 Thank you for the Baumgartner University of Bonn. Thanks for three stimulating presentations. My question goes to Margaret. I liked your findings that growth brought even more employment in the rural areas if I got it right. And you said women in urban areas are particularly bad off. One thing that came to my mind was how did you include informality of employment in urban areas? Maybe you could elaborate on that later. Hi, can you hear me? Thank you for your question and your interest. The short answer is the DHS data don't distinguish between informality and formality. So the good news is that we have everybody. The bad news is that we can't tell the difference. My paper online, which one? The question was on the conference side. I was looking for your paper. I have some papers. I'll put something there. The DHS data, we haven't written it up yet. Matthew Powell. I think this is not very interesting research. This style of analysis only really takes you so far. Because if you have a movement from a low productivity sector to a high productivity and without a fall of the productivity in the high productivity sector, that's not really a cause of economic growth. It's a pattern of economic growth. To actually get the causation in, you have to move back and say why can you do that? I wonder if you could say something about your research programs and how they address that particular. Can I answer right away or do I have to wait? I'm just going to answer right away. 100%, 150% right, if that's possible. So there are a couple of things. In an earlier paper, a background paper for the African Economic Outlook, I included a lot of different political variables from the Oh, what's the name of that guy? The Ibrahim index. I included those variables to try to tease out whether there was any correlation between governance indicators and structural change and there was some correlation. The next step, actually, I need to be a little careful because we haven't talked about it fully with my co-authors. We have a research assistant who's just started a series of commodity prices for us, so we can look at the extent to which commodity price changes are driving. There are a couple of ways to go about it. We have an indigeneity problem, so could we instrument GDP growth with commodity prices? Or we can include commodity prices directly in the aggression to see to what extent they're changing things. We already have the political variable there. We should probably include something to do with conflict. That's one route we can go down. Then the other route to go down, I think, is more detailed country-level studies. Well, yes, like Robert's study, but even more storytelling. A separate line of research that I'm involved in, that I think is related and really interesting because it's much more micro, is for example, in Ethiopia there's been a lot of investment by the Chinese, particularly in the leather industry, and they're exporting now designer shoes. Leather designer shoes. It's interesting to understand the consequences of that, but it's also interesting to understand how that came about. A lot of it has to do with personalities at the top, so that's not very satisfying from an economist's perspective. It's fascinating questions. Maybe I can take this opportunity. I do have a quick question for Marcus, and of course I have not had a chance to read your paper, but what wasn't entirely clear to me was whether you specified postulated one production function in agriculture. Because if that is a case, it seems to me that it may well be an extreme assumption. At one time I looked at the evolution of production, of agricultural production within the case of Taiwan over 20-25 years, and it started as an essentially almost totally labor intensive technology and gradually they started moving in some agricultural implements that increased the land productivity, labor productivity, but this was a very gradual process, but clearly 20-25 years later the technology had become significantly more capital intensive. So my question to you is, am I correct in understanding that what you did was to postulate one unique production function? If so, I would have some reservations. Thanks a lot. That's a great question and it's the usual curse of dimensionality for me. So what we do in this research we say the existing literature thinks that agricultural production is identical in 1950 Ghana and 2010 Taiwan everything is the same everywhere always. Same alpha, same beta. So what do we do? We change the alpha to alpha i. We relax the assumption that every single country has the same function and we can do that. So from my perspective I would say one defense against this kind of suggestion is we can say these are movements along the production plane, let's call it. So initially capital stock was extremely low, later on it was much, much higher. This would be kind of a non-empirical defense. An empirical defense would be to say okay let's say we have long enough data we can look at the beginning and then towards the end. We can compare whether if we analyze a kind of a moving window of data whether we can see a change in this production frontier or this production technology and for one of the papers I mentioned that's exactly what we did and we found them to be comparatively stable. I know this is your area of expertise. I think these environmental impacts on what is possible in agricultural production or what is feasible is very important in this context. Thanks very much. Just two brief questions to Dr. Robert Jose on his presentation on Ghana. I'm just wondering whether you could throw a little bit more light on what you mean by indicating that the cuckoo sector has declined. Is the decline in relative or absolute terms given the fact that cuckoo production has increased quite substantially in Ghana since the early 2000s. And secondly I'm also just wondering whether your paper considered the implications of the sectoral patterns of growth for issues of inequality in Ghana. Thanks Abdul. So what I meant with respect to the cuckoo sector was the relative share, its contribution to GDP. So that has declined with respect to the fact that we've achieved the highest in the country's history with respect to the output. Now the second question I was going to clear the question was I'm just wondering whether you look at the implications or the impact of that on the patterns of inequality that we observe in Ghana now. Okay, yes indeed. There are three sources by regions where we split the country into three zones and then look at the movements with respect to resources across the three regions. So but also even with respect to the sectoral productivity changes you remember one of the points I made earlier with respect to why I thought Ghana was interesting was essentially what the implications of that part of growth is for employment. And so for instance if you do observe a reallocation of resources from say agriculture to the retail trade sector which in essence isn't a relatively high productivity sector. The question is whether that is a part that A is sustainable but B with respect to inequalities whether it does help at all with respect to inequalities. My submission is that probably it doesn't. Of course the fact that the tourism sector has become relatively more important. Reallocation of resources to the tourism sector is a positive. Generally with respect to the tourism sector because also the tourism sector has relatively high productivity. So we do look at what the implications are for inequality and employment. Thank you very much. Any other questions comment? Yes please. My name is Imran Belodia. This is a question to Robert. I was just wanting to know how you dealt with the informal sector in Ghana. Is that completely out of your story or is all of that employment sitting in the services sector? How have you handled the informal? Yes like I said we've done a disaggregation by sectors with respect to the employment movement and then you can then relate that to the productivity changes that are for care across the different sectors. And so if you look at the retail trade sector, the retail trade sector is typically at least for Ghana the sector which is highest with respect to informality. So moving of course our Greek is also traditionally classified as informal. So while Labour is actually moving from a Greek to the relatively low productivity informal sector essentially you are juggling the balls but the core of the structure of the economy in terms of how things are done generally hasn't changed. So people have stopped farming and then they are now selling the purple on the streets. Thank you. I guess we are all getting hungry but I don't want to close the session until I'm sure that we have exhausted every opportunity for you to ask questions or make comments but if I don't see any did you want to have the final question please? It's about the first paper. It would help me, I don't know maybe a couple of other people to explain a little about the correlation between the Labour shares and the climatic zones. The idea that in South Korea there was a big reason agriculture was particularly capital intensive whereas in Ghana it was labour intensive. That's the particular response. Is that the picture? And if so, what's the connection between the climates and the capital? Great question. What we mustn't confuse is the technology with the labour or capital intensity. So all that we observe we are very, very cautious about this correlation because we don't want to talk about geographical predeterminism. All that we try and show with these patterns in the data if we plug them into a very basic and stylised model of how structural change works, we notice that there's very, very significant quantitative differences in terms of whether you seem to be in a high labour coefficient environment or in a low labour coefficient environment and in a way that's trying to excuse people who say well we can't just be the next South Korea. I mean there's a lot of other political economy reasons why South Korea was incredibly successful but just taking that as the sort of gold standard, the best you could do in terms of structural change it would not be possible if Ghana for instance had the same level of technological progress, if it had the same level of population growth and the same level of increase in wages, of course these are all endogenous to a certain extent but it would still not achieve the same level of structural transformation and income after 40 years. So it's important to notice that countries are different and if I can take that as an opportunity I wanted to ask Maggie, so you're using these large micro level data sets now and I know my micro friends in the room know that you are on to the path of the Holy Grail because micro is better but here's my question so I have 900 observations in my data data set and I use regressions that are based on say 30 because I do it country by country. You have in the hundreds of thousands of observations in your data set across a very diverse set of African economies. If you are a policy advisor and I think that's ultimately what you have to be what is your recommendation based on these hundreds of thousands observations from an incredibly diverse set of countries what is your policy advice to that one single politician are we not better off to doing just case studies? Why do we bother with these cross country analysis? Well you know what I have a question for you too but I'm actually going to put you off for a minute because because I have, we have not gotten to the point at which we're talking about policy recommendations. This is work in progress I'm just describing what's going on in the data and first understanding what's happening. You need to do that before before you can make policy recommendations. Having said that in the macro regressions when I pull all the, there are a variety of things I can do. I could do it country by country no problem. I have country fixed effects and so one thing we can do is and even with the country fixed effects the socio and economic things and the GDP are important but I could go country to country and run the same regressions and see I mean I'm betting you anything I would bet my first born son and I don't have one on the fact that I would see the coefficients look similar for every country but that's easy to check. Okay so that's one thing but can I ask you a question about your paper? Please be very, I mean we are now at 20 minutes still. It will be very quick but in that slide where you had a beta you know what is beta the share of in the technology. Okay so one thing I found really confusing about that slide is you pointed out these huge differences in productivity but the differences in consumption are minimal. Yes so I lost over that. There are two consumption variables there. One is consumption of agricultural goods. The other one is consumption of non-agricultural goods so following angles you know we now we consume what 5% of our income in terms of agricultural goods and so therefore across these three different scenarios there was very very little difference because people don't consume food once they get much richer but there was a vast difference. The South Koreans they use Samsung phones and Hyundai cars. The Ghanaians unfortunately still eat most of their income so you're very right that agricultural consumption was flat across these three scenarios. Non-agricultural was very far from flat. I have to say one more thing it will only take two seconds and for the thing about policy so actually one thing that I think is important so for example in those regressions this issue of youth unemployment comes out hugely important and a big problem and it's common to all countries so that's an important fact for policy makers to know it's something that African policy makers can rally around together you see. Well I have the final word and of course I want to thank the presenters for some very interesting and challenging presentations. I've always felt that it was the resource endowment of a country that to a large extent predetermined the type of technology that would be used so I've never and Hayami was one of my students you know I'm old enough to but anyway my first job was at Iowa State University and Hayami was getting his PhD there I've talked to him a lot about it but I've never been convinced with the idea that you can have a super production function that accommodates any type of resource endowment but that's a you know you're supporting me actually. Okay good so but anyway thanks to the presenters and also thank you very much for the incisive questions and I think we've passed the deadline and we all deserve to have a nice lunch.