 Good morning. Good afternoon. Good evening wherever you may be. My name is Peter Martinez, and I'm the executive director of Secure World Foundation It's my great pleasure to welcome you to this Secure World Foundation webinar on space security Where we will discuss recent developments in multilateral space security discussions and explore what the future might hold Those among us involved in space diplomacy for some time Will know how difficult it has been to make progress on the difficult issue of safe security in Part this has had to do with the fundamentally different approaches to tackling the issue Which in my mind has created a sort of false dichotomy of legally binding versus non-binding approaches that has divided the actors into different camps Each with their strongly held views on the right way to ensure space security and to prevent outer space becoming a domain of conflict At the same time the pace of developments in the global space arena Especially driven by the rapid growth of the commercial space sector in recent years has heightened the sense of urgency To adopt some effective governance measures to ensure the safety security and sustainability of space operations In recent years, we've seen a growing acceptance that a behavioral Norms-based approach offers the possibility to bridge the dichotomy between Voluntary and legally binding approaches by creating fertile ground for developing common understandings of what constitutes Responsible behaviors and for promoting commonly agreed practices of states that could ultimately pave the way for the adoption of legally binding instruments One of the behaviors that has attracted considerable attention in the past couple of years as being legal But undesirable or as some would say lawful but awful is the conduct of direct to send anti-satellite missile tests Which produce copious amounts of debris in space Last December the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 77 slash 41 Calling upon states to commit not to conduct such tests This resolution was passed by a large majority of 155 states with only nine abstentions and nine votes against Since the adoption of that resolution 37 states have made this commitment In today's event, we will discuss recent developments around these topics that I've just mentioned This is a three-part event in the first part We will discuss the recently concluded UN open-ended working group on reducing space threats In the second part we will review the progress made since the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 77 slash 41 and examine the reasons why countries choose to support or oppose this a sad test ban moratorium Lastly we will end the event with the launch of some new secure world foundation products that track these multilateral space security initiatives Those of you who know secure world foundation will know that we've been active participants in various space security Processes and dialogues for over a decade for a long time discussions in multilateral for where essentially deadlocked But over the past few years we've seen a number of promising new developments There are now new approaches to discussing the problem and there are now also many more countries actively engaging in space security Dialogues for this reason we at secure world have decided to establish a new high-level portfolio on space security and stability And today I'm happy to announce that this new portfolio will be led by Victoria samson who has been with the foundation Inception and now over 25 years of experience in military space and security issues Before diving into the program I would like to take this opportunity to thank the secure world team for putting together this event And our expert speakers who are participating today Thank you also to you the audience for joining us. We look forward to your engagement in the discussions It's now my pleasure to call upon victoria to open and moderate our first panel victoria. The floor is yours Thank you peter. Hello everyone. My name is victoria samson with the secure world foundation And I'm delighted to be here To speak with a fantastic panel about the recent un open-ended working group on space threats Love seeing all the hellos in the comments. It's great to see so many friends in the audience and Looking forward to having a really good conversation with everyone I will point out that if you need closed captioning A link has been posted in the chat to our youtube channel And as well, we will be taking questions from the audience through our comment section here On the streaming platform of streamyard So with that again, we're going to be having a quick panel recapping the un open working group on reducing space threats I will point out that it met over the past two years It met four times meeting for a may 2022 to august of this year And it had widespread participation from more than 70 countries Secure world foundation was able to participate as a civil society observer Thanks to the decision of the helmet logos the working group's terror to be as inclusive as possible And I think we'll go into some detail on this But while the group was unable to reach consensus in the final report I would argue this open-ended working group was a success um It socialized the idea of focusing on behavior as an approach for this space security of medic options It brought many more countries into the discussion and popularized the role of non legally binding instruments as one tool In an overall toolkit that can bulwark space security And for many countries it demonstrated the value of participating in these discussions and putting legitimate proposals on the table So with that I would love to introduce our panelists going in Or at alphabetic order We have Alma Dana Ascarate Ortega who is a space security researcher at the united nations institute for disarmament research Reunitier She has published widely and brief you and member states on topics of space security law and policy And has presented her research in multiple fora She has led unidire's participation in the you and open-ended working group on reducing space threats through norms rules and principles of responsible behavior Established pursuant to the un general assembly resolution 76 slash 231 Prior to joining unidire Alma Dana was a research assistant at george john university law center where she is currently a doctoral candidate She holds an llm and national security law from the same institution She received an alibi from the university of navarra, spain Claudio Lopudino is Is in the ministry of foreign affairs of brazil Claudio has been a career diplomat at the brazillian foreign service since 2003 He is the former deputy coordinator general for defense affairs at the brazillian ministry foreign affairs from 2013 to 2015 He has also served at the delegation of brazil in the united nations the ia ea Guatemala and Haiti Claudio is currently serving as the head of disarmament and sensitive technologies division At the ministry of foreign affairs. He holds ba and ma degrees in international relations from the university of brazilia And last we have dr. Jessica west who leads research to advance peace and security And outer space through an humanitarian focus on space for all and benefits to people on the planet As part of this work. She interacts regularly with key united nations bodies tasked with space security and space safety issues Related research interests include approaches to peace and disarmament Rooted in humanitarian protection and feminist perspectives As well as the impact of new technologies on space security such as cyber connectivity and artificial intelligence Jessica holds a phd in global governance from the balsali school of international affairs She currently holds roles as a research fellow at the kindred credit union center for peace advancement And as a senior fellow at the center for international governance innovation or city So with that I'd like to start off with them just a few brief opening remarks meet your panelists. I'm almedina You've got the floor Thank you very much victoria for the introduction and thank you so much To secure world for having me here. It's such a pleasure to be here with you All and to be sharing this panel with such wonderful co-panelists um, so uh, since I am the one to start today, uh, I like to provide some context into The oeg and how it came to be um So as peter already said in his opening remarks, we've been talking about space security for a very long time um, this is not a new topic, uh, and Despite the fact that uh, you and member states have been trying to come up with mechanisms to address space security concerns for many many years They've done so with limited success and the reason for this I would say is twofold on the one hand there is a disagreement on what to ban and um the outspace treaty for example Bans the stationing installation or placement of weapons of mass destruction in space But it doesn't really say anything about conventional weapon so and Also states have struggled to to determine whether or not defining what a space weapon is um, so This inability to to agree on what's capabilities to ban has been a problem We've been shifting towards uh, as victorian peter already mentioned to a behavioral approach Which I think combines with this traditional arms control Um approach that focuses more on capabilities could be a good recipe for for success in the future looking at capabilities as important But looking at how those capabilities are used how states behave when they employ those capabilities is important as well um, so this is a new uh development that's conversations surrounding the Open ended working group uh broad Then there is a disagreement on how to ban or how to mitigate space security threats And as pizza mentioned, this is kind of a false dichotomy. We've um, and when I say we I don't mean me I mean the states um, they they have traditionally seen The legally binding approach and the non legally binding approach as incompatible But uh, the reality is that and peter already mentioned this is that this is this is false They are actually really closely interrelated and highly complementary and mutually reinforcing And again, I I believe that discussions throughout the work of the owd have served to highlight this. We've had states from across um, uh, the whole geopolitical spectrum Saying that these different mechanisms can support one another and they can be negotiated At the same time without having to be seen as mutually exclusive or incompatible Um, and I believe that the clearest evidence that we see of this is the outer space treaty itself um We have to remember that the outer space treaty came to be um in great part due to the fact that um Right before it was negotiated and enacted to un general assembly resolutions Um were negotiated by member states and those two un General assembly resolutions essentially contained the principles that eventually were were to become the What we know today as the outer space treaty So moving on to the owd itself um, the the mandate of the owd Had four masses to four states to another stakeholders to address Firstly, it was to take stock of existing international legal and other normative frameworks concerning threats erasing from state behaviors With respect to space that was addressed in the first session In the second session, uh, the group considered current and future threats by states to space systems and actions activities and emissions That could be considered irresponsible um Then during the third session, uh, we the group started to talk about recommendations and possible norms rules and principles Are responsible behaviors relating to threats by states to space systems Including as appropriate how they would contribute to the negotiation of a legally binding instrument Including on the prevention of an arm choice in outer space and during the fourth session These negotiations were continued and um, the group tried to draft a report and agree on our reports that eventually would be presented to the General assembly unfortunately the group was unable to reach the necessary consensus to um to To agree on this report and and eventually be able to present to the general assembly as was the mandate But I don't think that the failure to reach this report Was a failure of the work of the group as victoria mentioned. I think the discussions that were had in the group were actually highly successful um, I think the mandate itself of this owd Already showcases Step forward in the way that states have been thinking about space security Because it really includes these two approaches that, uh, peter called a false dichotomy Of incompatibility the legally binding approach and the non-legally binding approach are contained together Um in this mandate therefore being shown being shown as very much compatible Even though we didn't have a report. I do want to highlight that um um The chair published a summary under his own authority and responsibility And this summary is available in the owd's website and I would encourage everyone who's interested to check it out it um Provided several recommendations which were to be the recommendations of the group If the group had reached the necessary consensus, but even if it's not an official report of the group I think uh, these recommendations do provide a useful basis for future negotiate negotiations on space security There were nine recommendations in total, uh, and they can be further grouped into three Three groups or Uh, categories. So the first group focuses on avoiding the weaponization of our space So these are recommendations on avoiding the damage or the destruction of space objects Or the use of space objects as weapons Through kinetic means like for example the tests that were mentioned at the beginning of this seminar um that course space debris This counts space capabilities um And essentially any type of activity that can cause An interference with the normal and safe operation of space objects The second group or cluster of recommendations was focused on protecting Out of space Through the compliance with existing legal obligations I think that one trap that states them to fall into when they Sit down to negotiate new mechanisms or new measures for space security is that they try to reinvent the wheel and the during during the conversations at the area and in this test summary as well We are all reminded that this is not necessary that we already have a robust body of international law That we can rely on uh when when attempting to negotiate new measures And it's important that we take advantage of that because reaching common understanding Based on already agreed principles is much easier than reaching common understanding from scratch And then uh last but not least uh, the the last block The third block of recommendations was focused on transparency This again is not a new idea We had a gd into In 2013 and also another gd in 1993 which heavily focused on transparency and competence building measures um and These recommendations in the chair summary kind of echo the sentiments of those reports From those gds um, so um these recommendations focus on sharing military space policies doctrines and strategies Notifying certain activities in space like maneuvers Between orbits the close approaches, etc. And also notifications of defense and security exercises so again To conclude This initial intervention. I'd like to say that as victoria mentioned even though the the This group didn't end up agreeing on our consensus reports This is not a failure. I think the the The work of the group uh, the process was highly successful in bringing states closer together in highlighting the complementarity of different initiatives and different processes um and instruments um and also lending clarity to what needs to be done um what states need to work uh more on for net for processes that we will be having in the future Like the upcoming gd on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms racing outer space Which is set to start this november. So I will leave it at that and I look forward to The interventions by the other speakers as well as the question and answer segment of this webinar. Thank you very much Thank you very much. Elma Dana. Um, I will point out in the comments section My secure world colleagues. I very graciously put the link both to the open end working group homepage So you can curious everything in the history of learning about the chair You can read more there and then they also included a link directly to the chair summary that almanita brought up So you read it straight from the original source there in addition to almanita's excellent summary so with that I'd like to go to one of the very strong and um A pervasive participants in the open end working group claudio claudio Can you give us some comments of your thoughts of how things went and where do you see things going from here? Um, thank you. Thank you very much. Victoria. I hope you hear me. Well, um, it is my pleasure to be here and I appreciate secure secure world foundation for the invitation especially for me to take part in this distinguished panel with Uh experts that I greatly admire Uh, I will just try to build on what uh, almodena has said about the the breadth of the discussions that took place At the oa wg. I won't repeat it. I'll just focus on uh, what the value what the worth of that exercise was from our From my perspective as a representative of a state state party Uh, and of course some ideas on how uh, this discussions should be carried forward To begin with I agree with almodena that uh, the ua wg has been an extremely useful exercise Even though it was not able to agree to a final report. So we believe I believe that With groundbreaking, especially in the sense that it was The first occasion in which all member states came together to discuss matters of space security in a results oriented framework One of the major takeaways that we have from the oa wg was that it's served as a demonstration a very powerful demonstration that space security is not just an issue for major spacefaring nations I think it represented the peace the conscience and awakening of awareness about the fact that all states have a stake in maintaining space security And also that developing states are particularly vulnerable Uh, I'd like to recall an african proverb that I heard many years ago When elephants fight it is the grass that gets trampled and I think that this Represents the reality here as well Uh, so it's not by accident that we now have renewed interest in this issue space security and coming from all quarters. Many regions are engaged and participated actively in this discussion And I was a learning opportunity as well for not just for those that are Beginning to involve getting involved in this but also even for spacefaring nations So we had a number of very productive discussions especially about the Relevance and the limitations of the current legal framework and about how the existing legal principles can and should be further developed And above all about the current and emerging space threats knowledge dimensions earth to space Space to earth and space to space However, the OEWG could not translate its discussions into tangible recommendations due to the fact that consensus was blocked this was very disappointing And it mirrored the experience of the 2019 gg on paris, which was chaired by brazil by ambassador agila empatriota Whose draft report met the same fate We believe that both of these results demonstrated there is a profound deficit of trust between major actors in the space domain And it also demonstrated that we are still trapped on a circular debate as to what aspects of paris of space security should take precedence One error where this descent is particularly strong is the issue of whether there is an opposition between pursuit Of non-binding norms and the objective of legally binding instrumental paris On this issue my country brazil continues to be very attached to the objective of legally binding instrumental paris our support to the oewe g And its objective of developing voluntary norms of behavior of states in outer space derives from the understanding That this option represents a viable alternative that will serve the as a basis for future negotiations of legally binding instrumental paris Um, another issue of contention is what sort of space threats should be addressed as a as a matter of precedence Particularly prominent breach is the one between states that emphasize The need and prevention of placement of weapons in outer space while others advocate for focus on anti-satellite weapons asap weapons On this there's not a lot that is new. We have been locked on this very stalemate for more than 40 years Like to recall that in 1981 The first two unga resolutions on the issue of paris That were adopted were already competing resolutions each was stable by either side of the cold war divide and they already demonstrated this This opposition one resolution called for the prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space While other the other resolution called for the prohibition of asap systems And the same competing priorities are very much present today How can we reconcile those priorities? I think that the the first order of business is that we avoid Repeating the same points that have been made in the past 45 years We need new approaches and fresh thinking and the second order in the business is that we need A holistic approach one that takes into account the security concerns of all states We believe that initiatives that focus on specific issues such as for example the proposal by russia 2014 On a non binding moratorium on the non first placements and the more recent proposal by the us on a moratorium on A direct ascent anti satellite weapons. They are very helpful They cannot aspire to be comprehensive answers to the challenges of outer space security But they do contribute to creating a basis of understanding and an environment of trust More importantly, we need to have a common understanding on how to stack tackle space security and Paris as a whole Otherwise, we will not be able to break out of the circular debate about whose priorities should come first To this end we have to bear in mind that outer space security is not detached from security considerations in other domains Out of space security is intrinsically connected not only to conventional war fighting on earth But also is a key element of nuclear deterrence strategies We cannot consider these these space issues on a vacuum because you know, even though space is in a vacuum It is not in security framework terms The upcoming gg on paris of which i am proud to be a member has an extremely important role to play in this regard And we hope that the failure Of the past oe wg and of the last gg on paris will not cast a shadow on it But instead that their experience will Highlight the need for concrete advances and for compromise, which has been very lacking in this domain Notwithstanding the the fact that the gg has this very important role to play We need to continue open and inclusive discussions on space security This has been widely recognized at the end of the last oe wg But we are very concerned about how the discussions on this issue on how to take this Uh debate further are going on at the unga first committee, which is happening as we speak And there we have two competing resolutions that aim at creating separate oe wgs each with different mandates Different time frames and different expected and results one proposed by the uk and another one proposed by russia Brazil and other countries many other countries have consistently called on both men holders To try to bridge their differences and offer us the un membership one clear path ahead Avoiding redundancies and conflicting mandates. This would pose serious problems for progress in this field however Voting on the first committee draft resolutions is bound to begin tomorrow So the chances of our last minute deal are very scant to say the least We continue to believe brazil that there is no opposition between the normative approach and the legal inviting approach But unfortunately There are quite a few countries who still fear that this normative non binding approach is a diversionary tactic And given how we discussions on this matter have Unfolded in the past 45 years. These are not concerns that can be Wished away or be called as unwarranted. So what we need in our view is for states to take A leap of faith for the states that have been resistant to the idea Of discussions on an lbi on paris to take a leap of faith and to affirm their willingness to consider Concrete steps towards that and I think this would make a tremendous difference on how these discussions move forward especially now That we have a multiple multiple avenues for this discussions to Take place. I think it's going to be a particular challenge to be to ensure that they occur in a mutually reinforcing and compatible way, but brazil is ready to play that part As to the best of our abilities. Thank you very much. Once again, look forward to discussions here and to hearing Jessica's observations about about our work. Thank you very much Thank you, claudia. We're claudia really appreciated that overview of how Your country and your ministry approached these discussions and we too hope that there will be some ways to find Complementarity and ways to work forward on this issue. So there are not competing processes, but mutually reinforcing processes And with that finally, I'd like to have a turn over to the mic to Jessica west My fellow civil society observer We spent quite a lot of time sitting next to each other Impairing notes during the opening working group and I'd love to hear her perspective of how things went and where does she see the process Going ahead in the future. Jessica Yeah, I like victoria. I was privileged to be able to be in the room and My own takeaway from the discussions is that while we did not Have good vibes only I think that the quality of the discussion at the open-ended working group was unprecedented We have never had an open discussion that allowed that kind of breadth of consideration For security threats in outer space before We have never discussed all of the tools of space security governance in one forum We've never had that level of inclusive discussion that included I think the report mentions more than 70 states as well as non-state actors And we've never seen the quality of cross regional cooperation that emerged throughout the discussion In fact, I think it's because it was so successful that we now have these Parallel proposals for open-ended working groups that claudio mentioned um And I think when you when you put the quality and the openness of this discussion Together what I see emerging from it is a real maturation of the debate on space security in ways that I don't think any Processor forum has been able to achieve in the last 40 years Um, and I think the maturation is reflected in the fact that we're now aware that there is so much space Between the stale dichotomies that peter madonna and claudio refer to and it's this space between Between the polls that I think can help move us forward So as claudio mentioned, I think peros is no longer seen only as a debate between states with major military capabilities um And then leaving those without on the sidelines clearly this is an issue that involves everyone And that the effects of that realization extend far beyond just the open-ended working group I think it's the fact that we see a growing number of states joining the moratorium on destructive any satellite testing countries like canada and costa rica that have No capabilities for this but understand that their voices matter on these issues um We now see that peros is not just a debate between weapons in space and anti satellite weapons States brought to the table a wide range of capabilities and activities that they perceive as threatening This includes non-kinetic capabilities such as cyber interference particularly with civilian services and command and control systems for strategic weapons They raised intentional destruction of objects as threatening They raised certain types of close approaches and other military exercises and activities as potentially threatening and that really Opens the door to how we talk about security and outer space I think peros also showed that this perceived dichotomy between legal and and normative or non legal approaches is also It it's not a dichotomy Discussions of norms at the open-ended working group were very clearly rooted in the existing legal framework And the complementarity of those tools really came to the fore in the discussion I think another thing that came out Is this concept that behaviors and capabilities are two different ways of approaching peace and arms control and outer space Whereas, you know, this the discussion showed that Like norms and law these are really embedded and complementary with one another Every time we were talking about behaviors in space We were at the same time talking about capabilities We were talking about how they're used and it goes the other way as well During dedicated discussion on on possible placement of weapons in space States tend to fall back on discussing this in terms of the effects and uses of different space systems And so that dichotomy is is eroded. I think in my mind Uh, I think we also think about peace and security and outer space more broadly Uh, I think weapons and the prevention of weapons is core to peros And yet we also had an opportunity to talk about environmental contamination, which can have indiscriminate impacts We caught we talked about humanitarian objectives and possible harms We talked about other human considerations including gender which can lead to differentiated and disproportionate impacts Um when there are threats to space systems And I think most importantly We hopefully came to the realization that the answers or the path forward on peros Is no longer a simple choice between illegal agreement and nothing States raised a broad array of measures that can help to enhance peace and outer space From having points of contacts and lines of communication To behaviors such as exercising do regard for others through prior notifications of activities and coordinating activities in advance The use of cooperative mechanisms such as consultations and diplomatic channels to resolve security considerations So I guess my main takeaway is that peros After this discussion should no longer be viewed as an either or debate Peros is a this and that and that Discussion and I think we really need to use all of the tools that we have in our toolbox as victoria mentioned in the introduction um that said The fact that there's no single answer to a single security challenge in outer space Um can also make moving forward as a community in a single direction difficult Uh, so I agree with claudio that we really have our work cut out with us going forward um in in terms of being able to bring these strands together And move forward as a single community in outer space uh holistically I'll stop but actually I think we should also just give a round of applause To everybody who participated. Um, I skipped that I didn't want to talk too long But I would like to thank all of the state participants The hosts as well as organizations such as unidire and the un office of disarmament affairs who worked very diligently in the background because Really, it's all of that effort that made this successful and now let's stop Jessica that was perfect timing my computer just cut out and uh, you covered the gap very beautifully. So thank you We're getting a lot of questions from the audience We only have a short time to go through them, but I'm going to take the choice prerogative Just get it maybe a quick point of clarification For perhaps people in the audience that aren't as familiar with the un vocabulary As um some of our panelists are what exactly is the difference between a gg and an oe wg Who would like to clarify that really quickly and explain why one process is chosen over another I think I should do it because I heard her do a great job of this earlier this week Sure, I can do it. Um, so uh an open end of working group is as the name itself says it's open So that means it's open to every single un member state, but also to other stakeholders like uh representatives from industry academia civil society who can go there uh and represent their own interests They wouldn't be representing any state. Um, and uh Gg stands for group of governmental experts. This is tend to be a more reduced group of up to 25 uh representatives and they are uh representatives nominated by states. So even though the the representatives themselves don't necessarily have to be diplomats They often are uh, but they don't have to they can also be um Professors for example or experts in other capacity, but they are nominated by states And this is a close group. So uh, nobody outside of that group Is allowed to to enter the discussions listening Listen in sorry or uh participate or submit documents in the way that you can do in a oe wg Um, I don't think there is a better or worse way of doing things Both groups have their advantages and their disadvantages something that states have really appreciated. Um throughout the This latest oe wg is that it's very inclusive And this is becoming an increasingly important issue for many states As they become aware that even if they might not be space varying themselves, they do heavily rely on space services So this this has been a really important issue issue for global south states for example Um, but the gd is also very good at efficiency the group of the group of governmental experts is a group of experts Which is not always the case when it comes to the oe wg the diplomats at the oe wg might not necessarily be Experts on space security issues. Uh, so um gd discussions tend to be more efficient. Um, um, there is less um Need for clarifying concepts that people in the room already know Um, so sometimes it can be easier to reach an agreement or to reach a consensus Um, and therefore to fulfill the mandate and we saw this in the 2013 gd and in the 1993 gd Um, so again both both can be very good for some things less good for others And I think the ideal recipe in the end is the the combination of both. So we will hopefully see this When this upcoming gd starts in in uh, november We'll hopefully see that the experts for that gd take into account the work that the oe wg has already done I hope that answers the question Different for me. Thank you. And there's just one more clarification just for people to get a sense of the timeline So this gg is meeting in november and then when is it meeting again? Um, so then uh the next time that it will be meeting it's it will be I believe the first and second weeks of august of 2024 Uh, thank you. Okay. We have about 10 minutes left for this portion of our discussion So we've got some great questions coming up from the audience I encourage everyone to keep submitting them through the comment section And I'll try and get my panelists involved as many of these as possible One question for consideration by paul meyer We can continue to repeat That the political and legal approaches are not mutually exclusive But the diplomatic reality Is that the states will need to agree on one or the other if they are produced an outcome accord How can this difference of approach be bridged? Another way that I was thinking along the same lines and claudio brought up the idea. There's a lack of trust How do we build up a trust? Is that the way we bridge this difference of approach? Or is there some other way of handling it? Who would like to take the first shot at that one? Well, yeah I can I could take a shot at it. I'm not sure if I'd be able to comprehensively answer the question I think I already touched upon what my view about this issue is. I think that uh, uh, I think that uh A lot of states have voted in favor of the uh resolution the uk resolution that created ua wg Which had a mandate to discuss non binding norms Even though these states Are very attached to the objective of illegally binding instrument on paris. Um, this is the case of brazil brazil has Always participated actively in the cd in discussions on the in the context of the cd on paris. We have not Abandoned this objective quite the country remains as important as ever Perhaps even more so but we we chose to believe that the The resolution that created paris That could created the oa wg. I'm sorry which pointed the to the fact that The discussions on norms would Contribute to a discussion on to future discussions on lbi on paris would be Uh, that we decided to take that promise on its on its terms and to work constructive towards that end um I think that to a great extent is the reason why the oa wg was so successful because states that uh Believe in the objective of an lbi many states Decided that uh, perhaps the best way to reach that objective is through a Bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach that had been the case for the past 45 years in the cd where we've been trying to negotiate from you know scratch a legally binding instrument on paris paris and that hasn't proven to be Effective to this to this to this point. So perhaps but still there's a lot of states that believe that This idea of discussing non binding norms is a diversionary tactic It's in a way a way to Pull the discussions away from an lbi so I think that uh one particularly effective way of Bridging that gap would be for example for the gg on paris which has a mandate to recommend recommend possible elements of a legally binding instrument on paris To reach a successful conclusion to adopt a consensus report Uh in my view, uh, even for those states that uh are not convinced at this point in time of The feasibility of an lbi on paris to agree to a report a substantive report on a paris treaty Would be a significant demonstration of of willingness to engage We we hoped that this would have been the case in 2019 when we chaired the gg on paris that that Ended without a result That didn't happen at the time, but I think we have another opportunity here and that opportunity in my mind should not should not be missed Thank you. Um other thoughts from the panelists Jessica Yeah, I think that lack of trust is is really the core issue that claudio raised and it it goes the other way as well I think some states are very much concerned about Not knowing and not trusting You know, what is a weapon in space and what is it? What is a commitment not to place one in space and here? I think there's a lot of value that can be leveraged from the open-ended working group discussion Um through a behavioral approach. Uh, so I saw in the in the questions dual purposes and they're somewhere Um, but there's a lot of technology that Is, you know, general purpose in some ways it can be used to do things that are incredibly helpful such as servicing and removing Debris from orbit But those same capabilities could be used for harm And I think a behavioral approach if we could agree on some rules that states abide by when they're using them in a non-threatening way to show that it's non-threatening prior notification and transparency measures that provide information about what you're doing when and how I think that could also help us Towards having greater confidence when we have the discussions about what kind of Capabilities we might not want to have in space and how we know if they're up there how we differentiate Between something that is intended to be used peacefully and something that might not be And again, so I see these conversations as being very much embedded in one another Thank you. Um, next question is coming from neil wolf Did the discussion of the oe wg? Proceed upon a definition of space security that is the same and very nearly the same As a definition of the term utilized by the former space security index publication and a twirl team Almanada, I feel like you might have some thoughts about maybe how a lexicon might be helpful in this case Thank you very much victoria. I'm laughing because um, uh units around the secure world foundation just recently launched a space security lexicon Which was edited by victoria and myself. So i'm always very happy To talk about this. Um, so it is true that um, there is a lot of terminology In space security discussions where we found that even though the words employed are the same The meanings behind those words are actually different And we thought it was essential that to to build that trust on that common understanding that clausio and jessica were just speaking about it's really necessary to ensure that every single State that sits at that negotiating table Um, understands what everybody else means um, so with that in mind, uh, we created this space security lexicon um to that I would urge you to to check out um, and It is an evolving project. So any You know any thoughts that you have on it Please do not hesitate to share them with us. Um, either with secure world or with unity We would be more than happy to hear your thoughts. Um to answer your question on space security more specifically There is no universal agreement on what space security means But generally most states understand that space security is concerned with their relationship that exist Among space objects and activities and the maintenance of international peace and security disarmament Including this concept that comes up very often the prevention of an arms race in our space or parrots. Um, so, um, it's really concerned with intentional actions From you know from humans instead of Accidental activities that can cause harm. So it focuses more on threats rather than risks. Um, and or hazards those risks and hazards It's pretty much copios in vienna That deals with them. Um And space security discussions focus on issues like the weaponization about space and how to avoid it How to avoid the intentional creation of space debris or how to avoid States interfering intentionally with the, um Daily operations of space assets and space activities. Um that that concept of harmful interference Um, so again, there is no, um common understanding Um, no universal common understanding. There are many states in the global south, for example, who take Uh an approach to space security that is a lot more focused on this idea of sustainability, of course, you do need space security as well to To to reach that goal of space sustainability Um, but for many states that focus on, you know, ensuring the preservation of the space environment Is a lot more important than the weaponization of our space, for example, which tends to be the focus of The major space powers. Um, but yeah, even though there is no universal common understanding or no universal definition I feel that most States came to these negotiations at the OEWG With with this sort of general understanding of what space security was or is Thank you. Any other thoughts from the panelists about common understandings or Helping with this type of approach Jessica Oh, well, I think I think it's also important to remember that the open ended working group was not linked to space security per se It was really linked to the un mandate on prevention of an arms race and outer space peros so we we are using the term space security, but The group itself is linked to that really fundamental mandate on peros And I will say that like the space security index. Thank you, Neil for the pitch. Um, the approach was comprehensive Um, so states talked about earth to space threats space to space threats space to earth threats Kinetic threats non kinetic threats as well as transparency and confidence building measures. So the full gamut was there Great, thank you. Um claudia. Do you have anything really quickly? Yeah, uh, just uh to chip in on this discussion. I think that uh, uh, I agree with both amudena and jessica. There's no clarity about what the term space security means. I think that it's uh, it's used as a sort of a fallback term to express everything that is not safety or is not peace related to peaceful users of outer space, which is the remit of copious Um, but uh, also that evidence is the need for clarity in many other areas. So there's no definition about what Uh, a space weapon is about dual use Major concern and one of the reasons why uh, there's this Upswell of support for a discussion on behavior because some in the classic focus on capabilities that uh, has uh, uh, been the The approach of many arms control measures thus far does not fit perfectly this this realm where basically any object in space can be used as a weapon There's a not not a lot of clarity about concepts such as what constitutes usual force in other space So this only makes it absolutely evident that we need to continue this discussion We have shed some light on this during the pathway w g But there's still a lot of work to be done on space security or pairs or however you want to you may want to call it Thank you Yeah, it depth absolutely and along those lines. Um, I would like also to promote a product that's secure well foundation unity or put up Um, just a couple months ago called a space security portal But the idea of having an interactive map of the global space security governance landscape to click on various countries To see what if they have space strategies if they've Signed on to various resolutions if they've signed and ratified various treaties relevant to the discussion Um, and it's up on the screen right now and the URL should be in the comment section That's a very easy to remember space security portal dot org So with that, I think I um have Overstepped a little bit of the time Please join me in thanking our fantastic panel for a great discussion of the open and working group and Looking forward to maybe convening everyone again in the future to see how they think the next step went and Hopefully we'll be able to continue to see some progress That space can be secure sustainable Impredictable for all over the long term and with that I'd like to turn it over to my colleague brian weedon. He'll be Um, shepherding our next process through. Thank you Hello everyone. Um, my as victoria mentioned my name is brian weedon I'm the director of program planning here scurril foundation And it's my pleasure to moderate the next section of today's program Which features some very interesting research that was done by chingwei soi Who is a graduate professional in the space security program at the united asians institute for disarmament research Before joining unidire chingwei spent last summer as an intern at the swiss existential risk initiative in geneva Where he worked with me on a research project in looking into why Different countries voted the way they did on the recent un general assembly resolution On the anti satellite testing moratorium that peter mentioned in his introduction In this current section chingwei is going to be giving a short presentation Of the results of his research Which is being published today in a report on our website that'll have more details on After his presentation And that report was published with support from the swiss existential risk initiative Following his presentation chingwei is going to have time to take a couple of questions from the audience that i'm going to moderate So with that chingwei i'll turn things over to you. Uh, and we looking forward to your presentation Hi everyone. Good day and thanks so much for having me. I really appreciate this opportunity So as brian mentioned, um, i'm here to introduce my research into state positions on this very pertinent and salient topic The excellent panel discussion before was extremely insightful and has set the scene up really well And with that, let's dig a little deeper into this specifically next slide please So i'd like to stress that although i am a graduate professional with unidire space security program at the moment I'm here today strictly in my personal capacity and that this research as brian as brian mentioned Was conducted prior to my time at unidire. So unidire really has no involvement with what i'm presenting here today Next slide please So this is uh Just a little bit of a background on the moratorium You can see the slides on screen right now and as you can see it's very much linked to the oe wg process And to date that there have been 36 pledges made by various states Costa Rica was the latest one at the At the first committee norway has quote supported it as well. So it really could be 37 to we're just waiting for confirmation there But as you can see the moratorium is specifically on destructive direct ascent anti satellite missile testing So it's a very specific wording. It was crafted to be that way for a purpose and for a reason and we can see its implications later on in the presentation as to how that affects how countries feel about this And as previously mentioned as well, there is another non binding measure that is russia's no first placement of weapons in outer space I do acknowledge it and we won't be delving into that today as it's outside the scope of this research Next slide please Thank you. So as for the resolution itself We see As peter mentioned in his opening remarks We very substantial vote very substantial votes of 155 in favor nine against nine abstentions And it's the resolution is particularly short as well with only three operational paragraphs Calling for states to commit not to conduct these tests Considering it as an urgent initial measure and calling upon states to continue discussions to develop further steps That could contribute to an lbi on paris Next slide please Yep, so as to the research itself this research provides insight into key questions What prompted the moratorium and resolution how states arrived at the positions the key fact is involved and Very crucially as well. It seeks to explain the gap between 155 states voting in favor of the resolution With 36 37 states actually making the unit the unilateral commitment The full list next slide please I'm sorry next slide please I'm sorry. Just um, I think internet cut out there for seconds before that. Sorry Thank you. Yes. So the methodology for this research really quickly I've gathered data through official state contributions at various urn fora Public statements made outside of these areas as well And I conducted a series of interviews with high-level representatives from governments and independent state experts So as you can see on the screen here interviews were conducted with either high-level representatives were independent state experts on Canada, China, Philippines, Russia and South Africa Along with a representative from a state in a non-aligned movement and two representatives from western states as well And Nigeria's representative chose to respond in writing. So this is a diverse list of how states voted Sorry, this is diverse sample of states geographically and in how they voted for the resolution I do want to acknowledge that states that abstain were unavailable to be interviewed in the time I looked in the time I had for this research, but the public statements were included in analysis as well The full list of questions that I asked can be found in the report and with all of this data I conduct a thematic analysis To come to answers for the questions that we had set up to answer next slide please So really getting into the findings of this research then we can see reasons for states to vote in favor can be grouped in in these following categories So states are very so these states are supportive of norms as a governing mechanism and we're building block towards an lbi They believe that even if this is non legally binding, it is still effective as a secured as a space security measure Next states are supportive of this as what has been described as a capability neutral approach So because the resolution and moratorium focuses only on the testing of destructive the AA set missiles It leaves open the possibility for example for the development of these Capabilities as long as you do not test them. So it seems to regulate the use of technology and not technology itself and some states Some states see that as a positive reason to support this because it doesn't constrain their technological development for example next states believe that this fits with What's considered transparency and confidence building measure as set out in the report contained by the group of governmental experts on TCBMs for outer space And what's really important as well is that this resolution addresses and or acknowledges concerns From developing states and developing space powers such as deep space debris access to space equitable access and due regard to Next slide, please So We see these following reasons having been cited by States as too. So there was really concerted effort In diplomacy by the united states to garner votes for this resolution It was the it is and was a us led initiative and they've been really active behind the scenes and jumping up support for that And so this and the next point ties into what I mentioned earlier. So these states are supportive despite the narrowness of the resolution and They believe that it's too beneficial could they stress that it could serve as a stepping stone towards more comprehensive measures More moratoriums in the future potentially an lbi in the future And crucially they also believe that is because it's very narrow It makes it very very viable. You'd be able to states would be able to step to see That other states are not conducting these very visible texts And they see that as a strength to the resolution it being crafted very narrowly in this way and Next obviously there's the influence of geopolitics as well What's interesting to note here our states will take in favor in spite of the resolutions heavily politicized nature So the non-aligned movement is a really interesting group of countries there which I'll get into later in my presentation as well And finally states and next states are also concerned by previous disruptive the asa tests in the past So numerous sources have cited that the latest tests by russia in 2021 really provided an impetus for the creation of this initiative And and so finally They states think and believe that this resolution does not affect or positively affects national security Next place Yep, so as for the states who voted against again, these are a very small group of states compared to the ones who voted. Yes What I haven't listed here is one of the biggest ones, which is the opposition because of the narrowness of the resolution They believe that is ineffective for parrots Following that these states often Are extremely opposed to the idea of any space security measure that is not a legally binding instrument They believe that it must and necessarily should be in the first step After that there is what's been called as a sword and shield argument So this is the argument that the resolution provides the united states having already tested this technology both an offensive sword and a deterring shield while preventing other states from gaining the defensive benefits of developing this capability as well and Lastly, and this is something that the previous the panel has touched touched on earlier too Is the idea that some states are disagree with the framing of this resolution in terms of responsible and irresponsible behavior They believe that this is a disagreeable rhetoric and they are not a fan and it does not conduce It's not it doesn't encourage them to be supportive of this resolution our next slide please Great. Thanks. So again, there's the factor of geopolitics. What's interesting here are states abstaining because of the resolutions heavily politicized nature States are also concerned and and suspicious over past rhetoric They distrust the reasons behind and merits of the resolution due to previous statements referring to space as a war fighting domain By states who are pushing for this resolution and moratorium They are also concerned by previous destructive days that missile testing with the us having conducted this in in the past they viewed They these states that vote against it hold the view that the resolution is therefore hypocritical and its merits suffer as a result and Then lastly, there's also the point that they do not believe that this Improves national the national security and that in fact it might actually worsen things for For the state's concern next slide please So lastly for the states who have abstained again, it's a small group of states who have abstained And similar reasons cited between them are the influence of geopolitics where states are abstained Because of the heavily politicized nature of this resolution these states often also have a strong preference for an lbi so What I said earlier about the states who both didn't know They tend to have an extremely strong opposition These states who have stayed just I would characterize them as having a strong opposition to any measure. That's not an lbi So there's a bit of a distinction there these states also cite the narrowness of the resolution as making it ineffective because it only focuses on again the testing of destructive the asap missiles and finally this There's a point here and this also touches on the earlier panel discussion about security and sustainability And the and safety and the gaps there in false space as a whole So this some states believe that these resolutions have a focus on space debris puts it under the remit of u and coprus Rather than anything by a space security body of the u and instead next slide please So coming to the end now then just some sort of high-level takeaways and concluding remarks So we see a significant concern by many many states over destructive the asap missile testing And also a heavy emphasis on the orbital debris that such tests would generate so and What's important and what's interesting here Is the framing of this resolution as a positive step to reducing space debris And how that was key in security the support of developing states and developing space powers That's my third bullet point here about how should develop space powers tend to have more traditional security concerns To do with these capabilities how it impacts the national security, etc Whereas for developing space powers who may have Significantly less satellites will no satellites of their own at all They're not really concerned as much about the national security implications It's still a concern but what's more important to afford them Are issues such as space debris access to space and do regard under article nine of the orst and we very much saw through the process of the the negotiations Before the resolution and in the text of the resolution itself Acknowledgement of these concerns that really helps get all of the countries on site And this leads to my next point Which is that the support of some non-aligned movement states was very very instrumental to the success that we've That resolution has been met by so far So just to characterize the non-aligned movement for people who may be unaware It's the NAM as a grouping of countries. They have a very strong geopolitical lens That they see everything true and they have a traditional position of favoring legally binding instruments An interview retold me about how in his in in his personal opinion Most UN delegates have a limited appreciation of the issue of space security Which then means that they default through the traditional NAM position of which I've mentioned earlier It's strongly favoring legally binding instruments and strongly seeing everything through a very geopolitical lens Even if there are efforts to frame something as being apolitical But what's important here is that once one NAM state supports a resolution There is no longer a quote NAM position against it if that makes sense opening the door for more countries to then support it Next slide, please Yes, so What was also interesting to note are similar reasons cited both for supporting and for Opposition So these are the narrowness of the resolution the influence of geopolitics previous the asap missile tests and As mentioned by the previous panel two the norms and lbi debate So countries have cited all of these reasons as all of these influences In fact, there's reasons to either support or deny which then makes it interesting when you look into the reasons That are unique to either camp which you can find in my report which I've laid out more in more detail So states who voted against the resolution cited extremely similar reasons between them and But what's also interesting to note here Is that there appears to be a softening divide between the two approaches of norms versus lbi Something non legally binding versus a legally binding instrument so as we see Which I put up on the screen there is there was a joint statement issued by states that voted against the resolution Which had some positive language in there noting that the suggestion to undertake the political commitment the moratorium Is a step in the right direction even if it characterizes it as Even if it characterizes it as insufficient and even if they voted against it and in the end there was some positive language there which is Interesting to note absolutely But also like on this topic of a softening divide many countries who have previously said they only supported lbi's also supported this resolution again The getting so many nam countries to support it whereas the traditional nam position is for lbi And what's more the u.s. Has also indicated that it is potentially open to lbi's lb legally binding agreements down the road too But what we have to note obviously and this will come to no surprise for Everyone here in the audience is the current geopolitical climate and the effects that that has So I've laid out the quote on screen of one of my interviewees told me Basically the idea that before the hot phase of the ukraine crisis started in his words There were signs that we might have moved somewhere in the direction of agreeing to start from norms to eventually reach an lbi But for now the overall competition Makes it very hard to reach consensus, but I do not wish to end on this our note. So next slide please Yeah, so on to the very pertinent question of the gap between Support for the resolution and the voluntary commitments that have been made This was a point that Interview be very much stressed to me even if she was speaking even if they were speaking in their personal capacity which is The developing states need for greater technical and legal expertise regarding the effects of these tests On how that would affect them as a state But also domestically. What are their implications if they make the commitment? So there's a difficulty for these countries to comprehensively understand both technical and legal implications Which then makes it hard for the delegates to convince capital to make a decision and for capital to then decide what to do as well This interviewee very much also stressed the disparity between technological and developmental levels between developing and developed states and space powers And so it was important to this interviewee that this initiative is was stressed to not be Limiting them in terms of in terms of their technological development, for example, shouldn't really hinder their use of space towards those ends And just last like to end on the note that what we we are possibly emerging We are possibly observing the emergence of a new norm against the asa missile tests So it would be very interesting to see How this continues to develop rather more countries will support the resolution And make the moratorium there appears to be momentum behind this And that's why it was a very pertinent time to dig into this through my research last slide please So again, thank you so much for having me I do want to again thank the secure world foundation for the opportunity for me to present this research I'd also like to thank cherry for funding this research and you brian for your excellent mentorship as well I would like to also say that if the audience is interested in a selection of relevant statements made by particular states or group of states I encourage them to look into the report because it's all laid out in a very neat table So it'd be very easy to find information there and you can find my details on the screen So please do not hesitate to reach out to for anybody interested Thank you Thank you very much for that great presentation and again, I need to thank you for the excellent work you put into I'm not sure everyone in the audience appreciates how difficult it can be to get governments to comment on these things and provide insight into Why they they made some decisions or not and jingwei did a lot of a lot of good work Trying to reach out and some build connections and and go through not only the written statements that countries may But also try and talk to some of the diplomats that were involved about to understand things We've got a couple and i'm gonna we get done here I'm gonna give a link to the report and a couple other things at the end of our discussions today We got a couple questions to get to but one i'm from my own for you Was there anything in your in your results or findings that was surprising to you based on Sort of the preconceived ideas you had going into the research Yeah, absolutely. So I think something that really stood out to me was the necessity of understanding The perspective of developing states we do talk about this in the work that we do how it's important to get their views on the table But I think this is just a very concrete practical example of how If you put in the work, you can really read dividends then so interviewees did express to me how During the lead up to a tabling resolution and when there was this idea of the moratorium a lot of work was Spent by interested parties pushing for this to happen to really have workshops and seminars to really Teach what to help inform developing states why this is something they should be concerned about how this actually affects Their national security and their peaceful uses of space And so definitely that was something that stood out to me as a concrete example Should be the practice headed for heading forward and something else as well. It's just the Interplay between different groupings of countries in the u.m. So again, like all the information about how the non-aligned movement How the nam countries think about things and sort of the politics there Obviously for the more for the experience delegates in the room They have understanding of all of these things as someone who is not a diplomat that was particularly insightful piece of research for me too and Just very quickly also just the softening force dichotomy between norms and lbis as well Yeah, the the the geopolitics and how the regional groupings and how those things play out in the un I think somebody might be surprised to see just how big of an influence that can have and sometimes it's it's not about the substance Right, it's about those those regional dynamics and the geopolitics So to me that gets to one of the questions in the audience is the one from tom royer asked about What's the rationale behind doing a binding instrument first? And you know my own impression is that is Due to a few factors one is a lot of the participant discussions are lawyers and lawyers like to have you know, right new laws and right new treaties Also, I think it's partly because this this Topic historically has had a legal treaty first Perspective coming out of the conference on disarmament, which is all about creating legally binding treaties And the third and I like your perspective on this xingwei is I sense that A lot of the countries particularly the non-aligned countries and the and the ones that are not space powers Want a legally binding perspective because they see it as a as the only way to get the big power To abide by something and the only way to kind of get them to to really kind of commit Is that the sense you get or do you have another perspective on why there's such a focus on legally binding? Yeah, absolutely. I echo all of your points there. It's definitely a historical element there too Um, and like you said, it's a way to really get bigger powers in bigger states to agree on a set of Um, something that is binding to the movie or document That would help to build a common ground or a common sort of way moving forward What I do want to say though was that this was right because so in the context of answering this question because there's always been this Legally binding versus non legally binding debate. Um, some will call it a stalemate States have found this to be a particularly refreshing approach almost So one of the reasons that this initiative for this resolution was tabled is sort of like Hey, the traditional approach hasn't been working for a good while How about we try something new with this very small very specific Part of the broader space security peros picture to see how that's going to go if we just run with this And this is the result that we're seeing happen before us Those are the question here from uh, matt mothore pro asks Why did russia and china both vote against the resolution that gives specific reasons? I think I think you cover that more generally But anything you want to add about why they specifically Said they they voted against it Yeah, so That's a great question One of the big reasons they vote against this was just again to do with the geopolitical nature of this issue So the us and other states that supported this really made an effort to depoliticize this initiative But it is still seen through a very geopolitical lens at the end of the day Something else as well is that because russia and china Were the most recent countries to have tested these types of weapons They Well, well, actually, I think it was india Um, before after china, you can correct me on this brian. Um, basically what i'm trying to say is that there's a certain sort of Pride or honor, well, that's that's not the right word. Is it sort of like hey, we've tested this in the past Exactly. Thanks. That's it. Thank you. Uh, so this that element too for sure Yeah, no, I agree and yes, russia was the most recent one to test one of these weapons in 2021 And then before that was india in 2019 And I suspect that played a role in why india abstained on this and then of course china tested one Against a satellite in 2007. I'll just add to kind of put a more finer point on this geopolitics In 2016 Uh, sorry 2014 when when russia first invaded ukraine We saw this happen in another part of the united nations under the un committee on the peace pleases of outer space Which at the time was dealing with the long terms the sustainability of space After that after russia's invasion there and the resulting sanctions from the united states and nato Russia took a very adversarial approach to that entire process And tried multiple times to disrupt it And I think one of the reasons for the strong russian opposition to this Is because of some similar again geopolitics with the renewed invasion early in 2022 of ukraine and russia's uh, you know desire to kind of fight back against The the the us and european sort of pressure on them. So I think that's also a huge role in this I want to finish up here with Oh, sorry one more question here from Dr. Cassandra steer And was there any understanding among the interviewees about the unlawfulness? Of the use of an asat. Did anybody mention that was there any discussion of that that you saw in your research? And and how this might make it easy to make a commitment to not test in times of peace. Yeah, that's an excellent question um, so for my interviewees who come from more of So for my interviewees who experience in law, this was definitely a big factor there So it's um, and the lilligo experts in this room notice a lot about it and I am but the debates about this are ongoing at the moment. Um, so Some states did mention that in the interviews What's also important to note here is the the Just repeating the point I made earlier about how for many states they do not understand Well, for developing countries, they might not necessarily understand the implications of making this commitment legally on them What that actually entails and that's reason why More work has to be done in that area there And but I would say that for the most part Law was mentioned, but it wasn't a huge emphasis based on what I found in my in the research that I've done for this personally um, I think in my my sense is that a big reason why that wasn't more of um More of topic more more of a substantive matter is because it this is a non binding resolution And that it has only three operational paragraphs So because of that it makes it very easy for states to support it and the legal question Um, might not have been emphasized as much as uh, as a result. I hope I answered the question Yeah, and I would just add um, I have I'm not aware of any country that has said testing or use Of a direct ascent and a satellite weapon is illegal or breaches Some aspect of the outer space treaty or other part of international law. So It may have but I don't recall ever seeing that so this is an area where so far no one has said it's it's it's illegal In in its nature. Well, thank you very much in way for this. Um, I'm going to get I'm going to talk about reported in a second and when I get to the the last part of our discussion here, but but Excellent research. Um, and I think it's the start of a great career in this topic. So, thank you Thank you so much So now I want to turn to the last part of our program here as we're wrapping up and want to talk walk through Uh several different publications that secure worlds releasing today That are related to this topic that we've been talking about The first one is a new secure world foundation fact sheet on the open ended working group on reducing space threats Which we talked about in the first segment The the fact sheet discusses the origin of the oa wg Summary of the major points of discussion And links to a whole lot of references including the excellent details summaries published by jessica west And the underlying implementing un documents which for those of you who's tried to search through the uo website To find a document can be very difficult to find So we've gone ahead and and linked those in there And as you can see you can find this on our website And we're going to put links to all of these both in the chat in a second As well as we're going to have a a summary page from this event on our website That'll again have a summary sort of collection of of these different links The second product we're announcing today is jingwei's full report Which is going to be listed on our website Under the sponsored research category and again in his report are all the details of His research the tables summarizing the points made by the different groups of Countries and why they decided to support something Sorry to support the the testing resolution or not Kind of broken down by different groups So that is also available for download on our website And again, we we we thank the swiss existential existential risk initiative For their support of both his research And in putting the report together The third product we are releasing today Is a web page that is dedicated to multilateral space security initiatives As we've talked about, you know, what's going on with the asa test moratorium There's not the first time we've talked about this neither is the open-ended working group So we wanted to put together a page that kind of provided some of the background and some of the history On these things so as you can see in the background it talks about the work that's been ongoing in the conference on the summer event for the last few decades on peros It mentions the 2007 international code of conduct that was proposed by the european union The 2011 group of governmental experts on transparency and confidence building measures And then the most recent open-ended working group that we talked about It then also summarizes two ongoing sets initiatives to have voluntary pledges related to space security The first is the no first place in weapons and outer space pledge or nfp That was first proposed by the russian federation in 2004 And then the second one is the voluntary moratorium on destructive anti satellite testing That was first proposed by the united states back in 2000 our site and just recently in 2022 And and it talks about sort of the the origins of both of those initiatives And then it links to the fourth product Which is a public Google tracking sheet where we have a record of all of the related unga resolutions Where you can see, you know All the all the resolutions that put forward how each country has voted on the various resolutions if we can go to the nfp tab. Yep And then also has a link to the countries that have made Either the nfp pledge and or the anti satellite testing moratorium pledge And i'll note for the record there are currently 37 countries that have made the direct-to-send asap test moratorium pledge With costa rica one of those non-aligned countries that we talked about In the and chingwai's research and norway being the most the two that have most recently Discussed that so in this spreadsheet, which is publicly available You can see all the countries you can see how they voted on the resolutions And then there's links to their official announcements of a pledge either way So all these are available on our website And we'll again, we'll send out a short summary after the meeting With that, I'd like to wrap up today's event. Thank you all for participating Uh, really enjoyed seeing some of the back and forth and some of the the discussion going on in the chat Uh, there will be a recording of this on our youtube channel Afterwards, uh, we will also be making the presentation that was given by chingwei available on our website Again along with the other products that were just mentioned. So thank you everyone for attending. Enjoy the rest of your day