 Well, today is, as it should be, a day dedicated to studying North Korea. I think so. We had Admiral Thomas Fargo come around. He was the Pacific commander for a while, and familiar with at least how it looked from the military. And you are a citizen diplomat. And you have specific thoughts, and you've been there many times, and you've been thinking about this since your time in the Army in 1820, wasn't it? It was the War of 1812. Yeah. Anyway, here we go. So some really interesting things have happened in the past few days, and the whole game seems to be changing, and the possibilities, the options, they're changing, the likely outcomes are changing, and certainly your thoughts have been changing. How are your thoughts now? Well, they have. Enough things have happened that have never happened before that I am now satisfied that a meeting will happen, which means that the brave new world is upon us now, because these kind of things never happened before. We've been through presidencies five and six in number spanning 30 years or more where nothing has been done. The U.S. pattern of behavior, which was imposed upon us really by the State Department, is to disavow any meeting with the North Koreans unless and until, first, they have to agree to forceware any interest in nuclear weapons. Well, that's their leading calling card. That's their main, that's their card. That's the card they play. And, of course, we have to tell them that the United States will... Well, hasn't he acceded to this? He said, I'm not going to... Oh, he has now. He has now. That's what makes it different. I mean, he's said it in English, and he's said it to the world, and the world, you know, there's no ambiguity about this. Is there or is there? I'm telling you, at a given date in either late May or early June, two guys with funky haircuts are going to meet somewhere and talk for a while. My prediction would be that they will meet in a small city in the free world, because Kim Jong-un, like his father and like his grandfather, has never answered to a hostile press. They've never put themselves in that situation, and that's why every time there's a meeting between North and South, it always happens in Pyongyang, and it probably always will. So those are the... That's the lay of the land. Are you saying this meeting is going to happen in Pyongyang, too? No. As a matter of fact, I'm telling you, it won't happen anywhere on the Korean Peninsula, because Trump, being the negotiator that he is, will not allow Kim Jong-un to have home field advantage. That's why the real likelihood is that it'll be in a place like Reykjavik, a small city in Iceland, where Gorbachev and Reagan met, or it could be where President Ford met in one of the smaller cities. Why about Hawaii? No, because it's the United States. It gives us home field advantage. And the press would be here in droves. Oh, can you imagine? I can. Yeah. Okay, so Helsinki, Finland is another good example of a very small locale. Where they could have a meeting and don't expect a lot of advance notice because they don't want to give the press advance notice. And they would like very much to have all the rooms and all the facilities sold out so that not everybody can get in. Of course, you and I could get in easily because we're the staff. You're right. Those cities are relatively small. Yeah. I think they're both in less than 300,000, something like that. Yeah, that's right. And they've been used before with success. Gerald Ford met with Brezhnev in Finland. Yeah. Okay. Anyway, so what I get, Pat, is you think this meeting will happen? It will happen. And because it happens, the world is automatically different because since the war, we have never met with a North Korean leader. Kim Il-sung, during the time of Detente back in the 70s, actually thought, really thought that he would get an invitation to the White House because all of the Warsaw Pact countries over on the other side of the globe were also getting invitations because Nixon was trying to wean the Warsaw Pact countries away from Russia to gain advantage over them. And that's why he went to China. Some people think that just to meet with Kim Jong-un, just for Trump, just to meet with him, that's giving up too much. No. You know, is that giving up anything significant? It's giving up something and it's something that we should want to give up because what we're saying to the whole world is we, as the leader of the free world and effectively of the world, are approachable. The one thing that looks rigid and inflexible is the notion, because we've always said the State Department has let us down this path and it's not a good choice. They've let us down the path of saying the only way we'll meet with you is in six-party talks. The two Koreas, Japan, Russia, China, U.S. will only meet you in six-party talks. Now, you and I both know that you don't get anything done with a committee. When I was stationed in Korea, I remember that the Catholic pastor always said, God so loved the world that he did not send a committee. So it has to be a one-on-one meeting between North Korea and the United States. And it shows a flexibility which changes things completely. One thing I can tell you for sure. Fast forward to 2020. I know Trump is running. I don't know whether he'll win or lose, but I know one thing's for sure. The Democratic nominee will have a plan for how to deal with North Korea. There may be economic elements to it. There may be military elements, but the Democratic nominee will have a plan for how to deal with North Korea and it will be, it will have a detail that you've never seen before at all. Well, they'll be criticizing whatever Trump does, won't they? Not only criticizing, but they'll be saying we can handle it better and they'll have a plan for handling it better. Because it's a big issue. Because look, once one president meets with Kim Jong-un, a North Korean leader, another one will. And another will. And another will. That's it. Yeah. That's it. The status quo is over as of now. It's already changed. Let's talk about what Kim Jong-un is looking for. That's a very good question. And you'd be amazed. One of the things they're looking for derives from what Kim Il-sung said in the 70s. I never get an invitation to the White House. They want respect and they're getting it by virtue of this conference. That's why if we have to surrender something in the deal, let's stop thinking about who's winning and who's losing and let's figure out a way for everybody to win. So one thing, is it worth our trouble to talk about regime change? I would say no. We didn't get it in Cuba and we didn't get it in Germany. What happened is Germany evolved out of communism and that's the best we can hope for. The other thing is this, I would hope that we can talk the North Koreans out of nuclear weapons. If we can't, every other country in the world that we tried to talk out of it, we failed. Look at what happened so recently. In 2011, practically in order to catch Osama bin Laden, we invaded Pakistan. Pakistan has the bomb, but whoever talked about, oh, maybe we'll have a bomb dropped on us. The mutually assured destruction that we've operated on for so long tells countries no matter what their makeup is, no matter how radical they may otherwise seem, it tells them don't push the button because if you push the button, this is true of the United States too. If you push the button, a button will be pushed dedicated to you. That is mutually assured destruction. It's like World War I, it's like a chain reaction kind of thing, literally a chain reaction. So would you agree with me that his comment, Kim Jong-un's comment about seeking a better economic future for North Korea is the core point here? It's one of them. We haven't ever talked about commercially connecting with North Korea, but there's no reason it couldn't happen. And I think you'll hear more talk along that vein in the near future. Is there anything necessarily wrong with weaning North Korea off of China so that now their quasi-alliance with the U.S. makes the Chinese a little worried? Here's what the Chinese are worried about. Ever since the time of Mao Tse-tung, they have not wanted U.S. troops anywhere near their border. And what Douglas MacArthur was threatening when he said, hey, this is World War III, you know, let's go for the big win. And that's why they went all the way up to the Yalu River. And that was the time when the Chinese invaded with their 200,000 volunteers. That was the time they did not before. Mao Tse-tung. We provoked them, is what you're saying? That's actually true. That's actually true. Once we were past the 38th parallel into what now is North Korea, we provoked them. And that's a result that we got. OK. Let's take a short break. There's Pat Border, an interested diplomat, a citizen diplomat. We're going to come back and talk about exactly what is going on with China and this deal with North Korea. There's a lot of wrinkles to that. It's kaleidoscopic. We'll be right back. I'm DeSoto Brown, the co-host of Human Humane Architecture, which is seen on Think Tech, Hawaii every other Tuesday at 4 p.m. And with the show's host, Martin Desbang, we discuss architecture here in the Hawaiian Islands and how it not only affects the way we live, but other aspects of our life, not only here in Hawaii, but internationally as well. So join us for Human Humane Architecture every other Tuesday at 4 p.m. on Think Tech, Hawaii. We're back. We're live with Pat Border, who has followed Korea, North Korea for a lifetime, really. It's been 40 years because I started in the South. And he's a citizen diplomat, and he follows it by going there, by studying it. Today, we're talking about, you know, the extraordinary events that have taken place over the past, what, week or so. And China. You know, I thought that China was engaged somehow in a sort of combined strategy with North Korea. But I think that's probably not so. Its self-interest is predominant here. And then there was this article recently suggesting that they kind of lost control of what North Korea is doing. So what do you think? China is like the parent of a misbehaving child. And they are, for the first time, having to rein in that child. I think it's enormously significant that Kim Jong-un took the night train to Beijing under instructions. For the first time, we're beginning to realize that North Korea is essentially a vassal state of China. China has absolute sway over North Korea. On every trip that I've ever taken to North Korea, I've had the best food, Western, and Korean, and others as well. There are fresh eggs, there's bakery goods, there's particularly fruits, more fruits than vegetables. And if you go to the international club, you can get the best beef, even though your typical North Korean never tastes beef, whereas it may be... He's still starving. That's right. That's right. And so China has been the supplier and the benefactor of North Korea. And you're absolutely right. And it's only come at a time, and I don't know whether Trump planned this or whether it just fell in his lap. But this threat on a trade war has got the Chinese spooked, and it should, because China manipulates its currency. If they want to have good trade relations and have the best in the way of exports, they manipulate their currency, so it's cheaper compared to the dollar. They can do that all the time. We don't have the luxury of doing that because we are the world's currency. We can't do that sort of thing. So they're finding themselves in a very precarious situation. Look at it this way. Let me put it to you this way, because I know you know the answer to it. Would you rather have a trade war with China or a nuclear war with North Korea? That's just the way it is. And Trump, I think, knows that, but it operates whether he knows it or not. I'm not claiming that Trump is Nixonian in his wisdom, but he's done a pretty good job of pairing two issues just as you were saying. How does this deal affect China, though? In other words, it sounds to me like China, although China, you said instructed Kim Jong-un to come to Beijing and all that, and they probably had some suggestions for him. But the bottom line is that he's like the wayward son, he's going to do what he's going to do. He's got his own agenda going on, is that what you're saying? To a point, yes, but he is a vassal state. He relies for support upon his benefactor, and if that's ever withdrawn, North Korea won't stand up for a very long time. The message that I would like to convey to you is that the reason they have lots of food for foreign travelers. I've been in huge places where they were serving breakfast to hundreds, even thousands of people, and it's all good Western food that keeps people coming for their tours. And if they ever shut off that lifeline, that'll go immediately. In other words, the hardship will be spread to everyone, including the travelers, and it will ruin the industry. Do you want to see a deal between the United States and North Korea or not? It's probably, probably it does, because it wants North Korea to survive. Ever since Mao's time, one of the most fervent beliefs, fears if you will, was that there would be US troops on the Chinese border, and they want that buffer. They want it to survive. So if we consider that as part of what we're willing to deal with, then that means China can be accommodated at the same time that our interests can be accommodated. And is it possible that the North Koreans would actually give up nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons? Is it? It's possible. No country. Well, actually Libya forced war nuclear weapons back before 2010, but one of the arguments within North Korean circles is, yeah, they did, and that's why Gaddafi fell, because he didn't have nukes anymore. That belief actually has some currency within the discussion. It's a fascinating topic, but it's clear from the things that are happening that everything is negotiable, that North Koreans dropped their demand that the US forces leave Korea. They dropped it. We dropped the command as a part of this meeting that the North Koreans forswear for all times nuclear weapons. That's all on the table, so we can negotiate all of it, and we don't really know what will end up. But my point to you here and now today is that even if no agreement comes out of it, this is different, because one of the great roadblocks to an accommodation has been solved. That's why I say for the North Koreans, give them a win, okay? So if Kim Jong-un wants to look like the big man on campus back home, and he can show photos of himself with Donald Trump, it's a reasonable concession to them to do that, because when are we going to finally do this? This has been going on for 70 years. There has to be an end to it, and the more that we can be accommodated by the North Koreans, the easier that life gets in South Korea, because there'll be more at ease, and maybe we can spend a little bit less. Now remember, Germany is a perfect example, because originally in the 60s, the Germanies were bitter opponents, and then Nixon came along with Dayton in the 70s and eased it up, so they both had diplomatic ties with each other, and now they're so warm that the Chancellor of Germany is a former East German politician. Angela Merkel is from East Germany, so the chances for improvement and the chances for surprising events happening is quite within contemplation. We can do a lot better. And the North Koreans are not the only people who have maybe not been the best of neighbors in some ways we haven't. I think the State Department is in for a lot of criticism, because you can name so many countries where the State Department got involved and we got in a mess. The best example of all is China itself. For 22 years, we didn't have any relations with him, and do you know that when Richard Nixon went to China, he arranged it privately through Pakistan, and the State Department didn't know about it. Henry Kissinger wasn't there. Henry Kissinger was there, but he was not the Secretary of State. He was in the White House as an advisor to Nixon, and he was the one who used the back channel of Pakistan to set up the whole thing. So he set it up, but he wasn't Secretary of State. Now what about the Mike Pompeo thing? Still, even now today, we're not sure the State Department is really involved in setting this up. The State Department has been minimized. Oh yeah, they're naysayers all the time. We've had problems with China. We have problems with Vietnam. We have problems with Cuba, and now we're having problems with North Korea. Is anybody surprised? I'm not. And I actually saw a story in the New York Times where they said, the whole thing is going to hell because our senior Korean diplomat, Joseph Yoon, is retiring, and he's retiring because he's hopping mad because they're not dealing with the State Department. He was in office for 30 years. What did he do for us for the past 30 years? Nothing. Have a happy retirement, Joe. We don't need you. That's my message. Got it. What about the possibility of reunification? Does this take us closer to that, or does it have no effect on that? You have to wait for the regime in, I'm sorry, I tried to turn this off. We have to see what happens first within the communist world, and that is, will the communist world cave in on its own? Because wherever we gained against the communists, it's not because we conquered them. It's because they failed on their own. The Berlin Wall came down because Mikhail Gorbachev decided, I can't afford this anymore. I can't afford to send in troops to Germany to keep the wall up. So they tore it down. And that's why it happened. It was out of a sense of weakness. Kim Jong-un is not going to give up his control. He won't give up his control, but his position is determined by how much his benefactor the Chinese will give him. And so that's susceptible to changes over time. That could be changed. Okay, last question. And the more, let me make this final point, the more that China suffers from the economic situation, a change in the agreement with the United States, the more they suffer, the less they can afford. You've got to think about that. You can prop up North Korea. The Chinese are building high-rise buildings that won't be occupied for 25 years. And they're bringing in people from the countryside who are going to have to find their way back to the countryside on their own because the Chinese are not going to send them back. They're using labor as they need it, as they think they need it today, but in order to keep the economy humming, they're building buildings. That's what you do when you're in a slump and you want to, you know, that's what we did during the Great Depression. So it depends on their economy. We invented jobs. Yeah. Last question. You know, you're optimistic about this. My perception is you've always been optimistic about the possibilities of a kind of detente with North Korea. Yes. I would say yes. But what about the worst case analysis, Pat? Isn't it possible, and a lot of people have speculated on this, that Trump would either not have this meeting or go to this meeting and there would be an argument that would lead to, you know, a degradation of whatever advantage we've had in setting it up. You're right. You don't know that Trump won't walk out on it, but the next president could be a Democrat or it could be a different Republican. And I'm betting that in the long run, not tomorrow, not six months from now, but in the long run, a president will meet a dictator and he won't walk, she won't walk out of it. So the possibilities are endless. Now I'm disappointed. Are we close to the end of time? Yeah. Okay. I was disappointed because I told you that there was a Vulcan proverb that was involved and I was hoping that you would ask me what Vulcan proverb did Spock invoke to support peace between the Klingons and the Federation. And in the 23rd century, do you want to know what that? Yes, I do. Okay. I was hoping you'd ask. Yeah. I consider the question asked. Okay. And in Star Trek 6, he said, the old Vulcan proverb is, only Nixon could go to China. And there you have it, the ultimate wisdom. Fred Pat Porter, citizen diplomat, comes to talk to us about North Korea and I think he'll be back. Oh, I hope so. Thank you, Pat. Thank you.