 So our next session will talk about, excuse me, could you either take your seat or your conversation outside? So our next session is, is putting the modern Thai politics into historical context. It's an honor to welcome Dr. Titinan Pong-Sutirak to Washington. I think most of you know him, he's a very widely quoted, he is a professor at Tula Longkorn University, and he also heads up the Institute of Security and International Studies, one of Thailand's premier think tanks. So Titinan is going to give a brief overview of the situation, and we'll have a brief time also for crossing an answer. Thank you. Thank you, Maureen. Good morning, everyone. It's not very long time, I taught a course, the whole course on Thailand, Thailand's crisis, right, for 14 weeks, well almost four months. But for Washington it's maybe sufficient, 15 minutes. I think we have, we've heard the senior officials, they've laid out the Thailand's significance, importance in the Thai-U.S. relationship, Thailand's role in the region and so on. It reflects, you know, the kind of frustration of our partners and friends. Thailand's very lucky, we have many, many friends in the world. I think the world just wants to see Thailand get over this hump and move on. And being in this hump, being stuck like this means that the region cannot fire on all cylinders. We have been kind of the laggard, constraining many of the endeavors in the region, you know, regional architecture, building and so on. So this is a crisis that we have to get used to in Thailand. The Thai's, you know, it's very, it's depressing for me because so much can be done. You know, Thailand is underperforming in some ways, non-performing. So I think we have to kind of brace ourselves for some more time of this crisis and polarization. It's been almost 10 years and I think it could last another 10 years. Now that's not very robust, sanguine outlook, but I think it's something that's realistic. Now on autopilot, the country does well. You know, this is a country that has suffered a lot in 10, you know, 10 years. How can you have an economy that still grows low rate now, but still is not in a contraction? And if you go to the malls and the restaurants in Bangkok, still very busy bustling. The airport is crowded. So the autopilot is very strong. The fundamentals in Thailand are strong. The shock absorbers are strong. This time I think that the shock absorbers are being exhausted. And so I have just a few points to say. First, you know, this is the first time in a very long time that the usual back stops and shock absorbers in Thailand are not working. So the big question that I've been asked many times is that is this crisis any different than before? Thailand is full of crises. We've had a coup attempt every 4.3 years, right? It's a topsy-turvy place for diplomats, for business people, investors, for academics. So many people have become accustomed to the topsy-turvy Thailand. It goes up and down, but eventually it regains a balance somehow. There are some kind of back stops that we are accustomed to, used to seeing. But now we're seeing a different kind of crisis that the back stops don't work anymore. So the first thing I want to address is that normally, you know, the back stops don't work anymore. Normally we would have a new kind of recalibration settlement by now. We had a coup in September 2006, and a new constitution in 2007, leading to an election in December 2007. But since then, you know, we've had more elections, no coup since then. But the place is still very unwieldy and ruley. Unlike the past, normally a military coup in Thailand is a reset. You press a button, kind of reset. And then things kind of gel, and they work again until you have another build-up to another kind of crisis. And then a reset, a military coup. Now this time, that's not working. The military coup, in fact, it has led to the same kind of government, which has been kicked out and got the governments of Taksin Chinawat and his party machine, and they've been kicked out. But they keep coming back. They keep coming back. So this is a different time. This is a different crisis. You know the narrative, the timeline. Taksin came in 2001. Actually back then he was very popular to all sides. But then after the re-election landslide in 2005, his ego and hubris got the better of him. He stopped being differential to key people in Thailand. In Thailand we have a kind of a sophisticated, subtle hierarchy, and you know your place. And you don't try to exceed or overreach. He did that. And that led to friction and conflict and eventually paved the way for the military coup in 2006. The difference with Taksin is that he was ousted, exiled. But he didn't go away, unlike the others before. So in a historical frame, this is not the first time we're seeing this. I would like to cast this in two directions. This is a crisis of a democracy, but also challenges that are besetting or facing the monarchy. Somehow Thailand has to find a new balance, a recalibration between an electoral democracy that has its shortcomings, defects, has been abused, manipulated by the Taksin party machine and so on. But at the same time, the monarchy-centered hierarchy also has to make some adjustments. So if you see signs of this recalibration and adjustments making peace and trying to regain a new balance, then those would be good signs. If you see what you're seeing in the streets of Bangkok, in the government house of Bangkok as of the last two days, then those are not good signs. It means that both sides are dug in for a long fight. This is not the first time that we're seeing this kind of unsettled Thailand. The last, the different junctures, I'll just mention three, 100 years ago, this is a century-long crisis. Before the Constitution in Thailand was introduced, 1912 to 1932, there was a series of rebellion. Very unsteady place. Rebellions were suppressed, but no concessions, no adjustments. So eventually, the system couldn't last, and in 1932, a group of young bureaucrats and military officers took power, seized power and abolished absolute monarchy, introduced the Constitution. And then the place was very topsy-turvy in the 30s through World War II until 1958, when they outright very entrenched and firm, harsh military dictatorship took hold. And that cleared a slate for 25 years of military dictatorship. During that time, Thailand, you know, the dictatorship years did two great things for Thailand, kept communism away, enabled economic development, working with technocrats and so on. And that military dictatorship period was built around the monarchy, bureaucracy, the military, through the Cold War. Very important. I think the independent variables here, the international environment has changed. And we've heard, you know, military coups no longer accepted or acceptable. Economic development meant that people have more education, more information and so on. So they are more awakened, more politically conscious. They want more. They have more expectations, more demands. And then after the dictatorship, you had student uprisings, and you know, the most comparable period now and in the past is the mid-1970s. In the mid-1970s, very unstable, volatile, violent assassinations, protests, all kinds of protests on a daily basis. And you know, bombings, shootings, and elections that led to nowhere. At that time, there was communism to unite the various forces in Thailand on the right. And then, you know, they retook power. Had a military coup in October 1976, October 1976. Very harsh coup, including, you know, shootings of students and so on. That clear slate, it settled the place, it settled the place. And then up and down, up and down until the 1980s, we had General Prime Minister, kind of a compromise, halfway compromise, Prime Minister from the army. But political parties, politicians can have elections and can have some cabinet portfolios. They can have their graph, their corruption, their projects and commissions. But finance, defense, finance, defense, interior, foreign affairs were controlled by the General Prime Minister, and he appointed the technocrats. So that was a good kind of halfway compromise at that time in a semi-democratic arrangement. The second most comparable juncture is the late 1980s, when we had the government of Chachai, 2001, had the election in July 1988. And General Prime said, no more, I've had enough of the politicians and the squabbling and the corruption and so on. So he said, goodbye. General Chachai took power. And you know, many of the ideas that we're seeing that under taxing, there's some continuity with the Chachai period. You can see that they want to make Thailand as the vortex of mainland Southeast Asia, around Indochina, and now at Myanmar's opening, and then to use the mainland Southeast Asia to leverage for the Asian landmass and beyond. This is a kind of a vision they had, and they had the same advisors. Chachai's advisors eventually were holdovers at work for taxing in the 2000s, early 2000s. That period is comparable because it was beset by corruption and graph. Obviously the corruption, they had a nickname for it, it was a buffet cabinet. You can pick and choose. Your corruption, your commissions, which projects you want to tap into. And it of course led to loss of legitimacy and a military coup in February 1991. Similar to the way taxing was kicked out, corruption was a key issue. There was also complaints about usurpation, disrespect for the crown, manipulation of bureaucracy, transferring senior officials and so on. And parliamentary dictatorship was another accusation at that time. The reset worked again. Our reset is military coup, constitution, election, corrupt government, military coup. It worked in 1991, 1992, had an online government, technocratic government did a lot of things, including the taxis that you see in Bangkok, media taxis, VAT, tax and so on. And then we had a new constitution, a real reform, the new constitution. 1997 constitution led to eventually election in 2001. And this is where we've been stuck. So the last 14 years, Thailand has this dilemma. You have a winning party that gets kicked out 2001, taxing one almost as an overall majority, 2005, huge re-election landslide, became the first prime minister to complete a full term, first to have a one-party government. And this is quite a phenomenon at that time. And very popular on the policy side, had this death suspension, microcredit scheme, cheap healthcare, captivated the imagination, captured hearts and minds. 2005, his ego got the better of him and became kind of overreached. After the coup, but this coup this time, 2006, didn't solve the problem. First because taxing kept winning. So we have the problem of the winner gets kicked out, but the electoral losers, they put in, but they can't win the election. So here again, time and again, we're seeing winners are not allowed to rule. Those who ruled can't win elections. And I always say that if the Democrats can win the election, this will be the end of the crisis. But I can go a long time, not enough time for the Democrats, because they have a lot to answer for. So this is the two main junctures. The place is a topsy-turvy, and it gets to a point, then some settlement. And then clear slate, and it gets topsy-turvy again, some settlement. Clear slate, topsy-turvy, reset, most comparable. October 1976, it was kind of a backlash, reactionary backlash. And now we're seeing a kind of a sophisticated nuance backlash as well. The conservative movement that we're seeing with the protesters in Bangkok and so on, they want to go back to the past more than go into the future. They see the future of electoral democracy has been abused. It's manipulated by Taksin, he's party machine, he's full of corruption. It lacks more authority, doesn't have any integrity. So they want to have an appointed government. That's what they're calling for in Bangkok now. The other side, electoral democracy is the only way, cannot be denied. We need elections, we cannot run Thailand without elections. So they are opposed to appointed government. That electoral democracy, of course, has its shortcomings. And it is manipulated by the Taksin side. So that's the dilemma between the two sides. Somehow, if they can come to terms and electoral democracy, I think in my outlook, you need democracy that doesn't just end with elections. You need deepening institutionalization. Our legislature is very weak. You need more accountability and so on. But the answer is not to deny popular mandate and not allow elections and not allow the winners to rule. So that's on the democracy side, drawing from the past. It's 100 years since the Constitution was introduced. And we're still working on constitutionalism in Thailand. Now on the monarchy side, there are some challenges. The protesters today, they want to have a royally appointed unelected government. They want to draw on the moral authority of his Majesty the King. The monarchy, his Majesty the King, has been on the throne for 68 years, long time. Thailand has never known anything different. I think almost just about every Thai person who's alive has grown up under this rain. It's been a glorious rain. But like US-Tai relations, like many other systems and things, times change. And unless you change with the times and make adaptations and some concessions, there will be a lot of friction. So the comparable period that I can, you know, different junctures. But I would point out the reigns of King Rama II, King Rama III, and fourth. And that's a long time ago. But the reference point, in fact, is you're President Jackson. You know, in 1833, Thailand had King Rama III. But before King Rama III came to the throne, King Rama II, days before he passed away, and I think that he, you know, he had a sense that his days were numbered, he told his eldest son, King Mongkut from the King and I, to go be a monk. The reason being that a white elephant had died. It was a bad woman for the nation. And being a monk would make merit and it would be good for the nation. So King Mongkut went to be a monk for 27 years. His brother, from a concubine, not from the chief queen. King Mongkut was from the chief queen. So Prince Mongkut went to be a monk. King Rama III was 21 years older. This is 1824. So he ascended the throne. And he was seen as a technocrat, accepted by the court. The accession council chose him. He had all the right-making, he had experience. He always saw the economy. So he had legitimacy. So he was king for 27 years until he passed away. And then Prince Mongkut, who had been ordained as a monk, you know, he got out of the Mongkut and became king for 17 years. And we know about that because of the King and I story. And then it led to King Rama V. But we had two kings at that time. During the King Mongkut era, his brother was also seen as a technocrat prepared for the throne. But, you know, he's not in line. So King Mongkut appointed Prince Bin Glau. So he became king as well, has equal status. And you know that he was very prominent because in the official, his official name in Thai is about three lines. You know, we have this Pali-based language. When you have a very long name like that, you're the king. Or you're the monk, you know. So he had equal status. But the first among between the two equals was King Mongkut. Now, this period, we are seeing a lot of tensions in Thailand. And I think that we still have some obstacles, some kind of catharsis transformation that we're going through. And the overarching frame and dynamics, I think, have to do with the royal succession. And, you know, behind the scenes, and many people will notice without saying it, the question becomes, you know, who's going to be the next king? And I would like to say that it doesn't have to be a zero-sum game. If it becomes a zero-sum game, then we have problems. So that's the first thing that we need to do in Thailand, not to see this as a zero-sum game of the next monarch. And then after that, we will have to recalibrate monarchy and democracy and the constitutional rule so that democracy is not easily abused, manipulated by the likes of Taksin. At the same time, the monarchy has to be framed, reframed within the Constitution. And if we can do that, if you see signs of that, that means that Thailand is going in the right direction. I hope it will not take too long, because the longer it takes, the cost and pain and grief that we are seeing and feeling. And we need all the friends in the world. We could have this seminar in European capitals, in Asian capitals. And I think we have such international goodwill. Even the Cambodians want the ties to get on. Myanmar says, they're worried. They want to see the solutions. So the international goodwill is there. We're lucky that there are no regional meddlers, unlike Ukraine, Syria, and so on. And no regional power is trying to meddle and influence what's happening inside. In fact, it's the opposite. Everybody is so flustered. They say, the ties just go solve the problem and we'll stay here. But they want to do something. So there's a risk here of trying to do too much. I think the best thing that the international community can do is setting parameters. And they've done that. We've heard from the two senior officials that military coup is not good. Constitutional rule, democratic process, and things like that, no violence. So those are clear parameters. And they make a big difference. That's why we haven't had a coup in Thailand. They make a big difference. So in Thailand, going forward, we'll see in a near term one of three things will happen. Either there will be a military coup, it looks unlikely. I think the military would not take, they will not do the heavy lifting the way that they used to. If you get rid of the government, OK, you change the government, they will enforce it for you. But they won't go and change the government for you. So if not that, then we'll have a royally appointed government based on Article 7 that the protesters are calling for. If not that, then we'll have election in July, planned for July 20th. And I do hope that July 20th doesn't look like that long. But in Thailand, every day is a long time now, especially in Bangkok. So if you can get there somehow with all players in and try to kind of have a stop gap, ad hoc, interim elected government, some reforms in place so that all can rejoin and reenter, then we might just navigate a way out of this murky environment and the brink of the abyss. Thank you. Thanks, Dr. Titton, and that was a great overview of how Thailand got where it is today and some ideas of how it might move to the future. The floor is open for some questions. In the back, please. Please identify yourself. Wait for a mic. Thanks. Good morning. My name is Heruam from SICE. Thank you, Chantitianan, for a very comprehensive approach and introductory remarks on the political history of Thailand. The funny thing about this crisis, the course that you just mentioned that you didn't get to do an exam afterwards, instead you get to ask you questions. And my questions related to your presentations, the fact that in the three comparable, two comparable crisis, and then the history of Thailand that you mentioned, the one in the 70s and the one in the 1990s, I think in my opinion, the key distinction between the previous two and the last one is the decisiveness of the royal intervention. In 2006, the king did not have a very resolute, so-called statement given to resolve the crisis, Mr. Vinyan, the way that the military coup function, as you mentioned earlier, is said by him. What the king did at the time, if I recall correctly, was to give more emphasis on the constitutional ruling when he appointed the constitutional court. And my questions related to how do you see the neutrality of the constitutional court in Thailand throughout this crisis in 2016 and in the past eight years in trying to uphold the message given by the king at the time? And how then is there any possibility that Thailand could go back to the 1997 constitution, which dubbed as the most democratically constitution in the country throughout the years? Thank you. Thank you, Heru. Side student interned with me at ISIS in Bangkok. Good question. 2014, similar to 2006. It's a murky year. No settlement, very unwieldy, unruly. Things have been very volatile day to day, week to week. In April of 2006, he smashes the king, gave some remarks to the judges, saying that at that time we had an intractable crisis. The election commissioners were answerable to taxing. The election was boycotted by the Democrat Party and the first boycott. And then the results were illegitimate and there was some cheating and fraud and so on. So no way out. They scheduled another election for October. But his majesty said, one party election cannot be democratic. And it was the duty of the judges to navigate a way out of this crisis. Since then, we have seen very politically assertive judiciary and the judiciary in Thailand has set political directions and they continue to do so. And the way you do it is you just rule against the ruling parties, the sitting government. You can disqualify the sitting prime minister for a cooking show that he accepted some small honorarium or disqualify Ying Lak for nepotism. So we're seeing more and more of this. And a long-term risk for us here is that the judiciary now has lost some credibility, has been compromised and I think many people will concede to that even supporters of the judiciary. But they see as the end justifying the means. The only way to get rid of the taxing party machine then you have to do what's necessary. It's coming at a very high cost and a long-term we need to restore that credibility. Otherwise, my worst fear is that Thailand has no backstop left. Once you have no institutional pillars to rely on, you need to rely on something. Otherwise, every man for himself. So that's a long-term danger for us. The anti-taxing backlash was so strong but I think the pendulum has swung too far. So let's hope that we can do that. Any questions? Hi, Elizabeth Becker, Simon and Schuster. Thank you for a wonderful presentation and certainly I feel I have a better understanding of what's going on in Bangkok. The one piece I'd also like you to comment on is the rural voice that was so strong pro-toxin and how your various scenarios will play with the rural vote. Thank you. Thank you. I encourage you to listen to the following panel and other experts who will speak also on the rural electorate. The understanding that we have that is portrayed is that the north and northeast, they comprise more than half of the electorate and they have been voting for taxis and parties all these years and to a large extent it's true. I mean, the numbers show it when they vote but it's not the stereotypical kind of farmers versus the urbanites and so on. There's no more, I think that there are very few stereotypical, prototypical farmer, the village farmer left in the villages. I mean, they have motorcycles, they have refrigerators, they actually are very modernized and mechanized. So they have been supportive of taxing, yes, north and northeast, but he's lost some support too. In February 2nd election, the taxing populist magic has worn off considerably. The first generation populism, the suspension microcredit, Village Fund, cheap healthcare, that just captured hearts and minds. But after a while he came up with rice fetching, the second generation and it's a disaster. Some farmers haven't received the money they've been told they would and the fiscal losses are just accumulating. So the first car policy, this is the idea, you just first car, first home, handouts and subsidies, giveaways and this time after a decade it doesn't feel so innovative, imaginative, it's just to win the vote. I think that a lot of people are feeling that way in the countryside, in the rural electorate. So if you were to hold election today, last one we had on February 2nd, the turnouts were lower. The Democrats boycott it so we will never really know the results and how it could have gone, but the Democrats could have gained some ground. And the third parties, third, fourth and fifth parties could have gained some ground to dilute the juggernaut party machine that taxing has. And I think now the time is better than ever to try to win at the polls and that is really the best way, the only way, sustainable way to beat taxing is to beat him at his game at the polls. Unfortunately the tyranny of the clock keeps ticking. So we're gonna take a short break now and then we'll return with another session that's gonna talk about that as Dr. Tittanon already said, how the crisis will shape the future political order. Dr. Tittanon thank you very much, it was great. Thank you.