 Yeah, thanks for this presentation. It was really interesting. I just want to maybe talk about two questions and then just raise an issue for everyone. So in the low-income countries, at least for Kenya and Ghana, you guys pointed to a low employment elasticity of growth. And I would argue that you're interpreting that indicator wrong because what you have is declining labor force participation. And since most people can't afford to be unemployed except the high end, if labor force participation declines, you have a decline in employment. Why do you have declining labor force participation? Because young people are staying in school longer. And that's a good thing. So actually for Kenya, I am not at all surprised that you have no relationship between informal sector employment and growth. There's no necessity of a relationship. The relationship between informal sector employment is related to the growth of the labor force and the labor force participation rate. So I would suggest you think about reinterpreting that statistic. I personally actually don't like it. I prefer the statistic that William cited, which is the poverty elasticity to growth. Then on the demographic dividend, I think I'm wondering if people are being optimistic. The size of the dividend depends on the rate of change. I can explain that intuitively, but Lee and Mason have done the math for it, so you can check it there. And the rate of change is very slow. Deaths are going down. Thank God, but fertility is going down very slowly. And so the likelihood of a dividend of any size is quite low. And it's true that it's important to have, you know, education policies, et cetera. But there's another policy that's needed before that in order to actually get the dividend in the first place. And finally, I think I want to pick up where Lemma left off. I had written down on my notes savings. It would be really great to discuss the savings rate in Africa and the role of private and public savings in finance, domestic private and public savings and financing growth, why the savings rate is low. Lemma, I was intrigued by your idea that financial sector reform could raise it. But you can talk about that in the comments. But I just think a little discussion about the savings rate might have been helpful. And it's your turn, Mr. Central Banker. Thank you. Thank you. I want to pick up on an issue raised by Lemma on the development of state promoting inclusive growth. And I just want to get from the presenters the lessons from these lines on constructing a developmental state. Given what Ernest pointed out yesterday, that the objectives of these politicians seem to be focused more at getting reelected, as opposed to longer term objectives that are required for a developmental state. Thank you for these quite interesting presentations. My name is Knut Tonstall. I come from Noura de Norway. It would have been nice also to include Ethiopia, which is a country with very strong family planning policies and an extremely high savings rate. It's approximately 35% of disposable income divided by GDP. So it's twice as high as the average in Africa. And in Ethiopia, also, there is only government banking, as was in both Korea and Taiwan province during the whole 60s and 70s. So actually the period of extremely strong growth in many of these East Asian countries was a period of pure government banking and no private banks at all. So I think one experience from Africa is that the liberalization of the banking sector has contributed to lower savings probably, more credit going to households than before, and also very high margins in the banking sector. The banking sector is the most profitable sector in Africa apart from resources. I think that the rate of return, for instance, in Kenya just a couple of years ago on shares was 27%. So it's a problem that the industry is competing with governments, with consumers, and with the banks themselves for credit. So you have extremely expensive finance for domestic industries. That is one of the reasons why you don't have more industrial development in Africa and why they had it in Asia, I think. It would be, in my view, the liberalization of credit happened too early in Africa. In Asia, they waited in Korea and Taiwan until the 80s and the 90s. So it has come a bit too early in Africa. I would like to hear some comments on that. Thank you. Thank you. I'm Donald Maher from Repo Tanzania. I have one question to William. When I followed your presentation, unless I'm mistaken, in one slide you showed quite a drastic decline in the growth rate of the finance sector between 2015 to 2017. I would like to know what derived that decline and what effect that might have on the real sector of the economy. Thank you. These were very insight of presentations. Rolf van der Hoeven of the Institute of Social Studies. And I think one of the points you made, how important the labor market is. Now, what struck me in the presentations of all the studies is that you look mainly at the formal labor market and very little at the informal labor market, something mentioned in between. But if you see the numbers, it's 75% of the people are engaged or work, how do you, in the informal sector. So in that respect, I have one question and one suggestion. The question is, the informal sector that was a research project, partly in wider ISS, Michael Grimm was involved. Actually, if you decompose the informal sector, it's not a uniform sector at all. There are, according to that research project that was mainly done in West Africa, French-speaking West Africa. There are gazelles in the informal sector. About 20% of the activities in the formal sector are growing. Then you have a middle class of about 10, 20% of the informal sector with a bit of support. They can also grow and you have both in those countries then, 40 to 50% of the informal sector for which the informal sector is actually no employment. It's just to save life, to stay on living. And so my question is, can we change the research that we focus much more on the potential of the upper part of the formal sector in a number of activities? But for that we need numbers, so we need to do research on that. So it's a question, have you, in your work, have you been able to dig out already some of those aspects of a dynamic part of the formal sector and a non-dynamic part of the formal sector? And secondly, how would you go about it for the next phase of your research? Thank you very much. So I think we can take two more. There was Nigel and then in front here. Thanks. And I think it's been, this has raised many, many issues, but just a few sort of slightly scattered comments. I think the first would have been useful unless I missed it in the beginning to have a bit more of a description on who the lions were and maybe a bit more around this research. That seemed to be, we got sort of pockets of it. You've got to buy the book for that. I'm a civil servant. I can't afford it. Just a comment also on the demographic dividend. Why do we call it a dividend? Is that something I know it's sort of been coming on? Shouldn't we, as in Sam's presentation around the challenges with Mozambique, shouldn't we start dropping the term dividend and calling it a burden or challenge or something along those lines? Maybe not the most politically correct comment, but do we still need to keep calling it the demographic dividend? Then just a question for Carmen. I mean, you mentioned transport and communications being, it's grown particularly rapidly, but as Per Stiglitz's comment, is it really a sector that is driving the economy? Transport and communications, those are dependent on other sectors. So I don't see how it's a driver of, as a sector. It's very much dependent on the growth in other sectors. And then just a comment on the desegregation of the public sector and the, or the, the role of the unions in the public sector. I think unlike firms where you've got unionized and non unionized firms. In the public sector, there's public sector bargaining and in a way the unions are there to deal with sort of micro issues from a, at a level. So I'm not sure that your, your statistics can, is it really the case that there's a distinction between those that are, that are part of union, that are unionized or not. So I'm not convinced about that. And then finally just a comment, I will, I think there could be a lot more work around this term, the developments, developmental state. It's not just about an approach, but it's around how one builds and commits to perhaps from a political, from a leadership perspective, how one really builds capacity in the state. So it's not just about an approach or a policy choice. It's really around building capacity. And I think this is where Africa is generally has a very, very long way to go in terms of building up the capabilities to intervene as a comment. Thanks. Thank you so much. And thanks all presenters for the good presentations. I'm called Susan Kavma from McKay University in Uganda. My comment is on structure transformation. And I, I want, I'm reconciling the talk we've heard from Stiglis with what we've just heard. There is an issue of comparative advantage. Should Africans completely drop that idea of comparative advantage, all we should think about it and look at sectors that give us comparative advantage. When Ndugu Professor Juguna was presenting, I was surprised he didn't talk much about tourism in Kenya. So I think Africa, we need to identify our comparative advantage, taking us back to the role of agriculture. Professor Stiglis told us that agriculture shouldn't be seen just as an end, but that means to enable us to achieve so much. We know that productivity is driven by capital. It's augmented by capital. Perhaps that is a line we need to take, that we should also increase the productivity in agricultural tourism, whatever comparative advantage is, so as to provide lessons and also achieve many other objectives that we can achieve. The second one is those on skills mismatch. But I presented this, that there's a skills mismatch in Ghana. I think I would like to differ. When you look at your presentation, when you're looking at the sectors that have a high demand for labor, it was social services, business and the like. And then even in the supply side, it is still that, you know, individuals are rational. They'll demand courses that give them, they have higher employment opportunities. So I think we need to rethink the issue of skills mismatch. In my view, it's mainly a problem of low demand, low jobs created. That is why we have unemployment. Okay. Should we go in reverse order? Let's start with Carmen. Let me do one. Well, let's just start with Carmen. We'll end with Lema. How about that? So, yeah, I'll address some of the questions more related to my presentation. I guess from Nigel, we had some comments about transport and communications. I suppose in the sense that we use the word driver, it's that it's a source of more rapid employment growth relative to other sectors. I think part of this sector has kind of direct demand like this kind of consumer demand, but part of it is also due to linkages to other sectors. So I think we have to then figure out how much of this is kind of like direct demand versus linkages, which I don't really have the answer now. But I mean, I guess we were not kind of trying to encourage the idea that this is all we can rely on. I think that's a proper industrial policy and industrialization strategy is still required and services sectors that have some export components might be useful to focus on. So yeah, I think you have to have a more diverse approach to that. On the public sector union question, I mean, I suppose we are using the standard labor force surveys and now we would probably have to look into that more in detail as you have discussed about how bargaining takes place. It's not really something I can answer right now, but it's something we should is probably important and we should look into, I think. On the demographic dividend, it's interesting you ask the question, but essentially it should be a dividend if the ratio of effective workers to effective consumers rises, so that average income per capital rises. The problem comes is that if there's not sufficient employment, then you're not getting the rise in that ratio that gives you the growth boost. So for South Africa, there was somewhat of a demographic dividends, but it seems to have all dissipated by now. So I'm not sure how that's been estimated for other countries. Yeah, I think that's it. Thank you for some very interesting comments. Yeah, just I guess I'm scattered responses. In respect to the question about the demographic dividend, yeah, I mean, I would certainly reinforce exactly what Carmen mentioned and reinforce as well that I think unfortunately in my reading of the Mozambican policy environment, firm, robust policies towards fertility or birth control have been lacking. So that has been a real element that's missing in the broader discussion. And of course, that is creating these challenges because if these new workers aren't workers, they remain dependent. And so you don't get the demographic dividend that could emerge. On the role of the banking sector and financial sector, I think this is a very interesting area that admittedly I think needs a bit more research. From what I know about the Mozambican banking sector experience, I think there's two things that are worth pointing out. One, there has been a substantial increase in the banking sector or substantial growth in the banking sector over time. Nonetheless, this has two components. One, it has been associated with extremely high profit margins, but largely due to the relationship it has with the public sector. So the public sector is just re-channeling funds through on a very short term basis. So the banks don't need to go anywhere to earn money. They can just basically finance the public sector on short term debt. And secondly, while there has been some increase in credit to the private sector, this is very short term credit often around consumer goods. So you don't get what you might call productive credit with a long term focus. Why that's the case? I mean, that's, of course, a much broader discussion. So I think that is an interesting area where policy perhaps could be much more effective. Two briefly, two brief comments on the developmental state. And I think this discussion about the developmental state is extremely interesting. But I do have two concerns, I think, relating back to one of the comments, implementation capacity, you know, to implement developmental state-like policies seems to be highly problematic. And my experience has been that there's no shortage of policies. The problem is the implementation. And I think many of us who've worked in developing countries would probably not about that. So, you know, we can have great policies with great objectives and, you know, and that look good on paper. But the problem is they just stay on paper. So how do we get to the implementation stage and effective implementation? The other point about the developmental state, at least the lessons from the Mozambican experience is that I think before we even think about getting the policies right, let's just not get them wrong. I mean, I know that seems a bit flippant. But actually, I mean, I think it's easier to identify the wrong policies that genuinely damaging policies than identifying, well, this is the right or optimal set of policies. So I think, and I think there, if we shift the focus to creating institutional environments which avoid the wrong policies, then that might be a productive first step towards a longer-term goal of developing towards a developmental state. And I would probably say, at least in my experience, that that first step is necessary, at least in some countries. And I can't speak for all of them. I'll leave it there for now. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. Let me start with the questions from the reverse order. Start with your point about can we use the relative comparative advantage that we have, even the sectors? And you even pointed that I didn't talk about Kenya's tourism. But I think the point I was making is that we saw, we've resolved the binding constraints that are preying some of the sectors. Then those sectors will take their advantage in terms of the resolution of the constraints. And let me give you an example. Tourism is one of them. But you can see how Kenyan tourism servers just because of perhaps even terrorist attack or even transport to some areas. Look at the catfrawa industry. Kenya was leading in catfrawa. It's still reading in catfrawa industry. But if you look at, if you were, if you got the hot rod of the farms in the catfrawa that have produced catfrawa for the last perhaps 20 or so years, then you find that they are empty. They are migrating to Ethiopia. That's why Ethiopia is becoming the second in terms of catfrawa industry. The question then you ask, what is the problem? And you come and find that there are some very, they can be resolved. One of them is labor conflicts. The other one is up definition of appropriate definition of property rights. They are they have been working on is being encroached. And the third one is purely the general the power that is power services that this electricity in terms of control of price and even outages. So you find that these are problems that can be solved. So we go back to binding constraints. That's why my argument was that Kenya has a vocational advantage. You can actually bring in some infrastructure or physical infrastructure as well as any other form of infrastructure. And even the legal frame strengthen the institutional and legal frameworks. And then you will find that some of the sectors will take advantage of that. And that is where the problem is coming in. I think Nigel and Rui is about the development of state. I think it's an interesting concept. But we go back to yesterday. Is it yesterday? You're talking about, you know, I think the direction by honest yesterday. And for example, I've been looking at Kenya itself. And one of the what intrigues me is actually to see what happens with political cycles after every erection and all that. We came from a very difficult past in 2003 and look at it. President Kibaki said that what we really need is policies to restart and sustain growth. And all of a sudden from 2003 to 2007, everything works so well. And everybody was very, very optimistic to the point where they came up with a vision 2030. But just look at what happens in 2007, 2008. And since then we have been grappling with that. Look at the new government. What is the problem? The problem is that every time we have a political erection cycle, new governments come in, they lose focus, and they have massive coordination failures. And that is where it checks the development so far. That is why everybody thinks we are going to have a developmental state. But in the end, you look at where we right now, right now, although I wouldn't want to criticize things in Kenya right now. But you can see the new president now is focusing on his second time is focusing on the big four. But then we had vision 2030. Where did it go? We are not yet 20, 30 yet. So you can see lack of focus and then massive coordination problems come in. So I think I like the point about financial sector development and even liberalization. And obviously the competition of resources in terms of the industry is competing for resources and because the credit becomes very, very expensive. But of course, at the very end, we have to come up with this debate. Again, financial repression is not going to work, liberalized. And then when you liberalize, then the market structure is also very problematic. So we have to go back and fix the market structure right now, because I think there's a point that was raised by Luis about savings. One of them is if you look at the Kenyan case in terms of virtual savings, it's actually massive savings. And I've been looking at the characteristics of those who are saving. But essentially, they are saving for short-term very, very, very, very small investments because they are also constrained by their levels of income. But most of them are actually saving to solve some cash constraint because they are cash constrained. But if we want to roll out these mega projects in terms of solving the problem of savings investment cycles, it can be done. But we have to go back again and say, how do we fix? Because the problem is not lack of, the problem is sometimes lack of bankable projects that you can roll out. And that is where, again, we come back to biting constraints. I look into, I think Wadhuven and Luis, again, the informal sector, I think we need to break it down. And that's the point. We were trying to see everybody, every write-up in Kenya is that the informal sector is going to be the one to absorb employment. The informal sector is expanding. But when you look at, it doesn't look like it's correlated with everything. So it's like, it's an escape route. It's an escape route. It is maybe a discriminant queuing process of people waiting to be employed in informal sector jobs, but they are not for the coming. So then you find that the units themselves don't expand. It is the number of units that increase. And something that we can look at. I think, I think I'll stop. So just a quick one. I will start with Luis comments on the interpretation of the employment elasticity. And I think if you just look at the participation rate to interpret it, you may also have a challenge. Because in developing countries, you need to put the inactivity into perspective. Those in school and those who are not in school. And if you look at the data that Ghana has, of course, we are having people staying in school for a long time. But we also have inactivity outside the school system also going up. So if you look at the net, not in employment education and training, over a period, you see that is also going up. So if you absorb unemployment into net, then you see that, yes, the employment elasticity issue is well interpreted, especially if you break the inactivities into that. So before interpreting, you need to look at the participation. All right. But you need to also look at the breakdown a sufficient condition to be able to interpret the inactivity. So that is the reaction to that. And the question about the financial, and I asked myself, that was the update from Tanzania. Over the last three years, 2015, 16, 17, I saw the financial intermediation, the growth going down. And I asked myself what is happening. The first thing that came into mind was what perhaps the regulator is trying to crack the whip, trying to sanitize the situation. But that only started last year. So what happened 15, 16, and 17? So I don't have an answer to it. Perhaps I need to dig deeper to find out why the growth in the financial sector over the last three years has been going down. And the scale mismatch, I don't know whether in a slide I put a question mark. And that's why when you were asking the question, I was nodding. I just stated that I'm doing to look at the scale mismatch deeper. And a PhD student I'm so biased in is looking at that. And what comes up that if you look at advertiser job vacancies in Ghana over from 1984 up to current, and of course it is correlated by what the central bank also does in terms of advertising. Most of the job that are advertised are not the science based, mostly looking for people in the social science and so on. So it also brought a question. So why the scale mismatch? And I conducted interview with employers. And the employers made it clear that you look at it and if manufacturing is going down, those sectors that require engineers are not growing. So you expect that people who even come out with engineering degree try to shift to the humanity because they think that is where the jobs are. So then it also brought some kind of thinking. So is it the stem or is it the fact that the jobs are not there for the stem? And if you have high informality, then it means that we need to look at the stem question very well. So we'll be able to have the stem to very useful if the Ghana economy is able to grow, be able to get those sectors that absorb people with the stem. But that is some of the things that came up in terms of interaction. So normally when I talk about the stem mismatch, I put a question mark because from the demand side, it looked like the jobs that the labor demand is coming from. For those who are in the humanities, but then it's not coming for the stem. But then we continue to have that. So we need it need to be interrogated quite critical. I think I'll end here. Has told me that I only have one minute. So I just want to weigh in on finance. I know that we blame financial liberalization, high interest margins. One thing that we need to be aware is because we have dysfunctional banking systems. We haven't we have not gotten the design features of finance in Africa. And one of the low-hungry foods is integration of finance across countries. And this how these ingredients are out there. The issue is the political economy on the development of the state. To me, if you have a benevolent social power, you actually get social optimality. But that's not very likely to happen. So these things are very specific. And I know that things have actually happened in that context in Ethiopia. And it's worked in the short span, but there has also been overshooting. Because remember what happened when they started expanding beyond artists? There was a massive movement. And we have the rise of Abid Ahmed. And now he's talking about privatization, liberalization. So I think you're right. It's a cycle. It's a political cycle. And so when it comes to government, the issue is not that government should not play a role. Yeah, you need a wealth-functioning government for wealth-functioning markets. The issue is whether or not the government is in its comparative advantage or operating in areas of comparative advantage. And typically what happens is that it ends up operating both areas of comparative disadvantage and advantage, and then creates what is not the mixed economy and then becomes mixed up economy. That's the issue. So yeah. Okay, thank you. Great. I thought we would actually have time for a second round. That's not going to happen. Enjoy your lunch, but please join me in thanking the authors.