 So thank you, thank you so much for the introduction. And yeah, it's great to be here and great to see some familiar faces on the call. So I'm going to be talking about state owned enterprises and particularly looking, I guess at their role in climate change and and and in the electricity sector in particular will present some thoughts about what you know what role these entities play and and and how we might motivate them to do more to decarbonize. As So Young mentioned, my a lot of this work is is informed by work that I did at Stanford as a as a doctoral student, I finished my doctoral work last year. I continued working in this area through through my affiliation at Oxford, but have also increasingly done sort of applied work with SOEs. So, this presentation is a combination of some of the academic work, as well as some sort of practice, you know, some work I've done in practice. And so I'll try to keep it. I'll try to combine a little bit of the kind of theory with with with with some observations from from working with some of these firms. So the overview of what I'll try cover today is really there's really three parts. Firstly, very briefly about what I mean by an estate owned enterprise, why they matter for the climate crisis. I'll do a deep dive into the electricity sector in particular. And then at the end will make some what could be done better to motivate these firms to to to decarbonize, and really the key outcome I think that I'd like to get to at the end of this presentation is for for folks to have a better understanding of the pathways for decarbonizing SOEs and how they differ. And how we ought to think about them differently to investor owned firms. So, I've started with this picture of what what we might think of as the archetypal state owned enterprise, this is the state grid corporation in China, which, as many of you know, is, you know, the second largest firm by revenue behind Walmart globally, I think it employs something like a million people. It's the largest electric utility globally. And, you know, these types of behemoths. Oh and importantly it's it's 100% owned by the Chinese government. And so ordinarily I think when folks think about SOEs they think about these types of behemoths. And indeed, these types of 100% owned very large corporations are oftentimes what we are referring to. When we talk about state owned companies. This data, which is taken from the IMF from 2020 shows that indeed Chinese SOEs are very significant contributor to the total pool of what we what what we might think of when we when we look at the universe of these firms. But of course, China is not the only story. There are SOEs still in in in many countries in, you know, many of you will be surprised to know that in the United States, there are many state owned companies in the electricity sector in particular the Tennessee Valley Authority, the thousands of municipal owned firms. There are many state owned enterprises in in Europe in Australia and many other liberal democratic countries around the world and so. So I wanted to make that point first and also to highlight here through this through this figure that state owned enterprises are remain very significant parts of the global economy. This figure is showing you the share of state owned enterprise assets amongst the largest 2000 firms and you can see there that it's it's in 2018 it's roughly representative of one fifth of of the global economy. So very significant indeed, and particularly when we're thinking about climate change. So, you know, state owned enterprises now take multiple different forms. I think the traditional one was what I was explaining before about state state grid. But after sort of decades of reform efforts by the IMF the World Bank and other development finance institutions, as well as by governments themselves. So the picture of SOEs is slightly different now with there are several firms that are partially privatized, as well as many that remain wholly state owned. And, and I think, in addition to that, what's what's important and what will highlight what I'll highlight later in this presentation is that in addition to variation in the amount of state ownership there's also quite a lot of governance models that are used to govern these firms and from my point of view at least I think those governance models are really critical for when we think about climate change because they really influence the dynamic efficiency that the rate of the ability of these firms to change in response to transitions in the economy and enter climate risks more broadly but I'll come back to that point a bit later on. Returning now to the universe of SOEs to give you a bit more of a color, you know, a bit more color to what what we're talking about here, and just to kind of highlight the significance of these firms when we're thinking about climate change in particular. And that really just highlights the, the distribution or the, you know, the, the distribution of these firms regionally and across sectors and highlighted here obviously some some significant high emitting sectors, I've highlighted the electricity sector because that's what we're going to focus on today. But, but you know, there's, there's a lot of really important work that's going on with respect to SOEs in other sectors in the oil and gas sector and in particular is one that you know colleagues at Stanford and elsewhere and have been doing lots of important work on as well. And what's what's I think interesting here and that folks often find interesting on this slide is that there are a number of firms here that are that that perhaps you've seen before, but may not have realized we're state owned enterprises in the transportation sector there are a number of airlines in the electricity sector as well, some familiar names there. So, what what what this really all means, I guess for for climate is that SOEs are very significant global emitters and there are some early efforts underway to estimate the contribution of SOEs to to global emissions. And so my colleagues, Alex Clark and Philip Benoit from Columbia University have recently just put out a working paper where they've looked at a sample of 300 SOEs and estimate the emissions of these firms to be about 7.5 gigatons. And they've looked at direct emissions from from these firms alone which on on their estimates that would put SOEs as a group as a as a as a, as the, as larger emitters than every country on earth, except for for China. So, underlying, I guess the importance of, of thinking about SOEs for for climate change. I wanted to go now a little deeper into the electricity sector in particular as I mentioned before, and really these first couple of slides are are the more sort of specific representation of some of the more general points I made earlier. So the first point being that that in the electricity sector, state owned companies still are the dominant players. So on the, on the left hand side. There's some analysis that I've done looking at a representative sample of of global utilities and sorry of, of global electric, electric generating assets, and, and the sort of ultimate owners of those assets. And, and based on that analysis. You know, we can see that the, the vast majority of firms that that are electric generators in the electricity sector remain state owned. We can come back to definitions later on but in this case the what what what I used to define state ownership was firms that had over a small threshold so 10% of state ownership. And you can see on the right hand side, there's the global distribution I guess of those of those firms so countries that are shaded darker are countries where there is more state ownership in the electricity system of those countries, the main point being that that there is significant state ownership in the electricity sector across countries. And this matter is because state power companies own very significant fossil fuel based generation assets. So this figure just compares investor owned utilities to state owned utilities, looking at at three different energy sources so this is looking at asset level data from 2018 up, sorry up to 2018. And I think, you know, the main point here is that state owned companies are holding a very significant share of coal assets in particular. So, so that's the bad news. The good news is that, and sorry, the bad news I think is very consistent with the, the Orthodox story about state owned enterprises that these are lumbering behemoths that are very resistant to change. And, and rarely do so. But what's, you know, interesting is there's some emerging evidence that state owned enterprises in the electricity sector at least have also been at the forefront of transition. So, these firms are in some cases. The first movers in in making technological adopting technologies and in developing new technologies. So, to give you a sense of that, I guess on the, on the left hand side here we have. We've got a figure here which which lists out the largest global utility. It shows the relative adoption of clean energy versus certain fossil fossil fuel energy. And the lighter shades. The lighter shaded companies here are those that have greater state ownership. The point being that you can see at the top of this list there are quite a number of state owned companies that that hold a really large proportion of clean energy. And more anecdotally there's, there's obviously a number of of case studies that have been put forward about state owned companies and the transition, perhaps one of the more famous ones is the story of or stead, which used to operate as the Danish national oil and gas company and is now the largest offshore wind producer globally. And it started making that transition it's a partially privatized state owned enterprise. You know, for reasons we can talk about, you know, leveraged I guess it's, it's role as a state owned enterprise. Quite effectively to make that transition. The other, you know, the other case study is what I've highlighted here is the New York power authority and some innovative work that they have been doing in New York State. So, happy to come back to those later on, if folks have questions about those. But the main point being that there is this emerging evidence that is contrary, I think, to kind of orthodox economic theory about state owned enterprises suggesting that, in fact, sometimes SOEs can be quite innovative. And so there's there as a consequence of that there's been a recent proliferation of academic work, looking at why some state owned enterprises, particularly in the electricity sector are more willing and able to innovate and and in particular to adopt clean energy and others. And I won't go into the details of this but this is this slide is just to represent simplified way I guess how we could think about the literature in this area. So I've given you, I think I shared with Katie and the team, an article here from the OECD was the Prague at all paper, which really represents I guess the first category of how folks have been thinking about this or there's some analysis which suggests that there's something inherent in state ownership in in in government owning firms that makes them more able to decarbonize and to change. So there's, there's, you know, that's that's in a very simplistic way the argument of Prague at all. And there's, there's kind of a middle group who that, well, state ownership in and of itself may not be the whole story and that actually it's a combination of state ownership and the prevailing policy conditions of the government that owns the firm that seems that that matters and highlight here a working paper from some folks at MIT, who make that argument with respect to a bunch of utilities in the EU. And then there's a third category which I put myself and colleagues from Oxford and Columbia mentioned before who were on this topic who who take a slightly different view which is that state equity ownership actually doesn't matter that much, what matters for decarbonization and for innovation at state owned power companies is is more driven by the corporate governance financing structures so state equity may play some role at the margins but it's not the kind of main explanatory variable. And so I wanted to present that to you because what I'll go on to say now really fits within my kind of theory of of of explaining this but of course there are other theories and I've given you a paper which presents another perspective on this. So, so I guess. You know the way I look at this is that. And I've tried to simplify it here really that we can think about innovation at state owned power companies on on the basis of two sort of vectors. On the one hand there's there's lots of variation as I mentioned before in the governance models of how governments manage the state owned companies in their portfolio and I'll explain what I mean by the governance model in a moment, but the basic point is that on the one hand you can have very controlling strong states that that have a lot of control over SOEs. And then on the other hand, governance models where the state gives much more freedom to the SOE. And then on the y axis. There's variation in how governments think about innovation and their their interest in SOE so on the one hand. There are some governments that are very eager to use SOEs as a as a driver or a pillar of their innovation policy. And then, on the other hand, some, some governments that are disinterested in using SOE for that purpose, but instead want to use them for other purposes and so if we split the universe up in this way, we can plot. Utilities as fitting within each of these different. Each of these different quadrants and so I've just given some examples here of utilities that may be familiar to folks that might fit within these different categories so I mentioned the New York power authority before. And NYPA, you know, has operates more within this strong state of the state government has quite a lot of influence over the SOE. And, and it operates in an environment where the, the, the state government has strong interests in using the utility for clean energy innovation. And this quadrant to I've given the example of New Zealand's Genesis, which is a partially state owned power company operates under much more independent model. Again with a government that with relatively strong interests. And, you know, I mentioned Orsted before. The other example there is CFE, which is a monopoly state owned utility in Mexico, which again operates under the strong state model in a context where there's, there's less interest in using it for clean energy innovation. I should explain now what I mean by the governance model and what specifically, what are the kind of aspects that make this up. So, there's a lot here and I won't go through all of it, just in the interest of time. But the purpose of this slide is to highlight the various tools, the financing and regulatory tools that governments can use and do use with respect to managing their state power companies. You know, we've clustered this in different categories. So, so the state states have some direct powers over a state over the state owned enterprises they manage. This can include, for example, approving the SOE's investment strategy, it can include introducing conditions on the types of fuel that they use for for generation. States in some cases have power to appoint board members and management as well. And as you can imagine, that can very significantly increase the level of influence that the state has over the utility and its decision making. There are also a number of rules, sort of conditions with respect to financing so some utilities are able to access private capital markets, which, which can give them a level of independence from the state. Others are limited in their ability to do that. There are a few terms here. The tunneling and propping, which may not be familiar to folks that really refers to the practice which is common within SOE's where where the state either will the state will either take some of the revenue from from SOE's and divert it for other policy purposes. Or, or conversely, can can provide financing to the SOE. Even if it's pursuing an activity that's not commercial. And then the last category is state financing rules, which, which also can can vary the level of state control so in some cases, governments offer debt relief, or government guarantees. They offer concessional financing for for certain projects. Oftentimes we see this in relation to fossil fuels, a country that has very substantial fossil fuel interests will often use their SOE to to support that industry. So we'll get into this in a little bit more detail in a moment so present a case study of a single firm just to kind of illustrate some of these features. Before I go to the slide actually. So, you know, the, the research that's been done in this area and has shown has looked at sort of different firms ownership structures. Holi owned firms or listed firms and then compared the clean energy outcomes of those firms, taking account of the variation of the different governance structures. So in other words, holding holding equity constant, what effect does these differences in corporate governance have for for clean energy outcomes. Now, in the interest of time I won't be able to do a full comparison of multiple different firms but as I said before I'll just do a deep dive into into one case study to give you a bit of an example of of how these features play out on the ground and we can we can discuss others later. Before we move on, can I ask one quick question about just more fundamental SOE. Yes, of course, yeah. Yeah, so it is very interesting that, you know, the globally SOE has a larger portion to the to the carbon emission. I'm not very curious about, you know, it's apart from the carbon emission share, but you know, what was at the beginning that the, that create the SOEs, you know, like, why the first point that you know government create the SOEs and is there any movement that you know is trying to, you know, like let those state owned enterprise go into the market. Yeah, it's, it's a great question so young. I mean I think, historically, SOEs have been introduced in government, well in circumstances where there's a market failure, and so where private firms have not been yet willing or able or to, to, you know, to provide services. And so you see a lot of state owned enterprises in the electricity sector for instance because that that model came out of. I think in its very early days, when electric utilities were first created. There was a problem in the United States of private utilities, basically using their monopoly power to charge exorbitant amounts for for electricity you had the development of municipal owned utilities to provide, you know, publicly owned electricity at cheaper prices. I think, you know, that's that's not always the case these days I think those variation in the prevailing kind of government sort of you know, government philosophies. And so you see, obviously, you know, very large number of SOEs as I mentioned before in China. Sometimes those SOEs are, are, are responding to a market failure and sometimes that's, that's just driven, you know, that's driven by the that the approach to the Chinese state to the economy. I, the other thing is that, you know, I think there's a lot of path dependency here so so you till so governments in previous years have set up state owned companies. And, and they haven't been able to relinquish control of those. And, and this case study that I was about to talk to is actually quite a good example of that so PLN is a monopoly utility in Indonesia. It is a very substantial global emitter. Because it, you know, provides electricity to 300 million people. And as I'll explain in a minute is very dependent on coal for power generation. But it was established. And as, you know, by the Indonesian state during a time when the government was very explicit about having a kind of a socialist approach to, to governing, and that was embedded in its constitution and, and as a consequence, there's been multiple efforts to privatize PLN over over the years. The Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and others I think have have made attempts, but, but because of the fact that it was, you know included in the Constitution. There was a path dependency that was created and it hasn't been able to be privatized. And so that phenomenon I think also repeats as well. Sorry, I can see. I can see a hand up. Yeah, sorry, that's, that's me puti. Hi there. Yeah, so I'm quick introduction first year engineering student I'm actually from South Africa. Worked a bit with escom so super super relevant and really excited about this talk. My question, I kind of go to two part question but I guess the first question is, how much of a factor does the actual ownership structure play in the manoeuvrability. And I think that is that there's also kind of the supporting regular regulatory infrastructure that this utility sort of sits in right so if we look at the case of escom for instance, this renewable IPP programs that have been mandated by government, but that might not work as well as say a renewable feed and tariff, which creates a lot more of a different market structure, or the system buyer for instance is embedded within escom and that obviously affects the manoeuvrability of that utility. And I guess it's just related to how much of a factor is ownership in the grinder scheme of things. And then the second part, you know, tied to that factor is the actual stretch of the utility itself. So, I think, you know, to your point there's, when you look at the trends of utilities there was this big shift from state on to some, some utilities privatizing, but there was also a big shift towards unbundling utilities. But as you see in Africa a lot of utilities are still very much vertically integrated. And I'd be curious to understand how much of a role that also plays in terms of driving towards, you know, decarbonization. Yeah, thanks for that's a great question and terrific to have you on the call I'm sure you'll have lots of other things to say. When when we get to the discussion but I think so I think to, I think you've raised a really important point which is, you know, the market structure, market structure matters a lot and I think part of what motivated. This research was was was precisely I think the point that you're making which was that oftentimes some of the earlier work that's looked at this is kind of looked at equity ownership state ownership in isolation of other other factors. And when clearly, you know, the market structure, whether whether utilities are vertically integrated whether there are IPPs as you say in in the market and whether. Yeah, I guess the way the government is intent, you know, using the utility within that broader context is really important. So, and some, let me try and cover off some of those points in this, in this case study because I touch on some of them. And maybe we can come back to those issues at the end if we have time. I think I want, I won't go through a lot of this background in great detail but it's suffice to say, I mentioned before PLN, it's based in Indonesia, Indonesia's very significant global emitter, roughly 4% of global emissions, the power sector PLN is is a monopoly utility there. And so, it's, it's the main contributor to power sector emissions which we've included here on the on the right hand side. And again, I think the key point and I mentioned this earlier is that it's asset base the PLN asset bases is largely is fossil fuel. And it, it owns a lot of the assets itself. There is, there is, you know, there are some independent power producers who PLN purchases power from within the country. But again, the, the, the vast majority of those are from from fossil fuels. So to, I guess, return to that framework from before, we might think of PLN is fitting within this, the fourth quadrant really so within a strong state governance model, where there is, I'd say limited government production using the firm for clean energy purposes. I've put an arrow there, because I think there's been a few recent policy changes which suggests that that may be changing. But in any event, it's, it's, it's most appropriate I think to think of it as fitting within that quadrant. So to explain that a little further. I think this hopefully should cover some of, I guess, foodies question before which is, you know, how much does the broader context matter. And my answer to that would be it matters a lot. This image here is, is, is basically a map of the institutions governing PLN within Indonesia. And you can see there, there are, it's immensely complicated it's very far from being a utility that's operating in a market, a free market environment. And the utility is influenced by a whole range of policy determinants. The rules on on tariffs, for instance, and importantly are set by the DPR, which is the National Parliament so it's a very, it's, it's the tariffs are not market based there are politically set. And you can see that the, the Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources has a very significant say in terms of the, the strategy that the, that the firm pursues. There are a number of things here I won't go through all of them but the main point being that PLN is is very heavily regulated by the state and. And I think about that governance model that I outlined before. This is a sort of simple way of representing that. Obviously the red boxes are those categories which, which, you know, PLN might fall into where it's, it's, it's quite hamstrung and its ability to make technology change to change from it's very cold. And coal and oil dependent electricity generation structure because. Yeah, because of the, because of the level of state influence and, as I mentioned before the, the, the other interests driving the state's use of PLN and so what I mean by those other interests are. There are a set of really significant political barriers in the country to decarbonizing it. One being that that coal, the coal industry is, is very much at the center of, of energy security and regional employment and competitiveness. You know, there, there, there are a number of ways in which coal is is quite locked into the political economy of the country, key political figures own assets and, and some of the key mining businesses. There are also economic development objectives that the government is trying to achieve through exploiting its cheap coal, coal reserves. And that means what that means in PLN cases that there is a, there are subsidies, which, which basically enable PLN to access coal at a much cheaper rate than, than, than renewables and, and that in part is, is creating a stickiness where on a pure market you know renewable alternatives are now competitive with with fossil fuels. So, again, there's a lot there I won't go through each of those points in the interest of having a little bit of discussion at the end. I will just say on the right hand side here you know there are. Obviously very driven by politics. There are some signals that maybe the politics are changing Indonesia has, has set a, and, and that determined contribution under the Paris agreement of up to 41% emission reduction. You know a sizable proportion of that. And that sort of that NDC is trickled through the country's energy plan. And there's, there has been an increase in ambition. Over the last few years. And so, you know, in addition to that, the government is introduced some carbon pricing policies, which include the electricity sector and so there are some signals that things may be changing, but, but I guess what I presented to you was really the state of things as they are today. So, the last segment of this presentation is really then to think about well what, what, what might work I mean I've presented a fairly bleak picture, I think in relation to to PLN. We could do that analysis for a number of firms. And, and I guess we keep getting back to this question then of well what, what, what, what can be done about it what you know those. You're all doing this course I imagine because you're interested in clean energy transitions and you know the opportunities for sustainable finance to kind of influence firms. And so, I thought that I'd throw out some kind of high level ideas, and which we could, we could discuss a bit further. The first point I wanted to make though is that a lot of the kind of climate policy tools, I think which we have in our toolkit are not immediately that the logic of them does not work as effectively for state owned companies as as they do for investor owned firms so carbon pricing for instance really works effectively on the logic of firms that that care a lot about market signals and market price of technology so so you know if you put a price on carbon a traditionally acting market driven utility might might make a transition away from from from technology that that has this additional carbon price on top of it. But that does not work as well when we're talking about firms as we've seen in the Indonesian case that are making technology decisions on the basis of political and policy factors not just price signals. So the other kind of tool which I think is getting a lot of traction there's lots of discussion at the moment with the SEC's new rule making process underway on climate risk is, you know, financial regulation of in capital markets. So as I've discussed some SOEs are listed and so that can actually be a useful tool for some of them. But in many cases, again, SOEs are not really responsive to that because they don't have exposure to capital markets. Another category here I've put there is is sort of performance standards introducing performance standards for utilities. This can be quite effective but we know from research on SOEs that there's there's the persistent problems where you have a government that's trying to regulate the utility, which is also the owner of that utility creates a limitation on the effectiveness of government regulation. So, you know, point being that I think that what's needed I think when we think about SOE decarbonisation is a different toolkit starting from looking at the governance models that I've been talking about. And some of the factors that might influence the government priorities and how they use these firms so I've sketched out here again using that kind of basic framework. So I'll give you initial ideas and I'd be very interested to kind of, you know, hear thoughts and perspectives on this, on how, you know, how, how to influence SOEs so thinking about both of these vectors, you know, on the on the one hand, you know, how do you change government priorities and how they use SOEs. So I've suggested, you know, thinking, you know, lobbying for green industrial policy, using SOEs as a as a lever to gain a competitive advantage in a country. You know, creating, I guess, advocating for greater accountability and transparency for SOEs, particularly on in relation to their climate performance. So, you know, we see, although there's been quite a lot of improvement in in relation to listed companies and the information that they're expected now to produce to shareholders. That the uptake of similar reporting for SOEs is still quite limited and so there may be some gains there and having greater transparency so that we can continue to do research like the research I mentioned earlier and get better estimates of actually what share contribution do SOEs contribute to a country and to global emissions. Another idea there is on that factor is strategic climate litigation which might, which might sheet home responsibility to the state for an SOEs contribution to a country's carbon emissions. And then on the on the governance model side. You know, there, there, there are a number of activities, some of which have already ongoing so the way of disrupting a strong state kind of governance model is to is to to actually make the directors of state owned companies themselves responsible for the climate impact of firm so there's some work happening in Australia at the moment on analyzing the, the, the duties of directors of public authorities or best SOEs as they refer to their and and exploring whether there are actually embedded within the legal system that governs these firms, whether there are duties on directors to manage climate change risks. And some of the other kind of thoughts there on on the governance model was leveraging existing public oversight systems so a lot of SOEs are subject to state auditing bodies. So there are opportunities within the rules that govern state auditing to, to, to, to interrogate or to hold accountable SOEs for for their emissions. And then a couple of other thoughts there about how, how it may be possible to use private leverage the kind of private financing. To influence SOEs so, you know, obviously talked about PLN PLN holds something like $30 billion in, in, in debt of sizable proportion of that is private bond holders. And when, when you kind of break down and look at the actual entities that are holding PLN step, a lot of them are large financial institutions that have made commitments to net zero publicly so you know there may be opportunities to influence SOEs through through that mechanism as well. And then the final point there is just, there are still substantial SOE reform programs within, you know, development finance institutions World Bank, ADB, amongst others, still fund SOE reform programs. So, you know, another option is to is with with those ongoing efforts to, to kind of introduce a green reform process to think about these vectors, and, and make reforms that might actually incentivize technology change rather than just focusing as those programs currently do on on static efficiency to focus on dynamic efficiency as well. So, that was a very rapid overview. I'll stop there because I'm running out of time but thanks very much and really interested to hear your thoughts or questions. Thank you, Regina. Now let's open our stage for Christians from the audience tonight. Sure. Yeah, so so I just, I guess I have like one question on the matrix here, which is it almost seems like like inherently within this. How do you deal with such a scenario where you have a state owned entity that's say controlled by government but is more in the independent side of things. I was looking at a couple of these it seems like it's very much focused more on utilities, slightly within sort of the right side of the questions. Just curious to turn off if some of these can be applied to some of the more independent SOEs. Absolutely. I mean, I think, I think on the on the independent side I think there are actually quite a few different opportunities for influence so some of those firms for instance will have private equity holders in addition to the state equity holders and in some cases those private equity holders themselves it can be a useful sort of point of leverage. I gave the example of PLN and it's bond holders so the same logic might apply for for for the private holders of some of the more independent firms. I think the other things that are relevant there are, you know, I think in. I gave an example earlier on of Orsted, which was, which is a, I think rightly classified as an independent firm it's, it was partially privatized at the time that it made its kind of large sort of transition from being a national oil and gas company to being a offshore wind producer. And the way that it did that in part was it leveraged its ability to raise equity finance to kind of fund its offshore wind expansion. And so, you know, I think, I think, I think the thing with the independent firms is that they that because they're less influenced or there's less levers I guess for the government to influence them they're able to be driven more by their own strategic priorities and, and, you know, the influence of their investors their other investors, non state investors and so in Orsted's case at the time that they that the CEO wanted to make this transition. You know there's some, there's some case study documentation of this that suggests that the government was very strongly opposed to that strategy. They wanted to that they wanted Orsted to remain a national oil and gas company. Because, you know, there was more independence because they were able to raise that that money, because there were fewer levers of state control, the CEO was able to kind of pursue that strategy anyway. So, yeah. And sorry, maybe just one one more quick question would just be. I noticed that I think one of the hard topics often spoke about to decarbonizing energy credits is decentralization. So, the integration of, you know, decentralized renewable energy assets within the grid. So what's, you know, on that in terms of the, the SOE models since I think from the perspective it's kind of a threat to their existing business. Yeah, I mean it's I think it's a threat. It's a threat to a lot of utilities. And it depends a lot on, it depends a lot about on the kind of broader structure of the of the electricity market in that we're talking about so I think in relation to monopoly and utilities I think the kind of distributed energy problem. And it is very significant because, yeah, because, you know, the monopoly provider usually has very substantial asset ownership, and they need a path to wind down those assets. You know, I think that's this, this is a live issue with the case study I presented with PLN where you know it's in a region where there is potentially that there's there's a lot of potential for much greater renewable and distributed energy uptake in particular, with a very young coal fleet, and, you know, very few options to finance a transition away from that coal fleet. It's tricky to do so. So, you know, and in to explain that a bit more, you know, there are some proposals that are being explored at the moment for the private sector for development finance institutions to in effect by PLN existing coal assets as a way to kind of give them a bit more freedom to generate power from other sources but, but it's, but but a lot of private investors are resident, you know, hesitant to take on those assets because they've made commitments to the market that they want on coal assets, even if the coal purchases to eventually wind down that asset. So there's, yeah, there's there's a number of kind of intersecting problems here I think in addition to, I guess, it's, well, I guess it's not just a state owned enterprise problem I think it's a it's a kind of a broader problem for electric utilities. Thank you, I think our our time is up. And then we have to save a lot of a lot more cushion like, especially for myself, but we can have a separate discussion but for those of you who have cushioned to join us in the study, you can always email him because he's at Stanford, which is great. Thank you for joining us today sharing your work. Thanks so much thanks for having me.