 I think the dominant factors in terms of the shape that Iraq's in today and the potential for stability and coherence as an Iraqi state has, frankly, only on the margins anything to do with the United States of America and what we choose to do and what we choose not to do. It has mostly to do with Iraqis. And this is my point about being rather sober, I'm not suggesting you're not, being rather suspicious of and suspect of notions that we can go to a place, the United States could go into a place like Iraq with our understanding of Iraq and all the cultural, political, geographic, historical, regional dimensions of that complex puzzle and engineer and deliver an outcome. Americans after the last 15 years ought to be damn careful about reaching that conclusion. Okay. No, I'm not suggesting that was yours. That's what we're doing now though, right? Well, no, I don't think so. I would argue that when we send 170,000 American troops to suppress an Iraqi insurgency, right, that's, we're kind of taking that on ourselves to engineer an outcome. I would argue today when we send several thousand U.S. troops in a low profile way, in a way where, you know, we probably tragically lost fewer than 10 soldiers in Iraq last year, right, where if the Iraqis don't take an action, frankly, nothing happens. That's the model that puts the burden where it belongs, which is on the Iraqi armed forces to deliver an outcome. But more important than that, more important than, you know, what comes at the end of a gun is what happens in Baghdad. So we can't want these things. We can't want an outcome. We can't design an outcome and want it more than they do. If we did, that's called colonization. And the world tried that for a generation or so, and, you know, that didn't work so well. And I'm not recommending that. So I guess what I'm after here is the point is that the indigenous, authentic Iraqi solution will be durable, whatever it is, will be durable and sustainable well beyond anything we can influence.