 I don't know where to begin with the good news or the bad news. So maybe I'll begin with the good. There is less terrorism today in Pakistan than there was last year. And there was less terrorism last year than there was the year before that. In fact, if you look at the fatalities, there was something like 7,500 in the year 2011. I'm sorry, there was 6,000 in the year 2011. And there were 7,500 in the preceding year. So there's been something like a 20% drop in the number of fatalities due to terrorism in Pakistan. The difference is also palpable. You can feel it in the cities. The barricades are fewer, they are less heavily armed, and you can get by from point to point in less time these days. It used to take me something like 30 minutes to get from my university to the center of the city last year. And now it takes me 20 minutes because the barricades are fewer. If one looks at the number of suicide bombings in Islamabad, we haven't had one since I think nearly two years now. In Lahore, there had been a number of suicide bombings, not one also I think in the last two years or so. Peshawar is not that good. There has been one in the last month or so. Of course, if one goes further away, if one looks towards Fata, the frontier province, well, there are more suicide bombings. And the fact that 6,000 people were killed in suicide attacks, bombings, and were killed by the army in the action against militants, all that is saying that things are better, but in no way can they be called good. Well, I've told you the good news. Now let me tell you the bad news. There's been a quid pro quo for this, and that has been the acceptance of the militants as being a political force. And one sees that in the last several months, there have been several major rallies in which hundreds of thousands of people have participated known as defense of Pakistan rallies. So they were held in Lahore, in Karachi, in Peshawar, in many other places in the country. At the podium were militant leaders whose names you will recognize, people like Hafiz Said of the Lashkar-e-Tayabah, renamed as Jamaat-ud-Dawah. You had on that same podium the Tehrik-e-Nsaaf, Imran Khan's party, although he did not personally appear over there. You had the famous Shia killer, Malik Ishaq, who was freed from jail after he terrorized the judges. When he was taken to court, and the charges were read out against him, he looked at one of the judges and says, I know who your children are. The judge tries to hide his face in his hands, but when he reads out the names of his children, he gives up. So Malik Ishaq today is a free man. As I go from my university towards the city, on the way is the Lal Masjid, which you have heard of as being the center of insurrection. In 2007, when they took over the children's library and they took over other government buildings and they kidnapped women who they said were prostitutes. And then they went on a rampage across the city, they burned video stores, they had massive bonfires and so forth, after which the military finally had to act. It acted after some Chinese were kidnapped from a Chinese brothel. And then, as you know, we had a major war within Islamabad. From where I was, you could see that rockets were being fired. You could see that heavy machine guns had been used. The other side, I mean not the government side, the Mullah side says that hundreds were massacred by the army. The army says only 130 or so were killed, but this is now happening within the heart of Pakistan's capital. So you might think that something big would have happened in consequence. Well, the big thing is that there was a war, there were people who were killed, but should you go buy the red moss today, you will find that it has not only been reconstructed, but it has become many times better looking than it was years ago. And moreover, you will see over there, and this I saw last week, there was a big board over there that's been there now for a few years, which says that, it says in Urdu that here is a place where peaceful Muslims were praying and the horrible animals of the government, they attacked them and destroyed peaceful Muslims, etc. Now the interesting thing is that this is happening on government land. That red mosque is government property. The Imam of that mosque is paid by the government of Pakistan. This is a mosque which was in open rebellion against the state, and yet today it exhibits a board over there saying that we fought off the state, the Pakistani state. And so the response of the state has been to not only improve that mosque but to give it land elsewhere for constructing Jamia Hafsa. What I'm trying to say is that the state has covered its shrunk before the assault of the militants. In places it has tried to accommodate them, given them a place where they can now freely speak from the podium. In other places where the militants are less amenable, they are being fought. Now what has been the cost of accommodation, of bowing before these forces that the state had earlier on been fighting against? The principal cost has come to the minorities of Pakistan who today feel especially embattled. One sees this for the Ahmadis, for the Christians, for the Hindus, but they were minorities to begin with. Now there is another minority that has been created in Pakistan. It's a big minority between 20 to 30 percent of the population and it is the Shias. Over the last several months there have been massacres of Shias carried out by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which is a banned organization but which now functions in full view of the Pakistani public. Therefore what we are seeing is the state retreating and giving more and more space for militancy to take over and for radicalism to spread. The cost of this is going to be felt not just by the Shias but eventually it will be felt by everybody because today there is a war that is not yet out in the open but which could explode and that's the war between Diobandis and Barelvis, the two major Sunni sects. Why is this happening? Well in part it's the steady radicalization of Pakistani culture, a process that started at the time of General Ziaul Haq, a process that was made permanent essentially by having school books that contain hate materials. It is also a process that at that time suited the Pakistan army very well because it was from that society radical elements could be freely drawn to pursue strategic objectives first in Kashmir and secondly to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan. Now that process although it is still intact and has not been dismantled is under some pressure. That is because those creations, those Frankensteins have turned upon their creators and so over the last several years we have had important army institutions that have been attacked and this includes the general headquarters of the Pakistan army. Three major centers of the ISI have been blown up and turned into rubble. I saw the one in Peshawar, it was actually just bricks that had been left over after a suicide bombing. We have seen the massacre of army officers as well as that of their children at the parade ground mosque and now there is a deep fear within the Pakistan army that this monster has gotten out of control. But this fear has existed for a while. Why is it that in the last year or so we have seen lessening of that fear and in fact as I said permission being granted to those people who had been earlier thought of as national security threats to now engage with the public. A good part of this reason comes again from strategic imperatives. As the Americans prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, Pakistan now sees a new opportunity that is opening up over there and is not willing to forego that. That is one reason. I am not sure it is the most important reason but it is an important reason. A second reason is the deterioration in ties between the United States and Pakistan. As we well know and in fact public polls have shown this, the most unpopular country in Pakistan is not India as it once used to be. It is the United States. Particularly after Osama bin Laden and then after the Salala incident in which 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed by NATO forces, relations have plummeted and you could say that there is almost a hysteria against the United States in Pakistan. Now responding to that, the army leadership, General Kehanyi and earlier General Pasha has been replaced, have now realized the temperature that lies in the ranks below and not very far below even in the officer's core and so therefore they know that they cannot now secretly support drone strikes as they had earlier. Obviously they are worried, after all we see from WikiLeaks and looks pretty genuine that General Pasha was worried about the Taliban taking over Kabul. We don't know but it is quite credible that that should be the case. What is perfectly credible is that those WikiLeaks reports which were leaked showed that the army high command had asked the Americans for more drone strikes because they after all do see the Taliban Pakistan and other elements of the Taliban as being genuinely dangerous for them. Let me speak to you about the danger to the army. It is absolutely something that possesses them. Today our army officers do not dare to wear their uniforms in public. Once upon a time it used to be that they could walk into a store, into a shop, into a business and people would get up to salute them. They would come in in their uniforms. In fact if you had a problem and you knew an army officer you would say can you come with me? I have a problem over there and your problem would be resolved. Today they cannot get out of their bases, out of their homes wearing their uniforms. No longer do they go in official army cars. They have private cars with these guys' numbers. Now that has been the cost and so the army genuinely has been at war with a fraction of the militants. And yet in its state of extreme confusion it cannot take firm action where action needs to be taken. Running with the hairs, hunting with the hounds, that was the earlier philosophy. It's still there in part. The Americans have made it more difficult after Osama bin Laden to pursue that policy of strategic duplicity but there is no clarity. There is fear in the upper army leadership and there is a strong anti-American pro-Islamic sentiment in the ranks below. I'll end over here and say that things don't look good. Once again we see that strategic imperatives are taking over as the priority instead of domestic peace but this has frightful consequences for the future. If men like Malik Ishaq who are advertised, self-acclaimed Shia killers, if men like Hafiz Saeed, many others who I could name are allowed to go before the public and be presented as genuine political forces, well then one needs to fear. Thank you.