 It's another weekend and we at Newsflick are once again tracking the Russia-Ukraine crisis or the crisis in Western Europe or the Russia-US crisis in whatever way you want to call it. Again, major developments this week, the United States has responded to Russia's demands. There have been a number of statements surprisingly from Ukraine talking about how they don't think war is going to break out any minute as opposed to what US and even British officials have frantically been claiming over the past few months. We'll be discussing all this on this episode of Mapping Fortune. We are joined by Praveer Burkayas. So first of all, I think one of the most notable things over this week has been what seems like a very strong effort by Ukrainian officials starting with President Vladimir Zelensky to dial down this talk of war. In fact, he is commented adversely on the British and the United States withdrawing the diplomatic staff saying that this is not the Titanic, there was no need for it and other officials as well. So starting with this, in light of what the United States and Blinken especially have been doing over the past month, how do we understand what these Ukrainian officials are saying since presumably they're more cognizant of what is happening at the borders? I don't know what hysteria has whipped up essentially by the United States and the United Kingdom. None of the major European countries also participated in this particularly campaign of saying war is imminent, attacks are going to take place. Of course, the media played its role by reporting all of these claims that were being made. As all of them said that we have information, we have information was stressed by both the United States as well as the United Kingdom saying that an attack is imminent, then it becomes big news. As you know, bad news is always big news. No war is not news. That's what happens every day. So I think that was one of the things which they continuously were ratcheting up. It's difficult to understand the purpose of all of this is the war doesn't take place and then all of it is either shown to be hysteria that built up or would it be counted as a victory because Russia did not attack even whether it had an intention of attacking or not, you could claim that it's victory because we have scared them off whether this was the plan. It's very difficult to say. To me, the more important issue is that I think finally there is a more grown-up playing the game than really childish tantrums which the United States was throwing earlier about Russia saying that you have no locus. We can do what we want. We have full authority to have any agreement we want, put our missiles anywhere we want, which is really the undertone, the undergrowth of all the statements coming from the United States. I think the fact that they are now starting to address the issues that Russia has raised I think is important as a step. I think what important is the fact that now Ukraine, Germany and France, all three are engaging with Russia, independent of United States in the Normandy Contact Group discussions. Now that was set up after the Minsk Agreement and that was really to address the post-2015 war in which the Donbas region and the Ukrainian Central Government fought. And the question really was what kind of Ukraine would be there after the 2015 agreement, whether the autonomy of these regions would be recognized, to what extent they would have authority, etc. All those issues which had completely been sidelined in the last five years, six years and the only talk was about Ukraine joining NATO, Ukraine becoming a part of the European Union. All this now has taken a temporary backseat to the central issue of Ukraine, what kind of Ukraine will emerge. And that I think is a welcome shift in focus because that has been the underlying issue in Ukraine for the last 10, 15 years that we can think of. So I think that's one. I think also the European powers, particularly France and Germany, who are the two major NATO military powers, if you will, in Europe, and discounting at the moment United Kingdom, which is a naval part, but certainly it's not a land power in Europe. Germany is also not a military power in that sense. France is. So the question is, both of these are now saying, well, we have to think about Europe. It is not something which is to be subsumed under NATO. And I think that for that, I think this is a victory for Russia and Putin, who wanted to put this issue. Are you really going to subsume the entire issue of Europe under the rubric of NATO? Is it going to be NATO versus Russia? Or is there a Europe in the picture? And what are the European nations going to say about that Europe? And I think that is one issue that has at least regained centrality as also the eastward march of NATO. I think, you know, there are three things to be, which are very, very important in all of this. One is NATO versus Russia. The other is what is the future of European Union? Third is what is the future of Ukraine, particularly, as we know, the strong fascist forces in Ukraine, who we have a lot of arms and ammo nations and who also play a very important role in the politics of Ukraine. I think these are the three questions which have regained at least some centrality, rather than the only issue being Russia, Putin, bad man, bad man, attacking Ukraine, poor Ukraine, poor Ukraine, which is the sort of the chant that both the United States and the UK were raising. In this context, the other major development was that the United States finally did respond to Russia's demands. And of course, the response remains confidential. It remains under wraps. All we have is certain statements, vague statements from Russians, certain comments from the Americans and what it contained. But more importantly, the fact that the primary demands of the Russians do not seem to have been acknowledged, at least as far as Sergey Lavrov said, that the expansion of NATO itself has not really been acknowledged by the United States. So in this context, how do we sort of see this, it's a bit of a seesaw game, because while space does remain open for negotiations, without addressing the central demand, how do we see discussions going forward? And you know, NATO, of course, has this issue that if it has to admit new members, it needs Germany, France, countries of that kind, who are already members of NATO, to give the green signal. Without that, it cannot expand its numbers. So if the purpose was to break the European members, at least the leading European members, from the axis of with the United States and certain East European countries, who simply very, very anti-Russia, I think to some extent, already that has happened. So it is not just US, it is also what does European Union or countries in European Union do. And to that extent, when Germany and France did not respond to the letters that Russia had written about the Minsk Agreement, saying that you are the co-guaranteers of the agreement, what are you doing about it? This is something that Ukraine has to deliver. And you have taken responsibility for that. The fact that they had kept quiet for all these years, and suddenly that's become activated, post all of this, is an indication that NATO is no longer unified on the issue of Ukraine. And I think to that extent, is a major gain for Russia. Russia, I don't think expects United States to say that NATO will not do ABC. That's something that the United States is not going to say. But if other countries do accept that this is an issue, then automatically Ukraine's entry into NATO is going to be very difficult. And I think that's more or less now guaranteed that France and Germany are not going to accept Ukraine into NATO, at least for the foreseeable future, which is all that we can talk about. So to that extent, their purpose has been solved. And the discussions on disarmament or missiles, should there be deployment of the intermediate media trains, missiles, military exercises, all of that, they seem to have placed on the table. If you take Lavrov's response to the letters, as you said, they have not disclosed what the letters say. But if you take his response into account, it seems to indicate that these letters commit more with respect to military exercises and disposition of missiles, the kind of missiles, than what was committed by Stoltenberg in the original discussions that NATO had with the Russian side. So given that some progress on that, but the main progress is to bring back Ukraine as center stage, talk about the eastward march of NATO, and then also try and split European Union to look at its own interests and not be really a complete tale of the United States in NATO, which is what it had become. So I think this assertion of independence to some extent, the fact that Macron did ring up Putin, the fact that we have the Normandy contact group start its discussions again on the Minsk agreement, the fact that Ukraine is taking certain steps, they have also started becoming players, because let's look, Ukraine's economy was sinking, all this talk about the war went, obviously it was financially took a big hit. So all of this I think puts into question that is now the US, the sole arbiter of what happens in Europe. This I think is a big change that has happened. So I would say yes, these letters are indicative of the fact that political realities have been reshaped to some extent by what Putin has done, putting this whole thing into play that Ukraine and NATO expansion we need to discuss, this is something Russia will not accept. I think it has put all these things into play is one part, but it also seems to have reorganized the politics in some sense. And let's not forget the last part, Ukraine has a strong right wing fascist forces inside it, who are a pressure group on the Kiev administration. And Zelensky will survive if the United States and these groups want this out, that is an open question. So will it also lead to a political reorganization of Ukraine itself? Will or will Ukraine accept that it has multiple nationalities, multiple identities and address that, not make it as not make it a part of only anti Russia, which is what the fascist forces inside Ukraine would like to do. And in this Germany and France, both have serious problems because they also have a white supremacist group within France and Germany who are not exactly weak at the moment. So this for them is also a threat. So I think a lot of things we have to see in the context of what the this of these two letters, that these two letters signify a much larger shift than merely what demands have been made and how the U.S. has responded to that. And Pribyant, finally, a lot of commentators have also pointed out a series of OOSCE treaties, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. And these treaties are the role of these treaties regarding how Europe has to be shaped, how military alliances have to be decided determined, and they've been pointing these treaties out in the context of Russia's demands. So could you also maybe take us through what is the key principle in these treaties that is at play here? The key principle is that you cannot have a military agreement at the expense of another country. Your security is sacrosanct. You have the right to demand that your security should be guaranteed. But your security should not impinge on other people's security, which translated into everyday English would mean if NATO wants to expand on Russia's borders, they have to also consult Russia. That's the simple explanation in English that I would make of the treaties. There is the Astana Agreement. There is an earlier 1999 agreement which was done. So all these agreements really incorporate this fundamental and understanding, which I think was done at a time. They had hopes. Russia had hopes. They'd be recognized as a part of the European forces, and they will be able to integrate with Europe. That was the belief that they had. Don't forget, this is just 1999. It's really at the end of the Yeltsin years and before Putin really takes over. So this is the crux of the belief that both Yeltsin as well as Putin had that Russia would be recognized as a European nation, not as a defeated nation who had succumbed or really been subordinated by the United States, which is what United States saw in Russia, which is why Obama at one point said, maybe it's a regional power at best, but with the total GDP of Italy, it cannot be considered an international player. Well, Russia has shown that that assessment is wrong. So I think that part of it that Russia has now reconciled, they are not going to be part of western powers, not be recognized as part of western powers. They're now looking at a duration presence, and they have shifted their focus more to China. As far as natural gas is concerned, now Russia has the option not to sell to European Union, but to sell to China. Because China is probably a much bigger market in the future. And yes, it will have a temporary, they will take a temporary hit, but then financial flows will not be affected in long run, even if they have to sacrifice the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The effect on Germany and other European countries will be much, much bigger, particularly given the temperature in Europe right now, it's pretty cold. So they need heating, they need electricity, and both of these will be hit if, for instance, this shift takes place. I do not know about their commitments about reaching much lower greenhouse gases, all of that, that European countries will promising would be really hit, if this change takes place. As the Americans insist, anything happens, we should throw them out of the system. And therefore, we should really put sanctions on them, sanctions which they have never seen before, and that there will be kind of nuclear sanctions. Now, all of that, if we take into account, I think we will see that this Russia demand for, as Admiral Schoenbach has said, up for respect. They demand respect. I think that is the central issue at play here also, that okay, all these things are fine, but do respect us or do not as a power which is after all, which has a very strong military presence today, not only in their home, at home, but also, for instance, intervening in Syria in other places. So they have the military ability, and particularly on nuclear matters, they are at parity with the United States, they have strategic parity, the only other country in the world to have strategic parity. So I think Russia, this is really as much about respect that Russia is playing for, and the treaty they're referring to is an embodiment of those that the respect they thought was due to them out of these agreements, which they haven't got. But I think the more important part of it is this is a strategic moment. Just as 1990 was a strategic moment, which is what would be called the unipolar world, the fall of Afghanistan and what we are seeing over Ukraine is really the end of that singular moment where the United States was a sole superpower, the global hegemon. I think that era is coming to an end. And Ukraine, just as Afghanistan was a very significant landmark in that. I think Ukraine is going to be another one, where the United States finally has to recognize its rig does no longer run all over the world. Whatever it says, it cannot steamroller. And now there are other countries who collectively will decide what will happen. Thank you so much for being with me, we will be following these issues as usual on mapping pipelines. Until then, keep watching you sleep.