 Yn ni'n fwy o. Roedd e'n fwy o'r bwysig, a'r bwysig o'r cyhoedd. Mae'n gweinio y rhan o gyfan y cwmfor yn gyflawn. A'r hyn o'r ffordd, rwy'n gweithio, mae'n gweithiau ei ffordd yn lleiwysig. Mae'n gweithio'r hoffi, a'r hoffi'n gweithio, wedi'u hoffi o'r cwmfor yn cael ei wneud. Mae'r hoffi o'r hoffi o'r cwmfor wneud i'w wneud y cwmfor yw y gallu ei wneud ffordd, pitched it's when people have had time to think and debate and consider the discussions before. So I'm hopeful that there's going to be plenty of scope for some interesting discussion. On our panel today, we've got, JoLin, have I pronounced it right? It's Yw Llin. Yw Llin? Lovely. I could never be a BBC presenter. My pronunciation is terrible. Y Llym. OK, that's lovely. Tobias, is Tobias here? Not yet. OK, so hopefully Tobias is making his way. Nick, we haven't heard anything from Tobias, have we? No, we have. I think he's stuck in the attendees' room again. I wish he's been our arch-nemonist, isn't it, this thing? Yes, I am. Hi. Yeah, I was as a participant, not as a panellist or something like that. Sorry for that. Yes, I'm sorry. I hope you're feeling better. Yeah, better at least. Thank you. Good. And then we've got David. Hi, David. Nice to see you. And Paul. So we're all OK to go in the order that's on the agenda, yeah? OK, then we will start. I think, again, there's four of you, so I'll work on the ten minutes. We'll try and keep quite strict to the ten minutes. We'll see how it goes. But let's aim for that. So, Ylyn, would you like to start? And I don't know if you'd like to share your screen you're welcome to, or if you haven't got PowerPoint slides, just fire away. That's fine. So I teach international relations at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town, South Africa. The paper that I'm presenting today is I actually wrote it in 2017 for an Isidarco summer school in Cyprus. And it's one of those papers that has been in the draw and then it comes out and I try to rework it into an article and I put it back in the draw. You know, it's just not somehow going anywhere. So I thought this would be the last digital thing to do something with it and present it here, maybe get some feedback that would set a cause for actually reworking into something that's useful that can be published. The other argument in this paper is that outlawing nuclear weapons should be placed in the context of outlawing war. As you know, the discursive history of the TPNW is that of the humanitarian initiative, which roots the argument for banning nuclear weapons in use in Bello. So what is legal in war or international humanitarian war rather than use at Bellum or when it is legal to go to war. The move from the nuclear abolition movement may have been the most logical and direct way to achieve a ban treaty of the sort. It definitely worked for chemical and biological weapons as well as for anti-personal landmines and cluster music munitions. It also closes the loophole that the 1996 International Court of Justice judgment on the legality of nuclear weapons left, namely that extreme self-defense and state survival may justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the conduct of war. So states could use the ICJ's opinion to retain or obtain nuclear weapons, but the TPNW does not leave room for any such interpretation. So nuclear weapons are illegal in all respects, no causes belly can justify the use or threat of use in war and therefore no causes belly necessitates their possession or existence for that matter. However, the humanitarian law justification for banning nuclear weapons run up against the idea that nuclear weapons are essential to deter wars in general and nuclear war in particular. So this idea of a nuclear peace. Some states have used this justification for not taking part in the ban treaty negotiations and some fundants have labelled the treaty a danger to international peace and security for the same reason. Discursively therefore, I argue to promote the ban, the treaty must be contextualized in a broader set of arguments that reject the idea that nuclear weapons keep the peace. Now one way to do so is to proffer arguments against deterrence theory that deterrence is immoral, inhumane, unfair, fallible, leads to arms races, is being undermined by nuclear arms states and policies for example developing missile defences and hypersonic delivery vehicles and so forth. But the other way is to argue that war has been outlawed and that the decline we see an aggressive interstate war is the result of a normative shift in how international order is constituted. Banning nuclear weapons is therefore not simply an issue of not using or threatening to use this massively destructive and indiscriminate weapon in war, but an important step in rejecting wars of aggression as national policy. So by contextualizing the ban in the outlawing of war, my aim is not to detract from the treaties humanitarian foundations, but to expand them so as to deal with this critique against the treaty that capitalizes on the discursive loopholes that a use in bellow approach has left. Now I do this by drawing on work that has been done on this on the Kellogg-Briand fact, more formally it's called the general treaty for renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. It's also referred to as the Paris peace treaty and I will use this denomination in the paper, which was negotiated in 1928. I especially draw on the work of Hathaway and Shapiro, although these are not the only work that revises the impact of the Paris peace treaty. I'm referring specifically to the book The Internationalists and they plan to outlaw war, which was published in 2017. And what they argue is that the Paris peace treaty ushered in a new world order based on the illegitimacy rather than the legitimacy of war. The Paris peace treaty represents a psychological slip shift in how people thought about war and the outlawry movement that unfolded in the treaty saw wars and aberration that needs justification, including in international law. So after 1928, states no longer have an unquestioned right to be prepared for or threatened or conduct for as they did before. Instead, they have an obligation to circumvent war and to find alternatives to resolve disputes or exert their rights. This psychological shift in the role of war was embraced at the Yalta conference, where the Allies negotiated the setup of the United Nations. And the UN was seen to provide the machinery to organise the peace that the Paris peace treaty lacked in 1928. And the UN Charter supersedes the Paris peace treaty, but the latter normatively informed the structures and procedures of the United Nations. So against this backdrop, I want to explore what discursive benefits the argument has that aggressive war as a constitutive premise of international society has been outlawed. For the way we think about nuclear weapons and the TPNW as an effort to outlaw them. In other words, how can it help the ban treaty supporters to think about nuclear weapons and use at bellum if we take the outlawing of war and the new legal order that it brought about as the explicit political context that the TPNW is born into. And I could think of five ways in which such a contextualisation can help the TPNW. The first is that thinking the two outlawing efforts together helps dismiss the charge that the TPNW is dangerous because nuclear weapons keep the peace. It does this by providing a plausible alternative explanation for why aggressive wars have declined, namely that war has been outlawed and a system of international institutions has been created to stigmatise aggression and to support peaceful resolution of disputes. Secondly, the idea of a nuclear peace does not share the current world order's normative underpinnings to resolve disputes peacefully. Rather, nuclear deterrence reifies aggressive war by its very premise. I think here it relates to what London was saying. So it's aggressively keeping the peace. The absence of war or negative peace proposed under nuclear deterrence is a form of unresolved conflict with much the same psychological policy and economic effects as being at war. Nuclear deterrence may even prolong or intensify international disputes as have arguably been the case in political hotspots like the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and even between India and Pakistan. So it was not by chance that one of the first acts towards political reconciliation in South Africa and a peaceful end to apartheid and rejoining the international community was FWDKLAG's decision to dismantle apartheid South Africa's nuclear weapons. The third point that I want to make about how thinking these two outlawing efforts together can help the TPMW is that in contrast to nuclear deterrence outlawing war favours positive peace. So what Geltung describes as the integration of human society, the Paris Peace Treaty as the trigger of a new world order where war is illegal and the UN Charter as consolidating this order of positive peace measures. In the long run positive peace measures build international society on a balance between national self interest and pro social values of cooperation and mutual benefit. The peace is organized to use Brian's term, not by the idea that a technology nuclear weapons in the hands of some chosen ones act as a leviathan on the international stage and frightens off war, but by pro social or humanitarian values embodied in international law. So peace is not a byproduct of terror and fear that a massively destructive weapon will be used in wars. Peace is the result of a community of states that have concluded that war can and should be avoided through renouncing it and engaging in peaceful resolution of disputes. We can think of the Latin adage if we see this pattern pattern, you know, if you want peace, prepare for peace. And then the fourth point, thinking about the nuclear ban in terms of outlawing war also helps to refocus us on the original intent of the NPT, namely achieving non-proforation. We have two minutes. Thank you. To keep nuclear disarmament negotiations viable. A popular interpretation of the NPT is that it legitimizes five states nuclear weapons, and these states become by default keepers of the nuclear peace as if other states have appointed them as these nuclear leviathans by signing on to the NPT. And for many states, this is a misrepresentation. In the paper, I point to at least two occasions that illustrate how nuclear deterrence in fact enables international aggression as national policy in contradiction of U.S. The two cases, the 2003 Iraq war and also Russia's annexation of Crimea. And then lastly, and I'll end with this, outlawing of war does not take away states right to self-defense, but circumscribes war to self-defense. The idea that nuclear weapons keep peace confuses the right to self-defense with a right to punish aggression through nuclear retaliation. The system set up by the United Nations to achieve peace. That's the UN Security Council mediation sanctions as a deterrent to aggression and collective security etc is sidelined and undermined by nuclear deterrence. So when nuclear weapons are off the table, these instruments are back in play and I'll end here. It's lovely. Thank you very much. Very interesting. Some very interesting points there. Let's hope we can sort of come back to those. Great. Tobias, Tobias. Tobias, hi. You're welcome to share your screen if you want to or if you've just got slides just. So if you haven't got slides and just crack away with the presentation. As I said to the others, it's about ten minutes for each presentation and two minutes beforehand I'll just let you know. Okay. Great. Thank you so much Patricia and Nicola and thank you everyone for organizing this conference and also for inviting me and having a presentation of a paper. Really thank you very much. I think it's really, really timely, really great and at the same time with the thank you also. I really, my apologies, I apologize for only jumping in now. I got COVID despite vaccination and it led to pretty bad headache and sleeping a lot and all that. But again, so thank you very much. Reassessing. I meant to say sorry, apologies. I took it for granted that other members had been here before but I just asked people that are presenting if they can just say a little bit about themselves. So if you can just before you start, if you can just let us know just a little bit about where you're working as an introduction. That would be helpful. I'm sorry to interrupt you and I'm really glad that you're feeling better. No, sure thing and you're the boss. So I'm going to stick to that and also to the ten minutes, keep it brief. No, so Tobias Festner, I'm head of the security and law program at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. So we're doing kind of three things, typically in an academic or think tankish manner. On the one hand, research on the other hand, organise conferences like these and on the other hand, third teaching. And for us, it's mostly extensive education. So mid-career professionals and being at the heart of being in Geneva. Well, we also consult and advise and try to maybe bring good ideas or thoughts into diplomatic processes, especially multilateral processes in the security field. So that to me. And as I said, really helpful to be here and reassessing the key debates. I think it's really, really great theme. And so I'm coming for the IR, but also doing a lot of legal stuff. So really focusing on the legal normative aspects. And this, of course, in the realm of nuclear weapons, we're thinking mostly in terms of TPNW, as has been already said before. Now here with the TPNW, the general explanation of the effect, but also of the rationale of the TPNW. And I think you're all really, really familiar with that is really that the TPNW codifies, creates, enhances and helps disseminate norms against nuclear weapons. And this is how the treaty was designed, was created and also how it's really now explained and both in the theoretical literature, but also in the diplomatic discourse and among practitioners, including, including critiques that are saying that this normative enterprise may now work as intended, et cetera, et cetera. But the focus is really on how the TPNW ffosters norms against nuclear weapons. Now this in general is based on the assumption that the fact that the TPNW is an international treaty, but under international law, actually this is not that important or maybe even actually that fact helps this normative enterprise. And this assumption generally is now outspoken or not really explicit, as it said, maybe because a lot of higher scholars don't think it's such a big difference between pretty law, soft law or fluid finding instruments, maybe because the lawyers, they like to focus on the critiques of the law and not too much about the bigger questions. I don't know, but at least it's a general assumption out there. I think my point here would be that there is actually a point that the TPNW is a treaty under international law, a formal treaty, so that does have an effect on how it works. And the argument that I'm making in the paper is that the treaty actually allows to signal, so it allows to serve as a signaling device from the states that have adhered to the treaty to the states that have not adhered to the treaty. I'm not saying that the normative enterprise is not working or is not is wrong or whatever. I see this basically as a secondary or just a second mechanism that is at play, but that does not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. Basically the paper develops how a treaty law enables signaling to two outsiders. And so signaling in general is a concept that is used between states, also especially in international security affairs. In the context of treaty law, it has been developed and applied already. And here basically the major focus is to say that when states sign an international treaty or adhere to an international treaty, they signal a commitment. And so that's how the signaling mechanism is applied. And of course also if you have costly signals that actually helps to distinguish between states that are very likely or more likely to comply with the given treaty regime. And those that have less costly signals, it's a less good indication about if they're going to comply or not. And so based on this, I developed how the signaling, how the treaty law regime per se now allows a signaling to outsiders, so to those states that have not adhered. And the mechanisms are, there are different mechanisms at play. The first one is treaty gives visibility, so the entire process, negotiation process that gives you certain visibility, the fact that to the treaty states or even in the public, it is being discussed, it's been noticed. A second one is that mechanisms, the treaty screens between insiders and outsiders. So through the ratification process, et cetera, et cetera, there's a clear then you can really identify which states have adhered and which states have not. And then you have you in treaty databases, et cetera, et cetera. So that makes you very easily accessible which states are on which side. Then another one is that treaty allows precise definition of the substance of the message that you want to signal. States are particularly careful when drafting international treaties. There's also established treaty language that helps you also that there are interpretation methods. This helps you to better understand the message, define the message, but also understand the message. And the last point is that treaty regime gives a certain level of credibility to the treaty, which is important to signaling, but of course only a certain level. This is limited, especially if the costs are not so high for states to adhere to the treaty regime. Although nonetheless the very fact that you're bound to this treaty regime gives a certain credibility because there are some costs associated because you cannot easily back down or withdraw from a treaty. So this is basically the theoretical foundation to which then can be applied to the TPNW. And for the TPNW here to keep it short, to give the major elements, but then also then maybe in the discussions we can build on that. I'm pretty sure that others have important points here. Well, the first point that it does in that sense is really that, as we said, there's visibility, etc. But it really brings legal division between states that have adhered to the treaty and those that have not. Now here we all know there's not much new under the sun or no big surprises. Those that have adhered are mostly non-nuclear weapon states. Oftentimes those also that are members of global, I'm sorry, of nuclear weapon free zones. The nuclear weapon states are outside umbrella states are remaining outside and some others. But what it really does now, it gives this clear signalling. Sorry, this clear screening that allows us to assess which states are aware. But also from a legal perspective, it makes it very clear. And Jolene has mentioned that before, that those states that have adhered for them, this is nuclear weapons are illegal. For those that have not adhered, it makes it a bit harder to say that international law is not clear. So you might even make the argument that you cannot be in this ice if anymore if you're not adhering to the treaty. So basically you're endorsing that nuclear weapons are legal. And I'm thinking here, especially for instance, like Switzerland, when you ask them, I know them pretty well. Do you think nuclear weapons are legitimate? They're going to say no, they're not legitimate. They're more or less. Do you think they're legal? Yeah, that's a bit complicated. You know, they're not legal, but they're also not illegal. I think this case is really, really hard to make because if you're saying that they're legal, well, why don't you adhere to the treaty and the treaty is pretty clear on that. So I think that's a legal division that the treaty in that sense brings. But then the question, well, what does it signal? And if you're thinking of signalling, well, what does it say? So in that sense, what are the messages? I identify four messages. Many of you, they sound familiar to you or did they know them? And I think, first of all, messages that nuclear weapons are illegal. That's clear. That's the goal of the treaty. Second is that nuclear weapons are immoral. I think that's also clear. Third one, that they're dangerous, risk of escalation and humanitarian disasters, et cetera. And the fourth, that disarmament, nuclear disarmament should advance, that the status quo is not accepted. So those are the four messages. Now, in terms, in the paper, I developed more specifically how the fact that it is a treaty on international law supports these messages or not. And I think the most important factor, however, the most important message overall is really that states clearly clearly signal that they do not want to do anything with nuclear weapons. So they clearly also signal that they want other states also to not have anything to do with nuclear weapons. But through the mechanisms of international law, where every state is sovereign, every state can only commit for in its own behalf, so cannot really extend any legal obligations on others. Thank you. That means that the most important message is really that we do not want anything to do with nuclear weapons. And that, as a consequence, leads to the question, well, if the TPNW actually is something similar like a global non-weapon, non-nuclear weapons for his own, nuclear weapons for his own. And here, the reason is because the signaling, this messaging is pretty similar to nuclear, to nuclear weapons for his own treaties. And in that sense could have, or has a similar effect. I think I'm going to leave it up to David Morales to develop this more. I think he has certainly more interesting and more developed thoughts in this. But I think that's kind of a logic coming out of this signaling. And so to end, in that sense, that would be the theoretical proposition, but how and kind of this reassessing a key debates in the nuclear field, I think this is theoretical propositions here. Okay. Is there something like signaling from treaty regime to outsiders and how the TPNW does that. But also from a practical perspective and political perspective, I think it is obvious that TPNW has brought a lot of division. I think it's also clear that this was intended. But to me that the question is a bit, and this is especially when I'm listening to a lot of debates in Geneva. The question is, if this is a step forward, or if it's maybe at one point, it would be interesting to try to bridge the divisions and bridge the divides and rather than being confrontational. And in any case, if you're looking at the TPNWF as a signaling device, I think that would kind of actually enable the floor for something like this because it appears actually much, much less threatening than oftentimes it is depicted. So again, thank you very much for your attention. Brilliant. Lovely. Thank you. Another really interesting presentation. Thank you. Okay, so we move on to David and again David. Welcome to share your screen if you've got slides or if you have no slides just far away. And if you could please just everyone have a little introduction about you that would be great. Thank you. Okay. Thank you, Patricia. Thank you, Nicola, for the organization of this event. Good morning everybody. Okay. Good afternoon. I would like to thank the opportunity to talk about this short presentation that is a part of my postdoctoral research that is in the beginning stage. Let me introduce myself. Yes, I am David Morales. I'm professor of international relations. This is the Federal University of ABC in Sao Paulo, Brazil. And I am visiting research fellow at King's College, Department of War Studies in postdoctoral research on the new proposals of nuclear weapons reasons. My tutor is Professor Wing Bowen and I have a scholarship from the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, in St Piqui, Brazil. Okay. The title of this paper is the impacts of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons for 21st century international nuclear security and its contributions to the nuclear weapons reasons. The first multilateral treaty to ban nuclear weapons, TPNW, came into force in January 2021. The disagreement was approved at the United Nations Assembly in 2017 when 122 countries adopted this new international regime that prohibits the production, storage and transference of nuclear weapons. Currently, no nuclear armed countries have signed the treaty, nor have most European countries, notably those that are covered by the NATO system. Therefore, we can identify three relevant points in the following analysis. Firstly, it is necessary to verify what the TPNW means to international security as it enters into force as the first global agreement that explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons and their total elimination. Secondly, it is important to identify the possible effects of the TPNW to nuclear security and to other existing agreements dealing with nuclear disarmament, principally the non-proliferation treaty. Third, we have to shape the real impacts that the TPNW represents to regional security mechanisms, especially to the nuclear weapons reasons regime. First of all, we can consider the TPNW as the culmination of a worldwide movement to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons. It represents a meaningful commitment towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations. This is why for the United Nations the TPNW is a new chapter for nuclear disarmament. After decades of activists, the humanity has achieved what many said was impossible, nuclear weapons could be banned. By the way, we can't generalize that this agreement that pretends to be global has an effect on countries that have not signed it. In this case, we are talking about countries that are currently not obliged to comply with the TPNW content. However, it is also not possible to reduce the significant force made for the approval of the global agreement in the United Nations assembly. The NPT focuses only on the prohibition of the proliferation, but the TPNW complements the NPT by prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons. However, the TPNW has its limitations. Of course, it prohibits nuclear weapons, but it does not open space to discuss new mechanisms to the reduction of current and potential geopolitical threats that will encourage the few countries that possess nuclear arsenals to keep their stocks ready for attack. Secondly, there is a risk that TPNW might jeopardize the NPT's objective of verification requirements. There is a possibility that non-nuclear weapons stage may join the TPNW and choose to leave from the NPT and thus be free from the verification procedures. This concern is addressed by the TPNW, which requires members' states to maintain the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments. It is possible that some countries might decide to withdraw from the NPT. Another problem is that TPNW didn't establish a highest standard for non-proliferation verification. The agreement does not apply to non-nuclear weapons states to accept the model additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards. Instead, the treaty sets only the International Atomic Energy Agency comprehensive safeguards agreement as the minimum non-proliferation verification requirement. This is an outdated system that has been known for about 25 years to be inadequate to the challenge of routine or clandestine nuclear activity. In third place, in each one of the nuclear weapons reasons, non-nuclear states agreed not to receive, transfer, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Also, nuclear states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to them or otherwise assist or encourage non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons. This is a double compromise between nuclearized and non-nuclearized states into the nuclear weapons reasons agreements. We have five nuclear weapons reasons recognized by the United Nations, Latin America Treaty of Tatelolco, Africa Treaty of Pelindava, South Pacific Treaty of Rarotonga, South Asia Treaty of Bangkok and Central Asia Treaty of Semipalatinsk and Mongolia. In every one of these zones, there are specific protocols directed to the nuclear states. It is assumed that these status will respect of a nuclear freedom and the commitment not to test nuclear bombs there. This is the main difference in comparing nuclear weapons reasons with the TPNW. While there are direct commitments in the nuclear weapons reasons, there is still no formal commitment in the TPNW and later being a global treaty while the nuclear weapons reasons are regional only. In conclusion, the TPNW and nuclear weapons reasons embody admirable goals for eradicating nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, at this time, the TPNW is only symbolic because the nuclear states have not signed it yet. Something similar has occurred with the 25-year-old completed Ban Treaty, CTBT, which is still waiting to be enforced. This is not exactly what happens with the nuclear weapons reasons because there are commitments and signed protocols from the nuclear states to each zone to everyone. In this case, the nuclear weapons reasons could promote a comprehensive and gradual global denuclearisation and join with the TPNW and CTBT to form a triad targeting an effective strategy to establish an international regime with FORE. Okay, this is all. Thank you very much. That's wonderful. Excellent timing and some really interesting points again. Thank you very much. Great. So, we're doing very well for time. We move on to Paul. Are you okay? Everything ready? I don't know. I'm trying. Is that not coming up? What you need to do is click the share screen. You have done that. And then when you see the screen, you need to click on your presentation on your screen. There we are. We've done that. Okay. Okay, full disclosure. I was the director of arms controls of the defence ministry of a nuclear weapons state for several years and I was a UN disarmament commissioner and I have seen the problem of disarmament close up and it ain't that pretty at all. And in addition, I unusually, professionally unusually, I have been a was a group psychotherapist for about 13 years. So I'm quite interested in the psychological and cultural dimensions. I'm not going to get presumptuously psychoanalytic, but this seems to me an important way of relativising who we are, what we're talking about, where there might be blind spots. And I'm, of course, struck by the fact we're, this is a tiny discussion amongst specialists and what I'm going to say is a ghetto within that tiny discussion. And so let's keep that in mind. And I think that's that's interesting why why is what are the implications of this being such a minority issue, even though we think that the whole question is enormously important. I'll give you a trigger warning because this is obviously a safe space that some people would like to have. I'm going to question a lot of the things which have been said unapologetically. I think it's, I don't think the man treating and achieve what it, that's how to be, I'll try and explain why and I don't think nuclear governments will think that it will. I'm not insistent there will always be nuclear weapons. I just don't see any good way out from the new the hotel California. I want to provoke. I don't want to just get up your nose. I want to hear substantive rebuttals of what I'm going to say, because when I presented similar ideas previously I get this kind of pain silence at the end. And my desire to wrestle intellectually just gets ignored. This is this is disasiful. Don't want to deal with that. I'm also going to try and because the debate's got so cliched and repetitive. I'm trying to introduce new new terminology. And but I also, I want to argue, but I also sense from my own experience and observing these processes for 20 years and reading as a pretend academic and former therapist. I don't think that rationality plays such a huge part in all this. My point, my, my lived truth is that I was involved in disarmament in the honeymoon period after the post Civil War. I was deeply involved in various negotiations. There's a part of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will be of a mind unfortunately doesn't work. So I might my experience my as an adult and professional is seeing the collapse of those multi natural, multi lateral hopes after the return of great power politics. I've walked fast and break illusions. I've written quite a lot. There won't be time to read it. You see things on the screen. I will send anyone who who wants it the these fairly detailed notes. So it my point is we don't yet know what the tpnw is it's the significance is in dispute. I have known people said it's not worth. And this is a supporter saying it's not worth trying to get seriously analytical that's tearing the wings of a butterfly. This is all we could do. We're going to go on doing it. And for some, I think it's just a quote for what they would have wanted to do anyway. But I read the proposition is this it's it's it's it's it's conditional because we know we can, or we believe we can press for complete nuclear nuclear abolition by diplomacy, everything else. So campaigning. We will go on driving towards an indispensable end state complete verified irreversible nuclear disarmament. So therefore it's morally obligatory to support that project. You've got to join us in pressing these morally reprehensible nuclear arm governments and alliances to give up their positions. But that of course didn't persuade the nuclear states that everyone predicted it wouldn't. I see now. And so I'm using this sort of blue font to indicate relatively new terminology what we have now is not persuasion we have suasion, which I looked up. And it's everything you do for persuasion but with other kinds of pressures, and I take those to be disarmament diplomacy stigmatization, whatever that means. And so it's all lobbying disinvestment potential economic boycotts legal measures from treaty signatories that that is what's sort of threatened in the icon manifestos, and this will change the world. But we should know the partial or reversible success leaves us still nuclear but maybe more dangerous world. So this has got to be an all or nothing project really to get people to to join up. And it suggests that we could look at the plausibility of this promise this kind of Pascalian wager should we should be leap to believe in this by the sort of chick test. Every country has its national intelligence committee makes assessments of what's happening in the world. I have once advised sat on the British chick. And I've, I have a sense of how these discussions are conducted. And I asked this question, knowing what the chicks in all countries know. What is there about the world situation, which would lead you to believe that the tpnw's project is achievable. And I, I, I mostly attempt and outline psychocultural strategic audit and net assessment. It's too long and depressing a whole list of dead acronyms of treaties beginning with Versailles, which have been profoundly broken and breached. I stress the chemical weapons convention, because I think it was not just because I worked on it. Because I think it was a leading edge for what the ban treaty would be. And it's, it's, it's being jammed. We can see that it doesn't work when a security council member with attitude and resources wants to block it. And I think it's worth mentioning the Budapest number random, because we have at the moment, the state which had been nuclearized given security guarantees, now being under attack from a nuclear state which was one of those who gave the guarantees and this in Europe, and this with major nuclear overtones. And so I have this concept of treaty regime fragilities, I think foreign ministers and intelligence agencies have it. I, I'm left seared with it, but I don't notice any such awareness in the statements of TPTNW supporters somehow this thing is going to be reliable and self maintaining. But okay, the assumption seems to be now this time will be different, it will be irreversibly different safely. And why is that well because it supports us want it to be so much. I don't know more to it, but we can get to that. And I think if we look at observable international behaviors. I see this, this disjunction between ever evolving idealized discourse within the disarmament archipelago, maybe disarmament academic archipelago, which we've some of which we've heard today very eloquently, and a complete split between that and the actual strategic strategic behaviors. Modernization of everything background nuclear balance is actually being rather important, very little sign of studentization of how that's working out in Europe. I think, I think if you're a Ukrainian you're feeling quite bitter about that. And then we get more we getting actual increases in nuclear weapons programs, etc. Modernization exotic weapons, all of that. And you get characters to contemporary Russian nuclear back Russian behavior. Even the German greens are supporting renewed collective nuclear deterrence that you would not have guessed that from this discussion. Now, that's in some way that's a list of deplorable causes of outreach that says we need the TPMW more than ever don't we. Well, you can interpret it that way but you can also say this indicates how difficult it will be to believe that TPMW is going to actually affect determined morally disinhibited nuclear arms states. There's a lot of cheating going on. We've learned from Wuhan you can't actually extract evidence from a country that doesn't want to give it. There's a toleration for nuclear programs in the Middle Eastern elsewhere with the DPRK, and it's really only Mossad in the Israeli Air Force by illegal activity which have eliminated nuclear weapons programs, which the IAEA just couldn't it would have been blocked from getting into them. The German coalition treaty, recommitting to NATO nuclear deterrence and worldwide we get democratic, democratic regression and blacks backsliding and more and more autocratic surveillance. We've talked about the lack of clear verification arrangements in the TPMW which has still not been fixed that structural problem goes unaddressed, but I'm going to go further. There's a lot of emphasis on the emotions in international relations, and I think the TPMW campaign is is is emotional understandably. I think it's an example of the emotional fallacy we could call this the militant the anti genocidal mentality it's real it's worth respect. I'm not rubbishing it, but it's not a reliable guide to how how things are going to work out in the wider world that is it's fault most in the weirdest countries I'll come to weird next. Okay, we got a Florence in a non nuclear weapon states, but not the not amongst countries which have their own weapons, where these are sometimes friendedly popular. And you've got national narcissism. I want to remind you if there were more time. I suggest you look at the idea of moral psychologist. There are very different moral psychologist. We're all weird. Westernized educated industrialized rich and democratic. Most of the world isn't. And it's going to have very different attitudes. It's going to stress purity sacredness. I tradition and sacrifice. You can see this in Russian statements. Less so in having time to look at Chinese and Indian statement. And there's an actual opposition to the idea of cosmopolitan global governance with disciplinary powers, which have been involved in in real and effective nuclear disarmament that people like do again do not want it. And you would find similar statements elsewhere. If you look at game theory is a very discouraging incentive structure for fine food non nuclear weapon states that only lose anything. In fact, relative power in the world goes up for nuclear armed states and allies, then you're you've got front loaded costs of entry into an uncertain destabilizing process of readjustment. And you don't know how this world nuclear disarmament agent is going to go what it will look like how reliable will be doing something which has never been done. It's going to be a national design if you think that other newton states can be trusted not to cheat, but why where's the evidence for that. And I just this idea of a huge shadow of the viathans I want to get you the idea of the prospect of the unsuadable states, big, non weird, very economically powerful stents had surveilled authoritarian or constitutionally resistant. And if you see and with, yeah, all the money business as well the producer groups as we heard yesterday very well. So if you see those up ahead is not possible mountain range. Why would you commit to a journey which would try you to go over them when you see no way of getting past them. So this group would be veto players in any disarmament endgame. I want to introduce this idea of nuclear regression regression. All these, all these gains from TPMW and nuclear abolition and ending the cumulative daily risk of nuclear weapons forever are fine if it is forever. But if you have to allow for the higher probability of nuclear regression regression breakdown of what the treaty was trying to do reconstitution races possibly war preventative wars against rearmament. And then, then you've got to add in those costs as well, which are potentially potentially huge, and I never see that that scenario mentioned, even though it's very important. And then what you have a link is a linking of the viathans. I found the Russian and Chinese ambassadors the other day saying, we together are not going to expect except interfering in internal affairs under any pretext. The country has the right to judge any other so they're going to work together to stop precisely the TPMW campaign. So then we listen to this question, why isn't this being discussed, what why are these points not being made. I think for the new for the nuclear weapons states. It's diplomatically smart to keep quiet it just pisses the nws off the big things been said we're never going to sign. And so under Germans have handled it, interestingly, because they can say well we will come to the as observers but we were at the same time. Well, then nobody knows how to chart a route to nuclear disarmament this is the unsayable truth, which has been said has not been said. And remind you of the forgotten costs of the TPMW distraction from the harder tasks dealing with indefinite future damaging the MPT we've said that, and reducing our ability to criticize proliferation and irresponsible postures and deployments if the only respectable larger is total elimination, then, and indeed the British government has dropped the idea of nuclear responsibility is no longer going to claim to the responsible nuclear state. So that again from the from nuclear discourse. We will see. And so I point out how few of these arguments have been mentioned today, and how few of the arguments which have been mentioned are going to matter at all to the joint intelligence committees and nuclear authorities of the world. And shouldn't that matter. Just a small question.