campaign, of Donald Trump's campaign on religious and ethnic minorities, and what his presidency might mean for these collectives. And in my final comments, I will address some precedents of fascism in U.S. history as sort of predecessors of the Donald Trump phenomenon. So, very briefly, as regards the comments, the commentaries on why he won, well, I started to look around and read various newspaper articles and things on the web, and I've been able to sort of isolate maybe six reasons and maybe some of the other people on the panel will comment. But obviously there are multiple factors. First of all, one I think which is very important is that he was as a Republican and as a populist politician. He was able to galvanize the vote of a large sector of the American population, especially in the Midwest and the so-called rust belt states of the Upper Great Lakes, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, etc. A lot of these people whose profile are white working class people from the old industrial base, part of the so-called losers out of globalization, etc. Well, those are people who several decades ago used to vote Democrat and over the last few decades have gradually gone over to voting Republican. And this mainly has to do with some changes that have been made in the Democratic Party with their own strategies of wanting to reach out more in order to capture the votes of big business, Wall Street, the large pharmaceutical companies and big oil companies, etc. And there's increasing feeling that they've sort of left behind or abandoned the working class men and women. And this was a group of people that Trump in his campaign was able to attract. So we have that. And then the second one is what some people have called the backlash of the angry white man. And this is more of a racial argument. So the argument goes that infuriated by having had to withstand eight years of a presidency of an African-American man who was president and commander-in-chief, the thought of having to stomach four years at least of a woman on top of that was just too much. So that shows then that those who thought that Obama's election confirmed that Americans were now living in a post-racial society, well, that argument has shown to be sadly mistaken. Then, and I'll just go on in order not to take up too much time, a third reason, and this has to do more, partly more with Hillary Clinton herself, a number of people have pointed out a number of character flaws and I think also what could be included, considered strategy flaws. So the character flaws are supposedly that too many people were convinced by the media and by her Democratic and her Republican opponents that Hillary was dishonest and that she was untrustworthy. So saying one thing, giving one message to general audiences and another message to private audiences of big business types. And then there are a number of strategies, strategic errors in her campaign. So I remember being in the United States this last year during the period of the campaign, I was there twice over a three-week period on different times. And I remember thinking, where is she? You know, she's just sort of disappeared from the media for a couple of weeks on end, whereas every day Donald Trump was in the news, there was a new item with him showing him in a different city, giving a speech or a presentation or doing something very active every day. And she was not appearing and the only thing that was appearing were these ads, these advertisements that she had paid for, but it's not the same as being out there and being seen talking to people, etc. Also another error that I think came back to haunt her was an insult that she made to his voters by calling them a bunch of deplorables. So the media really latched on to that and talked about that for a very long time. And it was just an off-the-cuff comment that probably shouldn't have made such a big deal, but it really, it made a lot of damage to her. Also the novelty, I think the novelty of having the first woman president was undermined by this perception that she just represented too much of the status quo. You know, she's been around in politics for a very long time, she had been first lady, she'd been a senator, secretary of state, etc., at a time when people were wanting something new and there was a perception that she just wasn't novel enough in that sense. Then I think another argument is misogyny. So a lot of commentators including in right wing or to the right conservative newspapers such as the Huffington Post have noted that there was quite a lot of misogyny in the campaign, especially in the debates and the way that she was handled as a candidate in comparison with the way her male opponents, whether they were the Democrats in the early period or when she was going head to head with Donald Trump. So one commentator from the Huffington Post quoted, said that he believed that the elections revealed a staggering gender biases, mostly in the constant and baseless scrutiny of Clinton's character. So the idea that she was being subjected to more scrutiny than her male counterparts. And obviously we can talk about stereotypes about how women that are seeking power are seen to be vilified as being pushy or aggressive or corrupt, etc. When the same thing doesn't happen to men necessarily who are running for office. Let's see, let me scan. Then, well I have more to say about that but I'll just go on. Then, another factor was what are called the depressed Saunders voters. So those voters, those people who enthusiastically supported Saunders and were disappointed when Hillary won the candidacy. Now it's true that in the end there was a move on his part to rally those people and get them to go and vote for Hillary. And yet people who follow voting patterns and say that one of the things that really helps is the capacity to not only decide your vote but to bring along, you know, three or four or five other of your peers to vote with you. And, you know, and that the people who were former Saunders voters, supporters who were grudgingly voted for her weren't able to attract those other people. So there's that too. And then there's another factor that I, for lack of a better word, I would call, Qleria. So there is this attitude among the Americans and this is something that Michael Moore pointed out when he predicted that Trump would win. This attitude that Americans will vote for him just because everybody is saying that they should not. So it doesn't matter whether he's the right candidate or not, it's just the idea that, well, no one's going to tell us what to do, we're just going to vote for him. No, no. Tada. No,рашurie spoilers al cost de la Generalitat de La Generalitat. Выs認anto吗? B IBM C а М immigration. Or what I would call Rebeldiaは sins. A rebellion without a cause mentality. Then, of course, and this is the final one, the media coverage, the biased media coverage and a specially disturbing increasingly El que va passar va ser el dret de la transició. La honestitat que passava a la sentència del president, que va ser l'altre d'הrmèrit, un dels moments que va venir, va ser el dret de la transició. I el supoint d'aquest rota de la transició va ser a l'combre de les forces. Quan la gent estava increasing la transició, i això no era el cas amb el Donald Trump. Aleshores, això és el que vull dir. Focussant en què la campanya del Trump i la presidència van fer les minoritats religioses i ethnic. És a dir, que un nombre de observers ha notat en la segona sèrie de concerns sobre el racisme, xenofòbic, i el discurs de sexes que és caracteritzat a la campanya del Donald Trump. Quo una persona, Lauren Karacic, directora d'International Human Rights Clinic a l'Universitat de l'Universitat de l'Esquadra que predicta que la presidència serà una catastèria per a les humanitats i la segona sèrie de la raó. I ella directament es desborda a ell i a la seva l'esquadra de Bellicose per agrair atacs contra diferents grups minoritaris, musulmans, americans africans, etcètera. I la tendència de convertir-la en l'esquadra en l'acció de l'esquadra, doncs, contribuint a un clima d'aquestes agraïments en escoles i populacions que va ser targetada. I, en un servei de campanyes d'esquadra contra musulmans i altres. I, per tant, es suffa de recordar-se que els racistes racistes que han fet sobre mexicans i altres latinos, la campanya de promocions a construir un lloc a la borda, a parar l'immigració, els drets infinits per prohibir l'entrè de musulmans a l'esquadra o per obligar les residències musulmans i les ciències a assenjar una registra en una base d'esquadra, per controlar-los, etcètera. Aleshores, l'últim que em dic sobre això és que no són només perceptions. Aquest és el base, per exemple, d'reports a l'Estatut Federal de Investigacions, l'FBI, que cataloga un total de 5,818 crimes de marge de 2015 fins avui, l'esquadra ha arribat a més de 340 a l'esquadra d'anys, inclusivament assaults, bombes, drets i de propietat de destrucció contra minors, gays i altres, etcètera. Aleshores, el que tenim aquí, i veig que és el primer, aquests són pocs exemples que estic explicant ara, aquí tenim una cosa que ha passat en una sèrie d'esquadres que s'havien sentit a diferents mosques en les Unites Estats, començant al mig d'anys de novembre, doncs mosques i centres culturals a l'esquadra d'unites estats han tingut esquadres, referent als musulmans als fills de Satan, demanant a Trump un nou xerif en la ciutat, qui serà plenar l'Amèrica i fer-la lliure d'una altra vegada per eradicar la població musulana. I aquí hi ha una referència a un... Sí, un lliure a la donació a les musulmans què Hitler ha fet a les jules. És un exemple. Després hi ha un altre exemple d'un atac que va ser un atac a un musulm, però, en un moment, no era un musulm, que també va passar en els dies després de l'election. Així, aquesta és una dona que viu a Nord-California. Ella es fa de l'Lupus, i jo crec que ella ha perdut el haaror. Així, sempre hi ha d'haver aquest headscarf quan va sortir. Un dia, va venir i va trobar que la caixa va vandalitzar, i una nota va estirar allà que va dir, «Hijab bearing bitch, això és la nostra nació, ara et quedi». Aquesta és una dona americana que no és un musulm, però això és el tipus que les persones, incluint els observants i incluint els FBI, han notat un increment. També hem augmentat atacs contra les populations african-americains. Hem tingut un exemple aquí d'un atac racista d'Arson en un 111-year-old african-americà a la ciutat de Greenville, Mississa, i, almenys, la resolució no és tan bona, però es va desbordar a novembre 2-i, i l'Arson es va escriure les ordres i es pot barely make it out here, but what it says here is vote Trump. So there's no doubt that the attack was directly related to the elections. And then we have another case of a murder in this case of an African-American who was killed, shot, beaten and left for dead by three men, three white men in California, and it turns out he was a well-known singer. So that's another example of the violence and the aftermath. So let's just move quickly to my third point and just mention briefly some precedents. So people are rather alarmed about Trump's victory, but he represents something that, unfortunately, we've seen in different periods of American history, and a number of observers have concluded that his populist campaign slogan, make America great again, really means or could be interpreted to mean and was understood to mean make America white again. And we, of course, see precedents in the discourse and programs of white nationalist supremacist groups, particularly the Ku Klux Klan, as well as other groups in American history. So I'm making a reference, for example, to one observer, a writer named Kelly J. Baker, who published a book recently on the Ku Klux Klan. And she noted that many of the goals of William J. Simmons, who was a man who sort of revamped the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, trying to strip it of its vigilantism and identify it more with Christian virtues and patriotic pride, he promoted ideals such as make America 100%, promoting 100% Americanism, stating that the nation was in peril because of the influx of the Catholic immigrants and the enfranchisement of African American, the inward migration from the south to other parts of the country. And that reemergence in the 1920s was a response to these shifting demographics, right, by the immigration of people from Catholics from Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, et cetera. A number of Jews also came, around 10% of immigrants, of the 16 million immigrants who came in this period were Jewish. And the Klan obviously saw this as a menace. So we can maybe find some similarities with that, those trends and what's going on with the social changes and demographic changes. Nowadays, with having had an African American president, with more rights being given to lesbians, gays, bisexuals, et cetera, with the enormous influence of the Hispanic community, et cetera, which have unleashed fears that America will become a majority minority country. So part of it can be seen as fears of that. And finally, and I'll just mention very briefly what Mariona was mentioning before, about these precedents and the figures of people such as Xiulong or a Canadian American priest, Father Coughlin, who also campaigned on similar patterns, you know, and used populist rhetoric in their attempts to attract an audience. Oh, what I have here is on the left, is the poster of a play based on a famous novel by Sinclair Lewis called It Can't Happen Here, which was meant to be a sort of a satirical political satire loosely based on the figure of Huey Long and obviously set against the backdrop of the rise of figures such as, you know. And then on the right, we have a poster from the Ku Klux Klux Klan, and we have here some of their slogans, you know, the things that they stand for, their militant Protestantism. Oh, yeah, that's right. That is cool. Freedom from... Yeah, greater allegiance to the flag. That's something that's sort of echoed in Trump's campaign. So, you know, many observers have seen sort of parallels there, and my last photo is just, and this I'll end, I'm finished now, thank you, is just the two photos on the left, we have Huey Long, and on the right, we have this Catholic priest, or former Catholic priest. No, no, no. Catholic, right through... Until he says. Ah, right, okay. 1960s. Ah, right, thanks. Right. So, you know, the types of people who, you know, obviously used the same kinds of populist rhetoric to try to reach out to, you know, working-class people on the one hand, this would be especially the case with Huey Long, and Father Coughlin, you know, being an example of a demagogue blaming all of America's ills on others, right, on non-Christian others. So, those are the comments, basically, that I have. I don't think I have anything. Oh, yeah, I'll just simply end, right, by drawing attention to the concerns raised by many observers that Trump might actually attempt to implement the type of authoritarian measures that the character in this play, the protagonist, it can't happen here, yeah, that he introduced such as outlawing any form of dissent or identifying people and rounding them up and putting them into some sort of, you know, concentration camps or other policies aimed at destroying the civil rights of anyone who has opposed him. And unfortunately, many of those that he has pledged to appoint make me fear that some of those things might actually happen. So, that's how I see it. Thank you very much, Linda, for this very interesting historical analysis on Trump. I completely agree with mostly everything you said. So, I'm just going to let Jake Jacobson start his presentation. Thank you so much. Deponga el mapa. Thank you for inviting me. Just a peek for organizing this wonderful session for Mariona for being such a wonderful chair and for the previous speakers who brought up a lot of points, some of which I'll repeat in, so I'll try to go through relatively quickly. I found the previous section on Brexit by Fernando and John Paul fascinating and Linda's perspective quite interesting. When I was first asked to do this, I was a little bit hesitant because I'm not an expert on United States electoral politics nor am I a political scientist. But I thought that the focus on populism was quite interesting. In fact, as a historian and my dissertation advisor, José Álvarez Junco was actually an expert on populism. I read quite a bit about it and thought perhaps I could offer some things looking at the perspective of populism. I've also relied on some friends in political science to try to give me some help with trying to make sense of this electoral map. I'll also, in my talk, concentrate on the election itself and the subject of populism. I don't think I can go into what lies in the future to the extent that the speakers in the Brexit, particularly Fernando, spoke about earlier. Obviously, what lies in the future, the future is up for grabs in many respects in the United States. Paul Ryan, who's the speaker of the House, who was initially ambivalent to Obama's looking to forge an alliance and perhaps go after Medicare and Medicaid, which is about the only thing that is worthy in the United States of the welfare state and are actually fantastic programs for the retired and the interests of oil and gas, the future of Obamacare. In fact, the whole future is a bit up for grabs and going into these very specific things on Medicare, Medicaid, and Obamacare. Obviously, I'm not very qualified to talk about them and perhaps in the audience today many of you are not familiar with them, but again, the future I won't talk about. So, what I'll try to look at is the election itself and its relationship to populism. And what I've done is looked at this website called Politico, which many people use, which break down the electoral results. And what's very good about this website, if you do take a look at, is it not only looks at the electoral results of this past election, but it also, if you click on the right links, you can get the results of the previous election in 2012 of Obama and then compare the results with the previous results to see the changing map of electoral politics, in particular where Trump was able to garner votes, not only on a state-by-state basis, but on a county-by-county basis. And so, I'll take a look at that. So, again, with risk of repeating a little bit of what Linda said in her very quick eight points, if you look at the breakdown of these elections on a racial scale and not all these statistics are perfect, but basically, as we know, Hillary Clinton's largest support came from African-American populations, around 88% voted for her, which was less than Obama, but still a very strong percentage voting for her. And Hispanic voters, 66% voted for Hillary Clinton, which was a little bit less than Obama's many have commented on in 2012, but very similar to the amount of people who voted for Obama in 2008. So, again, in terms of percentages not looking at turnout, which the statistics aren't in yet, her support chiefly came from African-American Hispanic voters, where the largest groups that came out in support of her. While Donald Trump's largest supporter came from white voters, 58% of all white people voted for him, in particular, white men without a university degree, 70% voted. So, more white men without a university degree voted for Trump than Hispanic voters voted for Clinton, not more, a higher percentage. And white women without a university degree, a little bit less of around 60%. And because of low voter turnout in the United States, we have to temper these percentages with information on turnout, and this is a bit difficult to do since the information isn't out yet on turnout. But we have some ideas in terms of total turnout. We know the total turnout was 59%, which was a bit higher than 2012, which was 58%, but significantly less than 2008, 62%, and less than 2004, which was 60%. So, in many respects, Americans thought that there was less at stake in this election than say the 2004 election following the War of Iraq or the 2008 election following the financial crisis. So, this still has to be analyzed a bit. But also, in the US elections, voter turnout isn't really that important because what's very key is the voter turnout in the battleground state, so to speak, the states that are up for grabs because if you're living in Massachusetts or California, New York or Texas or Georgia, your vote really doesn't count. And so, in the battleground state, 70% voted in Wisconsin, 62% in Pennsylvania, 64% in Ohio, 66% in Michigan, 66% in Florida. And so, these states, really, with pretty high voter turnout in which the election depended. It seems, though specific figures I know, that African American black turnout was down and Hispanic turnout may have been down, we're not sure yet, but what's very clear is for demographic reasons more Hispanic voters voted forever before. So, again, the high Hispanic voter turnout in terms of, for Clinton, means that she probably had stronger support among Hispanics than Obama did. And so, if you look at this, basically putting all the statistics together and then taking a look at the key sort of populist messages of Trump's campaign. And if I could take three slogans that he used the most. The first was, as mentioned by Linda, make American great again. But the second two are quite important. The other two was drain the swamp at his election rallies. You could either say drain the swamp, drain the swamp over and over again, which was a code for expelling the lobbyists from Washington, in particular, although we know he's not gonna expel oil and gas or the National Rochville Association from Washington, but the leftist lobbies. And then the second was build the wall, meaning expel illegal Hispanic immigrants. So, these two messages drain the swamp against the political class and the lobbyists build the wall against Hispanic minorities, which can be seen as a general message for immigrants, refugees and minorities in general. And you can see that this populist message basically seemed to work as a racial response. The defeat of the victory of Trump can be attributed to this popular racial response against immigrants, minorities and the political class. And the defeat of Hillary Clinton can turn be explained by her inability to stimulate voter turnout. Perhaps, as Obama had done among minorities, her lack of a populist message, as Linda pointed out with her ads and her incapacity, to deliver a populist message, even though she was much closer to the people in many respects than Trump was. Trump was very aloof, but he could give a very strong populist message. And the fact that she also became embodied again is this embodiment of the political class. So, this is a bit the traditional interpretation that's been given so far, and what I'll do for the rest of my time is offer a little bit of a different view. But going along with the traditional view, I guess the place where this works best is Florida. So, if you look, for example, at the electoral map of Florida, which when I was awake at three o'clock or 3.30 in the morning and the electoral counts came in in Florida, I knew that she had lost, when she had lost Florida. And here you can see the electoral map of Florida by county in Florida, where the blue obviously represented the Democrats and the red representing the Republicans. But what's amazing about the Florida electoral map, and again I owe this analysis a little bit to my colleagues in political science, is that in these three key counties, Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County, in which the majority of, I don't know, majority of the large percentage of Florida's live, she did better Hillary Clinton than Obama did in 2012. In fact, she, for example, won 64% in Miami Dade County while Obama in 2012 won 62%. And so in fact, when some political scientists saw these results came in and they came in earlier during the rest of the states during the evening, people thought that because she had pulled so highly in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach that the Democrats were going to win Florida. And in fact, then they would win the election. Obviously this turned, this turned pear-shaped very quickly. Orlando, in some places were around big cities such as Orlando or Tampa or Tallahassee or Gainesville, Florida here in the middle where the university is. She did win, but she was absolutely killed along the Gulf Coast in the North, presumably due to her inability to bring out the African American vote and her poor popularity among poor whites convinced by Donald Trump's message. So if you look at, again, the map of Florida, you see this very clear racial division and this very, this idea of America divided on racial lines and a populist message among uneducated whites being key to the victory of Trump who literally wanted to drain the swamp. In fact, if you look at the swamp countries in here, they voted overwhelmingly for Trump. So I don't know if that had anything to do with the metaphor was particularly convincing in the glades. However, what I'd like to do with the rest of my time is talk about why I think that the, this populist message in the United States was fundamentally different than the Brexit vote. If you look at it here, what I've analyzed so far it corresponds a little dip to what Joan Powell was talking about with the Brexit vote. But first of all, and I think this is very important, the latest statistics published a few days ago by the Cook Report last week reveals, and this is important, that Hillary Clinton did win the elections, right? I mean, she won 65,527,625 people voted for her and 62,851,000 people voted for Trump. In fact, she won the elections by full 2 percentage points, 61 to 59%. And indeed, since the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, the Republicans have only won the popular vote once, that was in 2004 by George Bush, and in fact he won by 51 to 48, very similar to what Hillary Clinton lost, and it was the lowest margin for an incumbent victory. So again, especially I was very angered the other night when I was looking at the Austrian elections and the analysts were saying, well, why did the Austrian vote one way and the Americans vote the other way? It's not exactly true if they had, if there had been a Brexit vote in the United States or had been a vote with the similar electoral rules for electing the Austrian president, Hillary Clinton would be president today, not Donald Trump. So some of this has to be tempered. Secondly, and this Linda mentioned, I'll mention again, I think it's very important and this distinguishes obviously the US vote from Brexit, is that the first two discursive arms in the populist message drain the swamp and build the wall were obviously against a political class and minorities, but the one message that was repeated over and over during his campaign were these misoginist messages because Hillary Clinton was a woman. I'll mention them in a second, but at least for me and here I'm not, I'm really not on the best ground that perhaps Fernando can help me out later, but I think it still remains to be seen in Europe and the United States whether a woman can win on the political center and left. I mean, Céloge and Roy Allen, France lost in 2007 and Hillary Clinton lost in the United States in 2016. In other words, women who are supported by feminists rather than Christian Democrats can win elections in major European and United States countries. It's still to me not clear perhaps somebody can bring up some, I mean in Scandinavia, but Scandinavia is Scandinavia. I mean in other countries where this occurred, but I'm still not convinced that women can win elections coming from the left, perhaps coming from the right, like Angela Merkel or center right or Margaret Thatcher in which they were traditional Christian and maternal values are somehow incorporated within the figure of the women candidate, but not when the women candidate is associated with feminist politics in particular and obviously the ability of Trump to associate with her with feminists was very successful. But not only that, the rallying cries of the Trump rallies, things that he couldn't enter were really amazing. So for example, Trump rallies consistently ended with rallying cries such as lock her up, they would repeat lock her up, lock her up, hang that bitch, hang that bitch, hang that bitch. Some of the misogynist gear that was sold around the election, not only included t-shirts, included t-shirts that read that Trump that bitch, Hillary sucks but not like Monica or I wish Hillary had married OJ, stuff like that. A million other slogans, mostly equating Hillary to a lesbian, a ball breaker or a slut or somebody who facilitated her husband's extramarital affairs or in fact had her own against the, what was that guy's name, Vincent Foster, who committed suicide in the early part of the Clinton administration, who was supposedly one of her lovers. Obviously Hillary Trump herself, Trump himself, promoted her as crooked Hillary. And all of this, as Linda mentioned, was quite amazing because if you look at her, this populist rhetoric that compared her with corruption, you know, none of the corruption ever stuck to Hillary Clinton. I mean there's really no evidence of political corruption anywhere and the FBI investigation into the emails obviously came up clean. And in fact, if you look at Trump, he's associated with a fraudulent university, Trump University, a fraudulent, unregistered charity, Trump charity, but somehow the Clinton Foundation received more bad press. He'd gone bankrupt six times and served as either a plaintiff or defendant in over 3,000 lawsuits. Indeed, if Republican, I think if Republican candidates had been permitted to use race against Obama to the extent that the press or whoever, the United States or the electorate or the people allow misoginist rhetoric to used against Hillary, then Obama's fate may have been quite different. But obviously it's certain racial, you can't use racial slurs in political slogans to the extent that you can still use misoginist slurs. My third point, and this is where the real difference I see with Brexit, is that is the economic difference and going back to particularly John Powell who concentrated mostly on the election, the question still is, did people vote for Trump because of this racial nationalism and for economic nationalism? And I made the argument earlier that racial nationalism would have a lot to do with it, especially if you looked at the electoral results of Florida. But I'm not completely convinced that this argument works in the so-called Rust Belt, where in fact is where many people have attributed to it. So if you look, for example, let's look at Michigan, Florida, sorry. I'm gonna look into Ohio first, I think. So if you look at Ohio, for example, before I do this, it's not clear that it's a racial message because in, if you look at the Rust Belt states, there's so many counties that overwhelmingly voted for Obama in 2012 and then switched and voted for Trump in 2016. And so in that way, it's very hard to attribute their switch and vote to racism if they voted overwhelmingly for a black candidate in 2012. In other words, the message Make America Great Again was not only a racial message, as Linda messaged, but it was also an economic nationalist message. In other words, to recapture manufacturing jobs, lost to globalization, to renegotiate the NAFTA free trade treaty, and to cancel the upcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership. And here is where I think it's different because I guess, as John Paul mentioned, I totally agree with them in Brexit. The argument of those in Brexit who favored to stay within the European Union was that there were economic advantages despite the fact that there was a secession of democracy or a democratic deficit because of joining Europe. So one of the messages of the Brexit supporters was in fact that even though the economic benefits or at least in the short term, the economic consequences might be harsh in the long term that Britain would recapture a better quality of democracy was not the case in the United States. The argument in the United States was exactly the opposite, was that the free trade treaties that Obama had entered into and was currently negotiating or Bill Clinton had entered into with the NAFTA and Trans-Pacific Partnership that were on the Democrats were somehow economically prejudiced. So if we look on a county-by-county electoral maps in these key states, for example, and I don't have time to look at both of them, but here if you look, I think that's Trumbull County, which is outside of Cleveland, it voted 60% to 38% in favor of Obama in 2012. So it's very hard to say that the voters in Trumbull County are racist because they voted 60% to 38% in favor of Obama, but then voted 51% to 45% in favor of Trump in 2016. Again, that's an 18-point shift between the two elections from voting from a candidate. So in that respect, if you look at that, you probably the misogynist, rather than the racist argument, seems to hold more water. In Michigan, for example, Macomb County, and I don't have time to look at it because they just gave me the percentages voted. If you can look at Michigan, you have to hit a back arrow first. Macomb County, which is a white suburb outside Detroit, voted 52% for Obama and 48% for Romney, but in 2016 switched 54% for Trump and 42% in Hillary, a 14-point swing. And this was a county with the third largest population in Michigan, 85%, which is white. And again, these swings of 18 and 14 percentage points occur a lot across the West Resbolts, and it's very difficult to attribute these swings to racism because these counties had overwhelmingly voted in favor of a black candidate. And so in that case, I guess it offers a little hope, well, I don't know that perhaps the scenarios that Linda was painting at the end might not come true, but it also offers, I think, a point of difference between the U.S. populism, this economic nationalism of the Rust Belt, and this democratic nationalism, this higher quality of democracy in Britain, argument in favor of the Brexit voters, even though the racial profiles of the voters were themselves, the populist messages in the two cases were quite different. Quickly, in one of the future holds, not in the future of the United States, but I think if you look at the electoral map, it seems that these Rust Belt states, if they are voting on economic nationalism, if Trump is unable to reverse the trends of inequality, which Fernando had spoke about, if U.S. growth continues to be strong as it was under Obama, but becomes distributed very unequally and does not really help out these poor white voters in the Rust Belt, it could be that their vote changes back to Democrats. So, particularly in states that are highly contested, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, it's not clear that in the future that they'll always be voted, that this racial difference will harden and become part of the Republican electorate. Moreover, if you look at the way demographics are moving in Florida, it looks like Florida as well as perhaps Arizona in the future will probably move towards a democratic camp. And so, if you look at these changes, for example, in the past election of Florida when Arizona voted Democrat, then Clinton would have won, Maine and New Hampshire voted Democrat in these last elections, but if Trump wasn't running, probably would have voted Republican. So, you can do this, you can do the math in a number of ways, but it comes to be a very close electoral map in the future and it would be very favorable to the Democrats. In fact, if these Rust Belt voters are voting on economic reasons and become four years disenchanted with Trump for having failed to deliver upon the economic promises that he promised in the election. So, I'll leave it at that with trying to show some similarities and differences with the Brexit vote and in fact, perhaps not auguring such a pessimistic scenario as Linda did in the previous presentation. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor Jacobson. Now, Antik, you have still time. I'm going to cut part of what I was going to do. I wanted to comment on Linda Johnson's paper and on Stephen Jacobson's, Linda's and Jake's papers or presentations. There's one factor I would add to the elections, which is the role of FBI director Comey, which was outstandingly scandalous and which would seem changing movie scenarios that we are all used to, that there is a CIA-FBI break, but in which the FBI isn't necessarily the good guys. To comment also on the, for instance, mistaken hate crimes, hate crimes directed against people who have nothing to do with it, I seem to remember the first hate crime after 9-11 was the murder of a Sikh. He was wearing a turban, so he had to be a Muslim, right? And on the role of the KKK and on Canadian-born Father Coughlin, I discovered, I was reading a book yesterday, that the KKK was extraordinarily strong in the 1920s and through the 1930s in Alberta and Saskatchewan. 50,000 strong. 50,000, 70,000 strong. And the KKK has a big change, strongly anti-Catholic in the 1920s and the very presence of Coughlin indicates that there's a shift. And the shift becomes centred on Detroit, what's called the Black Legion, but it's Ku Klux Klan with Black regalia, and it's basically racist, it's basically anti-Black immigrants from the South. And the reflection this has on what Jake was presenting, which is very high participation, certainly by European standards, we're talking about 77% participation, but six Democrats, six Democrat victories of popular vote in the last seven presidential elections. It's very significant in terms of what is the structure of the electoral college and presidential elections. And in the linking up, Linda and Stephen, with the use of very simplistic, very attractive, simple-minded slogans, and their power, and their power even to generate hate crimes, the most spectacular hate crime since the elections was fortunately didn't cause any murders, but was caused by the vehement envenomous fantasies of the son of one of the Trump nominees, Flynn, Flynn Jr., Matt Dogg Flynn's dad, Flynn Jr., who invented the whole pizza gate subject, secret sex crime abortion in the basement of a pizza, guy grabs his automatic rifle and decides to do a personal investigation, quote-unquote, so he aims it directly at the poor pimply guy at the cash register and says, you know, what's in your basement? And then starts shooting. This was not last Sunday, it was the Sunday before last in Washington, D.C. I'm going to go to this one, right? And I'm going to... Civil war culture is, because I was borrowing something I already had, but I decided it was perversely appropriate. And let's see if I get one of those. First, the capacity of Trump to play with popular culture. In June, this last June, coinciding with the process of Pokemon Go and its take-off, a new character, a new Pokemon figure, which is Yungus, was immediately identified as a Trump clone and by both partisans and enemies. And the fact that this would amuse Trump was indicative of, despite his being extremely thin-skinned, notoriously thin-skinned, of his capacity to tone in on images and use something like this. En històric terms, I think that Trump reverts back to the two most disastrous presidents in American history by general historiographic consensus. Millard Fillmore, after the 1850 California compromise, who comes into politics through the animasonic party, then the no-nothings of the American party, strongly identified with anti-immigration. He's really a much more complex figure than this, but this is the standard image of a moderate pro-slavery unionist who during the Civil War is accused of being a copperhead. But the image of no-nothings, of anti-immigration, is something that seems to reappear in a very different United States, some 170 years later. And he obviously also makes Warren Harding look good, who is the other disaster in America. As you know, Americans organize history by presidential administrations. It's just that's the only way to understand anything, according to Americans. That's what makes them an exceptional society. And I used an example of propaganda of the Democrats who were strongly defeated in the 1920 elections and in the 1924 elections with John Davis, when Harding has had the worst scandals since the grand administration after the Civil War. Okay, no more Mr. Nice Guy. He's someone who's proud to act like a thug. He's mean-spirited, personally vengeful, and he's quite willing to go after small people who he feels have offended him and do very, very systematic lawsuits. This is... Jake was citing some more than 3,000 lawsuits. Some of these are done by him. This is... I have to admit, the other PowerPoint I had was even more emotional. I was talking with Linda about this. I've decided not to do it. But I'm quite serious about this. I think Trump is a psychopath. This is a scale established by a British psychologist, criminal psychologist, forensic psychologist, who established a list of 20 criteria to establish whether someone is or isn't, can be considered a psychopath. 20 criteria, the list is, one, glibness and superficial charm. Two, grandiose sense of self-worth. Three, pathological lying. Four, cunning manipulative. Five, lack of remorse. Six, emotional shallowness. Seven, callowness and lack of empathy. Eight, unwillingness to accept responsibility for actions. Something that Trump is particularly famous for. Nine, a tendency to boredom. Ten, a parasitic lifestyle. Eleven, a lack of realistic long-term goals. Twelve, impulsivity. Thirteen, irresponsibility. Fourteen, lack of behavioral control. Fifteen, behavioral problems in early life. Sixteen, juvenile delinquency. Forty, criminal versatility. Eighteen, a history of revocation of conditional release that is broken parole. Nineteen, multiple marriages and promiscuous sexual behavior. I have no doubt that, this is an article from the Telegraph in April 2014, I have no doubt that Trump would gain the score of 40 which would establish a psychopath. I'm not kidding, I'm quite serious. Herr's argument is that psychopaths can live next door to you, you can work with them, you are not aware, they are apparently seemingly normal people, they're much more of a presence than is normally taken for granted. So, going wrong way. So, on a grand scale psychopathic or even sociopathic which is a slightly milder term can be extremely attractive in real life. This is the unidentified Rumford Thug who was beating up people in Rumford outside of London on an unannounced basis, meaning just sort of slamming someone because they looked different. One thing is on an individual scale, another thing is on the big screen. Which is the character, it's outrageous that six year olds can't vote, but what does he really want? A bigger piece of the pie. We have the problem of the professional celebrity in politics, this is a big change since the 1980s, this is a campaign button from these elections, it's got the MAGA, make American great slogan, but Reagan, whatever you may think of him had considerable professional experience in politics before he was elected president. Trump has none. This is Linda's main point and I completely agree. The center is an attitude of white backlash, sexist, sexist, homophobe and racist, where nobody wants to remember, this is the other side of it, the pendulum swing effect. This is after Obama, now comes the reply. And I remember not so far away in the past, white separatist David Duke who shall we say, the most sophisticated kind of Cluck's attractant, who offered to be Trump's VP at the beginning of the summer. Trump is sold as a highly successful businessman, this is how he presents himself, here is Trump University among other of his glorious achievements. He's just a con man, he is not a businessman. All he knows how to do is set up attractive cons, cons in which people put in, investors put in from 100,000 up in his deals and then discover that they lose their money and all they have is a hole in the ground. And when they try and sue him, they find that there is very, very small print on page 18 of the contract, which says that he had sold his name and this has nothing to do with him personally so he can't be sued and he walks off happily on his way to the bank. What does this imply? I think that there are social patterns here that have to do with very major trends that are outside of the political arena and which have to do with both Europe and the United States. And it have to do with a process of change, first place, a process of change in forms of communication. Press has become parasitic on sensationalism, be that yellow press or be that, as they say in Spanish, prensa rosa, pink press. It is all by definition an act, it's all fake. This is how Trump thinks. He says, I can do that because he thinks in terms of reality TV. He's not thinking in terms of politics. That the I can do that is a quote from Trump. That is, go to a, go to a, he has a lovely New York accent, go to an international meeting, I can do that. It's a role and he cannot understand anything beyond that. The cultural change signifies that TV also now threatened has become sensationalist in response to the progressive collapse of paper press, of print press. And so the reality show, which is on live, is a form of survival. So if we had artificial royals in Hollywood stardom, Hollywood royalty, we now have standard issue artificial billionaires and instant TV stardom. We go from Trump's The Apprentice to Jersey Shore, but Trump's The Apprentice from 2004 and Jersey Shore in 1220 are interactive transatlantically with the dynamic of cultural change in English-speaking areas, which is in turn a parasite of TV sensationalism, which is for lack of a better expression, I've chosen to call cloneorama. In other words, The Apprentice is a clone on Trump's program, but Jersey Shore is a clone on Jordi Shore. So you have dynamics, which are using the same tricks. The man who runs the British The Apprentice is a very similar kind of speculative millionaire-billionaire to than is Trump. And you have the same kind of instant TV stardom. You have, furthermore, a kind of parasitism on a fourth level, which is social media and the dynamics of trending topics, as shown by PewDiePie. PewDiePie, sorry, and his bro army, meaning you have someone who starts in May 2006 with 3,000 followers, has 50 million followers in December 2016 and is actually making a good deal of money off of this, several millions a month in dollars. Oop, sorry. Argument, different from what Fernando Guirau was saying, I think that this is a major caesura. It represents a caesura that is as significant in style, in appearance of politics, not necessarily in the legal substance of institutions, but yes, in the appearance of politics, as a series of crises that change models of discourse. The postwar collapse, Nazism and what it represents as a change, the end of the Axis regimes, the independence of Israel and the beginning of desegregation in the US, the collapse of empires with the Suez crisis, the fall of the Soviet empire, it's a solution of the USSR and the end of communism, even as a discourse, and Brexit, the Columbia plebiscite, against the pacification and the Trump elections. And I think this has an interaction with long-term economic crises. Here I am situating what I see as opposed to what I'm told. I'm told that the crisis, the so-called Great Recession, is over in 2013. And in terms of macroeconomic statistics, that may well be. It is not so in terms of street-level life. There are, even in Barcelona, indications of a turn-up. But street-level life remains ugly. And I think that that is true on the rust belt in the United States. The long-term effects of the Great Recession hit and have implications, which are, Fernando Guirau was alluding to some of this, which are what I would call the immiseration of the intelligentsia or the intelligentsia in the Atlantic world. The end of spokesmanship and protagonism for the liberal professions. Producers are no longer leaders, but rather the entire capitalist market in the world, in the West, is dominated by financial speculators and financial concerns. He was speaking of the real economy as opposed to the financial economy. Those are terms that don't completely convince me. I'm not sure that these work either. But I pose, in any case, the concept. And I think that the Great Recession has a byproduct collateral damage of the PC and its growth, the robotization of administrative tasks, productive activities, and even to some extent of intellectual life. I'm not sure that classes couldn't be given by holograms and won't be given by holograms. We're using MOOCs now, but you could turn a MOOC into a hologram and give a class relatively easy. You could already do it, technically, now, and you probably will be doing it in 2025 or 2030. This is a significant change. In other words, the intellectual sectors, the philosophes are the spokesmen for the bourgeoisie from the French Revolution or from the American Revolution, for that matter, on. And what is taking place now is, I think, I use this very romantic Norwegian realist painter of a spinner, you have a solid artisanal economy that is working for people at the end of the 18th century, and then you introduce the spinning journey, then you turn it into a mule, and what one person was producing over a period of time and maintaining a domestic economy now becomes, you have 60 spools, you have 100 spools, you have 80 spools, you have 250 spools, and one person, perhaps a woman, perhaps a child, can take care of that. And all the other people have simply lost their work. I think this is what is happening now, but it's not happening simply to manual productive trades, it's happening to intellectual trades. Otherwise, the other people here in the audience would be looking forward to some kind of job, which I don't think they are. So, I think that there is a struggle between millions of erased jobs, which are seen as a natural ergo-invisible loss, meaning that computer tech firms, software firms consider that millions of jobs are lost. Well, that's not our problem. We're bringing about a great new world in which you can have home delivery. And so, and it'll be carbon-free because the home delivery person will take a bicycle to bring you whatever he's bringing you, he, she, it is bringing you. So, I see the use of the term Silicon Valley Party is a serious term, meaning I have not invented this. I believe it was Newsweek two weeks ago, had a two-page, long two-page article about the need, the response, how to understand the defeat of Hillary Clinton in the last elections, the need was to create from California a Silicon Valley Party that would represent the interests of the future as opposed to the past. And I think this is rock-hard-blind. Finally, in the U.S., and as I say, even in Spain, the Great Recession is officially over, but the U.S., as of November 30th last, had an unemployment rate of only 4.9, but those jobs are garbage. There's a beautiful essay from about, what, six, seven years ago by Barbara Ehrenreich, Nicholden Dime, she goes and works in different kinds of appliance stores and fast food chains and tries to chronicle the life of the people who are working there, and they are literally, as the expression goes, nickled and dimed to death. There is no way that one can survive on what one earns. What reactions will there be to this? I think that there will be. I agree with Dylan and Patty Smith a few days ago at the Nobel Prize, meaning she got very nervous and she missed her cues, but there was, this is, by the way, a New York, the back photograph is one single photograph. It's a New York subway station that has become a reference point. Last week, these photographs sent to me by a friend, more correctly, sent by a friend in New York to a friend of mine in Barcelona who passed them to me, and I love that one that says, just go, which truthfully is how I feel about the whole thing. I agree that that's not realistic. So, you know, I won't argue that point, but it's simply how I feel. I don't know what reactions. We're supposing that there won't be any reaction. Truthfully, the process of establishing the cabinet that Trump has selected is picking up a very characteristic kind of anti-elite loser, people who have lost in turf wars in the last years, and are really representative of nothing in particular. So, I don't know what's going to happen, and I think it's very easy to assume that nothing is going to happen. I think it's also too easy to assume that this will go authoritarian. We don't know what will happen with the whole of the Republican Party. We don't know what response will come from the institutions. Certainly, the institutions are playing American politics, and that's why I cited Comey, in ways, Comey and the FBI, in ways that were absolutely unimaginable in the past. So, ways that we could call third world, European, old world, this is a change. So, you don't know what can happen, because American discussion is always based on what Americans did. Of course, those examples I used from the 19th century, the beginning of my PowerPoint, are examples that are discussing United States, which has no physical relation to what the United States is now. Point, Trump only won, no mandate, but he will claim won anyway, and this will have consequences. He's acting like he is in charge, he is in charge, whoop, ignoring Obama's lame duck presidential end, and this, if I looked up lame duck on the line and I found, I don't know, 30 pages of imagery, and I borrowed these two from Daffy Duck, in which Daffy is offering his crutches to Obama, and in which Elmer Fudd, representing white America, is there with a shotgun ready to blast away. And then, simply summing up, this is a radically new situation, it is extremely unpredictable, more unpredictable, I think, than the European one, I think Fernando Guidao has made, in relation to the image of the election, and which was very neatly presented by Joan Paul Rubies, Fernando Guidao was making a cause for rational analysis and rationally analytic actors. I am not at all sure that Trump is a rational actor. And I have tried to state examples of why I think this. And with that, I'm over and out. Thank you so very much to the three panelists, well, the five panelists. I think we, because I have a lot of questions in regards to Trump, but I think it's better if we try to open it up to the Brexit case. So, for what I've seen, and I'm sure you all agree with it, or not, the voter in favor of Brexit is quite similar, the profile, to the voter of Trump, which means that there are some concerns that are being expressed politically, like both Trump and Brexit represent a sort of an alternative, so maybe we could reflect a little bit about that. And then in both cases, there's also clearly division. So, we have the cover of the Time Magazine, thanks. Here, and we can see here, Trump portrayed as the president of the divided states of the United States, sorry, the president of the United States of America. And of course, in Great Britain, we also have a society somewhat divided now. So, do you think there's going to be a reunion, a process of reunion? How can that be done? Will it be successful? Of course, we don't know, we can only speculate. So maybe we can reflect upon a little bit about these two things. Or you can respond to each other's presentation. I'm going to take the chair for a moment and I'm going to answer you right away. I say, ask Chris Christie, who was the head of Trump's transition, except that he was a personal enemy of Jared Kushner, of Trump's son-in-law, husband of Ivanka, and because he put as attorney general, as attorney district attorney in New Jersey, put in jail Kushner's father for corruption. And Kushner went out of his way to have him dumped. And now, who's running it now? They've had to redo everything, they had to go to take all the papers, very Spanish situation, take all the papers to the White House with Chris Christie, he had it all set up. And then five days later, Christie was out and somebody else, a Trump loyalist, was in. No, Pence, Pence, the VP. No, the head of the Republican National Committee. The head of the RNC, I can't remember. But first Kushner was in. First it was Kushner himself, the son-in-law. And then it was Christie, and then Christie was shiv-ed. By Pribus, right. Pribus, yeah. Yeah, I would like to follow on the last point that you made about the unpredictability of Trump, because that is, I think that is exactly the problem. I had a conversation with a colleague from Harvard and Oxford three weeks ago, where we commiserated and asked each other the question, what is worse, Brexit or Trump? I'm sure you all have had that conversation with a friend in the last few weeks. And she was being an American professor, convinced that Trump was worse. But then she said, but of course what I can see is that at least you can, we can reverse it. In a few years time we can vote for someone else. It's not going to last as long as Brexit. And I said, yeah, you are right there. You can reverse it quicker because it will take a long time for the whole Brexit catastrophe to be unpicked. I mean, the best case scenario is the one that Fernando was describing, that we slow it down, then it becomes a soft Brexit, and then just from now perhaps you can rethink about it. But the question is, how much damage can Trump do in the next four years in foreign policy in particular? I think he can do other damage to the U.S., but I think that can be reversed. But the damage in foreign policy may not be so easy to reverse. That is my real concern. I don't know, I can't predict the future, obviously, but I do think there's a... I'm very concerned about both the negative repercussions on the international scene and internally, internally because even though there were so many Republicans that were against Trump and came out against him, opposed him, et cetera, we still have a situation where the Republicans control the House and the Senate and the Congress. We have... There's certainly going to be positions in the Supreme Court that will have to be filled during the period when Trump is in office because they've categorically refused to even consider any of the people that Obama had proposed earlier. So there's a lot of potential. It remains to be seen what the Republicans will actually do when they have this other vote that's coming up. And whether they will actually all vote and ratify all of the appointees that Trump has named that has to go through a process. But I don't know how inclined I am to think that they might, you know, when push comes to shove, I'm really not sure how much resistance there will be. That's the thing that concerns me. And then on the international scene, I think what really is very worrying is, well, it goes back to what you were saying about him being more or less a psychopath. I couldn't help but remember interviews that came out. There was a... I don't remember his name, but one of the things that put Trump, it made Trump famous several decades ago, was this book, this sort of supposed autobiography, The Art of the Deal. And... Harry Schwartz, I think, Harry Schwartz. Is that it? Okay, so he came out, the ghost writer, the person who really wrote the book, came out and said, well, he just couldn't stand it anymore. He had to come clean and speak about what Trump really was like. And he basically, you know, a lot of the things that were in the list of what constitutes a psychopath, were on his list, except for where it said, I don't know, it said one other thing, and he used ADD, somebody who has attention deficit syndrome, who's just always onto the next thing has, you know. So somebody like that, I don't know. I mean, even though it's true, he's not an island and he can't make up foreign policy on his own, et cetera. But I think I'm still inclined to think that he's in a position where he's able to do a lot more harm than good, and I'm not really sure the extent to which somebody like himself can actually be tamed, you know, by the institutions. You know, he's somebody who's so apt to sort of just go beyond, you know, the rules don't apply to me, et cetera. So, you know, I think he's going to put the United States institutions and all the checks and balances and all of that to the limits. So we'll just have to see. Yeah, I'd like to answer that question. I guess I don't think Trump's really a psychopath and I do think probably it will be undone in four years because I just, as I said earlier, I just don't think that the economic promises he made to these key states will prove true. I think inequality will continue to increase despite economic growth and that these very key states, particularly Pennsylvania and Michigan will switch back in Florida and Arizona may come along as well. But in any case, so I don't think, I think it can be undone. Havoc said that, I'm also fearful of what can happen in four years. I think that what can happen in four years? Trump can immediately forge an agreement with the House Majority Leader Paul Ryan to redo Medicare and Medicaid and deny healthcare to most of the elderly in the United States or to roll back healthcare of elderly in the United States. Right before, during the Obama administration, the state police were being used in many southern states to implement federal law by deporting people and using immigration law that was proved to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court with the change in the Supreme Court that could be changed and state police in southern states could be mobilized to not only state police but even cashier registers in supermarkets could be asking for IDs and asking illegal immigrants and reporting on illegal immigrants and having them deported. So, it obviously depends who you are. If you're sitting in Massachusetts, the United States is a federal country in which states have much more autonomy and political responsibility and say the autonomous communities here in Spain. So if you're sitting in Massachusetts in New Hampshire, Maine or California and Northern California and Oregon and Seattle, probably nothing's really to be worried about in four years it can be done. But if you're a legal immigrant or even suspected of being a legal immigrant in the southern states, it could be extremely disadvantageous. If in four years he succeeds in renegotiating NAFTA and putting up walls and, in fact, starting a domino effect of trade wars in the whole world, they could have massive effects. I'm sure the annulling to Trans-Pacific Partnership isn't very big. But I think in four years he can do lots of damage. I think in four years he will do lots of damage. I think despite not being a psychopath, he will react in ways that probably will look for scapegoats and to blame his losses on his inability to put through his program on probably minorities. And it could be pretty ugly for four years. But I do think it will be reversed. That's what they said in 1933, 34, about Hitler. We can trust Gering, he's a very reasonable man. The Office of Chancellor will calm him down. It will force that the needs of German society and of the German state will force Hitler into a rational policy in Europe and into rational policy goals. It didn't work out that way. So, I'm not that sanguine. There are too many things here to discuss, so I will leave all the space to the audience. So we are opening the floor for questions. Nice. Hello, my name is Daniela and I'm a student here at Universitat Pompeu Favre. I must say that I have a huge problem with divisions of Uth-Shalai or Gell-Jones. Because, if I have to put an example before, We heard the conference of Girao and Robies, and Fernando Girao, for example, explained me very well, and I think to all the audience, why the things happen. What are the causes of the Brexit, for example? And listening to Gail Jones, I have the impression that she thinks that all the American people that vote for Trump, and indeed the reason of Trump's victory, is because people is stupid, is because people is racist, is because people is misogynistic, and so on. I agree with the conclusions of Uselai, that we have to wait and we don't know what will come out of Trump's presidency. But all this stuff about relating Trump to fascism, to Hitler, to Nazism, and all this stuff I think is completely out of touch. I would like to know why so many people vote for Trump, why so many polls didn't come out as they had to come out. So, Hillary's victory, I want to know which are the real reasons. A person who is like Donald Trump, that I agree that is completely disgusting, now is ruining United States of America. I don't think that the profound causes and the profound things behind his winning are the racist messages and all this stuff. So my question to you is, is there, if you consider yourself liberal, progressive, like for example I consider myself, is there some critic to the previous years in American politics. Is there some critic from our ideology to do, to understand why this man is in charge now without saying that the people is manipulated by the media to say that the social media is all. I would like to know this. I get the impression that maybe you didn't listen to my talk. Because in the very beginning I gave you 8 reasons why I thought that he won. And those reasons were not only racism, racism was only one of the reasons that I mentioned. I mentioned a number of other factors, some of them that had to do with these economic problems that all of us have been mentioning. Others that had to do with Hillary's own failings, in her campaign strategy. Others that had to do with misoginist attitudes and handling, which not only myself but my other two colleagues mentioned as well. So, you know, I will just simply say that. No, that I've already, I think, responded to those questions, to those issues. And I never said, of course, that or implied that people are just stupid or they're just racist. Right? There's a lot of other issues that are at play. Also I should mention that the reflections that I was mentioning are not simply my own opinion that I've just thought up. And maybe you're thinking, maybe you're sitting there thinking, oh, she's a woman. Oh, she's African American. And so therefore she's thinking that way. I'm getting my information from people that I have consulted with. People who are, for example, members of various Muslim American associations, members of various other ethnic minority associations. And so I'm simply reflecting their perceptions and quoting actual facts and data by the FBI. So therefore it's not just my perceptions. All right? I was making two points. One is that I think that this is a changing point. It's a chronological changing point. And that the personality factor is qualitatively significant. Clearly the office of presidency can be limiting to the personality of the president. But the key remains to be seen, as of the 20th of January of next year, to what extent the Republican Party will back this up or not. As to why Trump was elected in the first place, part of it has to do with the nature of the electoral system in the United States, which means that a popular vote is not what counts. It counts by districts. It counts by states. And it's a winner-take-all for an electoral college. So it's a double system. And it was designed that way in the 18th century so that it would not have produced mob tyranny but have a cooling effect on resolution. I, com a president, I think there is considerable discussion about whether this should be changed or not now, in part, as a result of the elections. But, of course, as Guidao said earlier, this kind of discussion is very loaded. That is to say the people who lose, that is to say Democrats, tend to say that the electoral college should be eliminated, the people who win, Republicans, say that it shouldn't. The control by the Republicans of the House of Representatives and the Senate. And what they will do with that control. Whether that control will be at Trump's service or whether that control will block Trump's initiatives. This is what I think Linda Jones and I were particularly stressing. That said, what, in, as, how did the elections come about? I tried to indicate my criteria, which is that I think that there is a long-term structural change in the social dynamics of western economies. I think that this affects working class, untutored, uneducated sectors, done only secondary education or even less, and who therefore have very cheap jobs, which are now getting cheaper. And so there is a social problem throughout Europe and North America and parts of South America, or industrial urbanized parts, in which this is visible. But that this also is affecting educated elites, intelligentsia, which to some extent implies everybody in this room, and that these sectors are being equally wiped out and that there is a confrontation, as it were, between the poorer sectors and the intellectual sectors, which I think has a lot to do with why Trump won and against whom the slogans he was using were directed and why Hillary Clinton lost and why she was perceived as cold, elitist, distant, while Trump, being really very emotive and incoherent, was perceived as warm, close, and direct. There is another factor, which has not been discussed by anyone here, except myself, perhaps, and only glancingly, which is that when I was speaking of change and parasitism, I mentioned that you go from press to TV to social media. The Trump message, i Gidal mentioned that things are a tweet away. Trump works, he just tweets things, just emotional reactions usually. Now you can discuss whether these are calculated emotional reactions or whether they are gut emotional reactions. But it's clear that Trump dominates both TV as a reality show style and is capable of transforming that reality show style into a substitute for traditional political organization. He has no party, he has followers, but those followers are really fans, and they respond like fans. And what he's substituting party organization with, something Linda Jones was talking about, getting out the vote, is simply mass use of Twitter, Facebook, etc., which are mechanisms, which at this point a lot of people use to get information, a lot of people who do not read print culture, who barely even watch TV anymore and just live off of what exists in social media. And what exists in social media is unchecked in all the senses of the word. It's uncontrolled and it's unverified. Consequently, it spreads a lot of messages, that's why I cited the case of Pizzagate and how this goes to the heart. Ryan Jr. had to be fired for Pizzagate last week because he continued to say after the attack, the Sunday before last, he continued to say that the pedophile abortion network working out of the pizzeria was still there and that Hillary was running it, which is, you know, this is too true in Belgium taken to the nth degree of fantasy life, but there's no control on that. And this is a new medium and this style of reality show politics that doesn't even have the limits and controls of television, but is working absolutely, as I say unchecked in all the senses, is a qualitative change. So you have something, someone who is working through methods that no one understands or controls, which have a clear age orientation, that is to say, younger people understand them, older people don't. And Trump is able to deal with this and is able to deal with this in an extremely thick skin, this is paradoxical, he's very thin skin, but he's able to use this in a very effective way. When I use thin skin, thick skin, I'll show you what I mean. I'll give you an image from the PowerPoint, some images from the PowerPoint I was going to develop. Okay? See, I'm getting here, there I'm going. Okay. I was talking about this, you're talking about someone, they were talking about slogans, I was talking about what his characteristic that he says, and he has two key phrases, one from the apprentice, which is you're fired, and the other one is it's a disaster. He never actually explains why anything is a disaster. When he was suggesting last week Ben Carson for health education and welfare, he started talking about the National Institute of Health, and he says everybody knows, it's a disaster. No check, no control, no explanation, it's a disaster. That's it. So you're talking about a kind of presentation which is extremely shallow, but very attractive, and this is a new radical epistemology, there's no truth in advertising, it's just what cells goes, and to give you a shocking, what cells, you know, naked intimacy, that's her, she doesn't care. So that's a kind of projection, thin skin, thick skin. That's a kind of projection that's very difficult to manage, and indicates the capacity for attraction and the lack of internal restraints that exist in the Trump camp itself, in the Trump family, as Trump defines it, without Marla Maples, without Marla Maples daughter, but without Ivana, though Ivana gives her blessing from the outside, but with the children, who are in principle going to inherit, who are going to run, as a quote-unquote blind trust, all the Trump interests, which is very difficult. So what happens? Does Congress, as the representative said it, challenge the Trump trust mechanisms? What happens with all the international deals that Trump has engaged in? How does one control those? How do those affect international policy? These are all very serious problems and are very hard to deal with. I don't know if I had any... I went the wrong way, sorry, sorry, sorry. So it was in this sense that I was speaking of Hitlerism, which is that there is the discourse that it's all reasonable that this has been a necessary demagogra to win the elections, but that these people will turn reasonable. You can work with them. And I'm not sure. I think that this morning a very clear case was made for how appalling the Brexit experience could be, but at the same time, how one could make a very rational interpretation of Theresa May as a rational player, on a slow, on a short-term and long-term basis. I find it very unlikely personally, though it may indeed happen, that this can be done with Trump, but the loose ends are enormous. I hope that serves to answer your questions. Thank you very much for the interventions. I think the political and media establishment cannot complain the people who voted Brexit or Trump of being stupid because the political stupidness is a consequence of the neoliberalism. Versus the neoliberalism and the populism, it's necessary more republicanism. So my question is, starting from a logic, political fact, in which we have to say we cannot tolerate how can we recognize U.K. and U.S. populisms as a legitimate political actors to build among all a minimum commonwealth or republic. I el que em sembla a la pregunta és si hi ha una altra pregunta. La legitimitat de la part política és no en qüestió. La legitimitat de Nigel Farage o la UQP és no en qüestió. La legitimitat de la votació és no en qüestió. La qüestió és una altra. La qüestió és una altra. Que la qüestió no et digui que el principal argument per Brexit és que el que guanyarà es vota per Brexit no és que es voti per Brexit. La qüestió és un argument racional i la populismària de l'emoció, l'emoció, la manipulació, l'aigua, i el punt que vaig fer en el meu talk, que m'agradaria insistir-ne, l'aigua de la media és crucial. Si t'he dit que per 30 anys que Europa és la sota dels teus problemes, quan tens una oportunitat de votar, la mesura subliminal és d'aquí. Tu votaràs contra si no ets particularment ben educat o ben connectat. I això ho ha passat. No, no, no, no és estúpid. No tenen tots els elements de jutge. Sí, sí, ho desagradaria. Ho desagradaria. No crec que ho hauríem de mirar. Realment, és per què les persones, per què la majoria de les nostres ciutadans no han de defensar el que veiem que hauríem de defensar. Per què no han de defensar aquest sort del sistema que pensem que hauríem de tenir per què la majoria de votants no han de defensar aquests valors que pensem que hauríem de ser els nostres valors. A més de mirar a les persones votant per Trump, perquè, de totes dues, el que l'Àfrica ha dit a nosaltres que, aleshores, han estat a les Estats Units. Per què? They have all the time been there. Now, what we have is because of Trump, because of all these discourse, we are just putting all them on surface. We pay much more attention to all these issues. Unfortunately, this is where they are. Unfortunately, Trump has gotten even less votes than Romney. He is president of the United States, but even less votes. So the problem here is not the whole those who voted Trump. The problem here is those who did not vote for Clinton. Why millions of people, a state at home? When you have that guy with the possibility of becoming president of the United States, how people did not feel concerned. That is the problem. So the answer to that, what I'm to say now, is because Malaise is wide-ended. And we don't want to face that reality. We tend to think that cannot be possible. It is possible. There is a big drunk of our populations, which are angry, fed up. And they just want an excuse just to kick some butt. Just put them to vote anything. They will just try to do damage. Why do we have so much people angry and willing to damage, even themselves, even themselves? Why do we have that? This is my obsession. Why do we have that? How can we reduce that? The problem is basically that for 25 years, I'm not kidding, I'm not talking 2 weekends, 2 years, I'm talking about 25 years, we have not been paying attention to that people. They were the losers, they deserved it. We have not been applying the kind of policies that we have been applying in the 1950s and the 1960s and the 1970s in order to address that situation, in order to get what we call allegiance. What we have now is that we have no allegiance to the system. The system is not being supported. The system needs to be rethought. We are not doing that. We are not doing that. So for the future, my expectation is that this is going to grow. It's going to get worse. It's going to get worse. Because we're going to get more people into that sort of situation of anti-anything. You can call it anti-system, anti-globalisation, anti-elite, casta, name it. It's going to be an anti-thing. So what we need is to improve the quality of our democracies. That's what we need. Our democracies are getting into a worse situation and that is being a progressive kind of movement. We have a much worse democracies in the United States and in Europe than we used to have, I don't know how many years ago, because the political system was able to identify... It was able to identify where was the interest of the majority of the people. It was simpler. I'm not simplifying. It was simpler at that point in time because the electoral consistency has been fragmented. It's much more fragmented. It used to be 25 years ago, 30 years ago. But the problem is that the political system is not even trying to do that. It's go there when they have to vote, when there is an election. Oh, they go just frenzy trying to find out what... But the electoral consistency is not well represented. It's not well represented. We are not doing that. We are not witnessing that problem. And we should be doing that. We should be looking not to the people who voted Trump, but those who stayed home and didn't go to vote. I said, no, I'm not concerned about that. Well, I mean, this was six million people. That's six million people voted for Obama and didn't vote for Clinton. And I was thinking, you know, maybe they were thinking, oh, Clinton is not as good as Obama. But boy, but it's an alternative. Trump didn't even feel concerned about that. That's the problem. I couldn't agree more with that. I have no response for it. The only thing I would ever say to people is that any vote that did not go... All of the people who were complaining about Trump and saying they were complaining about him, but at the same time, there was a level of... of a dismissive kind of attitude that, oh, he couldn't possibly win. So... But my feeling always was that the stakes were very high and that basically any vote that was not explicitly given to her was a vote for him. So either through abstention or by voting for one of the other two candidates, that those votes, that actually was going to benefit Trump. That's the way I saw that. What I don't have beyond... I don't have a further explanation beyond the fact that there was a lot of dissatisfaction, a lot of, you know, this affectatio, a lot of people feeling that somebody like Hillary Clinton, who very much represents the system, just wasn't... couldn't represent their interest at that moment. Just a couple things. First, in terms of why they voted for Trump, I think the most convincing article that I read on it was an article that would have been cited widely by George Packer, called Hillary Clinton and the Populist Revolt in the New Yorker, which is a fantastic analysis of these reasons of the Democrats abandoning the white voters in the Rust Belt in particular. And I think it's a very fair article, which does not portray all the Trump voters as racist in any sense of the imagination, but more as victims of, again, rising inequality during a period of rising growth, which is the ultimate problem with these Rust Belt states in particular. So I think that there's a very strong economic nationalist argument, particularly in the Rust Belt, particularly, again, among those counties that I mentioned voted overwhelmingly for Obama, and in my opinion, were not racist in the very least, and ended up voting for Trump for economic nationalist matters. I think that's a very important point, especially in the Rust Belt, and again, a reason why the election could be overturned in four years if Trump, which he will not be able to do, is able to reverse trends on inequality. Secondly, in terms of voting turnout, I'm not convinced by the argument, because voting turnout is very difficult for in the United States elections, because most of the states aren't contested. So for example, in the state where there was most voter turnout, which was Wisconsin, which was 70%, it moved away from Hillary Clinton into Trump. So I don't think that the problem of the Americans, the Democrats, was inability to get to voter turnout. Again, if you look at the Hispanic vote, even though perhaps Hispanics might not have, and we still don't have the figures turned out to the extent or that they might have, actually, to the extent for Hillary Clinton, as they did for Obama, in terms of percentages, there were more Hispanic voters than ever before for demographic reasons. So the voter turnout, it's not clear that the inability of Hillary Clinton to get a strong voter turnout was her downfall, and that if there had been a higher turnout in some key sectors, I mean, obviously, among black populations in Florida, it would have made a difference, but not necessarily in the Rust Belt. So it's a very difficult argument. I think, again, I just tend to be less cataclysmic about this because I don't see a fundamental difference between George W. Bush and Donald Trump. I'm used to the Tea Party, I see them all the time. Although I am, in a short period of time, I am extremely nervous of what could happen, especially with the Cabinet appointments. And Saturday at live this weekend, they just had a spoof on Donald Trump appointing the protagonist of Breaking Bad to head the National Food and Drug Administration. And so his Cabinet appointments, as well as the Supreme Court appointments, as well as a House dominated by Paul Ryan and with large Tea Party alliances, means that they could do a lot of damage in four years. And also, with response to this fact that, well, it can't be for racist and misoginist reasons, well, it can because the voting spreads were so small in such key states, in states like Philadelphia, in states like Pennsylvania and like Michigan, the voting spreads were just a few hundred thousand voters who perhaps didn't want to have a woman in the White House. I don't know until a woman can win in a major European or American country from the political left, I'm not convinced that these small spreads can be affected by misogyny and to some lesser extent racism. And so I think that it's not a question of the whole United States voting in this racist manner but it's a question of very specific population or misoginist matters, very specific population, specific counties. Even going back to Jersey Shore, if Jersey Shore had been part of Pennsylvania, which is essentially what it is since it's a suburb of Philadelphia, then Pennsylvania would have voted Democrat and we would have had a different outcome. So it's still a very divided country, a very closed country. And even in the best of circumstances, without a populist candidate, the spreads in most of the states are roughly what they were today. I mean, there are very few contested states. En fact, there's probably more contested states now than ever. But in general, at least with the last two Bush elections against Kerry and against Gore, the Democratic-Republican states were pretty much stable. Very short. Very short. Just as an indication of local concerns, especially in the central part of the United States, permitt west, that are not discussed at this macro level, but could have an enormous impact on small towns, there's a raging, anelgesic, opiate epidemic in the United States, with products like Oxycodine, which are affecting strongly working-class and lower middle-class voters. Why? Because synthetic opiates were produced by big pharma and pushed through doctors over the last 15 years, approximately. And these are highly addictive analgesics, which create a huge demand, which can't be necessarily fed by continuing with prescription. They're also very expensive, so that many people who are addicted have ended up using heroin as a cheap substitute. And there were several interesting reportages done on this subject around September, October, which were indicating that this was Trump country, that there was the feeling that Trump was going to produce a sense of authority and order that would eliminate these problems and create, bring back what small-town reality had been before these changes. I give this as an example of things that I've not talked about, but which exist and which are major indicators. And then, as a macro point, I would say that when I'm arguing that this, that 2016 is significant, that it isn't just a blip that will be recovered, is because I'm seeing, as of the 1930s, without the same necessarily the same ideological implications, a collapse of the classic left-right polarization. These are votes that do not correspond to a clear left-right angle. The people who are supposed to be supporting the left are voting for the right. Sectors that traditionally support the right are now suddenly panicking and supporting the left. And you see this as a change, you see this as an overall Atlantic change. And it remains to be seen what that will turn into. That is simply, in terms of trying to pick up what both Zhuampao and Fernando were indicating and what we were indicating for the United States, that this kind of standard discourse that, as historians, we're almost irreflexively used to, is perhaps, after 2016, no longer valid. And that the standard left in Europe is in shambles. And that the right is changing. And what does this signify? And we don't really know. Last question from the audience. Oriol, you had a question? Bueno, una cuestión que el Jai que ha posat molt de relleu i que no estic del tot d'acord, aquesta sensació que el Donald Trump té cert que no és gaire diferent del George Bush, jo no estic del tot d'acord en algunes qüestions. I tu mateix has dit algunes coses que semblen contractòries. El final del George Bush va permetre l'entrada en el discurs polític, del dipartit de manera molt forta, i el tipus de discurs que ha fet el Donald Trump no necessàriament la persona del Donald Trump, però el partit republicà pot incorporar moltes d'aquestes propostes, discurs o qualsevol cosa. Ha exemplat el discurs del que un polític pot dir en públic i això pot ser incorporat. I també no estic d'acord amb el Jean-Paul Ruyet de que el Brexit pot ser, diguem-ne, més definitiu que l'entrada en el drama... Bueno, has dit més o menys que és més fàcil de... He dit que és més fàcil de fer for el Trump, que no pas de revertir el Brexit, que és molt diferent. Però el Trump no és només ell, és el discurs que ell ha posat sobre la taula i el fet que, si hagués perdut, haurien sent molt més fàcil, però el fet d'haver guanyat ha legitimat socialment tot allò que es pot fer en públic. Jo crec que el Trump es desacreditarà, la qüestió és el que trigui amb desacreditar-se, i el cos que tingui, això, és molt prèvi. De altra manera, el qüestió que volia tornar és, com ha dit, si la gent vota per una cosa perquè no és necessàriament en els seus millors interessos, perquè sí, estúpida, és que la racionalitat és relativa a la informació i a les pressupostos ideològics, i quan tu us llegis el Daily Mail durant 20 anys, tindràs una informació i uns pressupostos ideològics completament diferents que una persona que està llegint de Gàrdia o el Financial Times, encara estigui vivint al mateix poble. Per tant, aquí estem parlant no de que uns siguin intel·ligents i altres siguin estúpids, sinó que us tenen una informació diferent i una referència ideològica i escoltar-ho de diferents. Última part... És una cosa d'una emoció anglògica que veus a l'esquadra i que es parla amb altres, que és una occurència a la teva comunitat i que ho has just creuat, com a segons d'altres prejudicis. Que parli de pratges emocionals, comunitats emocionals, que regulen aquests sistemes d'emocions emocionals, i que hi ha una manera, en un sentit, d'explaining what Jacob was doing to say that it appears to be that on the map there are certain regions where the racial rationale seems to explain things and there are others where the racial rationale doesn't explain them, which would mean that certain communities have adopted a racial prejudice as a kind of legitimate way of looking at politics and others haven't. But that they have grown into it, ties up again with Rubies, the fact that you have been receiving for 30 years information on the European Union, which is only prejudicial to the European Union, of course gives you the legitimate feeling that your emotion is right. And in that sense, it's just a comment that goes towards saying that the image that we have of Trump's voter is suddenly releasing something that is really there, that is really stored up because of real social pressures. It may, of course, do some of the explaining, but we also have to keep in mind that people are taking in information that becomes a currency in communities and that they are being led on by certain languages, discourses, maybe. It's just a comment. Let me make a comment. It says that the electoral constituencies in the United Kingdom and in the United States are immense, huge. So who knows, who knows why people voted one way or the other individually, even by groups, it's very complicated. That's very complicated. One thing that we know from history is that emotions, emotions determined elections when the material reward behind them is deteriorating rapidly. So here what the problem we have here is a lot of people that is feeling themselves to be losers, to be some sort of sentiment of not being benefited by the system, and then at that point in time they're angry, becomes entangled with many other issues. If it is only a motion, where you have, we say, growth is going on. There is a report since that industrial wages in the United States had resonated for 25 years. What would you vote if your wage for 25 years has resonated while everybody else, from your point of view, is becoming richer, is benefiting from the system? At one point in time there is a point of saturation. There's a point when you say, oh, there's something, it's a click. And that then emotion comes, then you have a candidate telling you exactly what you are feeling. It's just verbalizing what you are feeling. At that point in time, then you become conscious of your own situation. Because you're not really bad. The thing is that you are worse off than all the people, like your neighbors, than all the other... You know, then you just feel angry, and then you vote. I think, am I going to be a historian? You are a historian of motions, therefore you deal with motions I deal with economic reward. And I think it's the deterioration of the economic reward. But can explain, it's a bedrock, upon which all this has happened. I see a little danger in that, in the sense that there will come a time when the Democrats and Labour will consider adopting populist stances in order to seduce the electorate back. And if we say that the anger is there objectively because the economic context for it is absolutely objectively there, which is, of course, I agree with it, I'm coming from Marxism and so on, but if we do that, then we also legitimise populism as a legitimate means to seduce back. No, of course not. And where does it end? I'm sorry, but I'm not saying that. That's you are saying that, I'm not saying that. But I'm saying is that you need to improve the living standard of your entire population. Or you need to get better education. You need to get more equality. You need to... There are many things that you can do. None of them we are doing that. Education is not a priority in any government, whether in the United States or in any European countries. Education is not a priority. Equality is not a priority. So we have problems here. And the problem is that we are not addressing the things that are causing all this malaise. And there is a huge malaise. Believe it or not, there is a huge malaise. And we need to reverse that. And the only way you can do that is basically by populist... populist discourse because what I just said to them is I'm going to solve that quickly, rapidly and painfully. And it's not going to happen like that. So they're going to be discredited. But if the malaise continues to grow, then at that point in time, the amount of people being angry is going to grow. Fascism, fascism... The bad rock of fascism was the economic crisis. Without the economic crisis, there would have not been fascism. Simple as that. I just wanted to very quickly, because I know that we want to have lunch now, but the question about populism and the left is important. The Labour Party is a good example. They don't know what to do. They don't know what to do with UKIP. UKIP is taking them votes. There are many voters in the UK who tell the Labour candidates. I am still a Labour supporter because my grandfather and grandfather were workers and therefore I am part of you. But I'm going to vote UKIP for this election or I'm going to vote Brexit on this referendum because I don't want immigrants. And the question is that the Labour, as trying... is not finding a way of putting together what it believes intellectually and what the voters are asking for. Because they don't believe that actually that your problem is to do just with immigration. And they don't believe that actually taking away rights from workers is a good idea to move around. But at the same time, they've been told that this is what we want. So that's the real difficulty. The right is playing populist cars much more effectively than the left in the UK. Ok. Thank you very much. Ho deixem aquí. Podríem continuar discutint. Cosa que podem fer a fora. Gràcies a tots per venir. Gràcies als 5 participants. Crec que ha sigut un èxit. Bon profit.