 I think we'll go ahead and get going. My name is Andrew Wilder. I'm responsible for the South and Central Asia program here at the US Institute of Peace. And on behalf of USIP, I'd like to welcome you all, especially for some of our first-time visitors to the Institute. I'd also like to, in particular, thank our colleagues from the East West Institute. We're very pleased to be able to co-host this event with them today for the launch of their paper on Afghanistan Reconnected Regional Economic Security Beyond 2014. And when we planned this event and this date, I think we had no idea that it would be such good timing, which I have to admit was luck and not planning, for three reasons. First of all, we actually have a new Afghan president and a CEO. And a few weeks ago, that was looking like somewhat uncertain. So it is nice to actually be holding this event in the context of having a new government, and one that's actually proving to be quite active in its first two weeks on the job, and long may that continue. I think both President Ghani and CEO Abdullah certainly understand the importance of the region, regional politics, and the importance of greater regional integration for Afghanistan's own stability and well-being. And if any of you have the time, I would encourage you to read President Ghani's 309 page, I believe, Manifesto, which has lots to say about the region in it. Secondly, we're holding this meeting just a little more than two weeks before the fourth ministerial conference on the heart of Asia, so Istanbul Process Meeting. That was scheduled for August 29 in Xinjiang in China. But due to the fact that there wasn't a new government by then, it was postponed until the end of this month. And again, this will be President Ghani's first substantive forum trip, and I think it's very fitting and important and symbolically important that it's going to be focusing on improved regional relations. Last but not least, just over the weekend, we had the signing by Afghanistan and Pakistan of the Transit Pricing Agreement for the Central Asia, South Asia, the Casa 1000 agreement, which, when completed, Casa 1000 hopes to enable the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan to solve some of their extra hydropower to fill gaps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And anyway, I think some progress on this area of regional integration, I think, again, a small step but an important step over the weekend. But it's also many challenges remain, as you all know. I think we have to be clear-eyed about this and can't be polyannish about some of the challenges, which I would briefly say, first of all, starting on the Afghanistan domestic challenges, will the new unity government be able to perform? Will it be bogged down in paralysis of internal fighting, or will it be able to agree on an agenda and move forward? And again, I think in the last couple of weeks, you've seen some very positive signs, many of them symbolic. But at this point, I'll take symbolism. I think that is important. But I think, certainly, if we have a maintenance of the status quo, it's hard to see a scenario where Afghanistan can truly become the heart of Asia. There's also some very significant regional challenges, as we know. Will Afghanistan's neighbors, and I think Pakistan, in particular, see their interests best protected by a stable and economically progressing Afghanistan? Or are they betting that instability will prevail and that their interests will best be served by continuing to back proxy to protect their interests? In the last few weeks, we saw a sharp deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations. I think that's not encouraging on this front. I think a lot of the problems we see in Afghanistan today can trace back some of their roots back to the Indo-Pakistan conflict. And unfortunately, that's not an area where we've seen tremendous progress. And that's going to be important if we're going to realize this vision. And last but not least, I think the international challenges are very significant. With the drawdown, sharp drawdown of international military and civilian assistance, will the international community remain engaged to the extent that they need to be, I think, to maintain stability in Afghanistan, which is going to be critical again to achieving this vision. So I think the vision can be achieved, but it will take really active commitments both by the government, by the regional actors, and the international community to be realized. And that's why I think today's discussion is very timely and important. I'm going to end with a small advertisement. We at USIP are very concerned that now with the elections over, there might be a danger in this town mission accomplished, letting Afghanistan slip far down on the priority list when there are many other competing priorities. And so we are planning, this is the first of a series of events this week. We're calling Afghanistan Week here at USIP to again try to highlight the importance of Afghanistan moving forward, both in terms of US national security interests, but of course for Afghanistan and the region in which it's situated. Today we have this event. Tonight we're hosting a small dinner with in cooperation with the British Embassy to talk about the London Conference coming up in November, which will also be a very important meeting signaling both what the Afghan government, its reform agenda, and then what the international donors can do to support that. Tomorrow we're having Senator Karl Levin will be coming here to USIP to speak on the future of US-Afghan relations in the context of the new government. And that's going to be very important, I think in terms of how do we maintain the constituency of support for Afghanistan up on the hill. And then on Thursday we're having an event on social media and technology in Afghanistan and the important role that played in the democratic process. So I'd welcome all of you to come back again both tomorrow morning and on Thursday for these other events. So with that I'll end it and turn it over to Jim Creighton from the East West Institute. And again, it's a privilege to be co-hosting this event with you today. Thank you. Leonard, thank you very much. And thank you to USIP who, in the three years that I've been with the Institute we've done many things together and it's always an honor to be here. Thank you very much. Also to the German government and the government of UAE who helped put this together. They're our official sponsors. Thank you very much. And then as I look out through the room I see many friends that have joined me in New Delhi, in Istanbul, in Islamabad, Brussels and now in Washington D.C. And our network is continuing to grow and it's a pleasure to see so many people coming from around the world to talk to you about the opportunities that we see and the challenges that we see within Afghanistan. East West Institute is committed to building bridges and trust in places where bridges don't exist and there's not a whole lot of trust. And this is one of many efforts that we have ongoing to do that around the world. Over the last two years with the Abu Dhabi process and we've convened meetings throughout the region with several hundred people participating at the ministerial level. But I think most importantly also from the private sector many CEOs and businessmen that are definitely engaged and want to move into the region. We see our work as being complementary to the Istanbul process as just the people that understand the region, they understand the opportunity and are willing to work to make it happen. And those people coming together are supportive of the larger government entities. Where this represents, this report represents the end of phase one of the Abu Dhabi process. Phase one consisted of looking at what are the challenges and the opportunities. Identifying specific recommendations to improve economic growth in Central Asia. And as we roll into phase two and this is also the kickoff for phase two we'll go back to New Delhi. We'll go back to Kabul, we'll go back to Islamabad and other Central Asian countries. We'll talk to government leaders with the information that we've gained here with the input and participation of major business leaders and government officials. And the idea is that there is no silver bullet. There's no fairy dust that you can sprinkle on these problems to fix them. But it's just good hard work and engagement and ideas that will help us bring Central Asia forward as the drawdown occurs. So phase two will mobilize this network that we built. We'll take forward the ideas that we've come up with. We'll listen. We're going to the UN on Friday to do some more listening and discussing so that when we go, we have a consensus about small ideas that can lead to larger benefits. So what I'd like to do now is to turn it over to our regional vice president who resides in Brussels. He runs our Abu Dhabi process, our Middle East, North Africa process. Ambassador Martin Fleischer, on loan to us from the German government. And sir, I turn the floor over to you and your panel. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Jim. And good morning, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues. It's a pleasure and an honor for me. That's what you always say. It is, I think, a difficult task to moderate a panel with such distinguished experts here on the panel who are first experienced and with an audience which I notice has 1,000 more time expertise about Afghanistan and the specific issues that I have. It's but a great pleasure for me and I'm really looking forward to engaging the experts on the panel with the many competent people that we have here in the audience. Let me briefly remind you the issue, the title of this event, Afghanistan Reconnected. Jim said Abu Dhabi process, that's another word for the same issue, Afghanistan Reconnected, regional economic security beyond 2014. So that we are not trying to solve the whole issues on the table for the future of Afghanistan here, but we try to find some very specific concrete, we try to identify concrete action that can help to improve cross-border trade, cross-border investment and in that way, also not only contribute to the economic development, but also to the security situations. Both are clearly intertwined and that's why we choose as a working title, regional economic security. But I will refrain from giving an introduction, knowing that you know much better what I would attempt to speak about. And so Dr. Frederick Starr, you are a renowned expert in this field, you have produced a wealth of knowledge on this issue, but you promised me this morning that you would not do share this extensive knowledge with us, but just mention a very few concrete lines of action that where you see that this process, Afghanistan Reconnected, could be helpful. And without further ado, I would like to give you the floor. Thank you very much. Let me begin by indicating four ways in which this particular project is distinctive. First of all, is the solid focus on trade and transport. These are not treated as two of 40 topics, but as the key drivers for economic development in Afghanistan, transport and trade. And this project puts that front in center. Second, the focus on what we might call the Southern Corridor, the great transport link that connected for 3,000 years, India to Europe. We hear a lot about the New Silk Road, the China-Europe link, but much longer, much longer, much more heavily traveled, and also never interrupted, and carrying more ideas in both directions was the Southern Corridor. The effort here is to reopen it. Third, this project has brought together people from most of the key countries along the route. This is really important. You can't do this without their direct participation up to now that's rarely, if ever been the case. And finally, fourth, and very significantly, it engages the private sector. None of this is going to happen without business people and up to now the focus has been on governmental and intergovernmental agencies and financial institutions. They can talk about it. They can't do it in most cases. Certainly not without the business sector. So hats off, I say, to this project and to its future. However, that said, up to now, it would seem to me, the emphasis in dozens of international meetings has been talk. The product has been talk. It's been papers, commendable often, very worthy, but the product has been talk. And we're fortunate right at this moment to be able to shift gears into an entirely different phase in which instead of talking, we start doing. Now, for that to happen, two things are necessary. Obviously, engage the private sector much, much more actively. I wouldn't say engage, but even allow the process to be driven by the private sector. But second, also, for this to happen, you need to know what to focus on. And up to now, there have been 40 projects, all of them worthy, all of them defended in papers and presentations, but no prioritizing. What is needed at this point is to identify key drivers, key projects, and focus 100% on the most important of these, then move to the next one, then move to the next one. Any other approach from now on, given the positive developments in Kabul is a waste of energy. Now, that said, the prioritizing is very important work. We did a paper at the Central Asia Caucus' Institute called Finish the Job, in which we attempted not only to prioritize projects, but to identify costs. That's worth looking at, but that's the kind of exercise that we'll need more of right now. Finally, let me say the following. Where does this all lead? And I'd like to switch in the last minute and a half to from the very, very concrete and very practical to a more philosophical level. What is Afghanistan's possible future? Now, ask yourself, you have in the back of your mind some kind of image of the future. What is it? And fears too. Well, I would like to suggest that you compare Afghanistan at this moment with South Korea in 1953 when the armistice was signed. And very simply, South Korea was not a state, didn't even have a flag. Afghanistan is 250 years old. South Korea has ports, had ports, but was remote from trade routes. Afghanistan is absolutely centrally located. It needs roads and railroads. Third, South Korea had no resources and it has no resources. US government says Afghanistan has a trillion dollars worth of natural resources. The Afghan government says three trillion. Finally, the Koreans in 53 had a very poor educational base. There's a very impressive rising generation in Afghanistan, many of whose representatives are here in this room. Given that it seems to me, and let me end with this, it's an absolutely sober realistic possibility. Not an inevitability, but possibility that Afghanistan could become the South Korea of the 21st century. For that to happen, it needs very steady international support and very hard work, not only by the international community, but especially by Afghans themselves. Thank you. Dr. Starr, you have exceeded my expectation of being to the point and being very short. That's perfect. When you spoke about the Southern Corridor, the Southern Silk Road, I'm about to tell my adventures when I was 20 years old and drove all that way by car, but we'll do that later. And it's a fascinating region. Your last words were the Afghans themselves and I think that is the perfect link to inviting Mr. Said Mubin Shah. On your program, you see his excellency, Excellency Muzami Shinwari. He was supposed to be here. His excellency, the new president has convoked Mr. Shinwari for a strategic meeting and we are, so we have to cancel the last minute and we are extremely grateful for Mr. Shah that he jumped in. Not just as a substitute, I said as I would say, as a very, very apt person to speak on this very issue. Mr. Shah was the deputy minister of finance and he is now a commercial counselor, a commercial representative for the Afghan government in various countries and with his main seat in Washington and lazing with the government and the business community here in the United States. And he is the expert on the issue of economic regional security. And thanks once again, Mr. Shah, I think everybody here is grateful that you could make it last minute. I know you have a very tight schedule, but to quote Frederick Stuygan, setting priorities is also an art that is required. So, Mr. Shah, please, you have the floor. Would you switch on the microphone? Sure. Distinguished here, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the most respected and competent audience, good morning. So there is no need for introduction because I have been already introduced. On behalf of the government of Afghanistan and also on behalf of the deputy minister and on my own behalf, I'm delighted to be part of this important event hosted by the respected organization, USIP. Thank you very much. So I am sure that such event will provide useful information to the relevant stakeholder, policy maker and decision makers. Today, as I know, the topic is political transition in security situation and what are the challenges in opportunity in Afghanistan. So, Dr. Starr, I know him from the, we've passed here, he's expert on Afghanistan and we work together in different and correct and Central Asian forums. When I was frequently also participating in that meeting of these 10 countries. Coming to the security situation, so if we see before political transition, the security situation was deteriorated exactly. People lost their hope for stability. Economic activity was downward sloping due to the delay of announcement of election result. And people were frightened to send their children to school. People were looking to the history that they were thinking that no political transition without bloodshed. But despite all such serious concern, now we have successful political transition in Afghanistan with the national unity government. Now, the hope in strong government is raising up. Hope about stability is also raising among the people. Hope about the changes is growing up. Positive expectation is moving up inside Afghanistan among the common people. And these, those are the people who are determining the situation in Afghanistan. Again, people are sending their children and without any fear to the schools. The life started with the hope that Afghanistan will regain the dignified and honorable stage which was in the previous time. Of course, this was seemed to be difficult without the help of the United States in its ally. And therefore it's a place to give a heartfelt thanks to all those contributed to safe political transition and without happening any bad events. And let's give a big applause and appreciation to this safe transition which we had it actually. Comparing the situation before and after the political transition. So before political transition, we Afghans and our partners were regretted in losing hopes of stability. But the hope and expectation has started to building again after the transition. Number two, and this is a positive factor I want to tell you because some of the people thinking what's the backside of the coins. So before political transition, the security situation become worsen. Insurgent group like Taliban and other forces and their supporter were motivated as the political choice among us, they were giving a motivation to the opposition forces in order to advance in war. But after the political transition and the political transition itself was a slap on their face in barrier for our enemy to succeed in advance. And you can see the news, despite some minor event is happening but the security situation in Kabul and the provinces improved a lot. Security forces are motivated in advancing step by step to improve the situation. Third, there are many causes and reason for the fragility status in Afghanistan. Corruption is the biggest one which is seriously taken by the current government. Kabul Bank issues, the reform of the general prosecutor office, current, et cetera are the starting examples. This combating corruption, I mean, will help in diverting people from war to the involvement in the productive activities if well managed. For, in addition, the current government is focusing on a comprehensive, effective planning for security improvement as the president said when he was talking to the security forces. Five, signing a security agreement with the United States in NATO had contributed already to the security and it will contribute lastly and finally to the safe and successful economic transition as well. Coming to the national unity government. When we call it national unity government, the people always think the backside of the coins and think unity government is a challenges. I think let's change such approach in case of Afghanistan. Let's think how we can transform such challenges into opportunities that can be a bit. Number two, people are thinking that the two parties are two sides are working on division of government position. But the reality is not like that. Rather, currently both sides agreed in principle to recruit people based on the knowledge, experience and skill. Each group has highly qualified people either Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashafgani. In both side, we have good qualified people. Without having a unity government, one group of qualified people may not be sufficient for optimal running of the public administration. That is why the combination of qualified professional will together meet demand of the public administration in relative terms. That's in relative terms. It means we have high demand for qualified people. Once the two sides think they are the owner of the government, it will lower the level of unrest in Afghanistan and build trust of the people. People of Afghanistan is tired of unrest. Opposition in Afghanistan context. I saw the demonstration here in Washington DC. It was very peaceful, but in Afghanistan it means some destruction, some killing, some injuries. So we don't need that one. So we need unity actually. The fourth thing is the government is working to strengthen transparency and accountability. This will help further strengthening the unity and enable the environment for public and private investment in economic growth, which is positive steps toward economic transition. For the positive computation in real form, in check of one group and other will result in improvement. This is another positive thing in the unity government. The other positive thing is, the other things have you, I don't reject the availability of culprits and puppets of our enemy among each group and can remain as a challenge for the time being it may result in dealer of real form, but cannot bring major deteriorations in the government system. However, we are facing the challenges as Dr. Starr said that we are talking much, but working less. The economic transition, even the, you know about the document of the 2Q conference, which is talking about the political and long-term stability, fiscal sustainability in physical self-sufficiency. That was at that time, I think 2025, and then it was revised the document and something is happening, that one. But I think this is also a challenges. The two main fitters in physical sustainability are just creating problem. Unless the Afghan are very proactive, I can say very active when they start a work. The corruption is a problem and also the systematic problems within the government process, this bureaucratic procedures and all other things. So if this is removed and we have, this is the challenges and the government is addressing this one. The second thing in the challenge is the withdrawal of foreign troops because there are many things I don't want to discuss and this can be a separate discussion at this point, but they have employed thousands of Afghans. When this foreign troops withdraw, so the thousands of people remain unemployed. The government and its partner has to address these things and that is also a challenging. Convincing our partner, this is the third challenges, to continue with the building up on whatever we have done. And that was the aims of the security agreement and the other agreement to continue, to keep our sustainable mode in the development process and continue until the planned end of the economic transition. The government and partner has to discuss and come up with a solution. Four, enabling environment challenges, which everybody is talking about actually, this is very important. The Korea example, in 1953 to 55, it was completely destroyed and there was no resources. What they have done, they have done actually selected the end and outward looking development strategy and by attracting domestic and foreign investors. And now we see Korea where it is and I think it will happen here. So the enabling environment is including many issues. We can say combating corruption, improving security, access to electricity, access to land, trade facilitation, trade policies and a couple of things. I would like to also say to the response to Dr. Starr related to the, I think nobody has worked related to what are the people priority areas in Afghanistan. If this happened and they have actually started writing on these issues, this will also help a lot building the gap between the people and the government. What are the national priority areas and what are the economic priority areas? These are the challenges and the things I think some research institute can help Afghanistan to would say fix even we are at the stages of emotion that we are going forward that we say we want to start something as he mentioned that North South corridor is one of the important projects and there is way actually and I myself here are pushing for that one in order to find some ways and we'll be also writing in report to the Afghan government ministry of finance and I was talking and I have sent several email related to that one that how we can push from this side because sitting silent will not help. Five, there are some opportunities. You see that as Dr. Starr said that being Afghanistan as I have in its location in the heart of Asia it's which connect the south and central Asia together that's itself an opportunity to be a well. Similarly exist in a political will. This is an opportunity which is emerging at the current time it has to be a well and growing expectation of the common people this is opportunity to be a well. Availability of huge investment resources are opportunities to be a well. Sorry for taking much time and I think I have to end with the words that let's be together and addressing together all these issues because the countries of the world like part of human body. If a part has got a problem the whole body will be not would stay silent rather I will be tearing and the mouth will be crying. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Mr. Shah for this enlightening and yeah and also very personal, very emotional plea for cooperation and we need to, I agree, we need to stand together. I would next I would ask Mr. Jonathan Carpenter from Department of State Deputy Special Permanent for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I don't know, John if you, I mean we are in the Chatham House rules and could you perhaps begin with your very personal feeling is the glass half full, is it half empty, the future of Afghanistan. This audacious comparison with South Korea which I find yes audacious as I've said. Maybe you would like to start off with that. Thank you. Thank you very much and thank you to everyone for joining us today. I am particularly struck by not only USIPs continuing engagement on Afghanistan and the work that Andrew outlined that they're doing this week and they've been doing for years to build shared understanding and a broad consensus of kind of what we're collectively trying to achieve in supporting Afghanistan's continuing transformation but the East West Institute's effort here to bring in multiple stakeholders, the private sector, the region I think is a really valuable contribution and I'm glad for that and I'm glad the process continues. I may defer to the end on the half glass, half full, half empty comparison if you don't mind but let me say, I will try to be a little personal and also a little quick on this. First of all, when I joined SRAP in 2011. When you joined SRAP? When I joined SRAP, sorry for the acronyms, right? It's a State Department habit. Okay, forbidden. When I joined the State Department's Office of Special Representative in 2011 for Ambassador Grossman, the first person he sent me to see was Fred Starr to figure out exactly how the new Silk Road and the regional connectivity piece that Fred was promoting how we could, in the effort that Ambassador Grossman was pressing on regional connectivity, how we could better marry these up and how we could learn from all the research that Fred had done in the region and his incredible both knowledge and contact. So I'm glad to be sitting here next to him. I'm also wary that when Fred says, there's too much talk and too little action that being the State Department guy that puts me in a bad spot. But nonetheless, 2011 was when Secretary Clinton first talked about the new Silk Road and we launched this idea in the context of a number of engagements including the heart of Asia process that the Afghan government along with the Turkish government launched at that time. The effort of sort of talking in a regional sense on an economic basis was somewhat new. It was new at least in government. It wasn't new in academia or in the private sector. It also wasn't new to Afghans, of course. So my first trip to Afghanistan in 2011, I actually called on Deputy Minister Shinwari, I'm sorry he's not here today, and saw on his wall a poster promoting the Afghan-Pakistan transit trade agreement if you remember this from a few years ago. But Deputy Minister Shinwari's poster had Afghan farmers and carpet weavers and other people. It had trucks passing through Pakistan and then it had people in a market in India. And this was very much sort of front and center the vision of the Afghan government of Deputy Minister Shinwari personally. And I know he's done a lot since then to advance this agenda. And I'm sorry he's not here, but I'm very glad for the intervention that we've just heard. I would also say that I know the next panel I believe a colleague from our South Central Asia Bureau, Fatima Sumar will be here. So I won't do a tremendous amount on the kind of engagements in the region, although we can talk about that because Fatima Assistant Secretary Abiswal and her team are doing a tremendous amount on this, not least the work to support the Casa 1000 signing, the Casa 1000 project, the signing of which was commented on earlier in this context. Looking back to that time, we've spoken about the three transitions a lot in our conversations about Afghanistan, the security, political and economic transition. I think we've remarked the least on the economic transition for obvious reasons, but I think now that's sort of rushing to the front and center. At least it was rushing to the front and center. It was sort of set, moved to the background for a few months while the political transition was sorted out. But I suspect over the coming weeks and months this will be a focus for many commentators. The reality is that the United States and our partners working with the Afghan government have done a tremendous amount here to set the conditions for success in Afghanistan. I won't take the time, because I know it's limited here, to go through the details of where Afghanistan has come since 2001, but it's really a remarkable story. And when you read the press articles about assistance and the challenges and how hard this is, those are all, that's all true, of course, but it cannot mask the fact that real progress has been achieved. And that progress is fundamental now over the course of a generation of Afghans in changing opportunities. In the context of what we're talking about here, Fred talks a lot about trade and transit. I agree. And the infrastructure that's gone into place in Afghanistan over the past decade is remarkable. I was in New York at the General Assembly and heard the foreign minister of Kazakhstan refer to Afghanistan in 2001 as an economic cul-de-sac. And if you looked at any maps at the time, that's exactly true. All the rail and road connections ended, whether from the north or the south, they ended. And there was a sort of black hole of 30 years of conflict, there was Afghanistan in the middle. And that's changed. That's changed in a really tangible way. There's much more to be done, but when you think about what the ring road is, we focus a lot on connections within Afghanistan, but if you squint at that map, what you realize that the ring road is in fact sort of a hub and spoke, connecting the whole region together, knitting the whole region together. It allows trucks that enter from Tajikistan to get to Pakistan. It allows trade from Uzbekistan now on the first rail line into Afghanistan. That connection from Hiratant to Mazar-Sharif built with the support of the Asian Development Bank. So there's been significant movement. I would say from our perspective now, the shift for us has been over the past few years has been to a focus on sustainability. And I think this is the real challenge now in the Afghan context. The challenge is that with our assistance levels declining, still very robust, and a tremendous amount of money to be spent, but really declining from the high water mark of 2010 and 2011, how do we move these very real gains? How do we make them sustainable? I think this is the biggest challenge for this new Afghan government, and we as donors and partners to the Afghan government need to figure out how to do that in a very tangible way. As I said, we still have a significant amount of money available for this, and I will finish very fast here. Let me say this. First, I would ask everybody to focus on this London conference that's been remarked upon already, the Brits who are organizing this, along with the Afghans have organized three side events beforehand. It won't surprise you that they are with a private sector on regional engagement and on civil society. And there's no debate about the importance of those efforts. Two, we have to focus on the business environment inside Afghanistan. So as much as everyone's gonna talk about security and concerns about insecurity and all that, the reality is that businesses, both Afghan and international, have ways to deal with that. If you talk to a large multinational firm, they do business in plenty of physically insecure environments, they know how to handle that. What they can't handle is regulatory insecurity and political insecurity. That's where, when they talk to us, that's the number one challenge that they identify. So looking at things like the criminalization of commercial disputes and the challenges that that poses in the Afghan context is right. And three, in that respect, you have to look at commercial financing moving forward, right? So there still is significant donor funding from the ADB, from the United States, and others. And our commitment to Afghanistan is longstanding and beyond the end of the troop presence that the president announced, of course. When you talk about a shift to a normal embassy operation in 2017, that is larger than that. And so that commercial financing, I think is gonna be critical. The banking sector, those are the areas now that we need to support the Afghan government as it moves to make progress. And I'm getting the look, so I will cease. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. And I was hesitant to cut you off because you came in the very end to what we really are all looking for, very concrete recommendations, points to start with. We will try to reflect those in our summary, in our report. I have to say that I was corrected by my staff. This is not under chair-term house rules. This is a public discussion. I hope this will not hinder you. So I really put you on there. Sorry for that, but to encourage you, I survived 25 years in the diplomatic service saying what I think and thinking what I say. My wife wonders how this was possible, but it is impossible. So let's not be afraid and continue to be outspoken. I would like to introduce my dear colleague, Dr. Philip Ackerman. Philip, if I'm not mistaken, you had more or less the same position that John has in the US government. You had it until recently in the German government as a deputy, a special representative or head of task force for Afghanistan and Pakistan. So you have actually been part of setting the ground rules for German engagement, especially when it comes to civilian reconstruction. And so you personally have been, and I'm sure you still are very engaged. And also, of course, the German government, as you know, is the second largest troop Contributo, at least it was, it still is. So I'm not fully up to date. By the way, the last time that I was in Afghanistan was 2004, and we had this 10 years ago. I hope things have changed for the good. But when we talk about security, I was then heading an effort for setting up a truck workshop that the German Federal Army set up to support the buildup of the Afghan national armed forces. But this in brackets. So my knowledge is outdated, yours is much more topical. And although you are now the deputy to the German ambassador to the US, I'm sure it's a welcome opportunity to talk about this previous field of work to which you have helped to conceive. Philip, you have the floor. Thank you. Actually, it is. It is a pleasure to speak, and I'm still very much engaged. Afghanistan is a matter that doesn't leave you easily. So it's something which is very much in my mind. Let me say that I was well known in the German Foreign Office as being a notorious optimist when it comes to Afghanistan. And when I listened to Dr. Starr here, I say, my role here seems, I mean, Afghanistan is the new South Korea. I'm not totally convinced that we are going there very quickly, but I think I wish, of course, I wish, of course, that might become the reality one day. Let me say that we have seen from a government perspective, we have seen that the new president in Afghanistan seems to be very determined. And he has some very, very clear and good ideas. And he has started with a quite impressive amount of initiatives. I just mentioned the Kabul Bank initiative. He's reopening the case on the Kabul Bank. And he's revisiting some of it. He will revision some laws, the mining laws, for example, that may make them more investor-friendly. I think President Rani somehow understood that in order to become South Korea in a while, he has to get two things going, the economy and good governance stability for the country. Now, I believe, I'm a firm believer, that government engagement in Afghanistan or the engagement of the international community, rather, is crucial for the next couple of years. And therefore, my government also has pledged and is committed to stay with Afghanistan in the next couple of years on very many levels. What is the task to take up Dr. Starr's sort of appeal to act rather than to talk and to write papers? What is the task of the international community when it comes to set up Afghanistan, set on this path of better economy, better government stabilization? I would say four points, and I'll be very brief. First of all is we have to start in supporting this government of national unity. Actually, we have to say there is no government at the moment. We have a president, we have a CEO, but we have no government. So we have to support the Afghans to come up with the government as quickly as possible. Now, my country is ruled by a grand coalition, so the big, big opponent parties got together and formed the government right now. Germany is a much duller place in Afghanistan, let me show that. And I can tell you that a grand coalition is even in Germany, not an easy task to administer. So I would say the international community has to support Afghanistan in order to get this government of national unity going very strict, very, very strongly. We have to remind President Rani that he has committed himself to this government of national unity and he must not leave and any price out the other part of the government. That's the first thing. The second thing is the government has to live up to its initiatives. When we see what President Rani has started, now this has to be implemented also and we have to escort him in the way of really making things happen that he started now. And the London Conference, and Jonathan was talking about, is certainly one of the most pivotal events in this context. We have to get clear messages from the Afghans what they want from the international community and how they intend to use what they get from the international community. And so far, I have been at Tokyo myself. We have made good starts in Tokyo. We have produced good papers. The papers are not entirely fulfilled, if I may say so. So we have to get London at a better level of implementation and realistic approach to what's going to happen. Now in the medium term, I would add two other things, which are of utmost importance. First, we need a new push for peace and reconciliation with the Taliban, with the opponent group, the rebel groups. Stabilization is one of the preconditions for economic development, and we need this economic development. We need to get the other side in the political process. And we have had some good efforts. We have had some first steps. And I think our American colleagues here, to who, I must say, goes a lot of credit also when it comes to the forming of the government of the national unity. It's really Secretary Kerry and Jonathan Yew's team and Dan's team have to be recommended for that. It's really an excellent job. But we need this new push for reconciliation. We have seen yesterday, again, a terrible attack by the Taliban in Saripool, a province with a java calm in the north. So I think stability, we are still far from a stable situation. We need to get over this civil war-like, which is not a civil war, but this violence in the provinces. And the fourth point I'd make is we need to reform the election system. And their election system. And this has been agreed upon in the forming of the government of national unity. But it's a very ambitious project. And I think what we see now is that the plans are perhaps a bit overambitious. In two years' time, we want a totally new constitution. But we need to sit down and talk with the Afghan government and with all the parties of the Afghan government in order to reform the political system. It has become very clear that the electoral system we had is not really working in Afghanistan. I hear that President Rani, and again, I must say congratulations that he took this initiative, has sat down with the UN on this already. And I think that's a very, very good first step. But we have to be really close to the Afghan government and look and support them in what they are doing in order to get that done. Now, my last point before I close, I think that the German government, as I said at the beginning, has decided to stay committed in Afghanistan for a long time. Financially, we are part of this troop financing trust fund to a large extent, but also in the development area, but also militarily. We are still the second largest troop contributor, thank you. And we will stay in Masar Shari for a certain while, even in the north of Afghanistan, in order to keep the spoke north running. We feel, and that's where we perhaps, if I may say so, differ a bit from our American friends, where we normally are very much in sync with. But we feel that the reduction down to zero by the end of 2016 might be a little premature. We think that we might reconsider this at a certain moment. But having said that, Afghanistan, and now I'm coming back to my more optimistic approach to the whole affair, I think we have come a long way in Afghanistan. I have been dealing with Afghanistan for a very long time, I must say, where we are now with all the setbacks we have seen also in the last month, we are much better than in 2004 when you were in Afghanistan last time. I think there is a perspective for a prosperous and working and stable Afghanistan. And even if it's not South Korea in five years, but let's take a part of India or something, which is more realistic. But if we are there in five, 10 years, I think I would be very happy. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Phillip, that leaves us with some hope and a vast area of problems. I'm happy that you have all been so disciplined because we have a full half hour now for discussion. That's excellent. Thank you for that. I have two options. I can go right into the audience, or perhaps I would allow if there is one or two questions on the panel to what you have said. If that is not the case, but I'll give the floor to each of you again for some final, it's not final. We are in the middle of the process. But for some concluding remarks from your point of view, so I would perhaps be happy if in the end you would name one or two things that you would recommend that we carry beyond this today. If that is the case, then I would like to open the discussion to the audience. I see we have somebody here with the microphone. That's excellent. And so if you have questions or comments, I mean, then you are more than welcome, and perhaps you would say to whom you direct the questions. Oh, OK. OK, just you take three or four questions. I think the gentleman here in the middle at Yale was the first. The gentleman over was the blue shirt. If please, you would give your name. If I forget somebody, then remind me, OK? I'm trying to remember two or three people. It's just too many. And maybe you also try to see who was first in raising his hand, if both of you helped me with that. If you in the name begin, please say your name and your affiliation, and then try to limit your question or comment on like two minutes. Maximum. Sarang Shidore, University of Texas at Austin. Question is to Ambassador Philip Ackerman. I think you brought up the elephant in the room, the only speaker, the Taliban, which I think are very much active in Afghanistan, still have not been vanquished. Perhaps they can be reconciled. But my question was really regarding that political process between the government and the Taliban. There are certain indications that Pakistan has sheltered and harbored many of the groups that are active in Afghanistan. And I was wondering what sort of signals is the German government sending to Pakistan to bring some kind of bridging between the two sides? What are their red lines? What would be the preferred German solution? Thank you. Thank you very much for being so concise. That's the way we can have several questions. Did you see who was the? I saw the gentleman here, two more gentlemen. There was one lady who was it asking for the floor? She has. OK, at least we have two gentlemen here, and the one at the ale here. Please give him the microphone. And then, yes. And the other gentleman will be next. This question is for Mubin Shah. My name's John Rothenberg. I'm an Afghanistan specialist. So in my most recent job, we did an evaluation of Muls' support to martyrs and disabled. And we found that 14% of the revenues of Afghanistan are being used for this program. And it has the potential of using 80%. There are several other what I call vampire programs in Afghanistan's budget. We were told that if Ashraf Ghani became president, these kind of things would be dealt with when we were studying it. I'm wondering if there's anything having been done yet. Can I ask again, your question was directed to whom? To Mr. Shah, OK. Thank you. Then we have the gentleman here. Thank you. My name is Omar Uloomi. I'm from Afghanistan. I'm here today at the Ramseil Foundation, and I'm a fellow of the foundation. My question is to both Ambassador Philip and also John. Looking at or hearing Dr. Starr's speech, that we have too much on the paper. But there's not really an action. We're not really doing much to produce to action and implement them. And I also see Dr. Philip saying that he's not very optimistic to see Afghanistan of the next Korea. I think if we have do still on papers, I'm not sure we'll see it. But John also said that there is a significant amount of money, and there is a significant amount of plans that we need to put into the real action to get this accomplished. My question would be mostly to John. Why is he not optimistic to see Afghanistan the next Korea? Thank you. I think I have one more question. That would be the lady in green at the aisle. And then I would close here for a round of answers. Can we please have a microphone in the middle? Good morning. My name is Hannah Schilder. I'm a scholar of urban planning. Can you get the microphone a little closer? Thank you. And conflict resolution. So I have a question and a comment. Basically, the discussion about the private sector investment in Afghanistan, I think it's incredibly important if you want economic growth. But then linking to the issue of stability, I think one of the key issues is economic inequality. And so I'm trying to understand maybe you can provide your comments and insights about how such investments in the country's businesses and resources can actually address the issue of economic inequality for the purpose of stability in the country. Excellent. Thanks very much. OK, I take one more, but just for gender equality. Because then I would like to have a round of answers. Thank you so much. My name is Zakia, and I'm from Afghanistan too. Actually, I'm doing my intern with the World Bank. And I read the report that they did on Afghanistan's mining. And I noticed that the economic development from that part of you is not participatory enough from the people elements. How I wanted to know if, since the new president is an anthropologist, whether there's going to be a strategy to make sure that economic development is taking the people's participation into the process. Thank you. People's participation in what? In the economic process. OK. So then let's try how we get this organized. Well, the question, why do you why Philip is not convinced that Afghanistan will be the future career, I would like to turn that question around. That would be unfair. I would like to ask a very briefly why you have this hope that Afghanistan could be the future career. And I've been in South Korea too as a student. And these are very different countries and with a very different political and economic and historical background. So please. First, you can compare anything to anything. Thank you. I'll take that in the conclusion. You're right, you're right. Second, I didn't say it will be. I said it could be. And I offered four very specific factors that favor Afghanistan in this comparison. And these are extremely important. However, I just, to repeat myself, said that this won't happen automatically. I did not say it will. I said it could. And this will depend on very hard work. And it will depend, and I go back to what Dr. Ackerman said. I think it has to be underscored three times. The key ingredient, in addition to South Koreans being Koreans, is that the United States and Korea, as in Japan, as in Taiwan, as in Germany, state the course. And even today is providing a security umbrella. If we're not willing to do this, I would ask you, what sensible investor on this planet would invest $90 billion and sacrifice 2,500 lives of its citizens and then walk away from the investment? We didn't do that in Korea, and that's a key ingredient. So without that, I can't see that this grand possibility is attainable. So I emphatically agree with Dr. Ackerman. Yes, you're welcome. Because I think Dr. Sari is totally right. If he compares South Korea in 2014 with South Korea in 1953, we have more than 60 years difference. And I don't know what's going to happen to Afghanistan in 60 years time. But what we need to know is what's going to happen to Afghanistan in 5, 10 years time. That's very important. So perhaps the South Korean bar is very high. But I think the sort of Gujarat bar or Punjab bar is not that high. So I think, actually, don't make me a pessimist. I wanted to say, I'm an optimist in Afghanistan. I'm very, very confident in Afghanistan. And let me tell you one example why I'm confident in Afghanistan. That goes to your question. When the mining law came up, the German business community, which basically is not very interested in Afghanistan because it's too dangerous and not stable enough, was at least interested in this mining law. And as you know, everything takes time in Afghanistan, even electing a new president. But in this case, it took a long, long time until the mining law passed the parliament. And we were pushing for it. And we said, we have to have this mining law. Now, all of a sudden in Berlin, when I was in my previous function, a civil society organization came to my office and said, listen, we are an Afghan civil society organization fighting to improve the mining law. And we influence female members of parliament, of the policy jerker, in order to make this law more population friendly, to involve the villages more, to bring the people more on board, to give them rights in saying. And what they said was so entirely convincing. And Afghan civil society was so clearly good for the law that I thought, perhaps we better wait a bit. Perhaps we better wait until the policy jerker really has made up its mind in order to know how this law must look like. And that's a reason why I am confident in Afghanistan. Because in this country, there has been a movement of civil society which becomes more and more powerful. There are independent groups outside the political act of ship that are really engaged and committed to something. And the mining law now is under revision again. And I think it's a good idea to revise it again. But the moment that the society is taking part in all these procedures, not only the parliamentarian, but also civil society, it's a very good sign. So please don't make me a pessimist when it comes to Afghanistan. Thank you very much, Philip, because I think you twice, because you have already answered the question from the young lady in the rear there about people's participation. Now that was about, yes, we had two questions overlapping. But you can't take me enough, it's fine. Go on thanking me, it's fine. At least? Yes, I thank you for answering the question on people's participation with a special view to mining. That was first impression. There was a question that I must admit I did not fully understand, directed to Mr. Shah about vampire budgets. Yeah, please explain what this is. I think he was talking about the education of the revenue or in the budget, something to the economic burden to be bearded by this. So we know that due to the long war and destruction which has happened in the previous time, and it left disables, values, and weapons, and all other things. And the government has to address that issues due to the available situation to comprehensively look to the political, social, and economic situation. And this economic burden, every government want to decrease, it is desirable. And even at that time, in the previous time, some steps has been taken how to decrease this burden. And the disabled were evaded in some people within the disabled community, which has listed by the Ministry of Social Work. That was also implied in different ministries. And that is how they were contributing in also solving their problem and also decreasing the government. There are 16 days to say that what is the new initiatives. So let's see what will happen. Yeah, I'd like to pick this up a bit. Because I think this is, I appreciate that. And I think this is going to be an increasing focus for us and our engagement with the Afghan government. And I would just point to the recent visit over the past week or so of new national economic adviser, Minister Zakowal, the acting minister of finance, former minister of finance, who came to the World Bank IMF meetings really on the back of the very positive initial steps by President Ghani to reopen the Kabul Bank investigation, talking actively now about a new IMF program, engagement with IMF, and donor governments on technical assistance in these critical areas. I think this is an important part. In addressing this fiscal gap, this revenue shortfall that's going to be a real attention grabber for the next few weeks and months, a critical part of this now is going to be Afghan ownership of their expenditures. Because I feel like to my point that the gains have been real but not sustainable, the budget is very much the same way. The budget in Afghanistan has not been a realistic budget now for some months, sorry, for some years. And so the Afghan government taking ownership of this, and we have every confidence that President Ghani fully intends to do this, will give donors the confidence here to step in and meet these needs that are substantial and ongoing. But in a realistic way, as you say, that doesn't expenditure spiraling out of control that sort of got the budget from the inside. Thank you for that clarification. I think that's really a big challenge in these transition economies. I think we have similar cases, for example, the building up of Palestine where this budget issue is really critical for maintaining the confidence of the donor community and the investors. Thanks for that clarification. I have one more question left from this round. Yes, the elephant in the room. And I'm sure you all have a lot to say to that, but who wants to begin? Yeah. Let me very quickly give you some words on this Pakistan Taliban issue. I mean, we have seen that Pakistan is very important in this whole equation. I mean, there have been many, many, and if not the most, the leadership of the Taliban sits in Pakistan and is there. We have seen that Pakistan has changed its attitude toward the Taliban. I think it went from bad to better than bad. Now, as we know, better than bad is the new good in so far. We should not be too unhappy about that. But let me say this in this context. Don't externalize this conflict too much. The Afghans have to reconcile with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan plays a role, but not the over-important role people are attributing to. I think we need now a sit together with the Taliban and the Afghan leadership in Kabul. And we know that this must be mediated somehow. It's not going alone. But I think we have to see this is an Afghan conflict within the Afghan population. Don't attribute too much to Pakistan. We talk to Pakistan all the time, and I think the Americans do it even more than we do on this. Thank you. I would just quickly add to that. I wouldn't add actually a word to that about the need for Afghan leadership and the fact that the Afghans are going to control this process. And we fully welcome that. But I would take a moment to quickly just do on the Afghanistan-Pakistan piece. Again, we talked about Qasar already. The reality is that in the spirit of Fred Starr's actions, not words, we've spoken to both sides, and we know there's an interest in moving on things like border security and standard operating procedures on the border and other coordination mechanisms that frankly had broken down over the past few years and that we will do our part from ISAF, from the US government and our embassy in Islamabad to promote, but really getting that Afghanistan-Pakistan coordination across the board, economic, political security, I think is an important task that both governments have said to us they prioritize and will put front and center. Thanks. Yes, Mr. Shah. I want to add something. I think I agree with Mr. Carpenter related to that we have to work on different backgrounds and economic grounds, so we have to evaluate what are the bigger benefit and what are the lesser benefit and how can we achieve the greater benefit by sacrificing the little benefit? How can we avoid an original level? And how can we avoid the greater dangers by taking the little rest? So similarly, that original project is one of the Qasar, Taupe and other projects which are in the pipeline, but still it is we have to work more. The second thing which is happening in these days related to the peace issues. So President Ghani, when he was integrating the president of Pakistan came and he visited and he invited him and he accepted and principle. This is one indication related to work on peace issues. The second thing is that his first visit would be actually before the Pakistan, he will be visiting Saudi Arabia for Omra and probably he will be visiting the officials. So the Saudi Arabia is also effective in peace process. So I think there is intention of the government. So just I want to add one more thing related to optimistic. You know, when we want to build something there should be some factors. Number one, good intention that we are doing this thing. Number two, we have to have a goal. Like maybe Korea or something. Better goal is better than the excellent goal. Putting a big vision is better than looking very small. The third thing is proper planning and mobilization of all domestic and human resources. And the third part is that moving together. So I think Korea is the nation not would say they do not have four eyes and Afghan has two eyes. And we can do that one. We have to, and that is not no matter. Maybe we've been 50 years or in 100 years, but we have to have a vision. We are not saying that we will be, tomorrow we will be, we will do this things. But continue safer. Thank you. Thank you. These were almost like final words, but optimistic final words, but I have Frederick wanting to say a word on the Taliban issue and then it's getting tight because I can only take one short round of questions and so that we don't exceed time. Frederick, please. I disagree with the question because I think all four speakers and the program as a whole is directly dealing with the Taliban. Why? Because it's talking about jobs. Now, there's been Jonathan Carpenter alluded to the fiscal gap. There is a jobs gap. People need work. And this is exacerbated, not just by the departure of international forces, but also by the reduction of international non-governmental aid and assistance. This is creating a huge jobs gap. Leif Rosenberger, who is a wonderful government-based economist at CENTCOM, compares this to East Timor. And when the international assistance plummeted in East Timor, the country came apart for several years. So this is deadly serious. That's what this is all about. Now, what puzzles me, given the gravity of this, is that there's not been a focused bridge program on jobs and it seems to me that obvious way to go is a public works program. This can be useful in any part of the country. It could be very limited in term, maybe for two years, say, three years maximum. Public works to build things that need to be built and give people very modestly paying jobs, but jobs. That's the alternative to Taliban. One question. Excuse me, but I have to take two or three questions. Then each of you will get the word. One question is unanswered. Which one? This is an investment question. Which one? Investment question. That's correct. The question on investment and with a specific view to economic inequalities, as the young lady termed that. Okay, I'll give you. I can speak to this very fast, Martin. And let me just say this. I mean, I think our program, our assistance program, working close in conjunction with the Afghans now for a number of years, has been shifting to less stabilization and more development. And big part of that is in the agriculture sector, right? Where a large, the majority of Afghans get their employment. So from a perspective of economic inequality, yes. There's gonna be a lot of focus on INAC and Hajjagak and these massive investments, right? But the reality is that the majority of work is in the agriculture sector. And we, the Afghans have prioritized it. We've done a lot to promote broad increases in irrigated land and other access to this. In conjunction, frankly, with the Ministry of Women's Affairs to make sure that this has a gender component to it as well. So this is a big component of what we do and it's an Afghan priority. So we're gonna focus on these big, kind of capital-heavy projects and talk about those and those are important. But I think it's important in this context realize that there's a lot of other work going on here. Okay. I will give you the floor one more time and that will be the final round at the same time. I'm, no, these are too many. I can take, we have a few minutes left. I have three questions that I'm still going to take and there is the gentleman with the blue shirt behind and then I give one more chance for each speaker to say a few words with which must both be possible answer to questions and your final remarks because more time we have not. So please go ahead. Hi, Bill Byrd from USIP. One question and two quick comments. The question relates to money laundering and I think at some point the UAE ambassador might have been on the panel. We talk about Kabul Bank. UAE has not cooperated with Afghan government requests for that. So I'm wondering in this whole process did this kind of issue come up at all? My first comment is, and I guess this is to Dr. Ackerman Moore, to be a little cautious about how much you demand of the new government. This was very heavily mediated and influenced by the international community and it's a very awkward and fragile arrangement. I know the principles involved on the Afghan side really are going to try to achieve progress, but let's not forget that to some extent this national unity government was imposed by the international community. And third point, just to compliment that point of disagreement with an agreement with ambassador, I mean it's absolutely ridiculous to promise in advance to get to move out all foreign troops by 2016. This is, and if you look at South Korea we can debate about that, but in South Korea there was a specific announcement of reduction of aid over time and that spurred them toward export led development. The security guaranteed remained even now and similarly Taiwan. So this idea that somehow you get rid of the security forces and you try to maintain aid raises all kinds of issues. And third, the irresponsibility of announcing it during a presidential election campaign in Afghanistan almost boggles the mind. Thank you. Thank you very much. I was going to cut that off because we have no time for comments but I think the last comment was a very important one and a very interesting link to further comparison with the South Korea. And if I'm not mistaken, your strips are still in South Korea today. Okay, that. We don't want to count the Korean War but this may be something like 60 something. Okay, as Shamari please. Thank you very much. My name is Shinwari, not Mozambil Shinwari but I'm Shinwari from East West Institute working with East West Institute. My question is to Mr. Carpenter. You know most of these regional projects like ASA 1000, TAPI Investment in Afghanistan, Trade and Transit, these are all huge projects and have been discussed for the last three decades you know like to implement them. But I believe some of these projects needs a very stringent and you know like committed leadership from the United States as well. You know like for example, the agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan were discussed for a long time and it was signed when Hillary Clinton went there. You know like so what is, what critical leadership role the American can play, you know like to make these projects happens and make development in Afghanistan sustainable. You know like you can do a public work to some extent you know like constructing a bridge or something engaging youths but at a short term you know like Afghanistan needs a sustainable economic development. And my question is what critical role you can play post 2014 to make it happen. Thank you. Thank you very much. No, I'm sorry. The last, last question will be the lady in the back. If you, you keep it very short, please. No, I'm sorry that was the other one that was earlier. You mean the one that was much earlier? I'm corrected, okay. By my coach, very able coach, coach, please go ahead then. No, that is, I'm sorry. That's a misunderstanding. It's the young lady here in the front. I'm so sorry. Yeah. Yes, it's you. I apologize again, please. Just a brief question. No, no more comments. My question is related to Fritz answer, creation of jobs. It's very important, especially with the leave of international community of guns, how they have lost their jobs. And a lot of these youth, they have to support their families. And in that situation, they don't, there are no jobs and they don't have any other options, not to dramatize it, but they might connect with Taliban because they need the money. What recommendations do you have for the situation? Thank you very much for this question. We have no time for full round of questions. What we'll do now, I will just refrain from the summary that I prepared. I will perhaps give only one remark, and that is that if I was in the Afghan government, I would probably spend a whole working day in just reading the recommendations that the international community gives to me and then have no time to implement them. So that is, so I think what was said, the Afghan government needs help in many ways, but also in really prioritizing on a very few recommendations so that low hanging fruits can be harvested. That's just a personal comment. I will not give my personal summary that I've taken notes for here. What I will do, I will give each speaker one minute for a last comment, which may be either answer to the question raised, but questions can also be asked and responded to in the coffee break. But I would ask each of you, is there anything that you would like that you really think, okay, that is interesting? That came up today. That's something we must have a follow up on. And I would start next to me with Philip Ackerman. Thanks, I'll be very brief. Let me just take up what you said on the question of how much is the international community involved. What we have seen, I think I'm convinced by the fact that the Afghans want a government of national unity. They want it because they see their necessity. And even the political actors want it. Why do we have such a big international involvement in mediation in getting there? Because there is a lack of capacity. And this is one of the key words for Afghans in its capacity building. It is frightening to see that in 20 years time, 25 years of wartime, all the capacities are gone, basically. You start from scratch. Whether it's agriculture, I have a special case in the sugar industry, I can tell you in the coffee break, even to negotiation and how to set up a government. I think that's what we need to do. We need to escort a company, the Afghans, in this capacity building efforts on various levels. And that includes also mediation on this. I'm pretty confident that this national unity government can work, but it needs a hand from outside. And that's where we are happy to, if the Afghans wanted, we are happy to extend this hand. Thank you. Thank you very much, Philip. Jonathan. Thanks. I guess I'll close by sort of taking just broad issue with this idea that the United States isn't going to stay the course in Afghanistan. And I think there's so much focus on the president's troop commitments and troop decision. I think it belies a broader engagement by the United States that is both in security assistance funding in a robust civilian assistance program. The case for which we have to make here, right? And you can't take any of this for granted. Our own fiscal situation at home is tight. So you have to make the case, as I think many of the commenters did today, on why this is in our interest. And three, I just, again, take issue with this idea that somehow on January 1st, 2017, our civilian presence and our interest in Afghanistan is going to look like an embassy in any other country in the world. It's not. You've been to Kabul and you've seen what we're planning for in terms of a civilian presence. It is significant. If you've seen the request we've sent to the Hill for assistance, they're significant. And I think my last comment to the issue of regional projects, we absolutely are committed to using our diplomatic capital to move these forward. But I walk away from this with the word sustainability in my mind, whether it's a public works program or anything else. For these things to be sustainable, they have to be led by the governments of the region, first and foremost, the Afghan government. We should not, none of us are constraining their ambition. They can be as ambitious as they want. But it has to be their ownership. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Shah. When we are talking about Afghanistan and abroad, the people think that Afghanistan means war. Afghanistan means killing. It is not like that. There are people living there. There are such type of human which is happening in the United States. That is happening in Afghanistan. But meanwhile, we know we are fragile states. The other motives for, so there is a opportunity to invest. The other motivation factor is that when you compare, the profit margin is very high. Even it is associated cost is high. If you compare, that profit may be greater than the profit with the low cost in other regions. So that will also make it motivation. And there is a way that American investor or other investor can invest in Afghanistan. So we can talk in a private meeting as well. Thank you very much, Mr. Shah. Frederic. You can't talk about economic development without first talking about security. That's a law of nature. It works there and it's relevant everywhere in Central Asia and the Caucasus. We don't get it. Now, on the way forward, it seems to me we're talking about human nature. Babe Ruth pointed to the fence and then actually hit the ball over the fence where he pointed. That's what's needed in this situation, to identify an objective and to attain it. It can be first something quick like a public works program, limited time. But then it should be things that are already half there, like the implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transport and Trade Agreement. That's signed. It's a good piece of work. Another one that's almost there, and that is fast borders. We're not talking about 50 borders. We're talking about five or six. If they're sped up, announce that you're going to speed them up. Speed them up. Every person producing anything, farm or factory, will benefit from it. Third, longer term, strategic. Tappy. Everyone knows about tappy. We've talked about it for 20 years. You can't just endlessly talk about it. Either say you're going to do it and provide the leadership or get out of the way. Fourth, it has to be talked about now in the planning stage and financing, railroads. This is a long-term project. It needs to get underway at the planning and financing stage right now. Now, do these things in an orderly way. Don't try to do 50 things. Announce that you're doing it. And when they're accomplished, let the Afghan public know that they've been accomplished. That will create the atmosphere in which further progress is necessary. That seems to me an entirely attainable set of objectives for the next 10, 15 years. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, John. That's Frederick. That's about the kind of summary that I had in mind, but you have done it much more eloquently than I could have done. I didn't want to stop you from applauding. I only wanted to ask you to include in your appreciation all the panelists, where I think I have done an excellent job here. I would, from my side, like to include into my gratitude you, the audience, which is an outstanding audience. I apologize. We didn't have enough time for all of the questions. I also want to include the USIP as a host and also my colleagues from the USWess Institute who have worked very hard to make this event possible. Thanks once again for your participation, for your cooperation, for your contribution, for your interest. We have 10 minutes for the coffee break. We have to keep it short. I suggest that we reconvene at 10.50, 10.50. Thank you. Thank you very much. OK, I think we have a critical mass in the room to begin the second session. We have a very strong panel to continue the discussion that was sort of framed and laid out this morning. I wanted to make two points of introduction, which, the first one being that I think it was a Norwegian scholar who had pointed out one of the, I think, key dynamics of the regional relationship, which is for all of the countries in the region, Afghanistan is important. And attaining a sort of a win-win outcome that we've heard about this morning would be beneficial. But for each of these countries also, Afghanistan is not the highest issue on their foreign policy agenda. So it's easy for the default mechanism to be a lack of cooperation. And in order to attain this win-win, sort of more concrete decisions are taken, which I think has been the point of the East West Institute's initiative so far. And again, some very concrete actions that were discussed this morning need to be done. And there needs to be the sort of political will, which is a phrase that I don't like, but sometimes you can't really do without it. And the question of political will relates to my second point, which I remember in the summer of 2010, I was with the UN in Kabul. And we were preparing for the Kabul conference, which I think was held in August of that year. And we are drafting the communique that would come out of the conference, as usual among a small group of diplomats. The main representative of the Afghan government was Ashraf Ghani at the time. And of course, he took a look at this carefully developed and negotiated piece of paper and said, we have to start over. This is worthless. And a few of us went into a small room where he began to dictate. And my job was to type what he said. And the first thing he said was, this idea of Afghanistan as a roundabout of Asia. He said, we can't use the word roundabout, because America's don't understand what roundabouts are. That's a British thing. So maybe a hub of Asia or a turning plate of Asia. And so we're just going through all of these words. I think all of which have somehow been used in speeches over the years. But basically, it was clear four years ago that this was somebody who was committed to this vision of Afghanistan as a center of regional development. And so that part of the political will, I think, is there on the Afghan side. And the East West Institute and others are sort of trying to do the heavy work of developing it among the other partners. So we have a panel here with representatives, not necessarily official, but formal and informal, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan, from India, and from the US, who can maybe help us solve the coordination and cooperation problem that so far has impeded this dream of regional integration, which as Dr. Starr said earlier, has been around for 20 years, but hasn't made much real progress. Before getting to our representatives from these countries, I'll go first to USIP's resident economist, and therefore pessimist, Bill Byrd, to sort of frame the issue from maybe an economic perspective. Thank you, Scott. And I think I will be making some fairly critical remarks. So I'd like to first talk, just underline that this is really an excellent report and a good initiative. And it's particularly good that it's concrete and it tries to prioritize, which, as has been said earlier, is a very important and difficult task. And I like very much what Professor Starr was saying, to move from talking to doing. Of course, now I'm going to be talking anyway. But so my remarks are going to raise some challenges and issues, but I think they need to be seen in this overall context that this is certainly a good report and a good initiative. And also, many of my comments are touched on at least in the report, but I'm trying. I think that the mix and the weighting of some of them perhaps needs to be changed. First, I think the centrality of geopolitical fault lines and political economy, interest groups and distortions really needs to be kept in mind. Don't treat them as an excuse for inaction, but if you're not informed about them, then the project will be very unrealistic. They already mentioned many of them, the Indo-Pakistan, that's key. It's always going to be a constraint unless there's real progress on that. The old Cold War iron curtain, which I guess I date myself by remembering, still Central Asia and Afghanistan and via Afghanistan, South Asia, they trade much less. Generally, the South Asia region and centrally Asia regions trade much less among themselves than most other regions in the world. And let's not forget Iran. I think the report is a little bit downplaying, Iran. It is mentioned here and there, but it's really, there's not a chapter on it. There's not sort of a major thing. And I do think if you're looking at this region and you're not talking about Iran, that's sort of ridiculous. It's a big trading partner with Afghanistan. It also provides a good bit of electricity to Afghanistan in the Western part. And it's certainly a potential competitor on some of the trade routes. If you just look at the map North to South, you can go through a lot less mountains by going North to South via Iran than by Afghanistan. And so, for example, on the gas pipeline, which I'll also talk a little bit about, it would seem much easier to send the gas pipeline through Iran than through Afghanistan. So it's a potential competitor on some of these internet sort of regional or long distance routes. And of course, the other thing which people would always mention, is a potential political spoiler in some of these things. So the idea that you can somehow talk about this region and really not give a central focus to Iran seems a bit odd. I mean, I'm not saying it's the most important one, but it's certainly not the least. And so the key question, I think, is not to be ruled by these constraints, but how to move around them and forward. And there were different initiatives and certainly the Afghanistan-led RECA process, all has included Iran, for example. I don't know about the Istanbul process, but I sure hope it includes Iran. It's just sort of so obvious. Another one I didn't even mention was the drug trade. The role of Iran is a transit point for drugs. So, but how to get through this, and I think the report talks about this, is you can make small moves at the margin and then look for breakthroughs sometimes. It seems like the prospect for Casa 1000 have improved. That's wonderful. It seems to me, and others could correct, that TAPI is getting bogged down a little bit. So the point is to have a few of these options on the table and then see which one can move forward quickly, not to be fixated on one or two of them to the exclusion of others. And on the other hand, so not to have 40 projects, but also not to put all the eggs in one basket of one project. Another point I'd like to make, which I think is maybe partly in the report, but also certainly in some of the warning comments, this idea that Afghanistan's natural resources are a tremendous asset and wonderful. I mean, you know, economists cringe at it, not because of pessimism, or there is a term called resource pessimism, but countries with heavily oriented toward natural resources generally have not developed as well as countries without them. And there's very strong cases why Japan was forced to engage in manufactured exports because of lack of natural resources. And similarly, South Korea, not having natural resources probably avoided it, some problems which other countries ran into. So in Afghanistan, in addition to the resource curse, which is actually called that by some economists, they're also issued, you know, it's not well located. There's not a nearby port, all kinds of transport and logistical issues. So, you know, I think the message generally from a very extensive literature on natural resources and development is that natural resources plus very strong institutions, like in Norway, or interestingly, like in Botswana, seem to work. Natural resources without those institutions, Nigeria, for example, can be an absolute disaster. And so, you know, so I think we need to be cautious that somehow having one or three trillion dollars of resources is going to make Japan into, sorry, Afghanistan into South Korea. I think it's really a dangerous notion and actually the ground is much more for caution on the resources. Another one where it's a bit unrealistic and I'm not sure the report is endorsing this that much, but the idea that somehow containers with bulk goods or with any kind of goods will go from Moscow to Delhi overland through Afghanistan, that just doesn't seem to be right in terms of the economics. The sea route, which were discovered, you know, whatever in the 15th century, are much more efficient and will remain so. So be very careful. And by the way, if you want to look at a land route north-south, maybe not quite so far, but something that's economic, again, it just looks much more easy from a variety of perspectives to do that through Iran. However, and I think this is really important, there's a large potential for what you might call local intra-regional trade. As I said, these countries don't trade, other than Pakistan, Afghanistan, which is different. The other countries don't trade that much with each other, especially Central Asia with Afghanistan. And so I think there's a lot of scope there, but again, not wanting to be overly ambitious and look for the 5,000-mile container traffic, but look, see if you can open a bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as was done a few years ago, and you start developing local trade. And then the important points that Professor Starr made about borders and managing them are very important. Infrastructure investments have been helpful, I think in the morning they talked about that, but I think we have to remember that without maintenance infrastructure can deteriorate extremely rapidly, and that's happening. And also due to security incidents, for example, on the Kabul to Pandahar road. So infrastructure is really important, but I don't see much signs that there is good prospects for maintaining it. Water. I was first gonna say maybe Iran is the elephant in the room, but that doesn't seem appropriate. I think water might be the elephant in the room in this process. It's something people don't wanna touch. President Karzai, at one point, forbade discussions of riparian water issues because he felt this is Afghanistan's water and any negotiations with neighboring countries would be wrong. That's obviously an extreme and ridiculous position, as is the position that I've heard from the Pakistan government that no international projects on the Kabul river without full, without essentially a veto power by Pakistan. So there needs to be dialogue here, but I did feel the report a little bit was underplaying this issue. I don't know whether it was because it was thought to be unimportant, which I think is wrong, or simply because the political constraints were felt to be too great. Regional cooperation, again, I think this is not inconsistent with the report. The best term for it is spaghetti bowl. There's many, many organizations overlapping unclear responsibilities. They sap the energy and the limited capacity of the countries, especially Afghanistan. It would seem to make sense to focus on the RECA Istanbul process, which seemed to be moving well, and then basically without saying so many words, just ignore a lot of the others. And I think very important point, which I think came out in the morning also, that regional cooperation could be synergized and could complement Afghanistan's development, but it's by no means a substitute. So we need to keep the focus on Afghanistan's progress in coming years while using regional levers as a tool to help both in that and build regional cooperation, but not to reverse that and put regional cooperation before or as a substitute for Afghanistan's development. I can't resist the last comment if that's okay. South Korea, I think for a variety of reasons, is not the right example. And I actually would challenge Professor Starr's point of view that somehow Korea's education system was terrible in the 1950s. Pretty much I think the East Asian model was on high levels of literacy and trained, relatively decently skilled, trained, very low-cost manufacturing labor. That's how the East Asian miracle occurred or that was what fueled it. And Afghanistan doesn't have that formula. We could quibble about, but literacy rates, I mean, I haven't gone back and looked, I didn't have time because I didn't, between the sessions, but it just seems to me to compare the education system and literacy rates in Korea in the 50s with Afghanistan. Now, I'm pretty sure Korea would come out better. I think the better example is, and I'll be very controversial, is Switzerland. And people may say that's totally ridiculous, but no, it's not. Switzerland's the last landlocked country. And I think actually colleagues from Europe will know this much better than I do. But Switzerland for centuries was a really backward country in Europe. And I think at some point in the 19th, I mean, A, they were a source of mercenaries, which generally is a sign that it's a poor country with a lot of unemployed young males who are seeking employment elsewhere. So the Swiss guards at the Vatican were just one example. It was very common. And somebody told me, and I'm happy to be corrected, and it's not true, that in the 19th century, the term Swiss actually meant some kind of low-cost migrant labor. And so maybe Switzerland is a model for Afghanistan when the region around Afghanistan is getting close to as developed as Europe was in the 19th century. Because in the 19th century, the Swiss got their act together. Political reforms, they built up the watch industry, which they stole from the British. I mean, not stole is not the right word, but they were able to take over the watch industry, which Britain had dominated, and they were quite successful. And then to become a financial and money laundering hub, which I guess we're not recommending that for Afghanistan, but UAE already pretty much plays that role. But my point being, there are a landlocked country and in Switzerland, the key thing was the neighborhood. I mean, the neighborhood you're functioning in, Europe was the powerhouse of development in the 19th century, and Switzerland took advantage of that very well with some astute political thing, difficult coalition politics among the cantonments, very decentralized. So that would be the kind of model, but just that may be a model in coming centuries rather than in coming months or coming years. Thank you. Bill, I was going to thank you for over-delivering on the pessimism, but then you ended on a surprisingly optimistic comparison. Let's move now to Ambassador Khakhar Haim from, as a former Pakistani diplomat, also I think we'd be interested in obviously your views of how Pakistan sees this complex regional integration question and maybe also something specifically on the transit trade agreement, which was signed to great fanfare, I think, in 2011, but we keep repeatedly hearing that it's not really being implemented. And I think there's some issues of trust and other practical issues that maybe you can help us understand. Thank you. Well, it's a great pleasure for me to be here. I'd just like to say a few words about the process, the consultations that were organized by the East West Institute over the past two years. I think there have been hundreds of meetings on Afghanistan organized by scores of institutions and United Nations agencies and others, but these consultations had some distinct features. They were focused, they focused on the key issues of Afghanistan's likely role as the essential land bridge between Central Asia and South Asia and beyond. They talked about the question of energy trade, energy corridors and the question of investments. These are all core issues in terms of both Afghanistan's resilience and development and in terms of the feasibility of regional cooperation in the two regions, Central Asia and South Asia for which Afghanistan plays or can play a crucial connecting role. And I hope I understand that apart from preparing this report, which has the key recommendations, the East West Institute intends to follow up on those recommendations and focus on the role of the private sector. And also on translating some of the talking into actions. And I hope that they will get the requisite support and resources for carrying on this important exercise. In any case, I think the recommendations that have emerged will serve as important inputs for all the efforts that are being made. Second point that I'd like to make is that Afghanistan has to necessarily go through these three. Transitions, political security and economic and financial. And there has to be a fourth transition or development, which is that the regional countries have to do more than they have done so far. And in that my own country, Pakistan, India is important and on the other hand Iran, I think will be quite rightly focused on the key role that Iran can play. And of course beyond Iran, the Central Asian countries and Russia, these are important partners. Now, as I don't work for the government, but I had an opportunity of talking to my former colleagues in Islamabad, there is a lot of optimism. The recent momentous decisions at the end of September have generated a tremendous optimism in Islamabad. And people in Islamabad claim that they were also instrumental. First, they did everything they could do to facilitate the process of election. And second, the agreement, the landmark agreement that was reached between Mr. Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah. Islamabad was the first country I think that warmly welcomed that agreement which led to the decision to the decision of the two main leaders to form a government. As we all know, the United States had played a great role in that in July after there were serious worries about one of the candidates going ahead with unilateral actions, with some kind of orange and green revolutions and all that. And Islamabad has also kind of expressed support for the signing of the two agreements, BSA, and the status of forces agreement and saying that Afghanistan was well within its right to sign these agreements. The Pakistanis made a special gesture, the participation of the president in the swearing-in of Mr. Ashraf Ghani was meant to be a political statement. And they speak, my colleagues in Islamabad speak, of opening a new chapter in their relations with Afghanistan after the departure of President Karzai. And although they tried, the present government claims that their position on Afghanistan has been evolving in the direction of having no favorites. And that all that they want to see is a stable, peaceful Afghanistan that is able to ensure continued socioeconomic progress in the country and also serve together with Pakistan as the essential land bridge between Central and Southern Asia. What we basically need is the first, as I said, the three transitions. I think it's no use talking about economic opportunities and job opportunities without security. We saw in 2012, 13, that economic activity virtually came to an end. Work on both the mining projects, Hajji Gak and Anak, virtually stopped. And industrial and even agricultural activities suffered and the job market suffered. So contrary to the World Bank prediction of 5%, the GDP growth actually came down to less than 3%. And you had also a drop in the real estate prices in Kabul and a corresponding increase in the real estate prices in Peshawar, in the suburbs of Peshawar, Hayatabad and others. And there were more Afghans leaving Pakistan, Afghanistan for Pakistan with the intention of not returning. So I think the importance of security as the foundation, is the essential prerequisite for economic activities that should not be undermined. So we need these three transitions, the political transition, and we have had very encouraging developments. There are no fundamental policy differences between Mr. Ashraf Ghani and Adallah, Adallah. I'm also delighted to say that both of them met the president of Pakistan and both of them. In fact, Mr. Adallah, Adallah spoke more eloquently about his intention, about his preference for good relations with Pakistan. So these are hopeful sort of things. And the economic and financial transition, I think there are good prospects, but Afghanistan's future development and as well as the possibilities of regional cooperation, they are feasible, but not pre-ordained. They will require actions by Afghanistan, by each one of the regional countries and in the regional framework and the support of the international community. The three actors are Afghanistan itself. The Afghan government will have to deal with the serious questions of corruption. I think Mr. Sopko's report has been circulating throughout the world and it will be essential institutions of governance. The foundations have been laid in the past few years, but we have to have robust state institutions to carry forward the process of economic development in a world where there will simply not be the kind of monies that were available in the previous decade. And so these three transitions plus the positive role of the region. And if Afghanistan is able to develop these robust governance institutions and if the regional partners play their new role, India and Pakistan have to try to put their act together and to avoid projecting their historic rivalry in Afghanistan. There have been complaints on both sides and those complaints have to be addressed. And the international community must engage with Afghanistan, continue to engage, and we hope, I mean, there are positive signs. Now, both the consultations as well as the international, the risk consensus on three concrete initiatives. Pakistan, Afghanistan, transit fare agreement. There is slow but steady progress on that. We know that Pakistan has to do a lot to improve its infrastructure between Peshawar and Karachi, improve the formalities, the custom formalities in Torchham and as well as in Karachi. And Pakistan seems to be willing, willing to do that. On the Central Asia, South Asia, Kasa, 1,000, which is actually 1,300, because 300 megawatts will stay back in Afghanistan and 1,000 megawatts will be transmitted to Pakistan. There is good progress. Last week, I think it was on Friday here in Washington, the price agreement was initial and the same goes for Tepe. Tepe had no problem. It was the eye which had the problem but I think all the enabling agreements have been agreed upon and we hope that Tepe will also be possible. I think there is a great willingness now in India to continue to work for this project. So we are cautiously optimistic and we hope that the positive trends can be and will be consolidated in future. Thank you. Thank you very much. And also a very useful reminder, I think, that as you said, we're all relieved that the political standoff over the election was resolved peacefully, but there was a tremendous economic cost that people like Bill have written about that was exhibited through certainly private sector activity that is stalled or even reversed. And I think that's a good segue to Ambika Sharma who wrote the paper on harnessing Afghanistan's economic potential in this report and also deals very much with the private sector and can maybe help us also understand what India and India's private sector can bring to this equation. So thank you so much and I would first like to thank the United States Institute of Peace and EWI for giving this opportunity to me and I would just like to share with the members who are present and listening to this deliberations perhaps for the first time that East-West Institute has played a tremendous role in deliberating and bringing different stakeholders together, beat industry, beat security, beat foreign policy relations. So we all have worked together, deliberated over the last three meetings and with a lot of pride, I would like to share with you that India, which the country which I'm representing, we have played a tremendous role over the last two years, but that's not what has been done, but we are going to work consistently forward towards that direction. My points are going to be very different from what you have been listening since morning and Professor Dr. Starr has already raised a very important issue which is walk the talk and that's what exactly we are doing. You all may be aware that Heart of Asia process when it was initiated, India took a lead that how to commercially enable Afghanistan and that's what we have been doing because we do realize the importance of political security, we do realize the importance of other security issues but economic security cannot be undermined. So I would just like to share with you a very underlying mission statement for us as far as rebuilding or reconnecting Afghanistan is concerned. We feel Afghanistan is definitely at a critical juncture in the remarkable political and security transition that is underway, but there's a lot more than simply looking at it from political and security terms only. We must not lose sight of the economic transition that is underway that requires the support of all the countries. India has taken that responsibility as part of the partner to Afghanistan and I'm delighted to share with you that over the last two years when we took this initiative we have organized numerous capacity building programs not only for the entrepreneurs but also for the chamber officials, the government officials. More than 2,000 business to business meetings really which has generated a lot of interest among the Indian and Afghan businesses to work together. We have worked on separate programs to enable Afghanistan young entrepreneurs to understand the new technologies, the new innovation programs and how to connect with them. And not only these programs have not only been implemented in India but we have gone ahead and done these programs in Afghanistan and I'm very happy to share with you that only next month we are sending a team of 40 leading Indian companies to go and showcase the products and not only the showcasing of products but as to how India and Afghanistan businesses can work together. So we are creating an enabling environment to bring the businesses together and we also run a very interesting program with USAID which is called Millenium Alliance which is a very inclusive platform to leverage India's creativity, expertise and resources to identify and scale innovative solutions. Here, sir, you talked about water. You talked about utilities which was talked about in the morning. So we are trying to bring about the knowledge of how the exchange of such technologies can take place and how we can support this huge cause which is waiting for a good technology solutions in the years to come. We are taking separate initiatives to harness the sectoral potential of Afghanistan. I'll just give you a very small example, marble. So we are giving the opportunity to Afghanistan industry to come and showcase what they can do for the rest of the world, beat exports, beat joint ventures and this is a very, very baby step but it is making a lot of difference to Afghanistan marble industry. Similarly, we do an international conference as it was talked about by one of the esteemed speakers from Afghanistan that it is very important to showcase to the world there are a lot of questions in people's mind about corruption has been talked about. There are a lot of other issues have been spoken, the security of the investments. So we have been creating these enablers and we did very successfully with Afghanistan government of huge program on doing business with Afghanistan because the world has to know the potential, the policy and the rules because there may be, there are problems but it's not the end of the story because there's a huge potential and so it is important to share with the world and the potential partners as to how we can work together with Afghanistan. I'll just share with you a very simple example. We started working on capacity building program for the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and we realized that they don't even have a B2B portal so we have taken that initiative to have that B2B portal which is going online in December. What is going to happen? It is going to enable the Afghanistan industry to connect with the people from the world, the people of business from the world be it an access, how to access the international trade leads the tenders and the projects this is very important. So we took upon these very basic steps as to how enable the Afghanistan businesses to be ready to take more economic challenges. Before I close, I would just like to share with this, the members who are present over there that from my organization which is Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, we are representing more than 275,000 companies of India which is one of the leading agencies. We have major two recommendations which have been talked about to bring about the policy change. One is the Afghanistan as a transit trade and investment hub. We have been talking about Silk Route so we feel that it is very imperative to harness Afghanistan's potential not only as a bridge or roundabout connecting these regions, contributing only as a transit route but as a possible driver of economic growth in the region with developments of its human resources particularly its natural endowment including minerals and hydrocarbon resources. We are very delighted to hear the progress on certain fronts which have been shared by Ambassador Kakel from Pakistan. We are also very, we would be very happy that at the earliest there should be a full implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan trade and transit agreement as well as its gradual extension to India. In this context, the proposed MOU between Iran, Afghanistan and India on the Iranian port of Chhabar to link Afghanistan with India is a welcome move. My, our recommendations are very business specific so we would also like to highlight that India under the SAFTA process has unilaterally offered to import duty-free and quota-free goods from LDCs including Afghanistan and we hope that other countries could also offer such concessions as it would help to transform Afghanistan into a manufacturing hub and that's the final goal for enabling Afghanistan to be ready to take challenges. And I would also like to touch upon another major policy recommendation which we as a business organization has taken up is the energy corridor as a confidence-building measure and the engine of growth. Energy has been talked about by almost every speaker in one way or the other and you will all agree with me that a regional energy trade could serve as a catalyst for economic integration and peace-building at the regional level contributing to the settlement of violent conflicts. As a gateway from South Asia to Central Asia we all know that Afghanistan holds a key position to unlock new economic potential in the regions by providing transit routes for energy supplies from Central Asia to energy markets of South Asia. A scenario with win-win potential for all the stakeholders. In terms of security concerns special attention should be given to mitigating transit risks through Afghanistan measures to be taken include employment of local workforce and local regular access to supply of electricity and gas along the transmission routes. Special security measures to protect the routes deployment of repair crews and maintenance. In terms of funding an intergovernmental regional trust could also be set up to cover set costs. So friends these were all very business friendly initiatives and business friendly recommendations and we are working with a lot of US businesses also with a very regular engagement with the final objective as to how we can strengthen Afghanistan economically. Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Now for the Afghan perspective I'm happy to welcome why Nula, why you see with a familiar face from many conferences I see in your bio you've listed Berlin, London, Rome, Bonn and so forth and it reminds me of a line by Nabokov who said that history was a process by which small European towns get turned into the names of international treaties. I think modern history is where European capitals get turned into the names of to-do lists for the Afghan government but I think we've all commented this morning on the opportunity that we now have with not only a new government coming out of an election but also a dynamic one and one headed by somebody who has very clear ideas on economic reforms and regional integration so we look forward to hearing what you have to say. Thank you very much. Most of the time actually when we were making these conferences and when we were together they named us conferences. So we were for most of the time we were conferences because of 22 international conferences that we were making outside Afghanistan and our department somehow but most of the time directly involved in developing of the conferences. Anyways, let me thank USIP and East West Institute for putting this great work together, great job. I think the recommendation that has been published in this document is really fair and very on time for the new government. This is, these are most of the issues that if you watch Dr. Ashraf Ghani's meetings with different groups of people from private sector to woman, to youth, to ministries and other categories of institutions. He is always trying to find out recommendations for the new agenda of the new government. So this will contribute a lot and especially the event and the upcoming events, this is really helpful. Let me start from the events that we have in the next six months. One of them which is on 31st of October in Tianjin, China is the heart of Asia. Yesterday we had an ambassadorial meeting, a coordination sort of meetings to understand where our countries are with the CBMs, the conference building measures. These are the core, the backbone of the heart of Asia conference. CBMs were, they are focusing on six priority or pilot areas, education, trade commerce and investment which Ambeka just mentioned about it. The regional infrastructure that most of the big names that you have here today, it has a 1000 TAPI project and two TAP and some others. They're all part of the conference building measures but this is mainly a political cap for the regional projects. Then we have counter narcotics, counter terrorism and natural disaster management. These six CBMs, every single country, every country of our region somehow is leading one of these. For example, India is leading the TCI, the trade, commerce and investment together with other member heart of Asia countries. For example, education is led by Iran. Turkmenistan is leading the regional infrastructure. They have meetings, they have discussions, they are there and talk and contact to each other but the big question is have we been successful so far and implementation of the heart of Asia recommendations or the CBMs which has implementation plans? The question to this, the answer to this question cannot be 100% yes or no because we still have long time, a long way to go. You understand the nature of the Central Asian governments together with other countries which are in our region 14, countries of heart of Asia. Different types of government set up, different types of cultures, different languages, different sorts of legal institutions and mechanisms and coherency among all these countries or a big challenge but not impossible. So this is something which we put together and it's a long way to go. Conference building is not really an easy job, never been in the past but so far some parts which are taking place that has been remarkable. Then we have London Conference. The London Conference major three major agendas are basically focusing on regional cooperation, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, the report has to be presented to the international community and for the first time they put private sector as a big agenda of the London Conference. So this is making a very good opportunity for national unity government to discuss with the international community its agenda together with the sustainability of the process and activities that are successful and that will make some changes in the future. The other one we have is the United Nations special program for economies of Central Asia. This consists of six regional countries, mainly Central Asian and Afghanistan and Afghanistan is chair of the 2014 of ISPICA. This is called UNISPICA and Abrivation which has two formats, the governance format and economic format. The economic format is mainly focusing on the major activities and major projects that we have already discussed here and we'll talk. And then the last event which we have will be our sixth region economic cooperation conference for Afghanistan that consists most of the regional countries. It has, it made a very good deal of regional projects consensus building and it's last meeting that we had in Dushanbe in Tajikistan and we introduced 17 regional economic projects and the sixth one includes some new projects and the continuation of the projects that we still have. For example, CASA 1000, it has a calendar for it. I mean, the implementation time for CASA 1000 in 2015, in 2017. So whatever you hear today, these are all based on the calendar that moves. Same for TAPI, TAPI implementation deadline is 2018. But today we are now in discussion with companies to absorb companies for investment and that's the right place, at the right time. It's moving, but it takes some times. So these are the four major events that I mentioned and the major thematic issue of all these four as regional cooperation. So this is becoming a big deal, not only for Afghanistan, but for our neighboring countries as well. The national unity government yet to put together, it is economic plan, it's strategy, it's development agenda. We have got Dr. Ashraf Ghani's economic agenda or socioeconomic agenda at one hand before election and also we had Dr. Abdullah Abdullah's economic agenda. Now they have to come together and set a unified agenda together and develop it a national agenda or a national economic development agenda that will take place, of course, once the government ships, shaping in next two, three weeks. But one thing is very much important that do we really need to write new agenda for Afghanistan? This is, in past 10 years, which I have been involved, the conferences that I have been involved and as Scott was talking about it, these were not about making of the conference. It was more about coming together, putting together economic agenda, development agenda, socioeconomic agenda for at that stage to work together with donor communities. So far we have written more than 1,000 pages and most of these activities have not been implemented. This is, if we stick to this morning's motto, to stick with implementation, that's the time of implementation and we have NFS strategies and even if you read something new, that if you read something from government, these are not new, these are mostly rewritten or they're basically cut and paste of past activities. So time for implementation is there and we have to really encourage ourselves to contribute as much as possible into implementation of these activities. Engagement of private sector, this has been discussed, but if you really study the Central Asian countries together with Afghanistan and Iran, I'm not talking about Pakistan, because Pakistan has a very good model of private sector partnership so far together with India, but in Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, we are really lacking experience of working together with private sector. This is something which needs to be a big deal for the new government. The public private partnership is still not a policy in our country and my country is. And in Central Asian countries, public private partnership is really, really something that they need to focus. Except Kazakhstan, which they are now moving towards some great partnership with private sector, but the rest of the Central Asian countries, which we are talking and need to deal on trade and transit that still requires some more greater work. So, but what exactly we are looking forward in future? I have categorized them into three phases. Quickly, I'm going through them national. At the national level, I mentioned about the new policy of the national unity government that they have to put together and prioritize the activities. Prioritization is a key element, rather, developing of a new strategy at this stage. Dr. Asher Avgani have already ordered or assigned teams in different groups to start some critical work. For example, he has assigned the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Justice to review all economic laws and regulations that should be more friendly and legislations for the private sector investment. So this is a very key issue. The Kabul Bank case, that is also building more confidence for investors. These are the activities which are happening right now. At the regional level, we have a big list of projects and activities. For example, I'm naming the trade and transit. At the trade and transit, the plan is to renew our existing agreements, trade and transit agreements, or develop new trade and transit agreements. These are part of the plan, alternative routes. This is something which is really happening right now. We are in discussion with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Today in Baku is the second technical meeting of the Lapis-Lazuli corridor, which we call it Lapis-Lazuli, to connect Afghanistan to Black Sea corridors or to Turkey through Bass Forest to Istanbul and to Europe. This is a new corridor on trade, transit, and transport. It's happening right now. The Chabahar and Baku already mentioned this serious discussions are going on between Afghanistan, Iran, and India, and we are encouraging other regional partners to join. The Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan, we recently established some discussion to develop this corridor, which is the nearest way for Kazakhstan to go through Afghanistan to Chabahar. The cross-border transport agreement, this has been signed between Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This is a very good model for, it's a multi-model and a very good passageway to connect my country with through Tajikistan and to Kyrgyzstan to China. The Trasika-Afghanistan is on the stage of becoming member of Trasika. Trasika is the transport corridor Europe, Caucasus, and Asia. This is a multi-model corridor that makes coherent the trade and transit activities of the countries who are a member of the Trasika. So this is happening right now at the trade and transit. On energy, you heard about Kazakhstan very much. This is a very good stage. TAPI is, I already mentioned about it, but I want to mention that, yes, TAPI, KASA 1002, these are part of the confidence. Once KASA is moving, I think this builds a big momentum or confidence for the rest of the activities in the region. And on the roads, the railroad between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, the two lines of railroads are now moving. The feasibility studies are happening, and some funds have been already allocated from EDB to construct the railroad. And some other activities moving on, which concludes our regional agenda. And at the international agenda, briefly I want to mention that we have got 18 strategic partnership agreements with the world so far. So where are we with these long-term strategic partnership agreements? This is something, a big action plan for the new government to move on. Every single strategic partnership agreement has economic and developing component. For example, we only had one time meeting with on economic issues of the Afghanistan, United States, a strategic partnership cooperation. So this, the momentum is now built and there are more work is needed. So if all this works, if all this happening, Afghanistan will no longer be in a position to follow either Swiss model or South Korea model. It will develop its own model. So this is something which is happening and we are very much hopeful for the future, especially with the national unity government. Thank you very much. Thank you. Especially like that point about not needing any new strategies. I mean, as you say, there are thousands of pages of what to do now is obviously the time to do it. I think go until 12.15 because we started a little bit late and now it's my pleasure to introduce our final speaker, Fatima Sumar, who was an old friend of the Institute for my days on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but we're happy to have you here. You're not so new role as Deputy Secretary for the Bureau of Central and South Asia. Well, thanks Scott. It's a real pleasure to be back here at USIP and it's my favorite location next to the State Department in terms of moving about. So thanks first for having me back here and thanks to the East West Institute for really timely and I thought thought provoking report. I had a pleasure of reading it over the weekend and I thought it really struck a lot of the tone of what's already happening in some ways around the region but gives us kind of a better roadmap for how to move this forward. So I thought Scott, what I would do with your permission is kind of pull together some of the themes that we've heard all morning and see if we can kind of look at what a political roadmap looks like for the way forward out of this and building out of the recommendations of the report. And first I wanted to say one of the things that strikes me from where I sit, I cover regional affairs for South Asia and Central Asia so I have a slightly wider lens is that the political context here really matters and it's not just about Afghanistan, it's about what's taking place in the broader region. It's looking at what's happening in Central Asia and the post-Ukraine aftermath for instance in the context of Russian moves on the Eurasian Economic Union for instance in terms of what China is trying to accomplish in terms of its own energy security and transport corridors in terms of the future of what Pakistan would like to develop and see move forward in terms of connecting to the region, in terms of India's energy security needs and India's conversation. So there's a lot of different political movements on the stage beyond what's going on in Afghanistan but they all tie together and will impact one another and I think that political context here is really important as we think about the prioritization of how we move this forward. One of the things that strikes me is when we think about what's going on in the region the overarching goal for many of these countries is security, stability, and prosperity and it's not just for Afghanistan in this context but they all kind of share that as an overriding objective. They will implement that in different ways depending on their own national and self-interest and what makes sense for where they sit within the region while he made a very excellent point of you're looking at multiple countries and governments with different forms of governance structures, different types of civil societies, different types of private sector and industries. So part of when I look at my portfolio and thinking about what role the US can play to help facilitate what's already going on in the region because it is already going on and I think that's another point I wanted to make that actually what we're talking about here today is building off of the work that has been going on for many years and it's not just starting today and it won't just start in a Ghani government but it's really building on the successes that we've had from the Afghans and from the regional community and the international community over many years but there is a question of implementation but also prioritization of how to move this forward. So we think about the key areas. I mean, one of the things that strikes me is that countries are going to move on different projects depending on what they need to complement what's already going on. So when the United States talks about its New Silk Road Initiative which many of you have heard about for the last few years, what we are very serious about and the way we think about this is that developing these new North-South corridors is about complementing existing East-West corridors of trade. It's not a supplement, it's not a zero-sum game of options but it's to give all these countries, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan, others different and additional economic options for how it can diversify its energy base, how it can diversify its economic and transport options and increasingly in a globalized world when we think about increased and Asian interconnectivity that's a key for market success and we see that play out all throughout the world. And that's what I think is one of the things that resonates the most with many countries in this region is that they understand the importance of economic diversification. Now it has to be done within a security structure that makes sense for them so that they don't feel that their borders are a source of insecurity or instability but that they feel that they have enough confidence of what is coming across and transiting their borders brings more good than bad in a very simplistic way. And so we can't forget and divorce the security piece from this conversation. The other piece that I think has come up in a couple different points but I think is worth us pulling together as well out of this conversation is the energy water nexus. You've heard a lot this morning from different speakers about the energy nexus but there is increasingly an energy water nexus of shared water throughout this region that will impact the future development of this region and I think one of the things that deserves more conversation and we're doing this a lot on the Central Asia side with our partners and the UN playing a particular role in the World Bank as well is transboundary water management because Afghanistan's increasingly gonna have an important voice and role to play on that stage especially when you think about the waters in the north with Central Asia and the water sharing that is already going on but is not done within the kind of institutional frameworks that are gonna be increasingly important for governing this space and deconflicting tensions over an issue that already raises tensions throughout the region. Then we talk a little bit quickly because I'm conscious of time of the United States kind of view on how we're taking this forward. We developed last year, the New Silk Road was an initiative launched under Secretary Clinton as many of you know in 2011. When Secretary Kerry came in, a secretary, we took a hard look at what was already going on in the region and came up with a very streamlined and prioritized list of what the US was gonna focus on from 2014 to 2016. And you know at this point it's four key areas that really build off of the work that's happening in the region and it's done in an extensive partnership with our partners in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, Central Asia, with all the development community and the international community. The first is creating a regional energy market. You know it's striking to me because if we had had this conversation a year ago you would not have heard I think as much about the regional energy side as we're hearing today. And I think in part because momentum builds confidence and you're kind of picking up on that on the themes. But you know the three projects that we've been putting some time and effort on. First is CASA 1000, which is a World Bank-led project. The second is the two tap connections which is an Asian Development Bank-led project. And the third is TAPI. And on CASA you know there's, I have to really credit Pakistan's leadership in particular because one of the key lessons actually if there's any colleagues here from Harvard Business School or other business schools, I think CASA 1000 is a terrific Harvard Business School or another business school case study that is not yet to be written. So good assignment for some of you out there. But why did we have a breakthrough on CASA in the last year? It's because of political will and leadership from the four CASA countries. And from Pakistan in particular when it signed the necessary framework agreement in last September and took that and took it to the next step so that all four countries were aligned. In the past year, I've been privileged to have a chance to work with all these four countries. The amount of political leadership from the highest levels of government, in some cases the prime ministers, finance ministers, energy ministers, all the way on down to work with the World Bank, to work with the CASA secretariat, to work with the international community and donors to get this to the next level has been tremendous because they see it's a window of opportunity that we have today, we may not have tomorrow. And so the signing that happened, the agreement that was reached Friday night and the signing that took place Saturday morning at the World Bank between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the transit price, it was a really critical step forward. The next step now is to bring, to finalize the sell price, the commercial pricing agreement between the sellers, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. And we're hopeful that that's only an agreement away sometime this fall as well. So that construction and procurement can begin on CASA. TUTAP is the other project which I think is also interesting not because it's a theoretical concept. Electricity trade is already happening in the region, right? There already is a regional energy market. Electricity flows currently from Turkmenistan, from Uzbekistan, from Tajikistan down into Afghanistan. Increasing that supply, increasing the stability of that supply and also looking at potential exporting to Pakistan is kind of the next step of this. So we're working with the Asian Development Bank with other donors to look at how we can further build on those lines. Turkmenistan, for instance, is building its line, building a brand new line. It's already under construction from Turkmenistan to the Afghan border. The next step, for instance, right now is to physically construct a line that will pick up from the Turkmen line that comes down to Polikomri to the substation that would then generate down to Kabul and throughout Afghanistan. So these are the kind of technical discussions that are actually taking place every week here in capitals all around the world to think about the next steps of how to sequentially move this. In some cases, it's a lot of money. In some cases, it's not about money, it's about political will and leadership. And it's also signaling that there's a confidence that this can happen despite uncertainty over at times on the security environment. Let me switch really quickly to the other three pillars because they've gotten less mentioned, but I think they're as important. The second is facilitating trade and transit. And here, the US role has very much been one of support for the regulatory architecture because we all know that you can build the physical infrastructure, you can build these multi-billion dollar investments, but unless you have the regulatory piece of this, the software of how trade works, very little is able to actually cross borders. And so here we're looking at the different types of successes we know that have to take place from other lessons learned from other parts of emerging economies and markets. A couple of things here that are really key, first is WTO accession. In order to trade, we want to encourage communities and countries all around the world to be part of a global trading community, a rules of the road of the international community. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan are already part of WTO. We have been working and are hopeful that Afghanistan will be able to join by the end of this year, early next year, and we've been working and supporting Kazakhstan's accession as well. But bringing more countries within this region into that framework is increasingly important. Tifa is another area where our colleagues at USTR have been working very hard over the last decade with countries in Central Asia, in Afghanistan, to think about the trade and investment frameworks that you would need in this region, both bilaterally and regionally, to support greater trade. Other mechanisms on a multilateral phase, which we've been looking at and supporting, joining the International Road Transport Union, joining tier, looking at the different kinds of regulations you need so that if you build the rail line, your cargo can actually seamlessly transit from country to country because you're all part of the same international rail architecture, international road architecture, so that your trucks can cross your border. I think NAFTA actually is a kind of an interesting parallel for a different way, which is in the 90s, we signed a very historic agreement on trade and transit within North America. It's only recently as of this month that Mexican trucks will be allowed to enter US space, which is a huge breakthrough in terms of these negotiations. But that is the kind of context in terms of what you actually need for physical trade to take place in terms of the regulatory piece. Another is the cross-border trade agreements, why he talked about NAFTA and CBTA. Now that these agreements have been signed, ratification, for instance, on the cross-border trade agreement with Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, we are working with Bishkek and hoping that the parliament there can move on ratification on those fronts. The third pillar very quickly is customs and borders. Now, my unofficial bumper sticker for this would be open but secure borders because we all know that no country in this region is going to keep their borders open and want to trade unless they see the benefits from trade do not come at the expense of their own physical border security. And that's clear throughout this region and frankly throughout the world. And so we have a huge moment here within the international community working with countries on our own donor coordination and assistance to make sure that as our own programs are working whether that's the US programs, EU programs, UN programs, and many, many other countries around the world to look at how we actually seamlessly connect border security with trade facilitation. And that's easier said than done in many cases because we have in many cases different implementing partners, different donors. You may have different streams of money that are connecting on the Afghan side versus the Central Asian side or the Pakistan side. And so that's an area where I think we can use this window of opportunity in the next three years to really push for an open but secure border model. The World Customs Organization can have a huge enabling environment role here in helping all these countries in the region think about how to do both trade facilitation and border security. And the last thing I'll just say on people to people which is our fourth pillar. To me this is one of the most exciting pillars. It's already happening and in fact it fuels and gives us the energy for every other pillar what we're doing because at the end of the day this is about people. It's not about countries and it's not about institutions, it's about people. And what we've been able to do working through USAID and our other partners is really bring businesses together, bring markets and it's a lot of what Amdika talked about. We've been hosting trade fairs throughout the last couple of years in Almaty, in Islamabad, in Tashkent, in Mazar-e-Sharif where we bring together businesses from the region that have never had an opportunity to meet each other before and they do their homework ahead of time we're seeing in some cases eight to 10 million dollars of letters of intent and agreement signed during these moments. So that you do start seeing not maybe necessarily the large scale container traffic but the inter-regional potential that Bill talked about earlier which can have such an unlocking potential in many cases and showing that some of this stuff can work in creating different types of incentives. So let me just end by saying there is this is the hardest region in the world to work when it comes to unlocking greater inter-regional trade and I don't wanna kinda gloss over that in terms of the context of putting this out there. This is the least integrated region in the world, right? So Central Asia is slightly higher than South Asia but not by much. Central Asia trades at about 6% of inter-regional trade. South Asia is about 5% in some cases inter-regional investments are less than 1%. The barriers are incredibly high to unlock. The good news is that success can be huge in terms of what we're able to accomplish because the bar is so low in many cases. It's gonna be generational. This is not a program that's gonna succeed in three years or five years or 10 years. It is a long-term generational commitment to think about Asia in a different way. Not just Afghanistan but to think about the way Asia can trade in a different way because whether it's energy security, whether it's container traffic or trade, if you can think about a world in which Kazakhstan can trade energy down with India, that's a fundamentally different Asia, right? That means the conversation we're having 20 years or 25 years from now and how we think about Asia as a land mass is fundamentally transformed and different. So the work that has been going on is actually, I think, historic and transformative if we're able to reach some thresholds that are really important for critical tipping points and I think we'll get there in some of these cases but it does require, I think, a doubling down today of looking at where we can prioritize, where we can implement and also where we can generate the necessary political will from the governments and civil societies and businesses in the region to cross the finish line, thanks. Thank you. Not only for giving the US perspective but also for having an excellent summary of the main themes and for seamlessly going from NAFTA and Ukraine at the top level to the substation of Puli Humri and integrating all of that. Let's take, yeah, okay, question here and one at the back and I'll take these three questions. As I say, we'll try to go maybe for another, well, 10 minutes or so. Thank you very much. My question is, you know, like there are these big projects we mentioned before, TAPI, Casa 1000, for example, trade agreements and all those things. I think to sustain or to create trust within the region, you know, address geopolitical issues, one has to pilot some of these big projects, you know, like Start, for example, with Casa 1000, for example, increase import additional few megawatts of electricity from Central Asia to Kabul and, for example, just give a few hundred kilowatts to Peshawar, you know, like just to show it to people that it works, pilot it, you know, like when it comes to, for example, trade agreements, you know, like just extend the current Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement to Tajikistan, you know, like engage it, just to pilot it that it works, you know, like, and by doing the small pilot project, so it will create confidence, trust within the region and finally the region will be ready to politically to embark on these larger projects. I think that is one of the key recommendation of the report of the East West Institute, you know, rather than talking big things but taking small action, you know, like big words, small action, that is very important thing of the, deliverable of this report, thank you. Good morning, I'm Dr. Brannick, I'm recently retired, so I've been in and out of Afghanistan since 05 and I agree with Mr. Wasi, we've got enough plans out there, it says implementation, the problem I see with the implementation is the capacity, you know, we have a dearth of capacity in Afghanistan, I'm the only Americans ever taught at Kabul University, so I know the quality of the students there and their potential but we don't have the capacity building mechanisms in place, we give lip service to capacity, there's very little bit of money, the only thing that really wins over in Afghanistan is those big ticket items, you know, and we need to start concentrating, we've been in there for 13 years, we need to start building the capacity, human capacity to be able to implement these things, otherwise they're sitting on the books, you know, and that needs, you know, US has great policies, I spent a lot of time with the Canadian Northern NATO Alliance to try to help them work on their plans and everybody's talking about big ticket items, but yet the population is starving, so we're not spending any time trying to build, you know, assistance living with them, so we gotta start tearing down some of our plans and our lofty goals and get down, you know, this gentleman over here talked about hydroplanes, plants, you know, to bring electricity to the communities, I mean, I could go on and on, but I've been in that country since 2005, in and out, you know, and so I really understand the dynamics and our plans are all, you know, every one of the countries, every business plan we wanna go talks about the government getting involved in big ticket items, sorry. Hi everyone, my name is Tabish, it's very short, my name is Tabish, I'm a fellow at NED, National Endowment for Democracy, actually I'm an election officer from Afghanistan. I was feeling very happy while Ambassador Shafakat was making comments on Afghanistan, apparently we, the Afghans and Pakistanians are seemed to be very friendly when we are out of the country, but I was asking a question that's looking to the extensively connected networks that you have back, with the diplomatic establishment there at home, how really the security centric view in the diplomatic establishment has been changed. Looking to the past decade of diplomacy, still the policy of the Jihad and to France, as Deleperro mentioned in his book is out of the table or not. Actually, I'm sure of the capabilities of doing diplomacy and sharing the interests with our Pakistani friends, and we need to find a way to live together, but the comments made by Excellency Ambassador was seems to me, it was too good to too, but hopefully I wanna hear from you that, is it a shift from security view politics to a more civil policy toward Afghanistan? Thank you. Thank you very much. My name is Abdul Hamid Qazi, I'm a civil structural engineer. I worked two years as a chief engineer for reconstruction of Afghanistan in 2005 and four. My question is to Mr. Visey, he mentioned about the thousand page of strategic plan, economic plan, whatever it is, but it was not in practice. We know that the last 12 years was different issues in Afghanistan, but now the recent government, whether they are using the same resources, the same data that our money politician come to force and starts from scratches. That's the one question. The second question is the population of Kabul city. Once Mr. Karzai announced that it was a garden of the city in that region. In 2002, when we were there in a society of Afghan engineers, we organized a conference. But in 2008, the United nation announced as a dirtiest city in the world. So that effect the population of the city when there is no job, immigration is going to the big cities and especially the Kabul city. Okay, thank you. Thank you. Let me start from the last question. Basically, what Joseph you mentioned, it's, you know, the new government has its own right to really utilize the old versions of strategic policies developed already and they are coming up with good recommendations or they do start from scratch. But I don't believe on starting from scratch because both Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, they were member of the cabinet of the past government and they were so much involved in developing off the national priority programs, the national development strategy of Afghanistan, the millennium development goals for example, Dr. Abdullah was involved. So this is something which they are very familiar with the nature and conditions of the overall development activities and planning procedure. And I think what I understood that it's more for implementation, monitoring and evaluation rather developing of the new activities. This is what I understand from Dr. Ashraf Ghani so far. This is something which is really required and he's doing by himself, the monitoring and evaluation. This is, this should be part of the big process and that was a big gap in the past. So the accountability, the corruption issue, the transparency, they were all the key elements of some negative improvements. So on the purpose of, the purpose of Heart of Asia actually as a building trust, Mr. Shinwari was talking about that we start small, then we make a role model for the future activities. I think, do we have time to really start small that's a big question. But the region, I think yet need to know its quality and it is potential. This is something which region really, our region really need to understand those countries who are really doing well, they have been able to utilize all their capacities for better development cooperation. This is something which we really need to do. I just want to add that as I have been focusing on that economic transition is really underway and we have to take a lot of steps which is, to enable the Afghanistan's small and medium enterprises to be more capable to take the global challenges and enable them with more efficiency. Thank you. Yes, there was a question about whether there was a change in Pakistan's security centered approach in its relations with Afghanistan. Well, of course, security is important and Pakistan has had serious concerns. Mullah Fazlullah, for instance, has been in Afghanistan for a long time and continues to remain there. Similarly, Afghanistan has concerns. But as far as the Pakistanis are concerned, the efficient level, they told me their position has been evolving and they have no favorites now. The operation that has been started by the Pakistan Army in June in Waziristan covers everybody. There are no favorites. There are no, it's a comprehensive thing. It's a part of a national consensus on fighting terrorism and people who believe in terrorist sort of means to achieve their objectives. So we have this assurance and I hope that the two countries can work together. We have a joint commission. We have a number of processes and that should help. The other thing, I think Bill Bird mentioned which I wanted to answer about water. Pakistan has absolutely no reservation and in fact is very keen to work with Afghanistan on completing the Indus Water Treaty because Indus Water Treaty did not deal with the Kabul River which is a very important tributary of the Indus and the lands that my family owns are actually irrigated by the Kabul River and the Kabul River replenishes the Indus or water flows by as much as 25% when it enters the area. We have absolutely no reservation either at the government level nor at the non-governmental level and we look forward to entering into consultations with Afghanistan on how to develop the resources of the Kabul River before the Kabul River enters Pakistan. If we have allowed India to have hydropower projects on the three eastern or western rivers before they come into Pakistan, why would we question that to Afghanistan? I mean, so there's absolutely no reservation political, technical or any other on the cooperation for harnessing the resources of water. By the way, Afghanistan has immense water resources much better than India, Pakistan or any of the South Asian countries. It only has to deal with all the four basins that it shares with the neighboring countries and there is tremendous potential for that. The other thing is that sometimes it's often ignored how much Pakistan has done for Afghanistan. We continue to have about two million Afghan refugees, 20,000 Afghan students are undergoing college education in colleges and universities in Pakistan, half of them on scholarships. And we also have four or five projects connecting improving the roads, connectivity and also educational and health facilities in Afghanistan. Thank you. So, Bill, have they turned you into an optimist? Well, thank you and I'm actually very encouraged by your remarks and I would suggest I think something was missing from this was to large extent water and maybe EWI could take it. It's very, take it forward a little bit in a very sensitive manner. There are enormous issues. I mean, I'm really happy to hear that but right now Afghanistan uses 90% of the Kabul water river. Is there a realistic chance that that goes to 70, 30 or something? This is huge and it affects intrapakistan dynamics because Sindh versus the other provinces is also a water issues within Pakistan. So I'm really glad to hear that it's possible to open dialogue. I don't think the status quo now where 90% of Afghanistan of the Kabul river water goes to Pakistan is acceptable to Afghanistan. So there needs to be give and take and I think there are win-win projects including hydro power projects in the Kabul basin that can also provide electricity. And again, if there's a level of trust then water conservancy in Afghanistan can actually help some of these problems like floods in Sindh so I would be, you know but I would sort of urge EWI to see what you can do and Central Asia just say, I mean, it was Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan issues on water. They have their own issues then there's Afghanistan where almost none of the Amudaria water coming from Afghanistan is utilized within Afghanistan. Big issues there and then similarly Iran, Helmand river. There they actually is an agreement. It's the only one where there is an international agreement between Iran and Pakistan but they're dissatisfaction on both sides about it. So I would urge this in a very sensitive and maybe low-key manner to start taking forward this issue. That was given rise by your very encouraging remarks. There are two questions which weren't answered so I'll try to address them very quickly. On the lack of capacity, I think we shouldn't overstate that too much. Maybe I'm a bit naive and maybe I worked mostly too much with the Ministry of Finance but there certainly is capacity there. In 2002, the Treasury Department of the Ministry of Finance was dominated by foreigners. Now there are not many foreigners there, very few. So my point would be I think the issue you raised is quite genuine but it's also an issue of prioritization. You try to do too much and you don't get anything done. It's clear where the Afghan government had the incentive because they needed to build that capacity in order to get revenues from aid into the budget. They actually could do it and I think the issue is prioritizing and sort of building but there's an awful lot of latent capacity particularly among the younger generation which I think let's say the Afghan government has not fully utilized. Kabul urban was another question, huge issue and it's very interesting why in Afghanistan development projects in rural areas have often, especially the national programs have often worked better than the urban projects. I think it's very interesting because logistically you'd think it would be different. I think during the Soviet occupation period the urban projects worked, the rural ones couldn't work because of obvious security reasons. Why in the current or in the last 10 years the rural projects have often worked better? That relates to governance, institutions, how the municipalities function. I think this is a whole issue and of course the urban pollution and environmental issues are extremely important. Thanks. Okay, thank you. Thank all of you for staying past the hour. Before concluding I also wanted to thank my colleagues at the East West Institute for sharing this event with us and asking us to host it. I think that it became very clear from both panels that there is an agenda for action and there has been an immense amount of the thinking work which is done and there are some possible wins up ahead as Fatima in particular pointed out. And then finally thanks to this panel for taking your time and sharing your thoughts. So a big round of applause for everybody.