 Welcome to what the app is going on in Latin America and the Caribbean, a popular resistance broadcast in partnership with Black Alliance for Peace, Haiti, America's team. Code Pink, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Common Frontiers, Friends of Latin America, Interreligious Task Force on Central America, Massachusetts Peace Action, and Task Force on the Americas. We broadcast every Thursday, 7.30pm Eastern right here on YouTube Live, simultaneously on three YouTube channels, excuse me, Code Pink, Common Front, ConvoCouch, and Popular Resistance. Post broadcast recordings can be found at Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. So everyone, today I'm really happy to have a personal friend and wonderful journalist from Venezuela join us. Ricardo Vaz, he is a political analyst and editor at Venezuela Analysis. He is going to be joining us live from Caracas for this episode and before I have him join the conversation. Let me give all of you a bit of background as to what we're going to be talking about in this episode. So here we go. And I will also add, I guess I should just tell you what I'm going to share with you is actually from an article published in Venezuela Analysis this week, and I will be sure to have that link in the program notes for all of you. So here's a bit of background. Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro traveled to Brazil as part of an official visit to meet with his counterpart, Lula de Silva, where the pair discussed regional and international cooperation, including the potential entry of Venezuela into the BRICS block. This is the financial block of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The high level meeting comes as part of joint efforts to strengthen their bilateral ties, following the restoration of diplomatic and economic relations, after years of tension under Lula's predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, who embraced Washington's regime change plots against Maduro and backed the so-called interim government of opposition figure one, Guaido Mondays bilateral meeting also focused on reactivating trade between the two countries, which fell precipitously after Bolsonaro's recognition of Guaido severely impacting populations on both sides of the Lula-Brasil border. The pair also discussed efforts to advance regional integration. Regional integration, as the audience knows, is a recurrent theme throughout Latin America and the Caribbean in the last several years. So welcome Ricardo. Wonderful to have you with us. Finally, as you said before, we've been live teacher and you're wondering when Venezuela now says we're going to come on the show. So here you are and I'm so thankful you had time to join us and just again for the audience, Ricardo's joining us live from Caracas for this episode. So we're really pleased to have you with us. So maybe we should start with the historical context of this meeting, give the audience a bit of background as to why Mondays meeting was so incredibly exciting and significant. Not just for Brazil and Venezuela, but for the region as a whole and perhaps the global south as a whole. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, first of all, thanks for the invitation. We are big fans of the podcast and we're thrilled to finally be here. We hope. We're big fans of Venezuela. And also great to see. I mean, we're used to seeing each other in Caracas. I think this is the first time we do. Yeah, it's true. It's great. So to give a bit of, let's say, near past context and then distant past context. It's very tempting to say that this is the end of the plan to isolate Venezuela, we might have declared it a few times in the recent past. I mean, just to make a quick recap, Venezuela was turned into a bit of a pariah state by these efforts led by the United States, of course. They weren't nearly they weren't ever close to reaching its goal, which was to ultimately oust the Maduro government, but it actually did succeed in kind of isolating Venezuela in the international arena. Venezuela wasn't exactly, I mean, the Maduro government was exactly replaced by this, you know, make believe the, by the quote unquote interim government because, you know, in multiple multilateral forums, they weren't just going to allow for this kind of circus. I mean, I think the OAS was the only exception. But then gradually as this interim government became more and more of a farce, more countries started to realize that, you know, there was no reason to continue playing along. And so step by step, there's a kind of diplomatic re-entry of Venezuela in the global arena. We're talking about Maduro trips abroad. I wrote them down. So I don't remember. So I don't forget. The first one was in September 2021. And this was very controversial, controversial for the corporate media because Maduro went to this select summit in Mexico. And, but they're actually welcome to this kind of confrontation. I remember that the presidents of Uruguay and Paraguay thought this was their chance to kind of, you know, please there. Oh, and they did. They were very across the table. Just because we're in this room together doesn't mean we support you. And Maduro said, you know, I mean, if you want to, if you want to debate, just set the time and place, I'm welcome to do it. So he was really spreading, spreading his diplomatic wings. Of course, Maduro, we should remember was Chavez's foreign minister for a long time. So he's no, no foreigner quote unquote to these, to these kinds of settings. It's great that you reiterate to all of us that Maduro was Chavez's foreign minister because in the United States, we, he has consistently referred to as a bus driver, which he was a labor organizer. But it's rarely if ever mentioned that he served as foreign minister, which is significant. It's a significant omission and it's a significant, you know, part of his resume. Yeah, it's significant. And it's not innocent, right. I mean, it's part of the picture that these authors want to paint about Maduro. So then the next significant step I would say, mid last year, you'll remember very well there was this, let's say less than successful summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, where there was this whole controversy of whether Cuban Venezuela and Nicaragua were going to be invited or not in the end, Biden just stuck to this hard line position. And it led to the summit being boycotted by a lot of other regional leaders, including, you know, perhaps the highest profile was Mexico's AMLO who didn't show up. So simultaneously with the summit of the Americas, Maduro went on a tour that had stops in Algeria, Iran, Turkey, Gulf countries. And this was his way of showing that, you know, maybe Biden will not invite him, but that does not mean that, you know, I'm not recognized in another place. And here we're talking about countries that have significance, significance when we're talking about the global energy markets and, and all that. Then a few months later, Maduro went to COP 27, the summit in Egypt, which isn't the most, I mean, I'm going to be a bit politically incorrect. I mean, like most United Nations initiatives, it's not the most useful thing in the world. But for Maduro, it was because it actually showed him on his on this first global stage. And there was you remember this highly choreographed handshake with Emmanuel Macron of France in the hallway. And this was perhaps the first time where he was face to face with an European leader who had publicly hosted Guaido in the past. So it was kind of, let's say an elegant way for Macron to kind of resume normal diplomacy and abandon the previous fantasy. Then there was kind of between them. And now the most significant development was Petro's election in Brazil, in Colombia. And, and he was very swift in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela and reopening the border in returning monomers, which is an agrochemical producer that had been seized by the Colombian government was returned to the Venezuelan state, and then he came to Caracas if I'm not mistaken in November last year. And then finally, we got to this point, just a few days ago when Maduro visited Brazil, and he was hosted by by Lula da Silva. It's pretty significant that Maduro met with Lula on Monday. And then on Tuesday, there was a summit of South American presidents, which we'll also touch on, which is very interesting, which is actually a few hours ago published a piece on that on Venezuela now. But actually, Maduro was the only one who was hosted one by one, one on one by Lula the day before. So this was this kind of ceiling, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Maduro and Lula between Brazil and Venezuela. They had been broken, as you mentioned in the intro, under the Bolsonaro government who decided for, you know, we know, we know why and decided to back this kind of entering government. There has been kind of a slow and steady road that has led Venezuela back into international affairs. I wouldn't say it depends on what we mean by isolationism. So the isolation, the isolationism is over in the sense of there being governments that somehow assume that Maduro is not the president, the legitimate president of Venezuela. So that that conversation is over. I mean, let's not waste any more time on that. But if we're talking about, we have to tell Spain that. Actually, actually, not even Spain. Just two or three weeks ago, Venezuela announced a new ambassador in Spain and she was, she handed her credentials to the Spanish government. It wasn't highly publicized because of course it's a bit of an embarrassment. But even Spain, even Uruguay, who just now decided again to take the microphone and criticize Lula for hosting Maduro, they've also sent a new ambassador to Venezuela. So whether it's public or kept hush, hush, basically the jig is up. So in terms of international relations, there's really nothing more to talk about. But there's still a nice selection when we talk about sanctions, right? And Venezuela's ability to develop international trade or get foreign investment, which is very significant, right? I mean, it's not just a matter of recognition. And I guess we can talk about that in more detail. But to your point, what you mentioned in the beginning, the historical background. Chavez, I mean, he had many virtues, but one of them was really pushing for regional integration. And this is highly connected to his idea that this was a Bolivarian revolution and inheriting what had been the independent struggle led by Bolivar. And Bolivar was perhaps ahead of his time envisioning a united continent that would be stronger to face what at the time wasn't as big a threat as it is now. But you know, this empire in the United States that wasn't so consolidated at the time, but it already had some early signs. But Simon Bolivar saw it coming. He saw the westward expansion and the potential threat. Yes, he has this very ominous quote that the United States is destined to plague Latin America in the name of liberty. A few hours ago, there was the first seminar of a series organized by Aldo Moig Nientus and the number of other collectives as a campaign that's called Bolivarianism against Monroeism. Oh, I'll put that link in the notes. Yeah. Because we touched on that we did an episode the audience may remember we did an episode mid April, actually with Carlos wrong from the Simone Bolivar Institute about the Monroe Doctrine and we did specifically talk briefly about Monroeism versus Bolivarism, but a full seminar on that would it would be really fabulous. Yeah, so so so Chavez saw that you know, given the recent history when he was elected I mean this second half of the century where Latin America was plagued by military dictatorships and coups and then neoliberalism, and no single country could really face the imperialism on its own I mean we had the example of Cuba that had resisted against this mighty empire right next door, but to a great cost. And so regional unity would actually present a greater platform to resist imperialist meddling and then to boost the kind of sovereign development. And so we had a lot of different initiatives. Each of them had different perspective and its own merits. We can talk about select, which is more of a diplomatic forum there's there was Alba, which was created as an immediate response to the the after free trade agreement of the Americas that was sounded rejected to George Bush's face in Argentina. And then there's the river which is, I mean, in my opinion at least a really wonderful initiative here in the Caribbean, to really help these small island nations break away from the their dependence on the United States so this provided oil and fuel in very favorable conditions, sometimes in barter agreements. And it was, I mean it's one of the reasons why childhood is so beloved in the Caribbean and especially in countries like like Haiti, and then I left. And I would like to thank UNASUR for last, because UNASUR is perhaps the most broad reaching initiative of them all in fact I would actually recommend. Last year in November, you know, after after Lula came to power and it was clear that there was really a new push for for integration into works. And along he was courier foreign minister in Ecuador. He wrote a paper on on separate the Center for Economic and Policy Research, arguing that relaunching UNASUR is really an important step for for the region. So I would recommend that people I can send a link if you want to put it in the description. There was a letter written by several former presidents and former foreign ministers, really arguing for taking taking up this this initiative that was created in 2008 and there was a charter signed in 2011. It was the one that had the broader reach in terms of economic trade agreements security diplomacy of course, but it also had some mechanisms that led to it becoming neutralized and then progressively dismantle I mean the decision taking mechanisms were always by consensus. As soon as this right in government starts to take power in the region. They just threw a, you know, spanner in the works and neutralize UNASUR and then gradually even withdrew from from UNASUR. So now we're actually, I think it was actually been sold. Has it not been? Yeah, this was very, very disgraceful step by the infamous Lenin Moreno, who got rid of the beautiful UNASUR headquarters in in Keto, but but step by step. He saw first the Argentine and Brazil almost simultaneously declare their desire to or their decision to rejoin UNASUR and just a couple of days ago Gustavo Petro said the same from Colombia he also suggested changing the name I didn't really get why he needed to make such a suggestion that I guess it's within within his rights. So, after Lula met with Maduro just just to finish and I'll hand the word back to him. There was a summit of this presidency in in Brazilian. And what I liked about it is that it wasn't just this kind of open ended statements that we see all the time when there's when there are these international issues. So Lula was very, was very clear and said you know we need a new roadmap for integration in the next 120 days so four months. And this actually suggests that something is already in the works, and it's going to be brought forward by the country, the different countries, foreign ministers, and hopefully in the near future we'll see what it's all about. I actually highlight a couple of things that Lula and the other president said, in terms of, you know, putting integration above ideological differences I think this is quite interesting, because I mean, we all have our political leanings. There are more socialists and some are less socialist, but even for governments in the center right as long as they are not just, you know, playing us surrogates, they will recognize that it's in their benefit to have strong regional ties. So creating trade mechanisms, for example, that are not so easily dismantled is to everyone's benefit. So I guess one of the triumphs of this meeting was actually getting everyone on the same page to do so. And something that people really like, because of its implications, and something that Lula has harped on very consistently, and Maduro as well and others is having a different currency mechanism we're not really sure what it would look like for regional trade to kind of take away from the hegemony of the US dollar and when we're talking about why sanctions are so hurtful and so deadly it's precisely because countries are dependent on the US dollar. Yeah, it's been weaponized. The US dollar's been weaponized and that, you know, when that, I think most of the audience knows this, but once you're locked out of trading or changing your domestic currency into US dollars to change globally, there's not much that you can do and you're also also shut out of the swift banking system which is the overnight exchange system it's how banks move money around at the close of business. And those two things alone and then I mean and then just gets more and more strict and more and more expansive the sanctions regime but, but the dollar as the global currency as the dominant global currency has been turned into a weapon of warfare. And the Cubans know that more than anyone, the Iranians, Venezuela, Nicaragua now to and about 30 other countries on the planet. Yeah, indeed, I mean, when we talk when we talk about the sanctions, I'll focus on Venezuela which is the case and more and more familiar with when we talk about the how the sanctions have worked. They've worked on different levels but one of them is what what you were just saying you know, blocking the country from accessing this usual hegemonic trade mechanisms, the swift system and so on. And so then it becomes an item to do even the simplest thing so you know, let's say the Ministry of the Ministry of Health wants to import vaccines and even if it has the money. Then it's a problem it has to triangulate with some other bank this bank may just decide that doesn't want the risk and you know freeze the payment for three months and then Venezuela doesn't get the vaccines doesn't get the money back. It actually happened I'm not making this up. Yes, it happened with the COVID-19. We've talked about this on this program. It happened with Yvonne Hughes actually when he was in Europe before he became foreign minister. Well, it also happened with insulin shipments and also all sorts of things food shipments as well. So it makes this kind of current, you know, daily trading activities much, much more difficult. Once you impose primary sanctions directly so saying, you know, every US agent who deals with the Venezuela state or company or any other state entity will be face will face punishment will have its assets freeze frozen in the US. So it becomes a problem because many trade has become so globalized that it's very uncommon for, you know, big companies to not have interests here or there so even if they don't. They're there and secondary sanctions so for a while, I hope I hope it's not too big a detour, but for a while after sanctions were imposed Venezuela was trading its oil by Rosnef so it would sell its cargo to Rosnef at the discount of course, and then Yes, partly owned by the Russian state, and then Rosnef would resell them with resell the cargoes on the global market and then the US Treasury Department both secondary sanctions against Rosnef, which had to pull out and became much more difficult so it forces the Venezuelan state to find this network of private intermediaries. This of course creates avenues for I'm not just saying but it creates avenues for corruption we just recently saw a corruption scandal, unfailing in the oil industry. So it hurts the, it's hurt Venezuela in a in a myriad of ways. And so having different Just makes trade so much more expensive. Precisely. It just added expense alone. Exactly. So, you know, Venezuela, if you want, if you want to sell an oil cargo to the China, you know, here are two non US agents and and you have all these mechanisms that stop them from trading directly with each other so it has to sell to an intermediary that has to do a ship to ship transfer relayable the oil in Malaysia and then it finally gets to China so a barrel that would be sold $500 Venezuela ends up getting $40 on the barrel or even having to do some kind of barter agreement that will yield, even less but I mean you might get the money for the oil but then you can you cannot use it to import food so you might as well do it directly so it's it's kind of a straight jacket on on the Venezuelan economy that has left very little room for maneuver to for the for the Maduro government, you know, not to say that it's not justifying everything that is done but but this is the reality. This is the scenario in which it has to operate. So having alternative trade mechanisms trading ecosystems will be to the benefit, not just of sanctioned countries and even private even private companies in sanctioned countries, but also to other countries so that they can operate without these looming threat that they are going to be target for dealing with someone who has been blacklisted I mean the US is basically committed what what it was trying to solve it's actually done the inverse is forcing people Latin America specifically to find an alternative to the US banking system to the US dollar. And so with this meeting, these two meetings Monday and Tuesday, we earlier in the year there was a meeting between Argentina and Brazil and they had talked about creating their own currency to trade with each other. Is this an expansion of that conversation to find it to create a regional currency or in addition to. Yeah, I think it's more more like they are parallel plans. So I don't think it makes sense for Brazil and Argentina to wait for kind of continental setup before setting up their own but they trade a lot with each other and Argentina has, let's say it's so unfair it's so unfair share of economic difficulties and there's a big strain on its foreign reserves, they have the weight of this disastrous loan from the IMF. So the, that the prior president took. Yes, talk about leaving an unhelpful present for for the Fernandez government and for the Fernandez government has not really found the way to deal with it. So, you know, having a way to deal with Brazil, which I guess, I'm guessing it's, if not the largest one of its largest trading partners, in a way that does not put a strain on its foreign reserves will be to Argentina's benefit so I expect that to actually move more quickly than something I mean, of course then once you have that infrastructure you can try to expand it. Exactly. It'd be like the prototype. Exactly like you have a model that you can then expand. There was there was another meeting. I think shortly after that Brazil, Argentina meeting which was between Brazil and China. And they also floated the possibility of trading, not necessarily in a, in a new currency but in their own currency so that, and it probably means exchanging some part of their respective foreign reserves and then trade directly in Chinese yuan and Brazilian real So skipping the skipping the dollar US dollar interchange. Skipping the the imperialist middleman. So, so it's a, I mean, and we're just talking about life in American, but in other regions of the world in the Middle East, for example, and when we talk about the energy markets, you know, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia, which is a big oil exporter to China as well. There have been discussions of, you know, moving away from from the US dollar which have been setting off all sorts of alarm bells in Washington DC. And to the other point about Venezuela joining the the bricks Alliance. I don't see it as a kind of an imminent scenario, but we should understand what it means. You know, it's not. It's a, of course, a very important diplomatic setup diplomatic forum. And if we understand as a counterweight to the G seven, you know, US and Europe dominated, but perhaps the most significant asset which is very attractive to countries like Venezuela is that the bricks are going to have their own development bank. And we were just talking about the, sorry, the delicate state of the Venezuelan economy, and having access to financial, you know, credit mechanisms outside of the let's say US dominated financial system and not not even the IMF I mean we're talking about the data, the Inter American Development Bank and stuff like that. All of that is very heavily under the influence of Washington so having a different source of financing that will allow again the government to plan a bit longer because right now it's kind of in a permanent emergency mode, you know, how do we pay next month's wages how do we get this next cargo exported. So having some breathing room to again, you know, address significant infrastructure issues, you know, plan plan more in the long term, you know, restart credit for agricultural producers stuff like that. So the allure of of joining the bricks you know beyond giving away to this kind of multi polarity effort. It's just, it's a strong, it's a strong message to the quote unquote international community, the West, that there's so many countries now, particularly in the global south that are interested in joining bricks and publicly saying that in the US, and that alone is creating a narrative, you know, a really strong one and so now to have Maduro mentioned the same earlier in the week it's like well there's one more, you know. Yeah, not not not only they mentioned it but he was also I mean Lula was, you know, expressed his favorable opinion in that regard. I think it goes to show kind of a clash between development models I think when we talk about when we talk about the US influence in the world and the alternatives and of course the biggest one is the Chinese one and China has investments and cooperation agreements all around the world I'm not going to romanticize what the West means of course it also has its issues, but it does not cause the kind of political strain and the political blackmail that we're usually associate with the you know the IMF and the World Bank. And when we talk about countries in the global south in Latin America or in Africa. So, in that regard, it shouldn't really be a surprise that countries want to look for the most favorable, you know, development cooperation, what have you trade mechanism that they can access is clear that this will be outside the sphere of influence of the US and to a lesser extent, the European Union. What perhaps this tells us on a more global context is that there's a real reduction of the projection of US power worldwide. There are plenty of examples I mean we shouldn't really go into Afghanistan and all that plenty of examples that show that this era of unipolarity the end of history all of that that came after the fall of the Berlin wall. This era is over so the US cannot just impose its will and you know change government as it pleases. So there are now other actors around the world which might not be as powerful to directly challenge the West by themselves, but they are powerful enough to understand and create alternative development and trading and diplomatic routes that you know inevitably will challenge Washington to Germany. Well, you know this is this is really to me I think that that's key and this is one of the things that's so important I think as we watch this integration of Latin America and the Caribbean become more articulated and and seeing it actually unfold. As each nation steps up and says, here's what we want here's you know the national sovereignty we want to protect the national, the natural resource sovereignty we want to protect we want our own economic model. As, as each one stands up more stand up I mean there is I mean you can just see there there really is this strength being created among among the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean I know you know we did a an episode on the select summit from September of 2021 here in Mexico City. Really, it really was on those call that that that needed to happen and you can just really see it, you know, every day unfolding unfolding unfolding. And, and it's very, it's encouraging and of course other people will say well, yes, but this is also when the US becomes the most aggressive when when Latin America starts liberating itself. We saw that during plan condor in and in the 80s as well specifically in Central America. Yeah, I was just going to mention that it's not like the US is going to take this sitting down so these countries and we as you know journalists activists, we should be prepared prepared for for the reaction and we see, for example when it comes to sanctions that there's not really softening US sanctions, rather the US is seeing how it can continue to use this, these weapons to kind of blackmail, not just the Venezuelan government but also Cuba and Nicaragua and even third parties. So when we when we talk about the advantages of of integration. I remember that in late 2020. We used to track an oil for food agreement with a couple of Mexican companies, and then these were targeted by Washington and this this swap deal had to be mixed. But as you create this kind of stronger ecosystem for trading in in the continent, I mean, one of the things that Maduro mentioned was reactivating. The biggest source of Venezuelan energy which is the guru dam is very close to the border with Brazil, and it used to supply electricity to Roraima which is the northern most state of Brazil in along the border with Venezuela and Maduro mentioned. You know a lot of people don't know that that Venezuela provides electricity to that part of Brazil. Venezuela's electricity struggles have also meant electricity struggles in this province of Brazil, which is, you know, in the Amazon and very hard to reach and to do significant infrastructure work. And I said, you know, if Brazil, Brazil, you know, as either its government or private actors are ready to bring the investment we can reactivate this electricity supply to to Roraima. So this is a case of, you know, Brazilian companies are not forbidden for doing this right, but there's nothing in the US Treasury sanctions that says they cannot do it. But they might be reluctant to do it. If they fear they're going to be targeted by by US sanctions. So if there's a, let's say, an atmosphere. That's what we call that overcompliance. Of compliance, precisely. So, so agents that are not necessarily doing anything wrong quote unquote, not if not that it will be wrong in the first place but they fear, they fear being targeted. So if there's an atmosphere where you know here you have the Brazilian government directly backing these kinds of deals, they might be more inclined to do it to do them and it will be to their benefit. I mean, it will be to the benefit of the region to have this this kind of electricity supply reactivated so just that's just one example of how things can change so there might not be a change to the sanctions policy. But there might be a change to the US's ability to enforce them. So whereas, maybe three years ago when Venezuela was more isolated, the US Treasury Department would be more confident to just go after some Brazilian companies. Now it might be more difficult. It might really hurt them in the long run to do so. It might actually push the Brazil towards the, you know, quote unquote, the arms of China. But it changes the little by little changes the equation all together and puts them in. I mean, I hope people will forgive me for centering everything on myself. That's why you're here. And other target nations in the in a better position to kind of circumvent sanctions get more room to maneuver and hopefully kickstart their own condoms. It's all, it's also encouraging. And I think maybe let's talk a little bit specifically about the Brazilian president's vision Lula da Silva, back in office. His vision. I mean he's basically re embraced Brazil's role as an international player. And, and he's quite good at that. And he's rapidly embraced that role again back in the presidency and I, you know, and like you said earlier he's immediately. Well, not not as immediate as Petro, but pretty fast recognized, re established diplomatic relations with Venezuela, overtly recognized Maduro as the democratically elected president of Venezuela, and, you know, has just set the stage. This is the dialogue we're going to have. These are the countries that make up Latin America and the press and the Caribbean. These are their respected elected presidents. And that's, that's, that's a big deal for for So specifically being the largest country in the America in South America that that's a huge step for him, not and it's not just a message to Latin America and the Caribbean it's a message to the entire hemisphere and to enter the rest of the world. Yeah, absolutely. I mean this article that I was mentioning by Guillaume Long in the beginning when he was talking about UNASUR, he made it very clear that you know regional integration efforts historically have been driven by Brazil. And it's not, it's not it's not coincidence I mean this is the largest economy the largest country in the region so it makes it makes perfect sense. And as you were saying it's actually very encouraging to see Lula embrace embrace that role and actually waste no time I mean he just got into there are always these these arguments that you know we shouldn't pick too many fights at once, but he has decided you know, life's too short. He knew, I mean he was very aware of what happened in just a few years between you know, not not him living office but the coup against Dilma, just the damage that the single term of someone like Bolsonaro can do. There's no time to waste and so that's that's why he says you know 120 days. Let's get this done let's get this moving. And let's make sure that this is not so delicate so not so vulnerable to the political wings of whoever whoever is in office and not just in America I mean we're not, we don't have time to discuss this but also when it comes to Ukraine. And this has really riled up us officials that Lula is not just echoing the US line. And it's, it's funny to those of us on the outside how he just says the most perfectly reasonable things you know, you know, Russia was responding to an actual threat on its doorstep and us officials just go crazy you know how they're And the same thing here, there was this this sentence that he said when he was doing the joint press with Maduro that was picked up by by the media and then also by this, let's say opportunist presence, Uruguay and Chile as well. He said that there was a narrative created that Venezuela was somehow an authoritarian and anti democratic state. I mean, of course it's a narrative it's completely absurd there's no way you can challenge the legitimacy of the 2018 presidential election and so it was indeed a narrative created by Washington and then echoed by this very subservient media outlets that serve to justify on one hand this murderous economic sanctions and on the other this now extinct circus called interim government so it's like saying reasonable things has become has become an issue so to wrap up. It has really been a welcome site I was, let's say one of the pessimists. I came to Lula and and to another progressive governments in the region, let me explain why, because they are they're coming back to power in a more delicate, let's say global economic context than when let's say the progressive, the first progressive wave came in the 2000s. So the big question is, were the lessons of the past learned of course I mean this region was targeted by attacks from the US all the time but there were also, you know, their own mistakes that need to be seen that are setting to be done differently this time around. So the early science, both on petrol, and now especially from Lula are that the lessons have indeed been learning I was saying, no time to waste, and both of them and Lula to a greater extent because of Brazil's have been very assertive in the international skin. They have and, you know, it's really encouraging because sitting here in Mexico City, we, a lot of us really love the message that the Mexican president is sending to Latin American the Caribbean, but it's also going to be really important that he have others standing beside him and others to carry the baton. And we have elections here in Mexico next year, and, you know, for the Constitution, President can only serve for one six year term. So there's going to need to be more voices. And that seems to be happening and like we were saying earlier, you know, as each country stands up and asserts itself more and everybody is becomes, you know, one becomes more unified and it's really this desire to create a block and specifically an economic block with a sovereign currency is really encouraging, really, really encouraging. And I think it's also important, as you said earlier that there is a tendency to say among the diversity of leaders in the Pacific and the Caribbean that the domestic affairs are to each country, it's, it's elected government and its citizens, and everybody has to kind of step out of that, and work together on the on the external on the foreign policy the trade and the economic issues. And that's, I mean, that's, I don't think I've ever seen that in my lifetime in there in the region. It's really exciting. Indeed, I mean, I think in the end, they are not separate issues. When we're talking about, you know, for example, the economic, the economic aspect, because if a country is just by itself, it will trade in let's say very unfavorable conditions with the, you know, a part of like the United States or the European Union or even China. If there's a broader integration that can, for example, relieve the need to get, I don't know, inputs from the US when you can get them from Brazil and they are much cheaper. But it will gradually reduce their dependence. And if it reduces their dependency means that they can negotiate in stronger conditions. And to your point, we should actually say that I'm low was actually the first one, or the first major player who challenged the the isolation as well. So there was there was this gradual reelection of leftist progressive leaders in Latin America, so I'm like Mexico and then Alberto Fernandez in Argentina. But I'm low who was actually, you know, the closest one, you know, so close, so far from God and so close to the United States, right. So, you know, he, he, I mean, he feels the, the breath on the back of his neck. And he was the one who actually took this stance and said, you know, it makes no sense. We cannot just be picking hand picking. And he invited me to this summit. He was actually the one who gave, you know, like an electric shock to bring select back to life. It had, it hadn't gathered for a number of years, even before the four years. So, to his credit, he, I mean, his vision of, of integration is perhaps a bit more conservative than than Brazil's. When we talk about original currency and all of that, he hasn't sounded as sold on the idea of, of course, he knows, I mean, he had the map to deal, he knows the importance of, you know, finding trade mechanisms that do not subjugate countries but to his credit, he has also been one of the major actors in challenging this US hegemony, which seemed, you know, unchallenged in the continent for such a long time. Yeah, he's been, he's been very overt about it and was really, really wonderful when the, when he reconvened Salak and after it was four years, I think, Ricardo four year pause they were a part of it. And it was after he gave that really fantastic speech in July of 2021 on the 238th anniversary of Simone Bolivar's birth and pretty much laid it all out. He did a beautiful, you know, talk about Simone Bolivar, the man, the history, the vision for the Americas and it just segued beautifully into the current need to rebuild the OAS and or get rid of it and the full integration of the Americas. And he was very overt in having in inviting Maduro to attend as the elected president of Venezuela he was very, very clear about that when the invitations were extended and Diaz Pinal of Cuba, and inviting Mr. Agua, and just showing that full, full integration of elected governments in the hemisphere he was really, really clear. Excellent governments, not just the government. The government said that the people elected and not the government's appointed by the United States so so it was really pretty exciting and just to continue watching it all unfold and now with Brazil being so, so visible and vocal in the world that's really, really significant what's continuing to unfold and grow. So regarding Monday's meeting, is there anything that that we've left out that we should share with the audience that's I think we pretty much covered it, perhaps just a final final point that both presidents made you know Maduro of course always talks about, you know, sanctions and some sometimes it feels like no one wants to talk about sanctions and that means that they've gone away they are still there and they're still hampering everything that's related to Venezuela and it's day to day life I mean there's really no aspect of life here that's not hurt by sanctions and Lula was also very critical in saying that you know you cannot just impose economic sanctions on the country because you don't like its leader that's not really how it works and actually to give perhaps undeserved props to Gabriel Boric, maybe it's the first and only time it will happen on this podcast. So Boric had these very, these very opportunist comments about you know it's not it's not a narrative the human rights issues are real which is not what Lula said at all he just took it out of context to score some cheap political points, but to his credit, he said that it's a welcome site for Maduro to take part in these multilateral organizations and to discuss these things directly with him if he talked about you know the border and the migration issue, and he also said, you know, sanctions have to be lifted without any any any preconditions. So I said, I was telling someone that you know, Boric actually read the room and realized that he needed to say something a bit more along along those lines. And he did. We'll see if he changes tune next time around, but for now I think it was you know overall for for knowing who he is, it's positive. Well, more positive news for Venezuela so hopefully we'll just keep, you know, getting stronger and stronger and more and more support for it throughout the hemisphere and on the rest of the world and the meeting Monday was really really encouraging, you know, for many of us outside of Brazil and Venezuela to see it was really a very encouraging. We were happy to hear about the invitation extended to Brazil, extended from Brazil to Venezuela and then to see it actually become a reality of this really, really significant news event for the hemisphere so. So thank you, Ricardo. Is there anything that we should say in closing. I'm just so happy to have had your time today and to work with you. It was my pleasure. I'll actually take the opportunity to plug in some some Venezuelan analysis content. We actually have a, we have a sanctions booklet in the works. So we have produced a lot of content on sanctions, their consequences how they work, the media coverage around them, and also perhaps what's most dear to us is, you know, the efforts by grassroots the popular organizations to, you know, fight back, you know, to take matters into their own hands and to construct socialism from the ground up. So I think it will be a booklet that we'll hope will be available in a month or two that will have lots of great content content on sanctions that we hope will be useful for for solidarity movements. And also, if we're talking about the regional integration we have an infographic called bully pironism against Monterey's and I think someone stole our name for this campaign. And I would encourage people to do we actually need to update because we have the member countries and we need to add Brazil and Argentina. So that's one of several infographics we have been producing in recent times we have some great graphic designers working with us. So not just that we also have infographics on the economy on sanctions on the Venezuelan communes. So that's something that we also encourage I think it's a useful way to have kind of a neat and compact content content that can be easily spread on social media and other. So where can we find those infographics there on if you go to our website and you look at the section that's called images you will see the infographics that the latest one was on on sickle, which is a very important asset. That's actually facing some very important threats right now and this infographic actually retails the story of how a combination of the combination of sanctions and collusion from the Venezuelan opposition has led to this, you know, imminent imminent danger. So I will for the audience. In the program notes are social social media links for Ricardo and for Venezuelan analysis and the Venezuelan analysis website, so that you can go straight there and look under images for these infographics. And then also I've included in the program notes. The article on on this meeting earlier this week between Venezuela and Brazil. The article was actually written by Jose Luis Ronaldo's who is a reporter for Venezuelan analysis and Ricardo is an editor so in Caracas. Very happy to have you with us this evening and Ricardo will have to have you come back when your sanctions booklet is published. And definitely I would be delighted. Okay, that would that would be fabulous so let's stay in touch about that. And we can promote the booklet and, and do an educational broadcast as well be really great. So thank you again for the audience you should just know that Ricardo was a friend and I have not worked with him since we last saw each other in Venezuela so it was really really a pleasure that you could join us for this episode Ricardo and I and I hope to see you in Venezuela soon so. Yeah, pleasure was all mine great to see you. Hi, let me just remind the audience that you've been watching what the F is going on in Latin America and the Caribbean. We broadcast on YouTube live every Thursday 730pm Eastern, you can find us on the following YouTube channels the Convo couch code pink and popular resistance post broadcast recordings can be found on Apple podcast Spotify or wherever you get your podcast so thank you everyone and we will see you next week.