 Thank you very much. It's really a pleasure to be here and to participate in this conference. I appreciate the invitation and the chance to talk about these issues. I hope that given how thoroughly Ben has been covered so many definitional issues in the first session, and if he knows that there won't be too much repetition. But there may be a little bit just as I stick to my script to some extent here. So my name is David Simon. I'm the Director of Genocide Studies Program at Yale, which I founded 25 years ago. And I'm going to talk about the constructs of genocide, the way in which, it's really about the way in which we think about genocide. And my argument is basically that the way we think about this idea of genocide, let me back that up, keep the word idea out of it for a second, the way we think about genocide influences what we do about genocide. And what I'd like to do is sort of trace that, the way we think about it, over the decades of some extent, through some major phases. I thought perhaps a shorter title might be constructing genocide, that might be asking someone if I was supposed to deconstruct genocide. That's not my department at all. I'm a political scientist by the way. So yeah, I run away as soon as I start. This is talking about deconstruction. The second sort of autobiographical note, my own area of research aside from genocide generally is Rwanda genocide. I'm not going to speak about Rwanda all that much. But as Rwanda happy to contain questions about Rwanda particularly, perhaps as they pertain to some of the comparative cases, Rwanda will make sort of a key but really just cameo appearance as a pivot in my survey of the construction of genocide. I got this to what I thought was appropriate. Okay, so the outline of this is three phases really. The first is to address how genocide started out as an idea. That's why I wanted to back out the word idea earlier. How it starts as an idea and becomes defined as a crime. And then in a second phase how that notion of genocide as a crime evolves into one genocide as a process. And the distinctions here are not. They are not continents apart. They're sort of neighboring countries. They mean overlapping countries with a disputed border. But they make a difference. And then finally I'd like to sort of think about what some of the issues that remain with post-criminal, but beyond the criminal sense of genocide and what issues remain and what value might come from bringing it back to the realm of an idea. Okay, so let me move on. Originally the history of an idea, it starts with Raphael Lentgen who's been mentioned a couple of times, a couple of times here. His idea adopted out. This actually comes from a small archive maintained at Yale because Lentgen taught and served as a researcher at Yale shortly after the past of the genocide he mentioned where he tried to write the first comparative, the first book on comparative genocide. He's never completed, I believe, and published later in fragments. For Lentgen, Lentgen was motivated in part by hearing Churchill describe from Lentgen's diaries. He heard Churchill describe the treatment of the Jews as a crime without a name. So part of what Lentgen wanted to do was put a name on the crime, literally come up with the word, the word genocide is doom, creation, extermination had been used, annihilation had been used. But Lentgen thought that what was going on to the Jews of Europe and what had happened to the Armenians in Anatolia in 1915, he thought that it was something more than just mass murder, and this speaks to an earlier extent. But what Lentgen found most distressing or most problematic about the episodes was not just the loss of life, granted that was problematic to say the least. But there was a measure of social destruction, this is a great one of these reasons, that was occurring as well. The fact that what he viewed is that he saw a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundation of life of a national group, and that that involved the interference in not just the physical existence of a group, but its political, social, cultural, economic, biological, religious, and ethical, or its moral existence, as well as the process that involves the evidence of the destruction of all of those. So it's not just the people, it's not just the killing of a loss of life, it's the killing, it's the destruction of everything that that group, as a group, was creating how they existed. It wasn't just the destruction of the extermination of the Jews of Europe, and what he sometimes looked like in his family, but it was the elimination of Jewish culture and Jewish life in Europe that was part of this crime that deserved the name. So the way of life, beyond life and simply life itself, was something that if there was going to be a word genocide, a word to describe this crime, we would have to address that function. Now, Lenny was also a lawyer, so he was motivated by this idea, but it was also this idea that something was going on beyond mass killing, but he was also, he channeled that motivation, he channeled his efforts into creating, defining the crime. And so the first part of the story is one about how the idea became a crime. I don't have that idea, but the outcome of genocide went from this idea of something that's going on to the crime of genocide. And it's primarily through the process of creating one of the very first things that the United Nations succeeded in doing was passing the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. So Lenkin himself may be the one who brings genocide initially into the legal sphere only, although that wasn't his long-term vision for it, but he also necessarily brought it there. He defined the crime and then he led the effort through his own literally timeless and personal lobbying with the help of others, of course, about the halls of the fledgling United Nations to bring about this convention. And it's almost, it's certainly a legal term. We've read or even been quoted from the genocide convention. Article one simply says, the contracts and parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in peace or war, is a crime. It doesn't get more declarative than that than in speaking towards my article two, defines the elements of genocide, which has been quoted a couple of times already this afternoon, so hopefully to go off. And at article three describes the acts, committing genocide itself, conspiracy, direct and public excitement, attempts to commit genocide and complicit the injustice and further elaboration of what it means for genocide to be a crime. There are 19 articles in the Genocide Convention as it stands commonly called. The first three do these real heavy lifting in terms of saying, hey, this is a crime. The next four, I guess just sort of, it's like maybe minor lifting, but they expand and talk about the punishment of the crime, what's necessary, who can adjudicate this crime. And that's something that is necessary to criminal cover. This is sort of logistics of what a crime is. You can't hear a crime, no sense defining a crime, particularly an international one, if there's no jurisdiction or process for punishment. Article eight, I'll come back to it in just a second, but we need to come back to that in a second. Article nine talks about interpretation disputes. Article 10 talks about the languages of the convention itself. Most of the rest of the articles deal with how the convention itself, it comes into being or falls out of being or becomes fermented. Article eight is the one that stands out, because it's the only one that doesn't talk about some prime and conventional sense of a legal code, of the word state, a US legal code that defines murder doesn't talk about how you stop murder before it happens. The genocide convention is a little bit different in that it has article eight, which reads, any contracting party may call upon competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide. Now, what I challenge my students when I teach a class on mass atrocity global politics is, what does that mean? Or I'll give them a whole convention and say, what is the duty to prevent? What is the specific duty to prevent? And it's not very clear there. A contracting party may call upon, but I think it sounds optional. So that the author of the memo, that Zine mentioned earlier, that she was wrong, actually. It doesn't compel you to do anything. There's still, by the text of the convention, a sort of a voluntary standpoint. What's more, the convention, as well as other articles about punishment, provides no guidance on what happens in a contracting party does not call upon the competent organs of New York to take an action as suggested here. So there's no punishment for not exercising article eight. It's sort of guidance. And I think this sort of plays out in the way that, on my hand, it's interesting that it's in there. Article eight is what makes this convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide instead of just the invention and punishment of genocide. And it's different, as I suggested, from an ordinary legal code in that this convention language is in there. But it's not given any teeth. And I think the, as a result, it tends essentially to be ignored for most of the rest of the, not the rest, but for the necessary decades, the rest of the Cold War, which breaks out roughly at the same time with genocide conduction becomes law-affected. Some of the initial debates between and debates within the UN system between the Soviet Union and the U.S. were over whether or not this genocide convention could be used as a tool to discredit the other in each other's sort of domestic affairs. Could it be used to score points in this new international forum that is the United Nations? There was a group led by the, led by the NAACP that produced a document in the U.S. called Recharge Genocide, arguing that the systematic lynching of black Americans in the American South were just continuing into the 40s that that constituted, that met the definition of genocide under Article 2. And Eleanor Roosevelt and others tried to push it, trying to deflate that and repress that document. It never received any government hearing within the United States and was sort of steered away from other countries. In fact, part of the story was trying to give France a lawyer in France to raise the issue and the U.S. denied visas to the activists who were going to bring this case and scheduled to prevent it in France to try to advance that cost. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, there was persecution of all sorts of national minorities that could have been considered, at least through an interpretation of a document that really had been interpreted by lawyers around the world, much of what the Soviet Union was doing in terms of deportations and exiles and lulans could meet some elements of the Genocide Convention. But by the time, by the mid-50s, the decision was sort of, let's not use this for those domestic matters. Let's think of the Genocide Convention as a product of a post-World War II concern that reflects the concern over the Holocaust in an effort to make sure the Holocaust doesn't happen again. Genocide refers to what the Germans were doing during World War II when we, the Americans, we, the Soviets, we other Europeans were trying to stop them. And that was a reasonable sort of detente. And it meant that on these domestic matters, Article VIII was really not invoked in any serious way, in any consequential way until the end of the Cold War, not just internally, but externally as well. So meanwhile, what that led, I think, in terms of thinking about genocide, was really to add, partially a debate, a debate inspired to some extent by those, the internal politics, political debates of the Soviet Union and the USA in the 1950s, to extend the debate about what should or should not be covered by the genocide. Should it include political groups? Would a better version include other classes of protection, economic groups? And in a way, what that means is that genocide studies such as it was was essentially a kind of legal exercise that happened over faculty lunches, entertaining the idea of what might be tweaked, what might be the implications of the convention as it is written now, and what would be a better way if we could do it all over again. And Lentgen, to come back to him after succeeding in helping him to get the genocide invention passed, went back into academia, including in Allen, and he started to write this comparative volume on genocides that would go back into the age of... We went back to the age of antiquity, not quite as far back. He did go from that far back. And draw numerous comparative cases. He never finished it, he died in 1959, and I would argue that for the next couple of decades no one really picked up on that argument. Genocide is an idea as opposed to genocide as a crime. We have to wait a while. Check my notes here, sorry. The age is catching up to me, and I need my votes. But the other side, the international side, there's a decision not to use it internally during the Cold War. That was met with the decision not to use it externally as well. So as a result, during the Cold War, there were mass murders that fairly clearly, just to go back to Lenkin's idea, at least involve the effort to exterminate, to eliminate a social group of some sort. In at least Indonesia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Guatemala, probably another half dozen cases with smaller death tolls that basically escaped the interest of the United Nations of the Security Council because there was no precedent, no willingness of any side to pick it up and say, this genocide convention to be passed is something with teeth. And so as a result, a lot of those cases that I just mentioned went unexamined honestly until Ben and a few of his colleagues showed up in Cambodia in 1980, and began to say, well, let's look at at least one of these cases. A bit of an exaggeration, but on major platforms, there really isn't in the 60s and 70s much in the way of comparative genocide at all, and therefore much in the way of consideration what's actually going on in genocide as opposed to is this something that we can take to a court and give a trial to. So the next phase, though, begins, I think in the 80s, with where there is a willingness to move beyond the crime construct of genocide, to start thinking about genocide as a process. I sort of, to back in the envelope about inspirations for this, include the movement within social science, to start looking at the correlates of war, the sort of idea that war could be studied scientifically, and I'm sure you're all more familiar than I am with a lot of this work, but the people on the war project by the ICRC is a non-government and the correlates of war out of the University of Maryland that pioneered that suggests that we can look at mass violence, large-scale violence, whether it's from a war or violence against civilians, which is actually less than a focus in the correlates of the war, but it's still there, it's still a correlate. That could be studied. Fred Stanton, who also actually happens to be a Yale law graduate, as well as a little bit of a theme there, and had worked with Ben Cambodia in the 1980s briefly. He sort of took, what I would say, the correlates of war process and sort of social science lens, to some extent, to try to develop a theory of genocide, or a paradigm of genocide, a new concept of genocide, recognizing that genocide is something of a process, a political process that it has what he viewed as stages. So it's not just the execution of something identifiable that matches the Article II or III of the Convention. But rather, there are anterior plans, there are precursors, there are stages that we can recognize as likely to lead to mass atrocities. And I think this broadly reflects social science, the movement of social sciences into the study of conflict, generally in new ways, in the 80s and 90s, in history, I might add, as well in history, it was there for longer, as a social scientist, I won't necessarily speak for them. But it also brings to, I would argue, brings some life into the prospect that genocide is something that can be prevented. In a way, it's the execution of Article VIII of the Convention. Because when it's just a point of thinking of genocide as a crime, deciding whether or not to prosecute, the question is not really one of prevention. It's an ex-post-question. But prevention is ex-antic. And if you're thinking about stages as Stanton and other social scientists did, then prevention becomes back into the, comes back into play. And this is one point where I would say that Rolanda plays a major role. Because Rolanda, what happened in Rolanda in 1994 was inarguably a crime violation of the genocide convention of 1948. There's just simply no way you could be at all familiar with the facts and debate that. But what was debatable and what was obvious and what did haunt President Clinton and many others, Kofi and I for years afterwards is the fact that that it happened and they, the UN and the US did actually, did nothing about it, did less than nothing, did worse than nothing. There were troops in Rolanda in April of 1994. The US led an effort to push the UN to withdraw those troops from Rolanda, the opposite of intervention, running away from that from that conflict. And after the fact it was clearly the wrong answer. But that therefore pushed on the floor this question of okay, so a genocide is happening, what are you supposed to do? What does article 8 mean? What does article 8 compel one to do? What are the processes by which the legal is institutional processes by which article 8 might matter? But also, what are the processes that we can identify in a country somewhere in the world that might lead us to say, hey, here's a case where perhaps we can prevent genocide. And that really we didn't have a precedent before Rolanda and Bosnia and Germanizo within a year after that. So that by 1999 when it looks like we got Bosnia 2.0, Serbia 2.0 and Kosovo, there is a prevention plan, a swing into action with much controversy and whatnot that had not been, it was literally not I think it can be fathomable, it wasn't fathomed just five years early with respect to the law. Okay, so let me take a quick look now as we shift over to the ways in which genocide was thought of as a process. Just take a look at Stanton's 10 stages. I'm just going to click them all up here because I don't meet well on any one of them in particular, just to sort of show the way which a process or genocide as a process would look like to at least one theorist. I would say a certainly very influential theorist. A lot of literature that I've read about genocide is around the world particularly in the sort of consciousness-raising maybe not as much academic literature but policy literature will make a reference to Stanton's 10 stages and say that we have to raise an alarm because we're at stage five or we're at stage seven in some particular case. So what I'd like to do is think a little bit more critically about the construct and highlight I think some of the strengths and weaknesses. The strengths I think I sort of emphasized already which is that viewing the the key strength is that moving from primary process allows for some consideration of of prevention. If you think of it as a process you can think of where you can intercede in the process rather than merely respond afterwards. In terms of the way it is set up one of the things that it doesn't just animate article eight it also animates article three where conspiracy to commit genocide incitement to commit genocide are listed as crimes and they are also listed as or within some of the stages that Stan describes. So the other advantage of this from a criminal prosecution standpoint is that you recognize the process made as a process aids intervention and also aids prosecution for seeing these other areas in which crime might be committed short of mass killing as well as helping to recognize or create a theory of intent or expanding on the theory of intent. If there is a pattern you can show this pattern that these sets of actions of say dehumanization sorry I was trying to say I didn't know if I heard a little red light I'm not going to worry about a little red light dehumanization prosecution they are all parts of the this this that's right and just to catch up to where it was so and honestly it's a matter of academic matter we can start to understand where genocides come from whether or not we want to understand that or prevention that said I think that there are some some weaknesses in the stage model one of which is that there's a sort of seed of the pants looking at the learning from the last genocide of nature to which is to say that that's sort of familiar with with Cambodia but he wrote the stages I believe after his experience of working in the State Department and trying to set up a tribunal for Rwanda and my impression is that he's drawing primarily on sort of the parallels between Rwanda and the Holocaust with some some of his experiences from Cambodia as well and trying to create this model the problem with that I think is that the every genocide is different you're all familiar with the the danger of fighting the last war if you do play war fighting plans I think preventing the last genocide is a similar construct and so there's a little bit of that to be played there oops so one has to recognize that every genocide is different some of these stages might not be there they might not be followed successfully and beyond that there's not really actually that clear guideline for what one wants to do with an intervention finally it's hard to recognize it's hard to say I think there's a sort of false implication for the stage theory that there's a beginning when none of these stages are present and an end when it's all happened although the addition of stage 10 denials sort of suggests that it does it does carry on but that's I'm going to say it all I'm trying to speak a little bit here but there's also a it's an issue for risk-based analysis as well there's another version I think of the process the process I think so the risk-based is set up I primarily refer to the Barbara Harves theory that as Ian mentioned earlier which was influential in creating the framework of analysis for the UN which is devised by the Office of the Special Advisor to Genocide and it's since been provided for the responsibility to protect again there are in this case 14 risk factors 10 of which pertain to 8 of which are said to pertain to all mass atrocities to more of which pertain specifically to genocide this approach I think is an improvement to some extent over the stage theory it separates notionally one item from the next there's an explicit mention they're not meant to be sequential they all sort of carry equal weight there's a nice a division between them that that there's both context and structure involved in these agency and institutions to the risks of genocide it's based on a fundamental premise that genocide is not form and a vacuum it's just happening but it's planned and not necessarily through steps but through this combination of context and structure what's more the factors themselves are fairly generic but they are they also are connected to a series of indicators I think 97 in total on the run ended up that it may be a little bit too much of the sort of U.N. approach to ordering the world but on the other hand it does give a little bit of guidance to what one might be or what one might be looking for here the waitresses however still still remain at the same time but you want to emphasize this as well that the risk factors non-stages sort of emphasize that there's a possibility for resilience beyond just prevention from the outside but responding to risks internally I think comes into a sharp focus of the possibility when the process is framed as risks that combine structure and agency. As a matter of weaknesses in the 97 indicators that should be staged but there is still something of implication of sequence even if the effort in the writing around it is to say that I'm not necessarily sequential. With 97 indicators though I think there is a risk of false positives and the danger of crying wolf to say there's a high risk in cases X, Y and Z and no genocide so in case Q if there's a risk we shouldn't be all that all that alarmed there's a little less focus on agency when we add the context that something may be lost there particularly when it comes around the prosecution if we all say it's context that everything is institutions then the agents might not matter as much. But I think the biggest problem maybe and this is common to both versions of the Stage 3 risk analysis risk factor analysis is that something has lost at the end or something is not quite recovered in terms of Lenkin's original view of genocide as an idea which is to say I think this is particularly important as looking at the back end of genocide. Because genocide, one of the things that I think that we as international activists, policymakers and scholars are having a hard time with in terms of understanding and modeling genocide is in what happens when genocide is over or strictly speaking how genocide never really ends. That the ideas of genocide, the goal of social destruction in that Lenkin sense tends to persist whether it's expressed through denial, whether it's expressed through the maintenance of internal displacement camps and the prevention of people returning to their homeland the struggles over repatriation the maintenance of cultural discrimination even in the sort of North American in the long-duray of North American policies towards American Indians one can say that the genocide that has happened has in a sense continued as long as it's not recognized in a certain way it's not just a matter of denial but a matter of thinking of genocide as an idea is something that endures so my call is for to recognize that genocide doesn't just end I think to do that we have to go back to that idea of the genocide is an idea that it's a very powerful idea possessed by its architects and promulgated to its followers and once it's promulgated, once it's out there it's a it's a genius, particularly hard to get that into the model and the risk of taking up even more time I'm going to stop right there thank you how far back can you take this and so I find the frame is we can start with Cicero because it's the unfortunate reality of the genocide that I mentioned and the question that Ellen, if you want to stop killing, you're going to have to kill some people to stop killing and so the question becomes what is the role of the force against the force so what I wanted to do today was take a look at we talk about decision-guided conditions a lot in the last five years and how those words be on the issues from policy leaders and words are really, really important and I'll give you this example about 130 years ago when we were available to set them up the outside can get killed to one day on the way to the party the outside, the outside I hear the last week you met Ion in a small field he boxed your ears he pulled your beard and he spat on your boots what do you have to say to this that's the God for a minute and then he replied I'm not so sure I would call it a small field it was more like one or perhaps just a matter words, how they understood it how the employee are really, really important now you've worked with pictures worth a thousand words today we're in and doing visual things everybody has a visual box and they're very, very young with them unless your government like me and you can swipe up but if a picture is worth a thousand words to some people I would argue that a picture is actually missing a thousand words and when we want to say something really important we lay it down what four words go with that picture now lots of words went to the left lots of words went to the right but in this case the picture, the context tells you what the words already were and for those of you that have proposed to us we know you wrote this job you wrote the letter to the father or at least you should have and went through all those things that helped you get those words exactly, perfectly right now words though are the tools the ultimate tool that distinguishes humans from animals you know E. L. Wilson believe it or not from the other side of Alabama we don't like to mention that especially this time of year but he pioneered the study of dance he could learn more about dance dance communicate they work in teams they use tools they do not speak they do not write and they don't do this so defining the words that provide a cognitive context for human action is really like words reflect they represent ideas and things to be understood we want to find the right word to describe a thing and thus languages will be able to really go into words or expressions with a better capture and idea anyone who has ever tried to be German knows that Haider is the symptom and not an outlier so we have words like this Rogina, the original Greek or Modus which means a word or a thought it can also be written in context in words as they are spoken if you are familiar with the Old Testament this is the Hebrew word for wisdom it shows up 222 times ok if you go and look at that you will see that every time it shows up it is used in a slightly different context because the people who wrote that were trying to break them precisely to find exactly what the wisdom is one of my favorite, Mondorst which is, you can tell by all the funny lines and books, obviously the folks that stands for smartness or insight or wisdom and because it wouldn't be an academic presentation with any German word of course we have master's studies which means comprehension but also insight or grasp, appreciation or even surprisingly for Germans and sympathy so precision counts and we have to be really really precise in these words, we've heard three people talk before me talk about precision, wrangling and arguing back and forth so what I wanted to do again was, this is from the Tao Te Ching I do not speak but like 15 words of Chinese so I'm going to only do this but this comes from the Tao Te Ching the gentleman, the common language of Confucius says the beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right name well the problem is what do you call something if it doesn't have it a hundred years ago or just I didn't insist the concept of war crimes was always slowly starting to emerge in a few periods of the room as you saw, I was here in Victoria they all saw certain utility of war and let's be clear by war they meant brutal war in which the losing force of them put the sword and slay the lemon, rate and kill and their children also were sold to the slayers for the education and conversion into a culture and she changed from a lot of trouble weapons to kinetic weapons to a very fire and a radius of effect expanded men had the ability to organically increase the number of people they could kill in the time and space the concepts of the war struggled to keep pace with this that extermination was an idea and it was an action and final policy was nothing new we only need to look at the Old Testament the concept of heaven and the Old Testament the story was solved to see that we've been there before loudly you've already heard of great events when I won't waste too much time on it but Rafael was getting a much larger part of this gap for us the story of these two men is extraordinary if you have not yet read East West Street I suggest you use it so straight away two school boys who lived but whichever one you want to pronounce it they attended the same schools they shared with the professor of the sermon groups they both escaped the calamity and went over to and they developed two guiding pillars of legal thought with these new concepts so Lincoln the gentleman on the left in the word genocide which focused on the killing of the groups the first lot of them came up with the concept of crimes against humanity which focused on killing of individuals with less emphasis although not all ignoring the group affiliation now neither of them drew these words or concepts out of thin air they were smart, well educated men they were informed by centuries of history of the human condition so when I think when we use these words today we should treat them with the almost sacred respect that they deserve but this was not a new word like selfing or a tweet storm but very carefully constructed sets of ideas captured in the four words genocide and crimes against humanity now it's a popular misperception the words were commonly associated with mass killing of those who were in World War II in fact as the means and bodes of killing increased from the full amount of wars to the Paris in 1870 and then of the poor author and the Red Hoodly and the Arbas who were done the words started to keep pace with the technological concentration of our power but a few examples of which Lincoln had to deal with in the 1950s or 2002 had to be cleansing and you want to hear from the Deep South Andrew Jacksonvalues the Greek Indians the Sino-Overworld the invasion of war without the right to watch the DC like why US and Indian policy in the West especially after 1876 reservations and some of you are telling others concentration camp, all right? Look at what we, the United States, and the American West, and the rest of South Africa. You start to see their ideas and concepts around there that you have to look like a right-name call. And just because the word didn't exist, doesn't mean crime wasn't permitted. And when we take a look at that, we have to bring out, it's been said before, what I was saying in public. The Ottoman government, the Armenians in 1950, there's concentration, there's ethnic cleansing, there's mass killings, of all people identified as the members of a certain group, and have the word existed, and there have certainly been views by Henry Orkin about how it was desperate to get into the fact that Washington didn't see it. So what do you call, then, the extermination of millions of Jewish people who were in the war too? Well, some scholars believe that the word holocaust is the catchphrase, and that's amazing. They took two brief words and sort of matched them together, okay? And the idea is that you have a completely burning sacrifice, or a sacrifice to burn and it isn't all fair to look at it. But if you read your mind, you'll realize this kind of analogy is so lagging. The problem is, the sacrifices meant to be willing. And although some Jewish leadership councils were forced to make horrible, so-called choices about deportation and other matters, there was nothing, nothing in that process. And therefore, it cannot be considered as a sacrifice, as such, in the term holocaust, when you want to fix it. I don't speak Hebrew like everyone you speak so, so I'm not going to try to pronounce this, but the idea here is in a huge tradition, is that a burnt offering is something that's entirely burned, consumed by fire. Whereas a sacrifice is purposely partially burnt upon the altar, and the rest of it is being shared in the altar, as the faithful drug here to God. This concept is mentioned 280 times in the Old Testament. So there's a race between wisdom and the sacrifice of offering, and the ancients are trying to figure out in a very, very clear and precise manner. It is if that were not enough, at least two works in the war period mentioned the holocaust, also the context of the ancient side. And their references as early as 1142 to a holocaust when the French came in the 7th. How John Milton mentions holocaust in Simon and Agonisties in 1671, and that famous libertarian Karl Marx mentions the holocaust in 1860. So what are we to do? So show also not a perfect work. It needs chromatic improvement. And this is what Jewish scholars believe most accurate data are not perfect. They're traced to a totality of the extermination campaign that I did in September before, just like people already mentioned a few minutes ago by Dr. Simon. Now at the same time this was going on, on the other side of the equation, the Germans, as well as the Soviets, later the malice, later on the holocaust and the holocaust and the holocaust, they're also trying to emphasize the benefits. And they let me say these things for three reasons. The first is that they're trying to make sure there's a replacement of policy to delineate actions and organizational responsibilities across the agencies of the Third Reich in the case of that subject. The second was to ensure adherence to the rules and laws as written by the legal structures of the Third Reich. The Germans need all kinds of linguistic leaps and verbal gymnastics to ensure practice and match between the two policies. And if you never get behind such stupid reports, the last time I went through I stopped at 25 different ways of saying pay attention in your arms. The third injectable of this was at the same time to precisely delineate that it was also to obscure and obfuscate them. It was, if you will, a policy to hide the policy. And if you've ever had a chance to visit Auschwitz, if you look very carefully, especially when you're on a summit, you'll notice, if you look out here, there are concentrative ratings of trees, barriers, and borders, and mountains. And I will list there, which were obscure of what was happening around the territory because now it's a special zone inside a special camp, inside a larger special zone. So these things actually can exist at the same time. Now, a few minutes ago, thankfully, you heard a great, exquisite description of the stages of genocide. You can see through his eloquent explanation how important the words are to this stage and how they took to provide a toolbox, even though for jurors and policy makers, to call things from their own names. The naming of these stages is important. It's not merely an academic exercise that has significant policy implementation and implications. So, at the risk of a trail and someone else's ground, let's use Roland as a keystone in using the right words, okay? This is what I call dancing with the bell and jibber. Now, we know from the actual documents of the Clinton administration, they knew that genocide was taking place. A legendary direction of the president and administration personnel were low to use the so-called jibber. Instead, they made a public reference to who was engaged in widespread and systemic killing. But they were quick to also note that the RPF, unlike government forces, did not appear to have convention, they even convention-defying the genocidal process, try saying that three times faster. Other phrases include the genocidal axe. Yet again, on the 28th of April, this was roughly three weeks after it begins, all right, the course spokesperson is up there and she's asked whether or not it was happening or not. It's a genocide, a shinspondence. The use of the term genocide has a very precise legal meaning. Although it's not certainly a legal determination, there are other factors there as well. We know, though, that time she made those comments that it was already classified in her own documents, she had probably said, this is a fact, a genocide. Two days later, not to be outdone, last week, in the US for this, the U.S. Security Council passes a resolution in favor of the killing, but purposely omits the word genocide. On May 11th, this is one of my favorites, this sounds very traditional, it's asked. Mike Currie is asked, has this government been able to determine whether any acts committed in the war and this is able to assess the constitution of genocide? He answers, I don't know that they have made any legal determination on that, not sure that they was or that, but you see that working against her out. A week later, the Security Council resolution says acts of genocide may have been committed. Mike and Currie a few days later, once again, I'm voting. As asked, has the administration yet come to any decisions on whether it could be genocide? It is genocide. He answers, I'll have to confess, I don't know the answer to that, but I will get back to you my no time consideration. Certainly though, things constituting acts of genocide have, and finally, please pardon me for my bad French word, but at least it is false. On June 10th, the State Department briefing, now Mike and Currie goes away, Porter C. Shelly goes back out and she's asked, well just how many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide? She responds, well that's just a question I am not in a position to answer. And a two-figure follow-up, well, is it true you have specific guidance not to use the word genocide in isolation, but always to preface it with these words acts of, but that's something for a moment. Now, what we do know is that if you apply the animal to a Frank America, I'm going to point you out. These things are made able to call things by their names, place proactive policies, present options to senior leaders. They help us to recognize all of the things that tend to take place inside these, along with the spectrum, if you will. There's fewer words here than 97, but you see the idea of trying to boil it down to things that people can recognize that you can get from the policy and everything, et cetera. These actions almost always take place in a wider context of war. And while these words are a part of the scholars, the shame is a great, a great play of that point in the morning with this, where the idea is that the policy must be limited and converted to hard-pressed action. And so rather than spend until midnight going through all the phases of that action, I'm just going to focus on two parts here, and then we'll get to the questions of that. The first is deterrence. We've got data with force packages. We have flexible deterrent options. We have all kinds of things, but they only work at the perpetrator leadership. It's an event that they are going to be affected in disrupting their actions and in their time lines. One of the most troubling nuances of this film is that the more probable a threat of an energy in force to more electric perpetrators are sort of self-requited, so it's to present if I believe, before mass violence is terminated. Thus, the challenge is to keep the plan secret until everything's in place, across all agencies or organizations and lines of effort, so that at the time and place that announcement of a possible intervention action, the time to commit to those operations is fast and possible. This algorithm degrades the potential efficacy of threats in the first place, so a more nuanced approach is to start planning all the plumbing policy to include public diplomacy and strategic messaging, making it visibly reinforced by both capability and capacity. And by capability, the example we're really talking about is credibility, who here's raised any teenagers have. Okay, the rest of you have to look forward to it, but there's a teenager, all they relax if they believe the threat is credibility. Some of you look young enough to have recently been teenagers, but you know, when you say, if you do this, this is going to happen, whatever it takes, you would better back that up, because otherwise you're gonna back up the next red line and the next red line, and then the next thing you know, they've wrecked the car and drinking the party. Now this is happening to me and my friends and my children, but my first story's not how this goes, so you have to have credibility. And so this exists in the minds of the authority of audiences, and you heard a zee talk about the elites and the elites of the elites. Usually we're talking about how we use and there's sub-structures of the later decision makers, they have to believe that the one and the potential intervention force is both capable and willing to use force, deadly force to stop killers, protecting the assist, project armed power, and also fight not only in self defense, but it's part of the organized, active defense of those that need to defend themselves. Admiring the problem does not solve the problem. And one example we can use when we take a look at this is, if you take a look at the rainbow late piece of the words in 1994, if you take a look at the date of the words in 1895, I'm not a first scholar, but what I'm told is when you translate them back and forth, the words are almost exactly the same. The difference is, the rainbow late is backed up by a French aircraft carrier and French paratroopers. Dayton is backed up by US Marines, multiple American aircraft carriers. The eight second area were, in other words, there's a difference in credibility and what they call credibility count. The words, the concepts, the ideas, the maps, the inputs, all very similar. The differences in credibility of the force. So the difference is not the words, but the deploying force packages and the perceptions of the regional actors as to which their force, their commanders and their national leaders represent them more than before. Now I like to call the 1990s the decade of descriptions and definitions, or at least the attempts to do so. If you just run off the table of experiences the policymakers and commanders went through, from Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, from Sarajevo, Kosovo, East Timor, and others, these all created the shared experiences of the recognition of the concept of responsibility to protect them. And here again the words and the concepts of the territory are vital. And they must be understood by all parties as part of the shared understanding. Otherwise all of these words and concepts end up as what I call importance of an action. So we're talking about prevention and punishment. It goes back to the idea of credibility, political will, et cetera. Okay? To some, provision is nothing more than nine of those corollaries. Punishment sounds like a punitive, a neocolonialism. So when we look at color one, that responsibility of the state to protect its populations from mass atrocities, what word is missing from that? Or citizenhood is missing because as you heard the zine talk about, if they could put the word citizen in there, then you strip people of their citizenship and go for the problem with the marketing system. If pillar two, the international community, has the responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this mandate. Well this has a curious word in the system. If you live in the Congo, if the Belgians come to assist you, that probably doesn't go over so well. If you live in Indonesia, when the Japanese come to assist you, that probably doesn't go over so well either. This word carries on what we know baggage and new places around the world. It erases the iphones of the modern right movement, providing alleged attention to human negotiations. What one nation may see as assistance, another may see as over to coercion. And finally this leads us to pillar three, which is chaff full of nuts and trunks of words that you can play. The international community must be prepared to pay appropriate and decisive collective action in accordance with, in which order, the word to be picked by politicians. So let's take a tease, these are those words out just for a brief moment. The international community, more often than the passenger, can you tell me what the cell phone number of the email address is from that one? All right, what this really means is six countries. Australia, China, Russia, France, the UK, the US. Six countries who can actually deploy, employ and sustain expeditionary operations in austere environments. Well, ironically enough, how many of those sit in P5? So you start to see what the world actually looks like very quickly. Must be prepared, what does that mean? Who puts the personnel, the policies and the resources against these requirements? And none of these are free. Appropriate and decisive action. Go back to that example, raising teenagers. What's appropriate and decisive? I know it is my household, it's always decisive if we can discuss appropriate later, but I usually get some feedback, especially from under the sun, so I don't know how that's appropriate. But at least when we look at that, you see the word action there, you think, okay, correct, we've got an action where we need to go with that. Well, the problem is, is that one organization that's holding a press conference in Cairo is an action. Another organization that thinks that a few Facebook messages telling the bad people to stop that is an action. Somebody else thinks that the problem is that they need to take pictures is an action. All the participants see these words as appropriate and decisive in action, but they see them through their own awareness industry. National leaders of the global state see them differently too. And of course, with the UN Charter, it pleads for the presence of a barrister and for them. And finally, in order to protect populations, I've been led to continue to have a true contribution, and I'm going to say, hold that front, or let me call back to my capital and see if that's how they interpret that. And that's not the end of the way out between you and me. So it's important that we remember that one man's intervention is another man's invitation. At a certain point of over, the deliberations will not conclude at a certain culminated that it's time by the Fisher company. The employee force will stand back and observe. But the data is a new problem and it's what I call the living effect. So the 20th Simply Bros. Phrase never again, the living effect is, in the 21st century, never again with the United Nations and Security Council Department thought I'd authorize a transaction. The living effect ensures that it will be even harder to obtain consensus for human sexual operations on the yards of people who are in the future and it unfortunately strengthens the office of an action authority. So the real challenge is this. We start with Cicero perhaps we should end up there as well, 2000 years later. And Cicero's role is the legacy of Selentic drama, the laws of silence and the presence of force. Timing is critical. What I like to do is break this down into three decision spaces. All right, because you're making the decision to go to war. It may not be Okinawa. It may not be Stalker. But to the people who are there, it's every bit as quality and as violent as any world that you've ever read about in history. And Tom Nichols is here today but I'd like to publicly thank him for giving us some ideas to think about this last bit here. So if we look at this, I've lined the pillars up here. The pillar one you can think of is sort of being preventative. Okay? Where you're trying to think, hey, this might happen at some point in the future. But even though we have increasingly complex capable models, analytics, and tools, remember those 97 contributing factors? It's really hard to know exactly how those legs are stacked up. And the information you're making is really hard to justify and prove that this is not so much innovation as it is a protective intervention under the power of the pillars one to two. If we move to the middle, okay, maybe we're starting to get a little bit hot in the middle of this, right? Okay, so now we're at preemptive. Here we think we know what is about to happen. We're closer to commencement or perhaps the acceleration of the genocide or mass killing. Preemptive in the era of large scale wars with massive mobilizations that was eased. For the days of mass communications, it's harder than ever, although not possible. You know, to look back in the hiding site and see what this was happening, we know that we talked about the documents that the Clinton administration had telling them that they wanted to tenderize. They could easily ignite. In 1998, at least one person in the Pentagon predicted to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs that the Serbs would attack Kosovo following a spring and the intervention force position to sell it and they sell it and they kill it. Another person in 2003 on the sit-count predicted that at some point, the new aside would convince a ruthless campaign that it would least equal power and kill large numbers of people just to prove that he was at least as ruthless as his father. And yet, even with that, with preventive, it is still hard to convince leaders, commanders, and public opinion of what we're trying to do. Other requirements to do this are the R-2P killer scene or even killer scene architecture, which leads us to be active on the far-right side here. This is the easiest to respond to, but at the highest risk of failure measured in state during the slaughter. Once a mass-killing operation begins, especially in today's hypersensitive, hyperlinked information environment, it's pretty hard to hide that crossing scene behind it. The best scenario might be East Timor, Sierra Leone's outpost, or by the Brits, or operation provided out of the blood by the U.S. and Obamagrack in 1991. Where national leaders saw what was happening and quickly intervened with enough force to stop the further killing. Conversely, the leaders who were considering initiating a mass atrocity of operations to intervene in them will realize that time is not on their side. Those who are committing mass atrocities, mass criminals, and genocide will also realize that time is not on their side. So the closer you get to initiating the intervention, the more likely they are to assault you faster. Thus, while preventive and preemptive may be in benign and less contested environments, the reactive forces are employing into a non-permissive, hostile-operating environment in the middle of a murderous manner. Well, I figured that I've gone long enough to take too much of the time. Okay, but I thought I would try to bring you at least as many answers as possible. If I failed at that, I'd venture down the questions I'm sorry I didn't hear more answers to. It's easy to deliberate definitions here. It's hard to do it in a human and an adult's power, and it's even harder to do it in the muscle and the mind that doesn't fly so far without force. But if we go back to Gail Wilson, we want to distinguish ourselves from the answer and we must carefully define these actions and employ policies that will employ effective forces. The words that make sense in a diplomatic press conference on the powerpoint briefing slide may be of very little use to the 28-year-old company commander who has no more force to achieve those objectives. Abyssin precision in words is impossible to expect in precision operations.