 Let me start with two questions, if I could. The first is we've talked about the opportunities for convergence of RCEP and TPP and more broadly TTIP, ZJK, but just focusing on, for example, RCEP and TPP. I wanted to ask, principally I think, well, all the panelists, if you want to answer, but since Urata Sensei and Scott focused particularly on this opportunity for a convergence of the trajectory of RCEP and TPP, you describe the upside of countries like Japan or Singapore ensuring that there are disciplines from TPP that are then taken into the RCEP process. But often people describe RCEP and TPP as two competing structures, so I wanted to ask you about the downside. Is there a risk, in your view, that RCEP could undermine TPP, that certain protocols, procedures could preemptively be struck in RCEP and then undermine the effort in TPP for a high-quality FDA? Or is it mostly the question of whether there's a lost opportunity? Is there a chance of these things actually coming at odds with each other? So Scott, if you wouldn't mind taking the shot at that, and then Rata Sensei or others may want to chime in. Sure. Thanks, Mike. Well, Petrie's study from the Petersen Institute outlines sort of what the big economic prize is for Asia Pacific integration, and it's really Petrie considered what would happen if these two agreements converged and that something between RCEP and TPP became the pre-grade area of the Asia Pacific. So it's a big number in terms of GDP contribution. So there's definitely an objective for growth. I think small differences won't matter a lot. Small differences tend not to matter in the current noodle bowl because of big data. One of the things, the so-called spaghetti bowl, as Beguati called it, or the noodle bowl, as it's called by my Asia Pacific colleagues, is an irrelevant concern, but on a practical standpoint, businesses can manage it because of the extensive data that's available in data management systems. So big data takes a lot of the inefficiency out of what's sort of built into the treaty. Now trade diversion does happen. Trade diversion is a real phenomenon, and any time you have a preferential arrangement where market access barriers remain for some parties, but not all, you'll have some trade diversion happening. I think that's probably a concern at the margin. It is suboptimal, but my experience is life is suboptimal. Why don't we go down the line? I think everyone's interested in this question, Professor Zhang. Personally, I think that it's too early to talk about the convergence of TPP and RSIB. I think that at this stage, maybe two tracks could be parallel, and they will be comprehensive. They will be complementary, I think. For example, you know that some of negotiators from TPP, they also will be the negotiator for RSIB. I think that a lot of issues discussed during TPP negotiation will be bring to the platform of RSIB negotiation. That will benefit for RSIB to become a high quality FTA in the near future. Meanwhile, I'd like to emphasize on East Asia economic integration process, because China will be a very important member for that. Regarding East Asia FTA, I think that China-Korea FTA will be a very important leverage for East Asia economic integration, because China-Korea FTA, we already studied for many, many wrongs of feasibility. Meanwhile, in recent years, China and South Korea economic relationship becomes more and more important. Just look at the trade data between China and ROK. It's annual trade volume already above 250 billion US dollars. If you look at trade data between China and Russia, lower than 100 billion US dollars. But you know that ROK has a so small population and territory, so very high economic efficiency. Also, China and ROK, we are working on the East Asia production network. Of course, Japan is also belonging to this network. I think that China-Korea FTA will promote CJK FTA. If you look at CJK FTA, I regarded CJK FTA as the key factor of East Asia FTA. Because CJK, three countries, GDP make contribution of Asia more than 70%. Just this number is enough. Lastly, I like to say RCEP will be the most important platform for East Asia economic integration. That will maybe after several years, maybe after 10 years, and track one and track two TPP and RCEP. Radity members, they can sit together to talk about our Asia Pacific FTA. Thank you. Thank you very much. Like I said in my presentation, RCEP and TPP are both regarded as pathways to FTAP. I think that's the way these two frameworks should be. In my view, high-level FTA cannot be, in terms of quality, cannot be lowered. It has to go from RCEP to converging into TPP. It takes some time for several countries in RCEP or East Asia to accept the kind of high standard TPP has. We have to give them some time, maybe five years, ten years. Gradually, they can grow economically, and then they'll be able to join TPP. I think that's how it will be. If it's TPP is here, RCEP is there, and then gradually then converging to FTAP. That's one point. Another one is they should use APEC as a platform. APEC is a voluntary arrangement. Then they can show best practices and so on. They meaning RCEP can use APEC platform. Maybe even TPP countries can use APEC platform to make RCEP countries to be able to join in TPP later. Finally, accession. Accession is in RCEP, although RCEP has just started negotiations. According to guiding principles, East Asia Summit member countries do agree that RCEP should be open to others. But there is one condition. This has to be ASEAN dialogue partners according to guiding principles. I think that principle has to be relaxed in order to accept other members such as maybe Peru, Chile, or whatever. Whereas TPP is open not only to APEC economies but to others. So TPP is very open in that sense. So again, RCEP has to make that adjustment in order to accept new members. The reasons again the two RCEP and TPP because TPP is exclusively conceptualized and marketed in such a way that it is a trade liberalization issues. While the RCEP is in addition to trade liberalization, trade investment liberalization, but also community building as well as development process. But second point is that is it possible? Of course it's possible. For example, there is a precedent in ASEAN. When Singapore started these bilateral, there are some ASEAN member countries disagree with it. But we have a principle they call it 10 minus x. So there is one track for the 10 kilometers and our speed and the other one is 50 kilometer or 30 kilometers. So it is possible to have two tracks system but coordination must be enhanced. Probably as Uratasan mentioned APEC because it's already a lot of the both RCEP and TPP members are members of APEC. The last point is that the ASEAN centrality and default functions is very important in the sense that if ASEAN agrees, because it cannot be top down but it must be from the bottom up because the TPP hides standard and all these things. So ASEAN centrality and initiative is critical in this point of view. So it can be done. Thank you. TPP I think most of the participating countries would argue is about more than just trade liberalization. It goes to quite a few disciplines beyond the border. And even I think many participants would argue it also is in its own way a kind of community building process. And I suppose it's possible I have overlapping communities. Kevin Rudd talked about the Asia Pacific community. Bill Clinton talked about an Asia Pacific community. RCEP is about an ASEAN centrality based East Asia community. And I suppose they don't have to be in contradiction. But it sounds like the consensus on the panel is in terms of the content of the negotiations TPP process is much more likely to shape the content of RCEP in terms of agreements than the other way around. And that's helpful for one low IQ American to take away from the excellent discussion. Okay. Please raise your hand and we have microphones around the station. Please. Thank you very much. Sherm Katz, Center for Study of the Presidency. I wanted to ask Professor Zhang if he would address a little bit. Professor Lim's point about presentation of TPP needing to be moderated. The question is really about trade diplomacy. You described several ways that TPP is perceived in China. Can you distinguish between those perceptions just as following as a matter of fact from the proposal of TPP and on the other hand from things which U.S. trade diplomats have said. And the goal of the question is to help us understand better in the coming years how we can, if we have not moderated, how we can moderate in the way Professor Lim suggests. Do I make my question clear? Yes. Sure. How can U.S., how has U.S. trade diplomacy led to misperceptions or misunderstandings in China? Period. Actually I already mentioned in my presentation because you know that for TPP issues in China now actually it's very difficult for us to get relative information. You know that because TPP negotiation is closed they don't release any relative information. We just say, you know, make our efforts to know what's happened for that. So this type of situation makes in China, you know, a lot of Chinese scholars their works are quite difficult and information is quite limited. What they can do is that just buy a piece of, you know, paper or buy very limited information and to guess and to make a relative judgment or to make some of a conclusion. And that caused a lot of scholars, you know, they can make not so appropriate conclusion such as I mentioned. Meanwhile, you know that due to TPP issue actually, you know, relative with a lot of aspects such as, you know, diplomatic issues, political issues, security issues, something like that. So combined together, very complicated. So for different experts maybe they are, you know, they are in different fields. For economists or for those strategists or for those, you know, diplomats, they have their different understanding on the issue of TPP. So I think that it's very natural in China why there are so a lot of misunderstanding and perception. I hope next step maybe, you know, that we can increase, you know, our information exchange and our discussion and meanwhile, you know, that next year China will, you know, host a 2014 APAC meeting. I think that's a very good platform for China and other, you know, TPP negotiators can exchange information and to know what happened for TPP and how to deal with TPP issues. Lastly, I'd like to tell you that this month because Japan already declared to join TPP negotiation and the spokeswoman from Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, they express their Chinese central government attitude. She says that TPP, 10 plus 3 and 10 plus 6, all of them would be the possible approaches and platform for Asia Pacific economic integration. Thank you. That was an important statement and I attribute that to Wang Yi's, Foreign Minister Wang Yi's understanding of Japan and of the U.S. And when security experts look at TPP, they see countries on a map and they think of a chessboard. And when trade experts look at it, they see competitive liberalization but also they know how hard and ugly these negotiations are and your presentation really brought that out. Did you want to comment on what the U.S. should do to moderate what it says about TPP? First of all, trying to get the U.S. to moderate what it says about anything is a herculean task and the talking point you could give the new U.S. GR to capture what you're saying, what would it be? Well, I guess the trade diplomats or negotiators, the U.S. did not publicize it much but the media and the publications that accounted a lot of those percepts. But it's also the second point is that it serves China interests also because China is also joking for leadership, at least in its neighborhood. So by accepting readily at this point, by saying that this is also the second chance for you like accession to the WTO in December 2001. But this one is not WTO of 180 over members. This is only the United States as a leader. I mean you're accepting the United States leadership. So therefore it is not only involved on trade issue. So it's not that simple. It is also leadership, leadership issue. So therefore it will take both sides to consulate. So we heard inside next year China will host the APEC meeting. China will use that a lot. But so U.S. must take active dialogue and coordination with these issues because it serves both sides interests. Sorry, in the back by the wall. Thank you very much Raymond Barrett from Park Global. Question for Mr. Zai. You pointed out some of the conflicts between the TPP members and some of the issues. Any chance that you could point out some of the conflicts between the RCEP and the CJK members and some of the issues that you see there? Yeah, actually the conflicts will be existing forever. Not only for TVV but also for RCEP, CJK even if for China-Korea FTA. For example, for China-Korea FTA we already negotiated for maybe five rounds. However, you know that because ROK had negotiated FTA with the United States. So from Korea side its expectation is very high. They want to negotiate a high quality free trade agreement with China. But you know that China now is in process of reform and opening up. So for China side we want to promote FTA step by step. So my suggestion to Korea side is that according to China's experiences and China's gradual opening up experiences, it would be better if we can go step by step. At the beginning maybe the standard or the quality is not so high. The standard is not so high. But gradually we can promote it. That will be very a coincidence with China's situation. For China-Korea, CJK FTA also actually there are a lot of barriers. For example, for Japanese side their expectation is that at the beginning we should put all fields on the table, all products and we can have comprehensive negotiation for FTA. But maybe China and South Korea have different understanding for these type of issues. So I think that CJK and RCEP will have, there is a long way to go. But right at the country they already decided to work together and to make efforts. Thank you. Middle here. Okay, thank you very much. I'm Liuzong Yi from Shanghai Institute for Internet Studies. I'm a visiting fellow in CSIS now. I have a question to Mr. Lim. Just as you said, the TPP was initiated by Singapore and several other small countries. But at first I think the structure of the TPP is just like a spider net. But after the United States initiated the T9, its structure has changed into a harbor-spoken structure. And just as you mentioned, the United States is the leader in this structure. But Indonesia initiated the RCEP and in the 10 plus 3, 10 plus 6, each Asian countries plays a leading role. So I would like to ask you, how do you think about, how do the Asian countries deal with your internal differences? Thank you. So Professor Lim, to Professor Lim. Thank you. First of all, I think when the P4, actually it was P3, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, only Brunei came later on, a year later, so it became P4. Secondly is the structure, although it was not elaborated, the structure remains the same. It's a high-level FTA and comprehensive. So the purpose of it, as I interpreted, is that it was actually the Singapore idea and brought it to the Mexican when it was a IPEC summit in Mexico. Former Prime Minister Go Chok Tong of Singapore, ideas of the P3. So it's remained the same, except it was not explicated into detail. So when the U.S. agreed during the IPEC meeting in Singapore in 2007, so U.S. spelled out the beans and put it out all on the tables. So the principle remains the same. So what many people are still confused is that the U.S. led and all these things, but actually it's the same principle except that U.S. spelled it out all into now 29 chapters. You know, the cross-border, horizontal, vertical, everything's under the skies you put it in, but during the P3, P4, there was no such specified area, but the principle remained the same. Now the issue of the ASEAN, how actually it's not Indonesia. A lot of the things are actually initiated by Singapore, but it quietly passes on to Thailand or to Indonesia. But it was Singapore idea, but of course it's not from the government, I didn't say, but it's actually a lot from Singapore. So the second point is that it's not one country specific. It's ASEAN consensus, agreed by the ASEAN countries. So the ASEP is not initiated by Indonesia. In fact, actually there is a conflict between the private sectors, the business communities and the Indonesian government of President Yudhoyono. Indonesian official position is very supportive of ASEP, but the private sector is not that keen at this point in time because of Indonesia as you know growing very rapidly within its own domestic last market, they don't need so much of the expansion at this point in time. But nonetheless Indonesia official positions is that to support first the ASEAN economic community and second is the ASEP. And lastly is also Indonesia does not disagree with Japan joining the TPP and all this and doesn't have any specific ASEAN voice on TPP. Right here. Ernie Preek of Manufacturers Alliance. A number of interesting points today about the trilateral FTA between China, Japan and Korea, which gets almost no attention to Washington quite frankly. Korea and China are engaged in negotiations. Professor Lim said China is very strongly supports it. Professor Arata says Japan should contribute to quick conclusion. And Professor Lim goes as far as to say that if Japan does enter into negotiations with the other two and it could be a quicker, simpler negotiation based on compared with the TPP comprehensive. Professor Lim said this is for my question that this would sideline the TPP. So my question is how would it sideline? How seriously would it sideline TPP? And what should be the U.S. reaction if this new important element comes on the scene? Again, this is my personal view. It's not but reflects a great deal of the underlying ASEAN consensus to it. Japan and U.S. do not have FTA, bilateral FTAs while South Korea and U.S. has. So the pressure, the pressure on Korea is not that big as on Japan. The third point is also that a lot of the things that Japan have a lot of commonalities that it should not be a problem on the 29 chapters of the things. But it's more of persuading the domestic constituency in Japan. So sidelining in the sense that because it is a tedious balancing act between domestic constituency and trade policy diplomacy on the part of Japan. So that sort of interpretation that you should, that it could be sidelined in the sense that balancing between domestic constituency because the Abe administration has to set up a credibility and political clouds domestically to push through, pursue all the trade reforms and which I personally think it is the right way to restructure Japan and to reboot and to re-engineer Japan into stronger economic growth. So that's sort of a sideline that I interpreted accordingly. If I understand correctly, Professor Lim, the issue you raise is that the Japanese government might use its political capital to liberalize for CJK and have nothing left for TPP. Thank you. Erato-sensei, I'd be interested in your reaction to that. Well, CJK, I think my view is that this is much more easier FTA than TPP probably because of maybe low-level trade liberalization. That may be acceptable because China maybe doesn't want to open up auto market but Japan doesn't want to open up agriculture market. If that's the case then they can agree on not opening up. But in my view, this is not a good FTA as I guess people are saying we need to promote economic growth is to adopt, accept reform and so on. So for Japan, if China opens up auto market, we should open up agriculture market. That may take some time but that's the way that CJK FTA should go forward. And then coming back to this Prime Minister Abe is using his popularity to carry out agriculture reform. Agriculture reform itself may not be so difficult if what is needed is a determination and of course the appropriate policy. It takes some time for agriculture sector to adjust to new environment but if you can formulate appropriate policy that is a mixture of maybe providing some kind of assistance to negatively affected farms and then maybe provide some kind of say R&D type subsidy to agriculture sector then I mean this structure reform can be done and that's what we like to see happen and that's how I like to see Prime Minister Abe to deal with this agriculture policy. I mean if I read the polls correctly, the Prime Minister announced he would join TPP before an election, his popularity stayed high and support for TPP went up. So in terms of political momentum, he sure seems to have it in the confidence across the LDP leadership. The rank and file backbenchers in the LDP have opposed it but the leadership across the board almost is supportive as I understand it. He should take this really good opportunity. If he misses this opportunity, this kind of opportunity may not come back again so this is a time. I would personally be surprised if the Abe administration squandered his political capital on CJK just given frankly some of the tensions right now between Japan and Korea and China but also given the Abe administration's world view. So the danger I would think would be if you have a different cabinet, different makeup which is always possible in Japan as recent history shows. I think we have time for one more. Yes ma'am, did you? Oh, sorry. Hi, my name is Eric Love with the Free Observer. Actually my question is a little bit, maybe directly to Mr. Miller. It's more like the problem with the TPP seems to be there is a bit of not enough transparency on this thing and people just know what it is about. Like actually I was one of those who entered into a press conference when the Japanese delegation come to Washington and found out that there is not a lot of information about the situation and a lot of people even read it. And also the point is that it has to be rectified so quickly in difference to the Art Recept which is is there a kind of a hurrying to get this over with or is there a need to be more consultation when more people know what the deal is all about? Thank you. Transparency is always in the eye of the beholder. There is a tremendous amount of information in the public domain about the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Certainly the agreement ratified among the original four parties is a public document. The actual negotiating positions of the 12 economies or 11 economies involved are not public and have never been public to my knowledge in any trade negotiations. So we would need to have a much more detailed conversation on what you actually mean by transparency for me to give you a fair answer. But I think if you want to know what the United States is looking for in the trade agreement, go online, fill up your printer with paper and print out the U.S. career free trade agreement. That is the most recent FTA we have done with an Asian partner. That will tell you pretty much what our sensitivities are and what our interests are. And it is all there. It is actually USTR.gov. You can download the whole thing. Take your thumb drive. So we can talk more about transparency. But what often gets criticized as untransparent is the fact are the private negotiations among the parties, which always take place in private. At the WTO they take place in private. In RCEP they take place in private. And any bilateral. Negotiators meet in private because they are exploring options. There are lots of reasons for it. Second on PACE, it is important that negotiators agree to aggressive or ambitious timetables. They do not always make them. I would point out that when the Doha round was concluded in November 2001, there was a three-year mandate for completing the negotiations. And that did not exactly work out. So all these things are a little bit elastic. I do think with Japan's entry that the fall 2013 date is probably impractical. Having said that, my own observation is that few things in a trade negotiation actually improve with age. And you are better off setting a timetable and having leaders agree to a timetable and force the negotiators to come to conclusions, make the decisions and move on. So there is a balance that has to be struck. October 2013 was a goal stated before Japan entered. And negotiators I think would rather have Japan in have an agreement concluded in this fall without Japan. So all these things are negotiable. But I do believe that the leadership in PACE, scope, and timetable are vitally important to a successful conclusion. Otherwise we get another Doha. And the October 2013 agreement was also heavily copyrighted, right? It was substantially completed and substantially is also in the eye of the beholder. You heard from Senator Cauden, their next hearing for the Asia Subcommittee is going to be on trade and economics and heavily focused on TPP, I'm sure. The new USDR is going to have to be confirmed. My impression, we may have colleagues from the Hill there, my impression is Japan coming into TPP has woken up the Congress to, and interested a lot of constituencies in a positive way who weren't interested before in TPP because it's a lot more than just Brunei now we're talking about. So there's a lot of interest, most of it positive, and I think you're going to see a lot more hearings and a lot more information getting out. I think that's right. Clearly it's a much bigger deal when you include one of your largest trading partners all of a sudden where there are still substantial, I mean, Canada is a big trading partner, but there are very few barriers to the terms of trade. There's real barriers to trade between the US and Japan that have to be dealt with. That's a big market access opportunity for exporters. It's a big opportunity for investors and people who want to engage, companies who want to engage in Japan, but that's going to take some time to work out. We have, we've been talking about New Zealand butter and konjac potatoes, and I'm hungry. We don't have either of those back there, but I think we have something reasonable. So we'll take a break, you can get your lunch, and in about 20, 30 minutes we'll invite Assistant USDR Wendy Cutler. So please join me in thanking a really terrific panel. In the administration, Assistant USDR for Japan, Korea, and APEC, Wendy Cutler, I mentioned Wendy that we structure these programs with JETRO so that we have a speaker from the Hill first, and then we have regional perspective so that throughout the morning we build up the case for how impossible your job is, and then you come in and you convince everybody you can do it. And in Wendy's case she absolutely can. Wendy's really well liked and respected. When I was in the NSC with the Asia job for Bush, people said thinking back on the first Bush administration, you know, get ready because the NSC and USDR are going to fight like cats and dogs. And I don't think we had a single disagreement, maybe because you're so persuasive, but Wendy is very effective. The amazing thing about Wendy is when I was in government and I went to Korea, every once in a while there would be a poster of me with a sign saying, you go home. So the security guys working on the alliance were told go home, but Wendy has, after negotiating with the Koreans and successfully completing the chorus, the USC Free Trade Agreement, Wendy actually has a cult following in Korea. No joke. And I don't know how many Twitter followers you have, but it's something. So I'm sure the same will happen in Japan and Canada and Chile and ruin everybody else in the TPP process. We'll invite Wendy up. She's going to give some remarks and then we'll take questions. But join me please in thanking Wendy Cutler for joining us and giving us her remarks. It's really a pleasure to be here today. What Mike didn't mention was that through the years I've been invited to this forum. And I think the last time I was here was maybe about five years ago. And I can tell you the turnout was a lot smaller. And I think this issue just wasn't as hot as it is now. And so I'm delighted to see so many of you here. And I'm delighted to talk about regional economic integration. I know this morning you had some really interesting discussions on the RCEP and TPP and how all this fits together. I thought what I would do is just kind of touch on some of those issues, then really focus on the TPP and then talk more about what Japan's participation in the TPP not only means for the United States, but what means for Japan and what it means to the region. It's very clear that the whole issue of regional economic integration has just become a very popular issue. And if you pick up the newspaper just from this weekend, you can read about the conclusions of the first round of the RCEP negotiations. We also note that the China, Japan, Korea FTA negotiations have been holding sessions with their latest session at the end of March. I was in Indonesia a few weeks ago for the APEC trade ministers meeting where APEC continued its quest to work on trade and investment issues, kind of laying the groundwork for a lot of these next generation trade issues. And at that time also the TPP ministers met and officially welcomed Japan into the TPP pending the completion of each country's domestic procedures, and I'll get to that in a minute. Another regional grouping that we don't hear as much about, but clearly the last APEC meeting we did hear a lot about, is the Pacific Alliance, which is going to meet at the end of this month, where they are planning to consider expanding their membership. And I will say today we are TPP negotiators on a plane as we speak to Lima, Peru for the 17th round of the TPP. Now why all this activity? I think it's pretty obvious and not surprising. There's a lot of dynamism and strong economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. So it's only natural that there's a high level of economic engagement and efforts to really strengthen integration. Most countries in the Asia-Pacific now are working to one degree or another to strengthen economic integration, and many of them are doing this in multiple fora. And while some have argued that some of these fora are mutually exclusive and somehow it odds with each other, we don't believe that. We see these groups as potentially being complementary and all moving towards the goal of trade liberalization, perhaps at different paces and perhaps not as deep or as high standard as others, but clearly moving towards trade liberalization and ultimately moving towards the free trade area of the Asia-Pacific. For the United States, it's no secret that our main trade negotiating focus in the region is TPP. Working with our other TPP partners, we are trying to craft a comprehensive high standard agreement which addresses what we call the next generation issues facing the region. First, let me just touch upon a couple of these points without getting into the details of the TPP negotiations. First of all, we believe it's important that for economic integration to be successfully achieved, you really need to have a comprehensive and high standard agreement. We recognize that ambitious trade negotiations can be challenging, but we believe the relevant economic research underscores that high standards are in the interest of each TPP country and in the region itself. And studies have projected that the benefits of TPP will be especially significant because of the breadth and the depth of the commitments we're seeking. Second, the TPP is adding new issues to the trade agenda, and we think this is very important. APEC has done a really good job of kind of laying the groundwork for these issues, whether they be regulatory coherence, supply chains, or dealing with small and medium-sized enterprises and integrating them more effectively into the trading system. And these are the kinds of issues that as the region and trade and investment progress in the coming years, these are the types of issues that we're hearing from our business community are extremely important, and so we think it's important that these issues now be folded into trade agreements. We are also developing the TPP as a living agreement and as a potential platform for broader regional economic integration. And over the past few years, we've invited other countries into the TPP based on their expression of interest and working with the other countries to join. TPP was initially P4, and then the United States and a couple of other countries joined and it was expanded to nine, and now we're at 11 members and on the eve of Japan joining the TPP, and so soon we will be 12. So let me now just turn to Japan and Japan's interest in TPP. Japan's interest was first announced officially in November 2011 in Honolulu when the United States chaired APEC that year, and it was a very striking announcement and people were very excited about Japan's announcement. And following that announcement, the United States undertook extensive stakeholder and congressional outreach and we started our negotiations and consultations with Japan February a year ago. February a year later then on February 22nd when Prime Minister Abe was in the United States meeting with the President, they had a discussion about TPP and following that meeting we issued a joint statement which for the first time put in writing that Japan was prepared to put all products on the negotiating table, meaning agriculture and industrial, and Japan was willing to join others in achieving a comprehensive and high standard agreement. And this statement was very important to the United States and other TPP countries because it clearly demonstrated that Japan got what the TPP was about and recognized that to join the TPP that it was going to be different than the other EPAs and FTAs it had entered to date. The joint statement also underscored the remaining work we had to do with respect to our bilateral consultations and we then picked up the pace and the intensity of these negotiations resulting in an April 12th announcement of the completion of our bilateral consultations. At that time we announced actions, assurances, and really a roadmap on a number of key issues that I'd like to just touch briefly upon. First, with respect to the automotive issue, we reached an agreement that U.S. tariffs on motor vehicles would be phased out in accordance with the longest staging for any TPP product and would be back-loaded meaning the cuts would happen towards the end of that staging. In addition, we agreed on terms of reference for a parallel bilateral negotiation on automotive issues that will start when Japan joins the TPP and the results of which will be incorporated into our bilateral market access schedule with Japan. We also reached agreements on how we would treat the insurance issue particularly with respect to the Japan post concern and that has to do with the competition between a state-owned enterprise Japan post with private sector companies. And we agreed that through the TPP consultations themselves coupled with our bilateral parallel negotiations we will address the level playing concerns and furthermore the deputy prime minister of Japan announced Japan's decision not to approve applications by Japan post for certain insurance products until equivalent conditions of competition have been met as well as until Japan posts at a properly functioning management system. Third, we also announced that we'll have parallel bilateral negotiations on a range of non-tariff measures, some sectoral and some cross-cutting. These negotiations will also start when Japan joins the TPP and the issues will be addressed at the conclusion of our discussions with Japan in the TPP. And finally, in our consultations we spent a lot of time with Japan exchanging information and letting them know about the negotiations themselves and particularly with respect to what the expectations would be should Japan join the negotiations. And we had several rounds where our negotiating leads met with Japanese experts to go through the issues in detail but in particular focusing on issues that to date had not been addressed in Japan's FTAs and EPAs to date. And through that process we were able to conclude that Japan was ready for this negotiation that it understood not only the U.S. expectation but the expectations of other countries that it would be a constructive and positive participant in the TPP and that not only would it not slow down the negotiations but in fact in many areas would really be a good partner in really lifting the standards and working with us to lift the standards of the TPP. Following our conclusion of bilateral consultations with Japan other TPP members then finished their bilateral consultations and then in Suribaya on April 21st all TPP members officially welcomed Japan to join the TPP negotiations with the many minister, Motegi actually joining the other TPP ministers recognizing that each country had to complete their domestic procedures. For the United States the domestic procedures means that we need to have an intensive 90-day period of consultations with Congress and with our stakeholders. This period started on April 24th upon our return from Suribaya through an official letter to Congress explaining our intent to start negotiations with Japan in the TPP. We are now in this consultation period I don't know about two weeks or so into it maybe a little more and we're having those consultations with Congress and with our stakeholders. We issued a Federal Register notice last week inviting public comment. Comments are due June 9th in case anyone wants to share their views with us and we'll be holding a public hearing on Japan's participation in the TPP on July 2nd. So those are just some kind of the process and let me then conclude by just making just some observations about Japan's participation. First I would just stress that we've really had in depth and detailed consultations with Japan and with our stakeholders. For the United States Japan is our fourth largest trading partner the third largest economy in the world. We've had a history of trade friction which in recent years has turned increasingly to cooperation but we needed to make sure that we got this right and so we took our time in these consultations to make sure that there was a real meeting of the minds on the issues and on concerns that we brought to the table. Based on the work we did with our Japanese colleagues we feel confident that we have the necessary upfront assurances and actions and a roadmap for addressing the issues that have been brought to us of concern as well as working with them through the TPP. Second I would just say that Japan that over the years we've seen more and more cooperation with Japan. For me personally I'm also responsible for the APEC portfolio and frankly most of our APEC initiatives now are co-sponsored with Japan so whether it's localization or environmental goods and services or supply chain issues Japan is with us hand in hand working with other APEC countries on these issues and that's extremely encouraging and I would also note that in the WTO Japan's a very strong partner with respect to the information technology agreement negotiations as well as in the services negotiations and so based on all of this and based on our continued cooperation with Japan we think that in many areas of the TPP not limited to but in such areas as IPR, services, investment and customs issues they will be a very strong partner in the TPP. Third we recognize that moving and opening up the agriculture sector is going to be difficult for Japan but we're very encouraged that Japan has had a national debate on this issue that Japan has agreed to put all products on the table for negotiation and that it's also having very detailed discussions being held on agricultural reform so all of this suggests to us that Japan is very serious about moving forward in this sector. Fourth we are encouraged by Japan's special negotiating structure for TPP as someone who's negotiated with Japan for many, many years. It's no secret that at times you felt that you were dealing with as you were negotiating with different ministries they might as well have been from different countries because they didn't have the same position and this time around Japan seems to have gotten the message and they are organizing a special negotiating team out of the cabinet office under the prime minister's leadership and we think this is extremely encouraging in terms of minimizing rivalries and different opinions between ministries but also allowing for political decisions to be made which we know through experience that negotiations like the TPP often require. And fifth I would just underscore and this is something I learned from the US-Korea FDA is that it's just so important that in these types of negotiations that a country that decides to embark on them makes its own decision based on its own national interests and doesn't feel like a trading partner pressured them to join a negotiation and so we are encouraged that Japan has had this national debate on TPP. There was a poll just this week I believe in the Yomiori saying that TPP enjoys 55% public support in Japan. I've seen other polls come in a bit higher and a bit lower but it's fascinating the debate that's going on in Japan on TPP how it's on the front page of the paper every day and people are really talking about the issues and I think Prime Minister Abe's speech on March 15th when he announced Japan's decision to join TPP really underscores Japan's rationale for joining TPP which talked about improving Japan's economy which talked about joining in the regional rulemaking which talked about not wanting to be left out of other preferential arrangements being negotiated in the region and talked about strengthening our bilateral alliance and so we are very encouraged that Japan has made this decision and we think as such when it comes to the negotiating table it's coming to the table for right reasons and reasons that will make the prospects for success greater. In short we're excited about Japan joining the TPP we believe it will contribute to the economic significance of TPP and has huge potential to support additional US exports and US jobs but we also recognize that this is the beginning of a process that we really have hard work ahead of us both with Japan in the actual TPP negotiations but as well as in our parallel bilateral negotiations on autos and other non-tariff measures and at the same time on the TPP more generally we've had 16 increasingly productive rounds of negotiation and literally are about to embark on the 17th round in Lima, Peru and with the TPP negotiations in such an advanced stage and progressing towards conclusion we as the United States are committed to working very closely with Japan to integrate Japan smoothly into the TPP negotiations as we have successfully done with Canada and Mexico. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Wendy and important takeaways for me and I think for others will be that TPP is not in competition with these other efforts that economic integration that partners don't get pushed into this and that partners decide if it's in their national interest and why it's in their national interest and then we go from there but I think the most important in a way is that after so many years of experience working with Japan and watching what's happening your assessment that it's real and with Japan's participation TPP becomes a much bigger thing and we'll open it up I wanted to ask you something based on our discussion this morning a number of speakers including Chairman Ishige that we have to have some mechanism to ensure that TPP are set China, Japan, Korea that these are moving in the same direction and reinforcing each other as much as possible and there were discussions of whether China should be an observer in TPP or there should be a trade minister session and remember at one point we tried in APEC to have different ministers explain what they were doing and that's a little maybe beyond your immediate target of negotiating this but how would you respond to that suggestion that we need to find a way to if not coordinate at least share some information among these different hopefully complementary efforts? Well we already are doing that in APEC over the past couple of years at the senior officials level at every senior officials level at every senior officials meeting we are exchanging information on the different negotiations and it was interesting when we first started this process that was in the Honolulu year when we chaired because we thought this was important we literally had to kind of behind the scenes ask countries to take the mic and to report on what they were doing and now this has become an integrated feature of our meetings that we really have had a robust discussion on the respective negotiations in the region and I would just also say in Suribaya under the leadership of Indonesia just a few weeks ago the trade ministers had a special luncheon devoted to this issue really exchanging information updating each other on their respective negotiations and looking ahead in APEC I think the remainder of the Indonesia year we looked at the China year I think they're just really strong opportunities to really increase the transparency with respect to these negotiations I hate it when think tanks come up with really great ideas and the government's already doing it but thank you Do you want to take credit for it? You already outed us but thanks it's a contrast to when we were both working on APEC say six, seven years ago and the US and some other countries made an effort to have this kind of sharing of information on FTAs and it was too sensitive at the time so we weren't sure if these were going to be in harmony or not and so that's an encouraging development let me open it up please briefly introduce yourself Furata Sensei Thank you very much for a very interesting talk I have a question about agriculture two related question you know we hear about LDP politicians talking about sanctuaries and the five agriculture products has to be removed from the negotiation does this kind of development affect the consultation with your congress? you know after 90 days can we expect the approval of Japan joining TPP negotiation or if they keep hearing these negative views then they may have a second thought on this that's the first question and the second question is that you told us about the agreement on auto the US will liberalize auto with several years and they talk about agriculture how Japan should deal with agriculture in that regard what I'm worried about is as I said in my presentation I'm in favor of opening up agriculture in Japan that is very important for Japan to recover economically but this agreement on auto may be based upon understanding that Japan doesn't have to open up agriculture if that's the case that's really something that I hate to see happen so these are two agriculture related questions let me just say that during this consultation period I'm spending a lot of time in congress and with our stakeholders and so statements come out by different parties in Japan such as the LDP saying that they want a handful of products excluded this complicates our consultations and we have to explain our view on what was said as well as our understanding with Japan on these issues and with respect to this issue we point to the February 22nd joint statement where Japan clearly said that all goods will be subject to negotiation and that Japan would join others in seeking a comprehensive and high standard outcome with respect to your second question the results of our consultations are public and so they're there for everyone to read and so what we achieved on autos is I touched upon and what we discussed on agriculture is also captured there which once again is reflected mainly in the February 22nd joint statement Mr. Sherman Thanks very much Wendy and thanks again for your years of great work at USTR this morning we talked a little about some of the downside risks related to RCEP and CJK and I wonder if you can sort of you've described very good things that you're doing to share information but I wonder if you take off your official hat for a minute and tell us what some of the downside risks are we spoke about a couple one that RCEP might be a lower level less ambitious in many respects A, B that it's more oriented some said toward economic development and some thought this could perhaps slow down the TPP process others said no no RCEP is going to have to graduate up into TPP and then there was also a CJK there was a concern that perhaps if Abe moves to that there might be competition for use of Abe's political goodwill as between CJK and TPP but speculate a little with us on the downside risks if you'd be so kind I'm going to just be really brief in my response because I never really take my official hat off when I'm giving public speeches that the media is filming and that is really just to emphasize more what the TPP is about and for the US once again we believe that really high standard comprehensive agreements based on the economic analysis we've seen would just bring more benefits to the region and that's why we are working so hard in the TPP to work with other like-minded countries to really lift those standards to address kind of the next generation issues and to achieve a comprehensive agreement I'm going to call on someone here but I just want to point out that Wendy is a graduate of Georgetown School of Foreign Service I know there are at least half a dozen Georgetown students in the audience so you know don't let us down but for now yeah Thank you very much Raymond Barrett with Power Global the issues like say autos and agriculture have been covered to death a small bit at these events so maybe if we could expand on to some of the kind of say other areas and things that you mentioned in the release were some kind of NTM's like sort of say investment into Japan you sort of highlighted mergers and acquisitions and any chance that you could just expand on what the US is trying to achieve in terms of say M&A into Japan and I think you mentioned the way boards are structured in Japan and those things just something other than autos and agriculture for a change Okay let me just say that we thought it was very important that given Japan's low tariffs with respect to industrial products that we would have the ability to really address non-tariff measures that our exporters and workers and companies are facing in Japan some of these non-tariff measures will be addressed through the TPP negotiations the TPP 29 chapters a lot of them are dealing with non-tariff measures but we also recognize that there are a lot of kind of Japan unique non-tariff measures that we've dealt with in the past but also through our stakeholder outreach more identified and as a result we have a pretty ambitious agenda with Japan as you mentioned in the investment area one of the key investment concerns we have heard is the inability for countries to acquire and to merge with other companies which really has become an investment barrier in Japan or has been for quite a bit we've also focused on bid rigging issues and government procurement we want to talk more about how to increase transparency in the Japanese regulation development process there are issues with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary issues such as food additives and there's just a whole host of those issues and so we will be spending time with Japan both in the TPP but also through our parallel bilateral negotiations to address these issues so when we are done when we've completed these negotiations we'll just have a solid package then in our view we can show that we really achieve market access in Japan my name is Kunio Kikuchi I'm with Washington Research and Analysis the country that's the closest geographic neighbor of Japan is Russia and it's also the country with the longest Pacific coastline but today I did not hear anything about Russia perhaps you spoke more about North Korea than Russia but my question is has the US contemplated inviting Russia to the TPP or has the Russians made any forays into a possible inclusion in the TPP thank you well thank you and just to be clear the United States doesn't like invite other countries to TPP basically we encourage other countries if they're interested to let us know of their interest and interest can be everything from wanting to find out more about the TPP in which case we would set up information exchanges it can be extremely formal interest expressed such as Prime Minister Abe did a few months ago so there are various levels when Russia chaired APEC last year you know there was a very kind of they wanted to know more about the TPP and so through APEC we were able to educate them more but Russia is an APEC member and all of these regional economic initiatives are all kind of headed or looking towards the achievement of a free trade area of the Asia Pacific could you clarify on F-TAP on the free trade area of the Asia Pacific it came out of APEC discussions is it a APEC membership considered a requirement or is this something that's still to be determined in terms of which countries would be eligible to participate in F-TAP in F-TAP? which is not yet a negotiation but if the goal is eventually to move towards a free trade area of the Asia Pacific and this came out of an APEC discussion is the concept that APEC membership is a requirement for F-TAP or have we not actually drawn that line in any hard way yet? I don't know if people are really talking about it as a requirement but clearly when APEC talked about it it was talking about these are the 21 economies of the Asia Pacific so there was obviously talk about an interest among APEC members but there's nothing in writing what's required I was there I just forgot Yes sir Hello, this is Adam Bisoudi from Inside US Trade I had two quick questions one is can you describe I guess the nature of Japan's participation in the soonest round possibly in a July round what kind of meaningful participation will they have at that round and also the issue of currency is kind of under the surface here with Japan joining and being brought up by stakeholders that have a concern is this an issue that you're addressing bilaterally with Japan or is this something that you see as being a part of the TPP text or provisions itself or in any other form will that be addressed? With respect to when Japan would participate typically we announced the dates for the subsequent round at the round before the negotiators are in Lima so at the end of the Lima round they will probably announce the dates for the following round at the same time we're conducting our 90-day consultation period other countries are also conducting their domestic consultations following their domestic procedures and so how all of this comes together we'll just have to see with respect to the currency issue I can be really brief we've heard a lot of concerns about currency and this issue is being reviewed by the administration you knew those two were coming and then the other one that you probably expected but hasn't been asked so I'll ask it is TPA how does TPA shape your effort to negotiate this? Is it something that can come later? Is it something that has to come sooner? How would you characterize it? I would just characterize it by saying that we are consulting with our congressional committees on TPA Yes, Professor Zhang Affiliated with National Development and Reform Commission China I just concern you know that China at this stage is not a TPP negotiator but the TPP is a big concern for China so in the near future how to improve information sharing with China? Thank you As I mentioned earlier we through APEC are sharing information on TPP and on the negotiations and when countries ask us for information on TPP we have consulted with them to bring them up to date on what we're doing to offer that to any country that's interested in finding out more about the negotiations Wendy, thank you the morning session had a lot of advice for you that you didn't hear and my impression is you're doing a lot of it which is good and Senator Cardin added a few more weights to the scales but it was pretty clear from him in the opening session that members of Congress are very interested in TPP now and generally quite supportive it appears and a lot of that as I said earlier is because Japan's in now so it's a big opportunity for economic growth across the whole region so you have a big task in front of you but I think you've given everyone confidence that once again you'll pull it off thank you and let me also conclude by thanking Chairman Ishige and our colleagues at JETRO and our colleagues from the Asia programs for putting together what was a really good session for us this is our 8th the next session I hope we will have in the new CSIS building which is shiny and wonderful and actually has air and circulation and then we can invite Wendy back to tell us how