 Good morning to everyone. Can I encourage you to please take your seats? Thank you very much. So we move now to the second session of this morning. And if you haven't had a chance to look at the program, the title of it is, and I read to you the title, is a new world economic order still conceivable in the foreseeable future. That's what we're going to discuss. And before I get into the substance of it with our esteemed panelists here, I'd like to make two observations to get us started. The first is that, in fact, we've already been discussing this topic in the first session because it's very hard today to discuss the economic outlook without talking about changes in the structure of international relations and what that means for economics. And we've already got a few insights from that session which will play into the conversation we have here. And the second point I want to make before we start is that, in a way, the question itself is a new world economic order conceivable in the foreseeable future? Makes another question, which is, is the current international economic order a stable one? In fact, you could argue that every year, as we meet, the international economic order is already changing. It is already fraying. So the question is not whether we can conceive of a new world international economic order, but whether how we cope with the pressures and changes that are happening, sometimes in a not very orderly way. And perhaps we might be moving from an international economic order to a period of international economic disorder during which countries will conduct their relationships without the same set of rules that has governed those relationships for six, seven decades. And so those are the kind of the questions that we would like to get into today. And you've seen a very, we have six panelists and each of them brings a wealth of experience and insights into this. And rather than follow the order, which is on your program, I'd like to reverse it because that's part of the disorder in the world now. We should not imagine that things are happening according to the rules that we agreed a few years ago. And so if you permit me, I'd like to actually start off by asking Adam Touge, I mean, Adam Touge who is of course the former prime minister of Senegal and was on the same panel, our discussion about some of the same issues at last year's World Policy Conference as well. So, panel of prime minister, I want to turn to you first, I mean, I'll ask you, do you feel that the world economic order is stable, is changing? Do you have a vision of where it's going? How is it affecting the countries that you're most familiar with? Thank you very much. Let me just say how happy I am to be here and thank you for taking this going as a tradition. Well, you know, when you age and you put on some weight and you look at this very nice suit because there are only men here so I'm gonna take the suit example and you wanna just fit into the one that you used to wear in your 30s but that's what the world look like. You do have all the powers that you used to dominate and they still want to keep things going because it's enjoyable to benefit from privileges but in between you have one part of the world that caught up or wanna catch up and then you move from what looks like a stable environment but it was not for many people coming from Africa. Obviously we want a new order for sure and you do also have within countries some groups that also want a new order that is more equal that is more human rights centered that is more dignified for people. So you do have this tension that is now being expressed through different ways not the most peaceful or the most positive ways but definitely when you look into the 54 countries in Africa out of the 194, it's quite a number and what they would like to see is something different. They wanna industrialize, they want to be more present, they wanna see it at the Security Council. They've been talking about it for so many years. So we do believe that a disorder is not that bad if you want to sort of be more present and you have your right more realized. So I think the disorder is called by many peoples including women. I mean, look at the room every year that's the same story. Black suits, all the men, not very diversified. Wasp as we said, I mean, let me guess, that's the morning but that's the reality I'm facing, I'm seeing. So we want a new world definitely that is more gender equitable for sure. How many women's are leading countries, very few or prime ministers or ministers, very, very few regardless of the level of revenues or industrialization stage doesn't matter. This is a very old order. The boys club or the old boys club, that is being very challenged, right into, I mean, even in Africa, look at the average of the population, the age, the medium age is 19. Well, it's 44 in Europe by the way. And there are no way to be seen. The elite is six year old plus. These are the ministers, the presidents of course and well, they benefit from everything but they're only 3% of the population. So these young people and these women want a disorder and we want a reshuffle of the cuts. So it is expressed as I said, disorderly, they don't have the chance of sitting where I'm sitting and saying it but it's really something that we need to look into if we want to move to a new stage that is on. Economically, obviously, you do have Africa, I can take Senegal, we do have a very old relationship with France but how is it now that France is being phased out in many countries? If you follow the economy, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, being the case in point, so what didn't go right for that to happen for such a long relationship? Well, what didn't happen is the hope for development didn't happen. So why would you entertain a relationship? It's like a bottle, a wife in a couple somehow. If you're unhappy, why would you keep that going? Are you going to replace it by something new that will be better? It remained to be seen, obviously but when you have new partners and new players in the economic field, I'm talking about the Brazil, the China's and the whoever is there, while you attempt to look in another way. So in a nutshell, definitely what we would like to see do we have to go through disorder? It looks like it and we are in the middle of it. By the way, when you talk about change, most of the time it's because it's already happened. So what we need to see is more equality, more justice, more representation of women, young people being there, more race diverse, that's also an issue, that we really need to look into the new world we want to build through what we are doing now discussing, but discussing very honestly and having the courage to put issue on the table. We are unhappy with the states of international affair, that's what it is and how are we going together to work together and make sure that we do have the dresses and the suits that fits everybody and everybody's happy with. So that's my first take on the issue. Thank you very much. I mean I think for raising sort of not just what people are unhappy about, but also some of the attributes of what people would like to see in a new international order. I think we'll come back in the second round to ask you whether you see us moving in that direction. What are the forces that will get us there? So if you were to look five years out or 10 years out, are we moving closer to that vision or are we basically staying in a set of relationships that lead to all these, not just resentments, but I think also increasing anger I think in many parts. Let me turn to Chahid then, please next, and ask you, from where you sit, how do you see the pressures on the current international economic order and where do you think this is leading us? Okay, before talking about new economic order, I guess we start to look at the current or existing international economic order from different perspective. For example, we can look at the Paul pattern which is a unipollar or multipollar. We can see the institution for current international economic order we have, we call Bradenwood institution, WTO IMF World Bank. Also we can see law and regulation objective which is global or domestic priority. So from this perspective, we can see current order still there, but at the same time, we have already seen sign of change or decoding happen. Very interesting, according to WTO, they find in the IMF annual report, World Economic Outlook, they count the fragmentation these words mentioned 172 times in this version this year while five years fragmentation only mentioned once. So that's very interesting phenomena. Also, we can see according to WTO, they feel middle products, pretty very important role in supply chain, but you can see the share of mid products among the total trade have already, the share have already down from 51% every previous year down to 48.5% in first half of this year. So all this happen I guess we can summarize two reasons. One is the internal fact in economic order, which I mean is the economic pattern or weight have already been changing. As mentioned, people mentioned in term of PPP, break country share have already exceed that of G7. Also, another factor is external fact like geopolitical tension, US-China conflict and war. So after that, I can imagine or think as there's a full possible scenario for evolution of international economic order. First scenario, I will summarize as a business as usual. That mean G7 with US as its head, still dominant Britain world institution. Second scenario is the economic order, get some improvement, but at the same time is some kind of backward is I can call is a mixture that second scenario. The third scenario is we can say is a substantial new order. Developing country have a more right to say in Britain world institutions. In international law and regulation are more equal to new developing countries. The last scenario, fourth scenario is I can say is totally disorder, is totally flambentation. Maybe there's a parallel group occur. For example, like US and G7, vice-China and the BRICS countries. That way, I guess the scenario, scenario second, scenario three are more likely happen. The scenario one and scenario four less likely occur, but the last one I don't totally not excluded but it will be last if the word totally flamboyant rate. I just stop here. Great. Thank you very much. I think is say you framed quite nicely four scenarios sort of two extreme ends and then two in the middle, one's a bit better than the other and probabilities are we'll end up somewhere in the middle rather than at either end, but you don't want to exclude the worst case from a fragmentation point of view. And I'd be interested to see whether the other panelists share that perspective in terms of whether the framing but more importantly where we're likely to end up. So let me turn now to Haimini and I mean you had long, long experience in international economic relations but also particularly in trade and it'd be good to get your take on this. Thank you. Sorry. Masuda. I'm very happy to be here with you this morning. I would like to first of all to welcome Haimini and his invitation and congratulate his team to put in place this magnificent conference. In order to talk about the new international economy order, I think we need to identify the challenges we are currently facing. In this sense, I'd like to highlight two more significant challenges focusing on trade. First is the breakdown of international cooperation system at the same time, the collapse of the rule-based trading system. Edward Luce, financial times columnist, recently said that the rule of, now, world trade is the rule of jungle. I think he's quite right because the existing W-2 rules are no longer respected and new rules cannot be produced. With the declaration of Janet D'Alan, US Treasury Secretary in April last year that US would pursue secure but free trade, free but secure trade with French O-ring, the WTO's fundamental principle of MFN is that. And as you know, the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism continue to remain paralyzed with the non-functioning of its appellate body. More seriously, new international rules cannot be agreed upon even though we need new rules on digital and climate change because the global cooperation system is broken down due to the intensifying US-China conflict and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. G-20 summit of last year and this year clearly demonstrated that the G-20 has lost its role as the World Crisis Management Committee with the breakdown of global cooperation mechanism. The G-20, in addition to stabilizing the world economy after the 2008 financial crisis, was very instrumental. I noticed it. I witnessed it as G-20 chef of Korea in concluding the Paris Climate Change Agreement in 2015 at COP 21 and its early entry into force in 2016. However, in view of the current international political situation, it would be very unlikely that G-20 can do anything meaningful regarding global issues such as climate, digital, health, energy, or food crisis. Because of the impossibility of producing a consensus on global issues, we can see the listen trend of fragmentation of the international rules on climate change and digital economy in particular. In fact, it would be more appropriate to say that European Union is monopolizing the legislation on those issues through GDPR, EU taxonomy, carbon border adjustment mechanism, digital service act, digital market act. Those EU rules are to be applied beyond the European Union. The good example is X, the former Twitter, can be subject to EU sanctions because of its misinformation and harmful content based on EU digital service act and EU's recent decision to ban misleading carbon, neutral claims will be applied to Apple Watches as well. With the launch of Indo-Pacific economic framework, United States is also trying to make new international rules, but it is not so certain because there are too many different economies participation in these discussions and the issues are so difficult to be resolved. Moreover, the recently published draft text of PILA 2, Supply Chain, I think is the most important PILA of the IPF is very disappointing and far from establishing binding rules. And we can see the proliferation of national security exception invocation by major economies and increasing export control based on these national security exceptions. Since the government cannot produce the rules, we can see more active rules played by the private sectors and NGOs. Lineal 100 is the initiative by NGO, an international sustainable standard boat, not the government is producing a global standard for ESG disclosure of the companies. Second challenge is the strengthened government intervention in the economy. De-globalization since the financial crisis of 2008 and COVID-19 have significantly strengthened government regulations and climate change and digitalization of global economy requires stronger government intervention as we need the new rules on these issues. The direct impact of the strengthened government intervention is the increased subsidies by the major economies to the detriment of the middle power countries. The US, European Union, Japan are currently trying to offer subsidies to their own industries, most notably in semiconductors and electric battery in order to combat China state capitalism. I think the problem of the subsidy is distilled, trade and industry because government decisions, not market forces determine competitive outcomes, thereby substantially reducing efficiency. We can see the invisible hand of the market is giving way to the visible hand of the state. I stop here and come back later about how to properly address these challenges. Thank you. Thank you very much, Hamid. We'll come back to that because you could have a parallel conversation where people would say, we have to achieve a set of goals, whether they're security, whether they're climate change or global public goods. We have to use a set of instruments that we have, policy instruments, some of them are subsidies, we talk a bit with Pierre Koms next and if you take the European version, it's a bit less subsidies and bit more regulation and if this has a consequence in terms of influencing the pattern of trade flows, that's a price once you just have to pay. And I think the question that we'll have to pose is how does one address that trade-off? Because we're no longer going to be in a world, in my view, where we can only sit on one end or the other of the spectrum, and the danger in some ways is that there are two parallel conversations going on, one about what we frame as a liberal economic order and one about a whole set of new issues that are on the table that people want to address at the national, international level, but I'm not sure that those conversations are coming together enough and it would be interesting to get your view and of the role of middle powers in advancing that. Pierre, you've listened to three of your fellow panelists and you have a set of views on this, so be interesting to get those. Thank you. And thanks to Thierry for inviting me in this major conference. Let me reflect a little on the notion of international economic order. The first question is whether we need one. And as an economist, my answer would be yes, because we believe in markets and markets don't function in a vacuum. They need rules. They need the previsibility. And an order brings that. And the reason why we were so prosperous after World War II was because there was a set of rules of the game and market players could believe in them and use them. So in a way, we do need an order. My second remark is that an order is not going to be stable. It's a reflection of a current set of political issues, concerns, challenges that needs to be solved collectively. And it's not likely to resist to changes in the global environment. So in a way, there are cycles and this is very well shown in a major work by Mark Danton in the United States about the history of the world government in which he showed that there are cycles. And the cycles start with a loss of legitimacy of the existing order. And then there is an interregnum in which new ideas are discussed. There is disagreement and that leads to a new order. And then again, the new order suffers from losses of legitimacy. And Danton says that we are in the third cycle. The first one was between the 1910s and the 1940s. And the interregnum lasted a long, long time. You may recall the fact that the major international conference in London in 1933 was a major failure. And the new order that emerged was the Bretton Woods Agreement. And then there was a loss of legitimacy at the end of the 1960s, the early 70s with the rupture of the exchange rate agreement within Bretton Woods with the oil shocks. And the interregnum lasted till the end of the 1970s with the emergence of a neoliberal order with Margaret Thatcher's Regan and the deregulation of financial markets. So this neoliberal order again suffered from a loss of legitimacy that maybe we can date basically with the 2008 crisis. But this loss of legitimacy is now what creates the interregnum disorder we live in. And it's very complex because it is multi-form. One is inequality, the fact that financialization failed to deliver prosperity for all. It benefited many, many the rich. The second is the failure to deal with the major environmental challenge. Not only climate change, but climate change and biodiversity. The third is the vulnerability created by very tight supply chains. And we again live through that during the COVID pandemics. The fourth is the political incompleteness of that order. It is increasingly difficult to explain to major emerging countries that the governance of the world is mainly directed by the older powers. It doesn't work. The fifth is horizontal incompleteness. We have worked a lot on trade, but how about labor rights? How about the environment? How about health? When you look at the structure of the world institutions, WTO was a more powerful institution than ILO. Is that legitimate? Well, increasingly the legitimacy, the loss of legitimacy hinges on the fact that we have not been able to work as successfully on other aspects of interdependence. So that's where we are now. Politics come back and this is a good news. We need to work on these challenges. The big question is how long will it take to reach a set of negotiated agreements that reconcile the national interest with international collaboration? And this is what an international order is about. It could be a definition of an order. I think for a number of years we are bound to muddle through, which may not be a catastrophe, but it means that markets won't be anchored on a set of rules. So we may have less growth indeed. That may also be an opportunity to redefine what is the purpose of economics. Is it growth? Is it shared prosperity? And by the way, how do we define growth? Is it the change of GDP? We all know that it's a very, very poor indicator. So in a way, all this now has to be discussed and I would interpret the disorder as a wonderful opportunity, but as the 1930s demonstrated, I'm not sure that we can manage this opportunity successfully. Thank you Pierre. So you know, very, very coherent and integrated comprehensive set of issues that all need to be addressed. And I guess the question I'm going to come back to you with is, and actually to the other panelist is, you know, two thirds of the way through the first round, we've got a very good sense of all the problems. And also of all the things that need to be addressed. But we also have a sense that the current set of international political relationships makes it hard to address any of those problems. Well, and what I want to come back in the second round is to get your views on, well, how are we going to actually make any progress on addressing these things? And if we don't make progress, in a way, how will we manage without the right set of rules still to have interactions? What's the consequence of all this? So I think it would be useful to see where is the impetus for change going to come? And it can't just be to preserve the past because of all the problems you've just outlined with the past. So starting with Madame Toubet, you know, so you started and then Pierre, your last set of comments shows this, here's all these sets of problems with the way we currently manage our relationships. And we're sort of not clear how we can actually move those forward. So I think if you could think a bit about that set of issues, we'll come back to that. But before we get there, I've still got two more colleagues to get their perspective. So, Ladislav, now I want to turn to you, please. Ladislav, you know, for where you sit, how do you see this whole conversation? Thank you so much. It was a very interesting question, a very interesting topic. And I reflected on this. I would say, first of all, that to me, the question of new order seems to be more a question of a new framework because the word order is, I think, too strong for describing the current economic condition. So the frameworks for economic cooperation, for economic competition, they have changed many times since in the last 100 years. And so what I see these days is that globalization, and you know, what is called the end of history, the unification of the world, which was also cited by Mr. Deman Beryal, and our opening session is a little bit exhausted because no order can, I think, persist without, no order can be universal. And so the major, I would say, challenge for the globalization is its own globality because the world is too different, many parts of it, they are too different from each other to be ruled and to be governed with one set of rules. So therefore, I think that what we are seeing now is not so much the emergence of multi-polarity and global competition between different centers of power, but rather a new kind of regionalization inside a mostly globalized world. This regionalization would be managed by the major economic powers, for example, United States and Europe on the one hand and China on the other hand, on the other hand, but it would not be so much political differences but difference in economic models. So it's not about Asian century or Pacific century against Atlantic century, it's more about information on post-industrial economy against more traditional commodity economy or industrial one. And therefore, I would say that United States and Europe will major, may I would say rely on the innovative economy on production of sophisticated and high-profile goods which actually underline maybe not superiority but so kind of self-expression of the people. So when you look on the United States these days, the most successful company is Tesla and SpaceX which actually embodies innovation. If you look on Europe, the biggest European company by capitalization is WMH, which actually specializes on producing unique and specialized goods embodying creativity of the European people. So my point here is that Europe and the United States will produce an economic model which is based on, I would say, first of all, the sense of belonging to some maybe golden billion or whatsoever. And on self-expression, while China and most of Asia will pursue the economic model built on mass production of cheap and high quality goods which would have a huge demand for them in many parts of the world which are not so much, not so wealthy as Europe or the United States. And therefore, I think this model can coexist for a while and they can compete, they can expand the region of influences without engaging in kind of political confrontation which was very obvious and very often seen in the 20th century. I would also point out that this competition between, I would say, information on post-industrial countries and resource-oriented economies and industrial economies will definitely result in much, I would say, in many rounds of this competition because what we are talking about is a kind of cash income development and I would say that since 1930s, there was no any change in the first economy in the world. The United States led the world for around 100 years. Before, it was very natural in over in France, over to Holland, when Britain overtook France, when Germany arrived, that's a huge industrial power and then the United States came. But for the last 100 years, there were a lot of attempts to challenge this hegemony, like by the Soviet Union in the 70s, by Japan in the 80s, and now by China. And so, therefore, I wouldn't say that we are now approaching some new economic order because for this to happen, it should be a proof that some country can overtake the leader, which is, I would say the United States or the Atlantic civilization. It's hard to believe that it can happen because everyone, if one remembers the end of the 80s, everybody says about the end of the Cold War, about the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the economic shock in Japan was actually had happened at the same time. So in the late 80s, the whole industrial system went into crisis, both in its Soviet version and its Japanese version. And this was the first step of new economic reality. So I would say, I would finalize that I cannot see the new economic order emerging. I can see another circle of economic change approaching. But this will not be a new order. This will be different frameworks, different models competing with each other. And it's very nice to say that these days, economic issues and economic power is actually more significant than political and military one, which is quite contrary to what we have seen in the early 20th century. So hopefully this transition, whatever it might be, would be more peaceful and more complex than it was before and during the first or the second World War. Thank you very much. So you've got this vision of multiple coexisting frameworks that sort of govern relationships amongst groups of countries. And I think that will raise the question of whether countries will be forced to be part of one framework or the other or whether they can be part of multiple frameworks at the same time. And whether countries are willing and ready to be forced to take sides and join one framework or the other. And I think maybe when we come to Madam Turei, I mean in a way in Africa today, a big issue for many countries that they're being asked to take sides and they don't want to. So how does one manage that as well? We'll come to that. Jan Patanam, I want to come to you last, please, for your thoughts. Yeah, excuse me. Thank you, Masoud. I think we can all dream of a new economic order, but if we really want to build a new vibrant multilateral organization, we need to meet in my view two conditions like frankly in any diplomatic negotiation. One is to define clear mutual benefits, right? And the second is to have strong equal players. So let me elaborate a little bit on that. How do we achieve mutual benefits? I think we are part of the problem we're all facing is that in a way we are flying blind here. We frankly don't have much information to assess, for instance, how much damage countries, companies are inflicting on each other and on society as a whole. So in other words, we must do a better job at understanding and mitigating externalities, right? And what I mean by externality because we've all used the word, but it's anything that disturbs the level playing field between individuals, companies and countries, right? So let me give you two concrete examples of what I think are achievable goals with hopefully enough consensus. One is to curb excessive concentration of corporate power pretty much everywhere in the world. We talked a lot about inequalities, but I think that's at the center of the problem. There are reasons to be optimistic. The OECD countries, as you know, have already achieved a minimum corporate tax. And I think the issue now is to tackle the issue of tax optimization and in particular transfer pricing mechanisms, right? As you know, the US government is looking very seriously at the issue. Microsoft was given a very significant fine just a week ago or so. And I think, you know, to put things in perspective first, you may know that, but you know, it is estimated that one trillion dollars of corporate profits each year are booked in tax havens, right? It's a considerable amount of money. And I think we need to do more on that front. And that, you know, again, government should have mutual interest because that's more money for their coffers, right? And the second goal I like to illustrate in the area of climate change is that, you know, first of all, you know, de-globalization makes it harder to achieve our decarbonization goals, not easier, right? So I think that's a very strong point to make. And to illustrate this point, someone talked about the WTO report that was issued just last week. One interesting statistic is that they looked at solar panels, for instance, over the last 30 years or so. And as you know, there's been a huge decrease in cost. And the WTO economists were able to assess that 40% of that decline was due to economies of scale that were obtained through international free trade. So, you know, in contrast, if we don't have this kind of economic efficiency, we are even less likely to meet our decarbonization targets, right? So that's the first point around, you know, defining strong mutual interests, and hopefully not too many of them, so that we don't get distracted. Again, it's like any diplomatic exercise. The second point about having strong players, I think we talked about GDP this morning and how the picture looks scary for Europe. In reality, in terms of PPP basis, so in plain English, adjusted for cost of living, GDP in Europe is only 4% lower than in the US, right? And actually, if you look per capita, Europe is actually in a better situation now than it was 20 years ago. So we have to put things in perspective. However, this is today and the past, going forward, the situation is very weak for Europe, which is missing essentially the technology revolution and just one statistic that is very revealing. In Europe, private companies invest about $50 billion a year in technology R&D in the US, it's five times this amount, about $250 billion. And China, which started from zero 15 years ago, is now well above Europe. So, you know, with less economic power, the issue for Europe will be how relevant it can be on the international scene and still influence the world. And then the second weak player for completely different reasons will be emerging markets. I think that's probably where we need to make collective decisions for the sort of long-term common good, if you will. Thank you very much, Jan. So we have 37 minutes left. I want to make sure that we have some time for people sitting in the room to be able to raise questions. So what I'd like to do now, if it's possible, is ready to ask each of you a question, which I'd like, if it's possible, to answer it very quickly in two minutes, if you could. And the first question I have is for you, Madame Thuray, which is, you heard this vision of multiple frameworks and coexisting. In some ways, you have some of that already. From your point of view, would that be a good outcome or would that be a bad outcome? Well, definitely. I've spent now some years in the multilateral organization. I was a former UN personnel for many years, went back to, I mean, went to government. And I came out of this process thinking that you need frameworks, for sure. You need many frameworks. And I always speak from the point of view of Africa now, I mean, after having been global now, focusing on Africa, the richest continent, by the way, by any means, and the poorest. So whatever framework that will deal with that issue, we're gonna be part of it first. Second, I'm more interested in, I think that's the feeling in the continent that we have to take business into our own hands. How to threaten African Union, how to make sure that we are self-interest-driven because that's how the world works. And we are going to be more forward-coming in terms of defending our interests, being very strong on whatever issues and making our own points. I appreciate it when you talk about sort of forcing some countries to take part. That was the case for the Russia-Ukraine war and most of African countries look at it as a white man's war somehow and just didn't take it in a position and that's how right, like everybody does. But I think the questions that needs to reflect upon is how are we going to make sure that we move forward peacefully to a more equal order, an order that respects the environment, that put women also on an equal footage. Nobody brought the issue of inequalities and making sure that young people are part of it. And that we need for the corporations, I think that's very important to bring that upon to look beyond profit because we are a profit-driven world, as we speak. So it's not enough anymore. So do we want to go through changes by revolution or do we want to be smarter and put in place equal frameworks where true discussion comes out of what we want to build for the future? Every time I come in this country, in the Emirate, I remember that Dubai 100 years ago was a small Bedouin village. So how did change occur? It means that it's possible. It means that you can accelerate change. And then you can have a more sane discussion because we are having an insane discussion because you do have a pool of very wealthy group of countries in front of very poor countries, but within those countries you do also have that huge gap. I was visiting south of Senegal in the mining areas just before I came. I mean, it was terrible. You do have very big mining companies taking gold out of the country. And they were not even capable of building a decent road because they don't care about it. They just have an airport. They can fly a private jet. It looks like the world we are in. So how are we going to take a pause and then come back to what the United Nations was supposed to be as a promise and share the common interests as human beings? Other than that, I mean, people are what I'm seeing now very much even within the intellectual elite is let's focus on our own interests as the rest of the world is doing. Human rights, okay, we can talk about it very globally, but it's not a reality. So that's how we look at it. What are the solutions that we want to come up with that are human rights-centered, that are equal and preserve the environment beyond just the idea of pursuing profit? Thank you very much. So a very clear message that you want to be clear about your own interests and engage in multiple conversations, multiple frameworks, but be clear about is it to the benefit of the continent and organize yourselves in a way to better represent those interests. And in that context, I assume that you and many leaders in Africa would welcome the decision about making the African Union part a permanent member of the G20, because I think that in some ways is one forum where that could happen. I want to turn to you and ask you a question. You know, you sort of said you've heard this vision about your four different scenarios. To what extent is where you end up across those scenarios a function of the relationship between the U.S. and China? How much is that going to drive where you end up and what's your quick response to that? Yeah, I guess the relation between U.S. and China probably is one of the most important relationships which will drive many things including geopolitical tension. Although European countries say to China don't look us through U.S. when they visit U.S., they say to U.S. government don't look us through China but actually the U.S.-China relationship now is kind of a very important role. The good news is in the past several months we can see the tension between U.S. and China are literally reduced. May not be a big improvement, the tension being reduced. I think that's good for U.S., for China, for the rest of the world. But at the same time we should be sure, we should understand that the policy U.S. governments adopt to China call small-yard hall fans wouldn't be changed. So competition wouldn't be changing but the tension has been reduced. That's my conclusion. Thank you. Thanks for being so clear about it. And of course you have to see what is the mechanism by which the small yard stays small because the internal pressures in all countries will be to make the yard bigger without worrying about the height of the fence. Now I want to turn to you and ask you a question which is let's assume there is some continuing improvement in the U.S.-China relationship but still tension and particularly when it comes to setting up global rules to what extent can middle powers create a set of rules that govern relationships among them even if the largest economies in the world are not so actively participating and I'm thinking of dispute resolution in the WTO where the formal process is frozen but there is a parallel process that has been created by middle powers which works to basically govern disputes as if it was within the WTO more or less. To what extent do you think that's a model that can be used in lots of different ways to provide frameworks for the world? Thank you for your questions. In fact, what you mentioned is ideal but in reality it cannot be applied. In fact, the U.S.-Ukrainian and China the only powers who make the regulations without them is not possible. You see, I participated in the Uruguay-Lown negotiation in the 80s and 90s. It was the fact of bilateral negotiations between European community at the time and United States despite more than 100 countries participated. Now the landscape are totally changed, totally changed, especially with the joining of China to the WTO in 2001. So I think it's very important to persuade the middle powers, the law including Korea, Japan, if you say the European Union is a middle power. Okay, the UK, Canada and other countries to persuade both China and United States to participate in strengthening rule-based international order because the strengthening rule-based order is the only solution to their dispute. Without clear rules, they cannot make any settlement. So I think the middle powers must enhance their efforts to persuade China and U.S. respectively to honor the already established commitment and agree to the strengthening the rule-based order. Thank you very much. That's also very clear. So the middle powers role is not to create a framework that works for them because from what you're saying it doesn't work without getting the big United States into it but they can play a major role in helping to persuade. And I think that's quite relevant for a conversation we'll have later about climate change. We're going to be having COP here in a few weeks. And is that the approach one has to follow also in COP? And here I want to come to you with a question which is you had a very long list of things that need to be fixed in the world order. We all have. And everybody will add to it. If you go around the room, we'll add another 20 other things to this. And yet, the first point about mutual interest. So which of these lists on your list, what would you say on which we cannot make progress without international cooperation and it is in our mutual interest to create a framework for operating them. And then there are other things where it would be nice to have cooperation but the world will struggle along without cooperation. So what's your sort of priority list of things? Well, there are many ways to address that question. First, I'd be tempted to say that whatever I think doesn't matter because what we need to do is reach a consensus. So for that to happen, we need to discuss with others. And I think the priority today is not to pick an issue and a solution. It is to meet and discuss and see where national interests are and how they can be combined to define a common good. But of course, as an analyst, I would be tempted to answer differently and say there are major issues today that cannot be addressed without collective action and certainly climate change is one. So it's going to be a mix of these two approaches. I think that we come to the negotiating table with ideas, with convictions but these convictions can reach nothing unless they are shared by others. So it's part of the negotiating process and to negotiate we need to understand and try to know more about the other parties and that's why I think that more research, more knowledge is needed to understand our potential partners and allies better than we do because we are working with stereotypes and that is not going to make the negotiation easier. Now there is a third way to address your question is to say that we cannot progress without a common vision. And I believe that's true and I believe that part of the negotiation is to reach a common vision. The difficulty is that when you look at history, common mobilizing visions, shared visions, tend to come out during wars. So a big question today is whether, it's what William James would have called in the early 20th century is a moral equivalent of war. Where is today's moral equivalent of war? Sustainable development goals? No. Climate change? Not even. The net zero economics? Not mobilizing enough. So where is this project that can be mobilizing enough to create a shared vision? And I don't know and that's what I think makes me afraid because if we need a major crisis of major proportions much bigger than when we have experience of a big war to reach a common vision then I think that it is certainly not the preferred scenario. So I'll stop there because it's not very optimistic but I believe that the pessimism of analysis can lead to the optimism of action and I think that we need more multilateral discussions and even when summits don't reach a conclusion it doesn't mean that they are not useful or successful. Thank you very much Pierre. So this is getting a little somber towards the end. But that's enough. So do you agree that we need common vision and understanding each other before we can actually reach agreements on things that matter to us and it may be quite hard to get to a common vision without more of a crisis. Do you think that it's possible to isolate one or two areas where we really need in our mutual interest without a common vision about the world and where it's going, still make progress? How do you see this big vision, big bargain versus let's pick a few things? It's a good question. But I would say that listening to this discussion I reflected on the current situation in general and I would say that to my mind we now are in a situation when a lot of old and fundamental processes are still evolving and we don't see the end of this trends close enough to realize whether we can orchestrate a new order or not. So first of all we have seen since the beginning of the 21st century the intensification of military conflicts in many parts of the world. And in any case I would say no political goals were really met with armed interventions. The economic effect was very devastating for many countries and this new circle of war like the war between Russia and Ukraine will also contribute to the understanding that the military interventions and the military confrontation is ruinous for the contemporary world and it just destroys the economic wealth and doesn't have any positive consequences because in the 17th, 18th, 19th century they deliver economic benefits for the victors. Now it is not the case. And before this would be really understood I think there is no little chance for new order to exist. The second point is that every time it was spoken about economic order and the new economic reality it was when the new economic trend emerged. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the resource production producing countries they became very high-flying in the economic sense and the very concept of new international economic order was put forward in 1971. But 15 years later all these countries were ruined by the huge debts and they were bailed out by the United States and many other developed countries. The same situation was, as I already mentioned with the Soviet Union and Japan in the 70s and 80s there were also high-fliers and then huge systemic crisis emerged. So now we have this competition between China and the rest of the world and I think we should wait for another, I would say, 10 years to understand what the perspective for China is. If China comes to the same result as Japan in 1989 by the end of this decade it would be an absolutely different perspective for new economic order to emerge. And the last point which the colleagues said was very interesting was the problem of taxation and the problem of offshore safe havens. So in this case I would say that this tax system which exists in the whole world these days actually has its roots. It takes its roots from the early 20th century and all the tax system was designed for either mercantilistic economy, economy of trade or for industrial economy where everything was reproducible and whatsoever and the stock market, the capital gains were not so much anticipated. Now the creative economy of post-industrial world of informational technologies creates a lot of wealth and this wealth creation is actually a major engine for economic growth and prosperity. If we tax personal incomes or capital gains as we do for last decades it would stop economic growth in the most promising countries. So my point would be so for challenging this offshore economy some countries, wealthy countries, should switch from the taxing to the incomes protecting the consumption and this may change immediately and generally the whole economic construction, the whole economic framework for the world because the first country that changes this system it will get enormous competitive advantages upon all others. So I would say there are too many trends which are coming from quite distant past which are still dominating the global economic order and many of them can evaporate and can be changed in coming decade or two and so afterwards I think the perspective for recreating this economic order would be much more realistic than they are now. Now we are in kind of a tunnel vision and we can jump out of it. Thank you. So we should wait for a decade or so until things become clear with my question to you. Can we afford to wait? I don't think we can afford to wait but I want to clarify something about the idea of setting priorities that's all good but unfortunately we cannot lose track of the bigger picture and we need a holistic view so that the impact of our decision is clearly assessed that there are no unattended consequences and if you take the example of the carbon tax that's going to have an impact on a single man struggling to raise a child who needs her car to visit patients because she's a nurse. The sad truth is that today governments don't have the ability to target specific, very specific categories of population. You can do it in broad terms but if you look at how much money we wasted during COVID or during the inflation period at the start of the Ukraine war it tells you a story that is a bit sad so we really need to raise our game in terms of pricing externalities I think that's essential and one area in particular if you look at the work the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change you know there's a lot of debate on whether new projects in all fossil energy should be allowed and you know you see a lot of arguments from here and there no consensus and I think that's again a lack of functioning or findings and I think it's very important that NGOs in particular become more involved companies as well to build stronger data to help governments make better decisions. Thank you, thank you very much. Of course every politician that tries to price externalities finds that they run into immediate political difficulties I guess the question for us is also going to be to what extent are the political systems in our countries particularly in the rich countries capable now of taking the decisions both nationally and internationally that everyone here is saying are essential and I think to what extent is the roots of the international economic disorder actually in national economic dysfunctionality and national political dysfunctionality in so many countries. Okay I think we have time for, we have 13 minutes I want to take two questions and in the strictures from Madame Tourier I want to go to the people who are underrepresented on this panel which is young people one over there and also and please be precise and concise if you can. I will try. Hello my name is Basil Cotts I work at the European Commission thank you so much for all of your insights you've mentioned that the global economic order is forever changing and is impacted by many factors my argument is that and you mentioned it as well it is impacted by the evolution of technology and innovations my questions to you would be in your opinion do you think that's the strategic use of innovation's new technology in our era of global interconnectedness will lead to a more stable economic order or on the other hand can lead to this order of the global economic system thank you. Very good question so is the technological progress going to lead to more stability or more instability and you might also ask within countries not just international anybody else have a question I see no other questions okay in that case who would like to answer that question do you think that technology the pace of technological change and particularly artificial intelligence now is this going to make international economic relationships work better or more unstable you won't have a view on that I've tried to ask chat GPT but I couldn't we could ask chat GPT for the answer I think it's a tough question and it can go either way really you know as I said you know in principle having more data you know more functioning of models can help educate all of us and hopefully come up with mutual decisions and that go in the right direction and that creates sort of win-win situations at the end but you know technology can also create some new gaps between countries on balance on balance yeah that was a very chat GPT answer though right because you're saying it can be this can be that are you feeling positive about this or you think I'm more worried than I am feeling good about it I am an optimist who worries a lot but I'm too right yes definitely I think we do have the example of the Arab Spring how much internet and technology play come into play so the end of the process is another story but if you come back to Africa definitely it has raised the level of consciousness more participation of young people and women and that's a good thing because I'm a pro-disorder type of activist I mean a disorder that would lead to a better order so for that sense in that sense I think it's a good thing that people get more aware of the issues of the scandal and that's one thing so it forces government even to be more accountable on the issue they deal with and I think it's very good because to get to a new order you need some disorder and maybe you know technology is going to play a role of course there is a downsize of it we do know that a message of hatred and think like that that we know but globally I think it's a good thing it's a tool that gets citizens to participate more especially in an environment where they don't have much access politically or economically so it gives more equal to the voices of those who you know are leftovers you know on the side of the road Thank you very much Good, a bit of disorder Hamid please Yes I would like to address the question raised from the floor with regard to technology development I think it's good or not it can be good or bad but I think that they change the priorities my experience in negotiating Korea US FTA 2007-2006 at the time with regard to telecommunication most important issue was how to liberalize facility based telecommunication services but after that with the OTT service in place facility based telecommunication services is not so important value added services are more important no one talk about facility based telecommunication services anymore OTT at the time we did not know what is the OTT and at the time the OTT doesn't enter into force so we resisted the US request to liberalize the facility based telecommunication services but we fully liberalized value added telecommunication services and OTT like Netflix is come over to the world through facility based telecommunication services so the development of technology they change the priorities in internet trade agenda but it can be both good or bad thank you Pierre I agree with what has been said I personally as an engineer see the potential it is in technology I think there are a lot of promises in technological progress but it is the responsibility of human beings to give a moral dimension to technology use and so technology is not a substitute to political will and to thinking about the moral dimension the ethical dimension of technological change what makes me more optimistic than I was earlier is that there are international discussions about that dimension especially in so far as artificial intelligence for example is concerned so I think that technology can bring people together to discuss substantial matters that's a good news even in the current context thank you very much I guess the progress of science generally is good but its implication its uncertainty the movie recently released Auburn Ham disclosed these fundamental contradiction I guess that's a very simple question simple answer thank you very much any thoughts on this? I just think that first of all technology brings chaos because it undermines some old technologies some established relations and some established visions so therefore every kind of technological breakthrough is connected with increasing chaos but the mission of innovators is to do what they are doing to increase the chaos and the mission of politicians and the mission of intellectual lead is just to combat this and to put in some framework to put some limits to this so this is a kind of societal change as it is organized so I definitely oppose the idea that we should regulate and limit the creative knowledge and the creative expression in any way thank you very much I think we've come to the end of our time and I don't think that's a conversation that is feasible to summarize so what I will say though is that I think what's very clear from this is that I don't think that this hankering for preserving the order in which we used to live is actually a meaningful approach because every time we start talking about it we discuss mostly the so many problems at the order that we have created and I don't think we yet have agreement on what is the kind of order where we are going to where we would like to end up let alone where we are going to end up and I'd say there's some quite open questions about how long and how disorderly the transition process will be and whether during that transition process we can make progress on some of the common challenges where we can't afford to wait for the lack of clarity to be resolved because it will just end up creating disorder of a whole different magnitude so I want to thank all our panelists for their insights I want to thank you all for your presence and I'd like you to join me in giving them a round of thanks please