 US engagement in the Pacific Island countries, really important. Take a look at that today with Carl Baker, Senior Advisor of Pacific Forum here on ThinkTech, Global Connections. Welcome to the show, Carl. Yeah, thanks for having me. Good to be back. Well, this started with an incident a couple of weeks ago where the government of the Solomon Islands denied the United States Coast Guard cutter the right to make a port call. And we found that they also denied UK to make a port call, a UK ship. Those things are changing, and that all has to do with China's growing influence as against the United States. What's going on, Carl? Well, I'm not sure I'm willing to say this is all about China's influence. I think what's happened in the Solomon Islands is indicative, I think, of the broader issue of what's happening in the South Pacific, the Pacific Island States area, whatever Oceania, whatever we want to call it, it's a big, complicated area. China's influence- Let's take a look at a map. We have a map. It'll be helpful if we can point out what we're talking about. Talk through a little bit to start off with. And the Solomon Islands issue, I think, is overblown a little bit, I think, in my mind, that we've sort of overplayed the importance of it. But as you can see from the islands there, or from the map there, the islands are kind of broken into Melanesia, down by Australia there, and then Polynesia, which includes, actually includes Hawaii, of course, and the French Polynesia, Samoa Tonga, and then Micronesia, which includes federated states of Micronesia, as well as Guam. And so that's kind of the breakdown of the three major areas. But as you can see, it spreads all the way across the Pacific. And typically we also include Australia, New Guinea, and New Zealand as part of Oceania. But the real focus isn't so much on Australia and New Zealand as it is on those other island states. And Papua New Guinea has about 6 million people, and all those other states combined don't have roughly that number of people. So the largest of the rest is Fiji, which is a population of about 830,000. So that's the biggest of the islands. So really what we're talking about is islands smaller than Hawaii. And they're spread across the Pacific, and there's a lot of diversity among the islands, although there's some level of cooperation in something called the Pacific Island Form, which is made up of 18 different islands. Some of them are French territories like the French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and then there's also some from New Zealand protectors. So it's a real mixed bag of individual states, and then territories of the French, New Zealand protectors, and then of course you have the American involvement through the Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. And then you of course have the U.S. Territories of Guam and a couple other smaller islands, American Samoa and a couple other Baker Island, I think is part of the United States. So it's a real mixed bag of what you have out there in the Pacific. Why do we care? I mean, they're not strategically important that I can see. They're not wealthy. They're poor. They're leaving. They're worried about climate change and climate change. These little rises inundating some of those islands. Why do we care about them? Yeah, well, in fact, that's part of the problem. You started off by saying that there's a problem. And part of the problem, of course, is that we didn't care. For a long time, we didn't care. So if you look at American U.S. involvement specifically, we have, of course, World War II, everybody remembers the Pacific Islands, the battles of Guadacanal, Tarawa, those when we were island hopping to retake those islands to push the Japanese back from that area. They're important. And when you talk to an American, that's what they remember. They remember the World War II version of these places. And so do they still matter? Well, they didn't for a while, but they are starting to again, because while they're small in territory, they're huge in ocean territory. And so what's becoming important is the blue economy of these island states. Because- What is that, Carl? Well, what it is is it's their economic zones because their countries, they get to claim a 200 mile economic zone around the land features. So that becomes significant. And I think that if you look at why it's becoming significant, why China has an interest is largely because of the fishing rights that you get and the amount of fishing that goes on there. And of course, that raises another issue of what's going on in the Pacific islands. And that is a competition between China and Taiwan over some of these countries. Because up until recently, Taiwan had relations with, for example, the Solomon Islands. It still has relationships with four of the countries, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, and Tuvalu. Those four, Taiwan still has diplomatic relations. Now, what happened is the Solomon's kid of us broke away from Taiwan and established relations with mainland China back in 2019. And then- Well, mainland China has been pushing them to do that every day and every way. They were putting pressure on all those islands to join up with China, enter into mutual arrangements to one kind or another, and turn their backs on Taiwan. And aside from those four, it's working. Well, the only other one was Vanuatu in 2004. The others had had a longer, longer standing relationship with China. So the recent history is the two that broke relations and kid of us and Solomon's. And the significant one here, of course, is Solomon's because it's one of the larger island states. And of course, because Sogavari has tried to play China off against- Sogavari is the- President Sogavari of Solomon Islands, yeah. And he's technically the president, but he's also quickly becoming fairly autocratic and dominant, and he's been dominant. I mean, he's had several terms in office as the leader of Solomon Islands. So the point is that China, yeah, China is trying to take advantage. They're trying to assert themselves in the Pacific Islands, partly because of the Taiwan influence, trying to push these countries away from Taiwan to reduce Taiwan's space, but also because I think it's interested in the blue water economy, specifically fishing in the Pacifica. Let me add a third possibility and see if you agree. It's like island hopping. It's like the island where it built the military base in the middle of nowhere, out of whole cloth. It's like the further east they move and have influence in these islands, the more strategic control they have toward the US or Hawaii. And I think it's very similar to having that military position on the island, they built out of nothing. So today it starts with maybe the Solomon Islands or some of the other islands around there, a way to become more influential. Maybe they have a base where they have a ship, an airstrip, what have you. And all of a sudden, one island after another becomes an extension of their influence, their sovereignty even, their military strategy. Doesn't it sound like that's a factor also? No, I don't think it is. I think that that is certainly an American perception is that that's the logical conclusion that China will be aggressively pursuing bases in the Solomon's and then on toward Hawaii. I mean, that certainly is the American narrative and it's not a narrative that I agree with. I think China is interested in that region but it's primarily an economic interest. And I know the discussion with the Solomon Islands is that it is signed a pact with China to militarily support Solomon, specifically Presidents Sogobari in his effort to maintain control of the Solomon Islands. But the fact is that there is an agreement between Australia and New Zealand to provide peacekeeping force in Solomon and they're there today. And they in fact do have access and they do have people on the ground in the Solomon. So, I mean, to make the logical jump that China is trying to island hop toward the United States is not really supported by the evidence on the ground at this point. And I think to make me change my mind I would have to see something more than a document that China tried to push out to the rest of the region to establish some sort of military agreement or some sort of a cooperation agreement with China. I think that's the- It did try that, didn't it? It did try that unsuccessfully, right? And it was unsuccessful because the other countries said we don't see the benefit in trying to establish this security pact with China at this point. And China backed away from it once they saw that they weren't going to get support. And the support of course was primarily not provided by Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Indonesia, which are closer to the United States. The presence of the expression of power by Australia, New Zealand in those islands must be a great irritant to China. I don't really think it is. I really don't- Again, you're trying to create a scenario where this is all about competition with China. And I think that to me is a misreading of what's happening in the Pacific Island States. The Pacific Island States are poor, very poor economically. They need economic assistance. They've signed on to China's Belt and Road because they see it as an opportunity to get infrastructure and infrastructure that can support them as the leader of those countries. And it's not contingent upon democracy, building democracy and all the human rights issues that go along with American economic support. And quite frankly- Have they gotten infrastructure? Well, it's very limited. But that's a separate issue of how successful they've been in getting infrastructure from China. I mean, China has built some buildings and some infrastructure in Solomon Islands. Yes, it has. And others have been somewhat successful in getting Chinese materials and infrastructure as well. But of course, it comes with the burden that everybody else has to put up with is you get Chinese laborers with it and you get a very strong push by China to support that Chinese labor and support China in international forms. And of course, that's another aspect of the Pacific Island States is in the past, they've always been sort of an easy vote in the UN for the United States in promoting United States' agenda. And I think China sees the same thing that you can buy off these countries and get their support for votes on the UN. And it's kind of an easy 15 votes that make it look like you're in the majority in the UN General Assembly because they all get one vote whether they're a couple of thousand people in Tuvalu or whether they're a million people in Fiji. They all get that one vote. So I think China sees that as a way to sort of push their influence in the international form. But I don't see China as trying to push its way in to replace Australia as the primary provider. And honestly, that's really Australia is the one that's been most interested and most has provided most of the assistance in the Pacific Island. Can we see the map one more time to show the proximity that there's Australia there? And to look up to the Northeast of Australia, there's the Solomon Islands and all that. Yeah, and you know, and somewhat cynically, I think the United States has kind of left that South Pacific area, basically Melanesia and that area to the Australians. And the Americans have been much more active in the states where they have the Compact Free Association, the Marshall Islands, Federation States and Palau. And they've kind of left those other countries to Australia. When you say left, Carl, do you mean that they physically picked up and left? I mean, for example, you have various countries that Australia and New Zealand with, as you said, people on the ground. You have the Chinese doing at least some infrastructure with the laborers on the ground. Are we on the ground? Were we on the ground? Did we pick up and leave from the ground? Well, we did in some cases, we did pull out some of our diplomatic representation. And of course, that's one of the things now that the United States is trying to reintroduce. So there's a Pacific Island Embassy Act that's being promoted in the Congress right now where we actually bring a mission back to Vanuatu, Kitabas and Tongva. And then also now there's talk about bringing one back to the Solomon Islands. So yeah, right now we have a representation in, again, Federated States, Marshall Islands and Palau. Can we ask, what about the Chinese? I mean, I really haven't been there in my life. Yes, I was once in a while. My coast guard resupply plane would fly over and we would drop supplies on little tiny airports. But in query, do the Chinese have a presence there? I mean, aside from these discussions and potential agreements and whatever level of influence they have directly or indirectly, economically, are they there? Are they on the ground? Well, they're starting to be on the ground. So they've built a new embassy in Oniara, the capital of the Solomon Islands. And that's drawn a lot of attention because it's a really big building. And so it sort of dominates the landscape in Oniara right now. And so that's been part of the discussion is yes, they are moving in. And so the same thing with Kitabas. When Kitabas changed its relations from Taiwan to China, China did bring in diplomats. And so I think that's why the United States is reacting and bringing diplomats into Tonga and Tuvalu places. Back, back, it seems like a long time ago. Remember the term pivot? I know you remember. Yeah, yeah. Well, I'm old enough to remember when it started. Let's put it that way. Wasn't that long ago, you know, in Obama? I don't remember. This was, did you say not long ago? This is over 10 years ago. I know, I know. I feel it every morning, I feel it. So OK, Obama wants to pivot. He wants to spend more time in Asia. He sees Asia as a very important place. And he's right. But then we get distracted, I guess, and we don't pivot so well. And China takes advantage of that. It's an opportunistic opportunity for them. OK, so here we are now. We've lost a certain amount of presence there. And, you know, opportunities and maybe some influence there. I remember a book written, this is probably 10 years ago, by a guy named Winchester, Simon Winchester, at the East West Center. And he had chapters of various areas, you know, in the Pacific, all over the Pacific. And he was trying to, you know, familiarize a reader with various historical and current events in the Pacific. And he talks about, you know, the decline of American influence. His general message was, get used to it the way it is. Sorry, that's where we are. And I would disagree with him, you know. Yeah, I mean, in some ways, you know, I mean, are we really that worried over the Pacific? Honestly, well, I think we are. I mean, I think, honestly, I think the United States has interest in the Marshall Islands, where it has the Missile Range, the Quaduland Missile Range. I think it has an interest in Palau. You know, we're doing, we're doing some defense work in Palau. The Federated States of Micronesia, not as much, but we have somewhat of an obligation maybe to the FSM for what we did in, on a wheat doc. Yeah, that was in Winchester's book. But, you know, so, you know, fast forward to yesterday, fast forward to Joe Biden's interview with 60 Minutes on the weekend. Really extraordinary statements where you're not sure that Ron Klain knew what Joe Biden was gonna say, because there was some big surprises in terms of foreign policy. And one of the surprises was the Scott, Scott, I forget his last name, the Scott Pelley. Scott Pelley asked him, well, you know, if the Chinese, you know, make inroads on Taiwan, they attack Taiwan, if they take land in Taiwan, are you going to, are you gonna, you know, put troops there? And Biden says, yes, I will, we will, we'll be there. We'll have boots on the ground. We'll have, you know, we'll have some engagement, if you will, with the Chinese, if they try to do that. And I can see the guys in the West Wing, you know, pulling their hair out on that one. I don't know if this really American policy, but that's what he said. And I think it puts us, the very statement, right or wrong, puts us in a different place. Yeah, I'm not sure how to respond to that. You know, I think, you know, this is sort of an ongoing game that we seem to be playing these days is that reporters, TV journalists seem to like to, they seem to enjoy creating circumstances where Biden is forced to say, yes, we will defend Taiwan. And then the next day, you get the White House coming back, clarifying U.S. policy, my view of what's happening. That's exactly what happened. I know, yeah, I know. And that's what I say. It's almost becoming a little bit of a game. You know, and my explanation for it is that, you know, the journalist is creating specific conditions where for Biden to say no, would mean that we aren't going to do that. And so it forces the whole issue of ambiguity, which is, of course, U.S. policy. And, you know, and it's, I'm not sure that it's very helpful because it's basically forcing him to say, yes, when the answer is supposed to be, it depends. You know, because they're giving specific instances that in fact, the ambiguity goes away. They're taking away the ambiguity and they're forcing him to answer yes or no. And then we have to remind them, but the policy itself is ambiguous. You know, and so I understand why we do this, but I think it's not very helpful in trying to deliver a message, which is what the point you're making is that this is a message that gets delivered. And it's, okay, it was, you know, it was clever the first time. The fifth time it's not so much clever anymore as just annoying to me. So there's my comment about journalists. Okay, there you go. We spoke before the show about how she and other autocrats, world leaders, autocratic leaders play to the media. They're in a conversation with the media. And, you know, I really hadn't heard put most terms, but I certainly absolutely agree. And the question is, is that an increasing phenomenon? Was that the way it was, you know, say after World War II? Was that the way it was 10 or 20 years ago? It seems to me that you could make the case that it's happening more now as the media is stronger, more focused, more consolidated, more global. And therefore you can have that conversation and you can, you know, work it to your benefit. Well, certainly the media has grown much more provocative, I think, you know, where when you go back and you look, you listen to the broadcast from World War II where the reporter, you know, is clearly delivering a very patriotic and forceful message to promote national interests. You know, I mean, those days are gone. I mean, nowadays it's about ratings, it's about, you know, can you get attention, you know, in a cacophonous world where everybody has a voice, you know, and I think, so that's part of it, I think. It's just a different environment, you know, where social media just, you know, makes everything so difficult to maintain, to stay on message, you know, and then that's part of the reason why dictators are so much more successful because their bottom line is, we're going to reduce the noise and the friction on the front end of information and try to feed it from the back end and provide that diplomatic, provide that patriotic message that way. You know, and so I think that it's something that we need to accept in an open society and it's annoying because it becomes, like I say, it almost feels like it becomes game of seeing, can you make them say that? Well, I can, can you make them say that? You know, and I mean, ultimately, that's right. I mean, you know, it's not contradictory to me. It's, I understand why he's making the statement he's making because he's being forced into a position to make that statement. And then of course, you know, you have to have somebody come and clarify, no, we're not changing policy, but you know, if you keep asking me these specific questions, I'm going to keep giving you a specific answer. You know, so anyway, so but back to the, back to the Pacific islands, you know, I think that that here's another case where the media is trying to make a little bit more out of this than there is. And of course, the United States is reacting because it sees China trying to build its influence. And we're now trying to recreate the influence that we had. And you're right. At one point, we were the only game in town for these countries. And yeah, when they see China flashing money, they say, we'd really like to get a hold of some of this because it's basically these economies are not really all that strong. You know, they've got climate change they have to deal with. They don't really have an economic base beyond fishing. And so it becomes very difficult for them to do infrastructure. And you know, the United States has been reluctant to provide that economic support. You know, there's controversy over the compacted free association. In Hawaii here, there's a lot of heartache over the compacted free association because you end up with a lot of migrants from a couple of countries in that region that are problematic for the Hawaiian welfare system. And it's again, it's a federal policy but the state really bears the brunt of the cost for that policy. So there's problems with the compacted free association with the three countries. You know, there's problems with Chinese influence. There's problems within the countries themselves. You know, the Pacific Island Forum in some ways is sort of falling apart because there's disagreement over who's going to be the secretary and can they really agree on a coherent strategy to develop the economies in that region? So it's very much a region that is unstable. There's a big problem with climate change. Obviously there's countries like Tuvalu that are predicted to be completely underwater in 10 or 15 years. So I think it's a difficult place. The American response is, well, let's put a diplomatic presence back in. But I mean, you're putting in a diplomatic presence in a country of less than 500,000 people. Is that really good use of your resources? At this point it is because that's what we're gonna do. We're bringing back a embassy to Qtibox, which, you know. So, you know, I thought it was interesting in Joe Biden's remarks when he was talking to Scott Pele over the weekend that, you know, he was whispering, you know, he was very soft-spoken and it sounded powerful. You know, Dan in no way used to do that. He would whisper, okay? So I wanna take a moment Carl and put you in the Oval Office. I'd like to, you know, put you in that soft-spoken, you know, power mode as not the senior advisor or Pacific Forum, but the senior advisor to the president or, you know, foreign policy. And I'd like to see you sit on the couch with him just as Dan in no way might years ago and whisper to him what you think our foreign policy should be with regard to all the issues that you and I've been talking about in the Pacific Islands. What should we be doing now? You can whisper your answer. I won't whisper my answer. I think whispering deals with old age. So I'll try to keep my voice up a little bit in case people get the wrong idea that I'm getting old. So, you know, I think what I would whisper is you need to recognize that these are small economies that they need attention, but they don't need overabundance of attention that we need to provide economic assistance. We need to maintain a good relationship with these countries. We need to help them develop their economies to the extent that we can't overdo it, though. We can't overplay it. We can't be overly concerned about China trying to make inroads because China can help, but we need to learn how to take advantage of Chinese help to our advantage. And I think that's where we fall short. We get so fixated on what's China doing instead of thinking, what is it that we really want from these relationships? And what we want is we want faithful partners. We want support in the U.A. And that's important to maintain our position. And we want to help these people develop their economies. And so, you know, so there's some work being done. USAID has developed a plan to work with these countries to develop the economies and bring in assistance at a level that's appropriate for these countries. And I think, you know, working on climate change is probably the biggest thing that we can do because the costs aren't that great to deal with these smaller economies, these island states. And so I think that's where we start. We work on that. We try to promote democracy and leave it at that, but don't overdo it. Don't make it strategic competition with China. Make it something that's beneficial to these countries. And if China is willing to contribute to that, great, let them do that and let us take advantage of it. Yeah, we can be good at that. So, you know, at the same time, you know, Paycom is expanding. At the same time, you know, you hear all this talk in and around the military community that we need to beef up in our position in Hawaii. And I wonder how much of that policy or any of the action quality, diplomatic action or whatever action it is in the engagement here affects Hawaii and affects the buildup of military, you know, military resources in Hawaii. Does the military care about this? Do they see this as an area where ultimately they will have responsibility? What's in their thinking right now? Well, their narrative is the narrative you started with that they see this as China's creeping influence moving down the island chain. You know, it's very much, they're military people. So of course, they think about the military aspect of it. And what I'm suggesting in my whisper is that think about the economic side of it because that's what really matters to these people. They're not interested in putting a military base in their country. They're interested in being able to sustain their economy through the resources they have, which is primarily ocean-based resources, you know, and leave it at that. And yeah, I mean, Quadjolin is important. You know, there's some room for defense cooperation with the military, you know, and I suspect that as we, you know, as we eliminate Red Hill, it's one of the areas of discussion is going to be, can we actually relocate some of that refueling capacity to this part of the Pacific? You know, those kinds of things, I think, make sense for the military, but not just a big blob of military capability, but very specific military capability that actually promotes U.S. defense interests in Asia more than in the Pacific Islands. And I think that the refueling aspect of this becomes readily apparent when you think about it that way. Yeah, and, you know, we talk about economic zones and the like, talk about the resources around these, you know, 200 miles of zone around these countries because they're countries and stuff. And two things come to mind, one is fish. It's about fishing because the Chinese, you know, are starved for fish and there's so many restrictions, you know, in the Pacific about fishing, U.S. restrictions, all kinds of restrictions, international restrictions, if they had influence, if they had the ability, you know, quality trade agreements, fishing agreements with these countries, they could fish to their heart's content and that would be a big benefit for them. The other thing, and I don't know the geography, maybe you do, you know, there's these manganese nodules out there and the manganese nodules are at the ocean bed and there's been talk about this for years about mining them because they're valuable. On the other hand, they do tend to disturb the ocean bed. So there are rather environmental issues around that. But you're right. I mean, there are business reasons to go in there, not only for China, but for us, right? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, I think that's right. And so I think that that's where we need to start, not as an afterthought. You can't let the military lead this. You have to let the economic assistance and the economic development lead and the military can follow and take advantage of the situation, but we can't let this become a military project. It has to be an economic project first and a military project second. Yeah, but it needs to be coordinated and collaborative to some degree, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so that requires actual coordination at the national level, yes. Yeah. Okay, I think that's probably good advice for Joe Biden. Okay. And we all heard you say it and I wanna say something now, Carl. Thank you. Very much. That's a powerful statement there, Jay. I hope to see you again soon, Carl. Thank you very much for joining us today. Yeah, thanks, Jay. Aloha. Thank you so much for watching Think Tech Hawaii. If you like what we do, please like us and click the subscribe button on YouTube and the follow button on Vimeo. You can also follow us on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn and donate to us at thinktechhawaii.com. Mahalo.