 Question 53 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Prudence. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Prudence. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 53 of Imprudence in six articles. We must now consider the Vices opposed to Prudence. For Augustine says in Against Julian 4-3, There are Vices opposed to every Virtue, not only Vices that are in Manifest Opposition to Virtue, as Temerity is opposed to Prudence, but also Vices which have a kind of kinship and not a true but spurious likeness to Virtue. Thus in Opposition to Prudence we have craftiness. Accordingly, we must consider first of all those Vices which are in Evident Opposition to Prudence, those namely which are due to a defect, either of Prudence, or of those things which are requisite for Prudence, and secondly those Vices which have a false resemblance to Prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for Prudence. And since Solicitude pertains to Prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold. One of Imprudence, two of Negligence which is opposed to Solicitude. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry. First, concerning Imprudence, whether it is a sin. Second, whether it is a special sin. Third, of precipitation or Temerity. Fourth, of thoughtlessness. Fifth, of inconstancy. Sixth, concerning the origin of these Vices. First article, whether Imprudence is a sin. Objection one, you would seem that Imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary according to Augustine, on True Religion 14. Whereas Imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore Imprudence is not a sin. Objection two, further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But Imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent. And yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore Imprudence is not a sin. Objection three, further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But Imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore Imprudence is not a sin. On the contrary, the spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away saved by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence according to Proverbs 21-20. There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just. And the imprudent man shall spend it. Therefore Imprudence is a sin. I answer that Imprudence may be taken in two ways. First as a privation, secondly as a contrary. Properly speaking, it is not taken as a negation. So as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, Imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have. And in this sense Imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence. Imprudence is taken as a contrary. Insofar as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence. For instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel. And the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way, imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect. Since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the divine law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitously through contempt and rejection of the divine teaching. Whereas if he act beside the law and without contempt and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin. Reply to Objection 1. No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 6.5 that he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended. Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed, however, that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly, all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin. Reply to Objection 3. Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases. But acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists. Second article, whether imprudence is a special sin. Objection 1. It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin, for whoever sins acts against right reason, that is, against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above in article 1. Therefore imprudence is not a special sin. Objection 2. Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. But ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes. Objection 3. Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefor Dionysius says, on the divine names 4, that evil results from each single defect. Now many things are requisite for prudence, for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated above in questions 48 and 49. Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin. On the contrary, imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above in article 1. Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice. I answer that a vice or sin may be styled general in two ways. First, absolutely, because to wit it is general in respect of all sins. Secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two accounts. First, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins. And in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue, since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason. Secondly, by participation. And in this way imprudence is a general sin. For just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, insofar as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence. If on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply, but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence. For just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above, Questions 48, Question 50, Article 7. So also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus by defect of counsel, to which ayubulia corresponds, precipitation, or temerity, is a species of imprudence. By defect of judgment, to which sinices, judging well according to common law, and genome, judging well according to general law, refer, there is thoughtlessness. While inconstancy and negligence correspond to the command, which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-intrugal parts of prudence. Since however, all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus in-cautiousness and in-circumspection are included in thoughtlessness. Lack of desolity, memory, or reason is referable to precipitation. Improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to negligence and inconstancy. Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers generality by participation. Reply to Objection 2. Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to the respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance as the nature of mortal sin, not of itself but on account either of a preceding negligence or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand, imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice, and for this reason it can be called a special sin. Reply to Objection 3. When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied. Thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If however there be various motives, there are various species. For instance, if one man were to take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place. This would constitute the species called sacrilege. While if another were to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence, the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence does not constitute a diversity of species, except insofar as they are directed to different acts of reason as stated above. 3. Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence. Objection 1. It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence, whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says on the morals of Job 2.49 that the gift of counsel is given as a remedy to precipitation. Therefore, precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence. Objection 2. Further. Precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore, precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence. Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counseling, not only through being over hasty, but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances as stated in Ethics 6.9. Therefore, there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 4.19. The way of the wicked is darksome. They know not where they fall. Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall, or to be precipitate. I answer that. Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of an others, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body, while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are memory of the past, intelligence of the present, shrewdness in considering the future outcome, reasoning which compares one thing with another, docility in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps into order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence. Reply to Objection 1. Ractitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence, albeit in different ways as stated above. Question 52, Article 2. And consequently precipitation is opposed to both. Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason. And this may happen in two ways. First, through the impulse of the will or of a passion. Secondly, through contempt of the directing rule. And this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to the first. Reply to Objection 3. Many things have to be considered in the research of reason. Hence, the philosopher declares in Ethics 6.9 that, one should be slow in taking counsel. Hence, precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over-slowness is. For the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel. Fourth, Article. Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in imprudence. Objection 1. It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the divine law does not incite us to any sin, according to Psalm 1818. The law of the Lord is unspotted. And yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matthew 10.19. Take no thought how or what to speak. Therefore, thoughtlessness is not a sin. Objection 2. Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel, and therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore, precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness. And consequently, thoughtlessness is not a special sin. Objection 3. Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason. Notably, counsel. Judgment about what has been counseled, and command. Confer, Question 47, Article 8. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore, thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 4.25. Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eyelids go before thy steps. Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore, thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence. I answer that, thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore, in speculative matters, a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, insofar as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment, and consequently, the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, insofar to which, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends, it is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because, as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God. According to 2 Chronicles 2012, Elsev man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God. Reply to Objection 2. All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently, thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment. Reply to Objection 3. Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars. Fifth article. Whether in constancy is a vice contained under imprudence. Objection 1. It would seem that in constancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For in constancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore, in constancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence. Objection 2. Further, it is written in James 3.16. Where jealousy and contention are, there are in constancy and every evil work. But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore, in constancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy. Objection 3. Further, a man would seem to be in constant, who fails to persevere in what he is proposed to do. Now, this is a mark of incontinency in pleasurable matters and of effeminacy or squeamishness in unpleasant matters according to Ethics 7.1. Therefore, in constancy does not pertain to imprudence. On the contrary, it belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore, to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now, this is inconstancy. Therefore, inconstancy belongs to imprudence. I answer that inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now, the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite. For a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him. Nor is this withdrawal completed, except through a defective reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived. Hence, inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now, just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so our lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently, inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counseled and judged. Reply to Objection 1. The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly, perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues. Chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary. Reply to Objection 2. Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows, which points to a defect in the appetitive power. But reason stands firm in the continent man against concupiscence, and in the persevering man against sorrow. Hence, continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason, and to this power inconstancy pertains also. 6. Whether the aforesaid vices arrive from lust. Objection 1. It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arrive from lust. For inconstancy arises from Envy, as stated above. Article 5. Second reply. But Envy is a distinct vice from lust. Objection 2. Further, it is written in James 1.8. A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways. Now, duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory, on the morals of Job 3145. Therefore, the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. Objection 3. Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defective reason. Now, spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore, the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices. On the contrary, Gregory declares, on the morals of Job 3145, that the aforesaid vices arise from lust. I answer that, as the philosopher states in Ethics 6.5, pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence, and chiefly sexual pleasure, which absorbs the mind and draws it to sensible delight. Now, the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Therefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason as stated above in Articles 2 and 5, it follows that they arise chiefly from lust. Reply to Objection 1. Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else, whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 7.6 that, the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all. Reply to Objection 2. Duplicity is also something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is. If by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another, hence Terence says in the comedy, the eunuch Act 1, Scene 1, that love leads to war and likewise to peace and truce. Reply to Objection 3. Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason. End of Question 53. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 54 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Trieties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Prudence. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Trieties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Prudence. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 54 of Negligence in three articles. We must now consider negligence. Under which head there are three points of inquiry. First, whether negligence is a special sin. Second, to which virtue is it opposed? Third, whether negligence is a mortal sin. First article, whether negligence is a special sin. Objection 1. You would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore, negligence is not a special sin. Objection 2. Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore, negligence is not a special sin. Objection 3. Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter, since it is neither about evil or indifferent things, for no man is accused of negligence if you omit them, nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore, it seems that negligence is not a special vice. On the contrary, sins committed through negligence are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt. I answer that negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful, wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all the vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above, question 47 article 9. It follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin. Reply to Objection 1. Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love, deligimus, a thing, the more solicitous we are about it. Since diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, insofar as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue. Reply to Objection 2. In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence, just as precipitation is a special sin, on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin. So negligence is a special sin, on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins. Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking, the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence, it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through a lack of solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted. Second article. Whether negligence is opposed to prudence. Objection 1. You would see that negligence is not opposed to prudence. Or negligence seems to be the same as idleness, or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory, on the morals of Job 3145. Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above, Question 35, Article 3. Therefore, negligence is not opposed to prudence. Objection 2. Further. Every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore, negligence is not opposed to prudence. Objection 3. Further. Imprudence relates to some act of reason. That negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is precipitation, nor a defect of judgment, because that is thoughtlessness, nor a defect of command, because that is inconstancy. Therefore, negligence does not pertain to prudence. Objection 4. Further. It is written in Ecclesiastes 719. Be that feareth God, neglecteth nothing. But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore, negligence is opposed to fear, rather than to prudence. On the contrary, it is written in Ecclesiasticus 27. A babbler and a fool, imprudence, will regard no time. Now this is due to negligence, therefore negligence is opposed to prudence. I answer that negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes in Etymologies 10, a negligent man is one who fails to choose, Neck Elegens. And the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore, negligence pertains to imprudence. Reply to Objection 1. Laziness is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs, whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence, it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is an oppressive sorrow, that is, hindering the mind from action. Confer question 35 article 1, as well as Par's Prima Secunde, question 35 article 8. Reply to Objection 2. Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence, it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason. Reply to Objection 3. Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act, otherwise than the inconstant man. For the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were by something, whereas the negligent man fails through a lack of prompt will. Reply to Objection 4. The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Proverbs 15, 27, by the fear of the Lord, everyone declineeth from evil. Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also, it has been stated above in Bar's Prima Secunde, question 44, article 2, when we were treating of the passions that fear makes us take counsel. Third article. Whether negligence can be a mortal sin. Objection 1. It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory, on the mortals of Job 934, on Job 928, I feared all my works, etc., says that, too little love of God aggravates the former, notably negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether, therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Ecclesiasticus 734, for thy negligences purify thyself with a few, says, though the offering be small, it cleanses the negligences of many sins. Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin, therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. Objection 3. Further, under the law, certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus, yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence, therefore negligence is not a mortal sin. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 1916. He that neglecteth his own life shall die, translators note, the vulgar translates life as way. I answer that, as stated above in article 2, 3rd reply. Negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly, negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First, on the part of that which is omitted through negligence, if this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly, on the part of the cause. For if the will be so remiss about divine things as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt. But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise not from contempt but from some lack of fervor to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle. Reply to Objection 1. Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First, through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin. Secondly, through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves him with a merely natural love, and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. According to the same authority, the Gloss, a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin. Reply to Objection 3. When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions are more hidden, wherefor no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public. End of Question 54. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 55. Assume a theologica secunda secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of prudence. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa theologica secunda secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of prudence, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 55. Of vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance in eight articles. We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence which have a resemblance there too. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether prudence of the flesh is a sin. Second, whether it is a mortal sin. Third, whether craftiness is a special sin. Fourth, of guile. Fifth, of fraud. Sixth, of solicitude about temporal things. Seventh, of solicitude about the future. Eighth, of the origin of these vices. First article, whether prudence of the flesh is a sin. Objection one. It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin. Objection two. Further. It is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh. For no man ever hated his flesh, according to Ephesians 5.29. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is not a sin. Objection three. Further. Just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore, neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins. On the contrary, no man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wisdom 14.9. To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike. Now it is written in Romans 8.7. The prudence of the flesh is an enemy to God. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a sin. I answer that as stated above in Question 47 Article 13. Prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence, prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body as stated above in the Baris Prima Sukunde, Question 2 Article 5. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a sin. Reply to Objection 1. Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, notably equality and the curbing of concupiscence. Hence, they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand, prudence is so called from foreseeing, providendo as stated above in Question 47 Article 1 and Question 49 Article 6, which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet if something be added it may be taken in a bad sense, and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin. Reply to Objection 2. The flesh is on account of the soul as matter is on account of the form and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence, the flesh is loved lawfully if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man places his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh. Reply to Objection 3. The devil tempts us not through the good of the appetable object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetable end, we do not speak of prudence of the devil as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us. Insofar as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence, we speak of carnal and again of worldly prudence according to Luke 16-8. The children of this world are more prudent in their generation, etc. The apostle includes all in the prudence of the flesh because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh. We may also reply that since prudence is in a sense called wisdom, as stated above in Question 47 Article 2, first reply, we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence, it is written in James 3.15 that there is a wisdom which is earthly, sensual, and devilish, as explained above in Question 45 Article 1, first reply, when we were treating of wisdom. Second article. Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. Objection 1. It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now, the prudence of the flesh is not subject to the law of God, according to Romans 8-7. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. Objection 2. Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now, prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost for it cannot be subject to the law of God, according to Romans 8-7. And so it seems to be an unpardonable sin which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. Objection 3. Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethics 8-10. Now, prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore, prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin. On the contrary, that which diminishes a sin as not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now, the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin, confer Proverbs 6-30. Therefore, prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. I answer that, as stated above in Question 47 Article 2, First Reply and Question 47 Article 13. A man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, that is, in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, that is, in relation to some particular end. Thus, a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly, if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends. As stated above in the Paras Primasakunde, Question 1, Article 5. If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin, for it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin, in which case, he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin, and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end. Reply to Objection 1. The apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin. Reply to Objection 2. Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost, for when it is stated that, it cannot be subject to the law of God, this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold. Reply to Objection 3. Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter. Third article, whether craftiness is a special sin. Objection 1. You would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Rit do not induce anyone to sin, and yet they induce us to be crafty according to Proverbs 1.4, to give craftiness to little ones. Therefore, craftiness is not a sin. Objection 2. Further, it is written in Proverbs 13.16, The crafty man doth all things with counsel. Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, he would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore, craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh. Objection 3. Further, Gregory, expounding the words of Job 12. The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn, says in his Morals of Job 10.29. The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false. And further on, he adds, This prudence is acquired by the young. It is learnt at a price by children. Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore, craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently, it seems not to be a special sin. On the contrary, the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 4-2, We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the Word of God. Therefore, craftiness is a sin. I answer that prudence is right reason applied to action, just as science is right reason applied to knowledge. In speculative matters, one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways. In one way, when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true. In another way, when the reason proceeds from false premises that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so, a sin may be against prudence through having some resemblance there too, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good, not in truth, but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh. Secondly, when in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine observes in his letter against Julian 4-3, Just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense as the philosopher states in Ethics 6-12. Reply to Objection 2. Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end, nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit, but by such as are true. Hence, craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end. Reply to Objection 3. Under worldly prudence, Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also. Fourth article. Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness. Objection 1. It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Corinthians 12-16. Being crafty, I caught you by guile. Therefore, guile is not always a sin. Objection 2. Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Psalm 5-11. They dealt deceitfully with their tongues. Now, craftiness, like prudence, is in the very act of reason. Therefore, guile does not pertain to craftiness. Objection 3. Further, it is written in Proverbs 12-20. Guile is in the heart of them that think evil things. But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore, guile does not seem to belong to craftiness. On the contrary, craftiness aims at lying in weight, according to Ephesians 4-14. By cunning craftiness by which they lie in weight to deceive. And guile aims at this also. Therefore, guile pertains to craftiness. I answer that, as stated above in Article 3. It belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true, but counterfeit, and apparently true, in order to obtain some end, either good or evil. Now, the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration. First, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness. Even as thinking outright ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly, the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution. And in this way, it belongs to guile. Hence, guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs there too. Reply to Objection 1. Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense. So too is guile, which is the execution of craftiness. Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness, with the purpose of deceiving, is affected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs, whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states in On Christian Doctrine 2.3. Hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Psalm 104.25. And to deal deceitfully with his servants. Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclesiastic as 1923. His interior is full of deceit. But this is to devise deceits, according to Psalm 3713. They studied deceits all day long. Reply to Objection 3. Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose. And for the most part, he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile. But as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence. Fifth article, whether fraud pertains to craftiness. Objection 1. It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise, if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness. And yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Corinthians 6.1. Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness. Objection 2. Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things. For it is written in Acts 5.1 that a certain man named Ananias, with Sapphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land. Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness, which is opposed to prudence. Objection 3. Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written in Proverbs 1.18 concerning some that they practice frauds against their own souls. Therefore, fraud does not belong to craftiness. On the contrary, the object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13.9. Shall he be deceived as a man with your fraudulent dealings? Now, craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore, fraud pertains to craftiness. I answer that just as guile consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does fraud. But they seem to differ in the fact that guile belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be affected by words or by deeds, whereas fraud belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds. Reply to Objection 1. The apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud. Reply to Objection 2. The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues. And accordingly, nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality. Reply to Objection 3. Those who commit frauds do not design anything against themselves or their own souls. It is through God's just judgment that what they plot against others recoils on themselves, according to Psalm 716. He has fallen into the hole he made. 6. Article Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Objection 1. You would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters, because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Romans 12.8. He that ruleth with solicitude. 5. Now according to the divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Psalm 8.8. Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things. Objection 2. Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. 6. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 3.10. If any man will not work, neither let him eat. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things. Objection 3. Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Timothy 117. When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me. Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy. For instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful. On the contrary, our Lord said in Matthew 6.31. Be not solicitous saying, what shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed? And yet such things are very necessary. I answer that solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First, on the part of the object of solicitude. That is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says in his On the Works of Monks 26. When our Lord said, be not solicitous, etc. He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the gospel. Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things. The result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search. Wherefore it is written in Matthew 13.22 that, The care of this world chokes up the word. Thirdly, through over much fear when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things, if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, notably his body and soul. Confer Matthew 6.26. Secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature. Thirdly, because of divine providence, through ignorance of which the Gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently, he concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do. Reply to Objection 1. Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them. Reply to Objection 2. The solitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate. Hence Jerome says on Matthew 6.31, Be not solicitous, that labor is necessary but solicitude must be banished. Namely, superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind. Reply to Objection 3. In the works of mercy, solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefor it is not unlawful unless it be superfluous. Seventh Article Whether we should be solicitous about the future Objection 1 You would seem that we should be solicitous about the future, for it is written in Proverbs 6 verses 6 through 8. Go to the aunt, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom, which, although she hath no guide nor master, provideeth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest. Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore, solicitude about the future is praiseworthy. Objection 2 Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is foresight of future things, as stated above in Question 49, Article 6, First Reply. Therefore, it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future. Objection 3 Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the moral is solicitous about the future. Now we read in John 12.6 that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and in Acts 4, 34 to 37, that the apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore, it is lawful to be solicitous about the future. On the contrary, our Lord said in Matthew 6.34, Be not solicitous for tomorrow, where tomorrow stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage. I answer that no work can be virtuous unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8.6. There is a time and opportunity for every business, which applies not only to external deeds, but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude. Thus, solicitude about the crops belongs to the summertime, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly, if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence, our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude by saying, Be not solicitous for tomorrow, wherefore he adds, for the moral will be solicitous for itself. That is to say, the moral will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what he means by adding, sufficient for the day is the evil thereof, namely the burden of solicitude. Reply to Objection 1. The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example. Reply to Objection 2. Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence, but it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms past and future apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says, in his commentary on the Sermon of the Mount, 2.17, When we see a servant of God taking thought, lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the moral, since even our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence our Lord does not condemn those who, according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things. 8. Whether these vices arise from covetousness Objection 1. You would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above in Question 43 Article 6, Lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, that is, to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust, especially since the philosopher says in Ethics 7.6 that Venus is full of guile, and her girdle is many-colored, and that he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning. Objection 2. Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence as stated above in Question 47 Article 13. Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin there too, such as pride and vain glory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness. Objection 3. Further, men make use of stratagems, not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger. On the contrary, Gregory, in his commentary on Job 3145, states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness. I answer that, as stated above in Article 3, as well as in Question 47 Article 13, carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason, Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness. Reply to Objection 1. On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act, whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the philosopher says that Venus is full of guile, he is referring to a certain resemblance insofar as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved into seatful actions, yet not by means of craftiness, but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure. Therefore he adds that Venus doth cousin the wits of the wisest man. Reply to Objection 2. To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pulsile animity, because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the philosopher says in Ethics 4-3. Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence. Reply to Objection 3. Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders arises not from anger, but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly as the philosopher states in Rhetoric 2-2-3. Confer as well Ethics 7-6. End of Question 55. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 56. Assume a theologica secunda secunde. Treaties on the cardinal virtues. The virtue of prudence. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa theologica secunda secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Prudence. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 56. Of the precepts relating to prudence. In two articles. We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry. First, the precepts of prudence. Second, the precepts relating to the opposite vices. First article. Whether the precepts of the Decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the Decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts, should include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the Decalogue. Since then, prudence is the chief of the moral virtues. It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. Objection 2. Further. The teaching of the Gospel contains the law especially with regard to the precepts of the Decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence in Matthew 10.16. Be ye prudent as serpents. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. Objection 3. Further. The other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to the precepts of the Decalogue. Wherefore it is written in Malachi 4.4. Remember the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded him in Horeb. Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence, for instance, Proverbs 3.5. Lean not upon thy own prudence. And further on in Proverbs 4.25. Let thine eyelids go before thy steps. Therefore, the law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among the precepts of the Decalogue. The contrary, however, appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of the Decalogue. I answer that, as stated above in the parts Prima Sukkunde, question 100 article 3 and article 5 first reply, when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the Decalogue being given to the whole people are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative order, as shown above in question 47 article 6. Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated above in question 47 article 6. Hence, it was not fitting that the precepts of the Decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet, all the precepts of the Decalogue are related to prudence insofar as it directs all virtuous acts. Reply to objection 1. Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, as stated above in question 44 article 1, as well as in the parts Prima Sukkunde, question 99 articles 1 and 5. Hence it behoved the chief precepts of the law, which are those of the Decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence. Reply to objection 2. The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means. Wherefore it behoved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence. Reply to objection 3. Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the Decalogue as its end, so it behoved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means. Second article, whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law. Objection 1. It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfitingly propounded in the Old Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts, which are directly opposed to prudence, are not less opposed there too than those which bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law, for it is written in Leviticus 1913. Thou shalt not columniate thy neighbour, and in Deuteronomy 2513. Thou shalt not have diverse weights in thy bag, a greater and a less. Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence. Objection 2. Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling. Objection 3. Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law. The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are quoted in the First Objection. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1, Justice, above all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to another, as we shall state further on in Question 58, Article 2. Now craftiness, as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above in Question 55, Article 8. And so it was fitting that the Law should contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, insofar as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in culminating another or in stealing his goods. Reply to Objection 1. Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence do not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which latter pertain to injustice. Reply to Objection 2. All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calamity, confer Leviticus 1913. Yet fraud and guile are want to be practiced chiefly in buying and selling, according to Ecclesiasticus 2628. A huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips, and it is for this reason that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling. Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of stealing, calamity and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of craftiness. End of Question 56 and the Questions Concerning the Virtue of Prudence Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC