 Chapter 15 The News Media and the Disorders, Part 3 A recommendation to improve riot coverage. A need for better communication. A recurrent problem in the coverage of last summer's disorders was friction and lack of cooperation between police officers and working reporters. Many experienced incapable journalists complained that policemen and their commanding officers were at best apathetic and at worst overtly hostile toward reporters attempting to cover a disturbance. Policemen, on the other hand, charged that many reporters seemed to forget that the task of the police is to restore order. After considering available evidence on the subject, the commission is convinced that these conditions reflect an absence of advanced communication and planning among the people involved. We do not suggest that familiarity with the other's problems will beget total amity and cooperation. The interests of the media and the police are sometimes necessarily at variance, but we do believe that communication is a vital step toward removing the obstacles produced by ignorance, confusion, and misunderstanding of what each group is actually trying to do. Mutual Orientation. What is needed first is a series of discussions, perhaps a combination of informal gatherings and seminar-type workshops. They should encompass all ranks of the police, all levels of media employees, and a cross-section of city officials. At first these would be get-acquainted sessions to air complaints and discuss common problems. Working reporters should get to know the police who would be likely to draw duty in a disorder. Police and city officials should use the sessions for frank and candid briefings on the problems the city might face and the official plans for dealing with disturbances. Later sessions might consider procedures to facilitate the physical movement of personnel and speed the flow of accurate and complete news. Such arrangements might involve nothing more than a procedure for designating specific locations at which police officers would be available to escort a reporter into a dangerous area. In addition, policemen and reporters working together might devise better methods of identification, communication, and training. Such procedures are infinitely variable and depend on the initiative, needs, and desires of those involved. If there is no existing institution or procedure for convening such meetings, we urge the mayor or city manager to do so in every city where experience suggests the possibility of future trouble. To allay any apprehension that discussions with officials might lead to restraints on the freedom to seek out and report the news, participants in these meetings should stipulate beforehand that freedom of the press to all areas for reporters will be preserved. DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION OFFICERS It is desirable to designate and prepare a number of police officers to act as media information officers. There should be enough of these so that in the event of a disturbance a reporter will not have to seek far to find a policeman ready and able to give him information and answer questions. Officers should be of high enough rank within the police department to have ready access to information. CREATION OF AN INFORMATION CENTER A nerve center for reliable police and official government information should be planned and ready for activation when a disturbance reaches a predetermined point of intensity. Such a center might be located at police headquarters or city hall. It should be directed by an experienced high-ranking information specialist with close ties to police officials. It is imperative, of course, that all officials keep a steady flow of accurate information coming into the center. Ideally rooms would be set aside for taping and filming interviews with public officials. Local television stations might cut costs and relieve congestion by pooling some equipment at this central facility. An information center should not be thought of as replacing other news sources inside and outside the disturbance area. If anything, our studies suggest that reporters are already too closely tied to police and officials as news sources in a disorder. An information center should not be permitted to intensify this dependence. Properly conceived, however, a center can supplement on-the-spot reporting and supply news about official actions. OUT OF TOWN REPORTERS Much of the difficulty last summer apparently revolved around relations between local law-enforcement officials and out-of-town reporters. These reporters are likely to be less sensitive about preserving the image of the local community. Still, local officials serve their city badly when they ignore or impede national media representatives instead of informing them about the city and cooperating with their attempts to cover the story. City and police officials should designate liaison officers and distribute names and telephone numbers of police and other relevant officials, the place they can be found if trouble develops, and other information likely to be useful. National and other news organizations, in turn, could help matters by selecting a responsible Home Office official to act as a liaison in these cases and to be accessible by phone to local officials who encounter difficulty with on-the-spot representatives of an organization. GENERAL GUIDELINES AND CODS In some cases, if all parties involved were willing, planning sessions might lead to the consideration of more formal undertakings. These might include a. agreements on specific procedures to expedite the physical movement of men and equipment around disorder areas and back and forth through police lines, b. general guidelines on the behavior of both media and police personnel, and c. arrangements for a brief moratorium on reporting news of an incipient disturbance. The Commission stresses once again its belief that though each of these possibilities merits consideration, none should be formulated or imposed by unilateral government action. Any procedure finally adopted should be negotiated between police and media representatives and should assure both sides the flexibility needed to do their respective jobs. Acceptance of such arrangements should be frankly based on grounds of self-interest, for negotiated methods of procedure can often yield substantial benefits to each side and to the public which both serve. At the request of the Commission, the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice surveyed recent experiences with formal codes. Most of the codes studied, a. set forth in general terms common-sense standards of good journalistic conduct, and b. established procedures for a brief moratorium seldom more than thirty minutes to an hour on reporting an incipient disturbance. In its survey the Community Relations Service described and analyzed experiences with codes in eleven major cities where they are currently in force. Members of the CRS staff conducted interviews with key citizens, newsmen, city officials, and community leaders in each of the eleven cities, seeking comments on the effectiveness and practicality of the codes and guidelines used. CRS's major findings and conclusions are, all codes and guidelines now in operation are basically voluntary arrangements usually put forward by local authorities and accepted by the news media after consultation. Nowhere has an arrangement or agreement been effective that binds the news media without their assent. No one interviewed in this survey considered the code or guidelines in effect in his city as useless or harmful. CRS thought that where they were in effect the codes had a constructive impact on the local news media. Observers in some cities, however, thought the increased sense of responsibility manifested by press and television was due more to experience with riot coverage than to the existence of the codes. The more controversial and often least understood aspect of the guidelines has been provision for a brief voluntary moratorium on the reporting of news. Some kind of moratorium is specified in the codes of six cities surveyed, Chicago, Omaha, Buffalo, Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Toledo, and the moratorium was invoked last summer in Chicago and Indianapolis. In each case an effort to prevent quite minor racial incidents from escalating into more serious trouble was successful, and many thought the moratorium contributed. The confusion about a moratorium and the resulting aversion to it is unfortunate. The specific period of the delay is seldom more than thirty minutes. In practice, under today's conditions of reporting and broadcasting, this often will mean little if any delay before the full story gets into the paper or on the air. The time can be used to prepare and edit the story and to verify and assess the reports of trouble. The only loss is the banner headline or the broadcast news bulletin that is released prematurely to avoid being beaten by the competition. It is just such reflexive responses that can lead to sensationalism and inaccuracy. In cities where a moratorium is part of the code, CRS interviewers detected no discontent over its presence. The most frequent complaint about shortcomings in existing codes is that many of them do not reach the underpinnings of crisis situations. Ghetto spokesman in particular said that the emphasis in the codes, on conduct during the crisis itself, tended to lead the media to neglect reporting the underlying causes of racial tension. At the Poughkeepsie Conference with media representatives, there was considerable criticism of the Chicago Code on the grounds that their moratorium is open-ended. Once put into effect it is supposed to be maintained until the situation is under control. There were doubts about how effective this code has been in practice. The voluntary news blackout in Detroit for part of the first day of the riot, apparently at the request of officials and civil rights groups, was cited as evidence that suppression of the news of violence does not necessarily defuse a riot situation. On the basis of the CRS survey and other evidence, the commission concludes that codes are seldom harmful, often useful, but no panacea. To be of any use they must address themselves to the substance of the problems that plague relations between the press and officialdom during a disorder, but they are only one of several methods of improving those relations. Ultimately, no matter how sensitive or comprehensive a code or set of guidelines may be, efficient, accurate reporting must depend on the intelligence, judgment, and training of newsmen, police, and city officials together. Section 47 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 15. The News Media and the Disorders, Part 4. Reporting Racial Problems in the United States. A Failure to Communicate. The commission's major concern with the news media is not in riot reporting as such, but in the failure to report adequately on race relations and ghetto problems, and to bring more Negroes into journalism. Concern about this was expressed by a number of participants in our Pukipsi Conference. Disorders are only one aspect of the dilemmas and difficulties of race relations in America. In defining, explaining, and reporting this broader, more complex, and ultimately far more fundamental subject, the communications media, ironically, have failed to communicate. They have not communicated to the majority of their audience, which is white, a sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of living in the ghetto. They have not communicated to whites of feeling for the difficulties and frustrations of being a Negro in the United States. They have not shown understanding or appreciation of, and thus have not communicated, a sense of Negro culture, thought, or history. Equally important, most newspaper articles and most television programming ignore the fact that an appreciable part of their audience is black. The world that television and newspapers offer to their black audience is almost totally white, in both appearance and attitude. As we have said, our evidence shows that the so-called white press is at best mistrusted, and at worst held in contempt by many black Americans. Far too often the press acts and talks about Negroes, as if Negroes do not read the newspapers or watch television, give birth, marry, die, or go to PTA meetings. Some newspapers and stations are beginning to make efforts to fill this void, but they still have a long way to go. The absence of Negro faces and activities from the media has an effect on white audiences as well as black. If what the white American reads in the newspapers or sees on television conditions his expectation of what is ordinary and normal in the larger society, he will neither understand nor accept the black American. By failing to portray the Negro as a matter of routine and in the context of total society, the news media, have, we believe, contributed to the black-white schism in this country. When the white press does refer to Negroes and Negro problems, it frequently does so as if Negroes were not part of the audience. This is perhaps understandable in a system where whites edit and to a large extent write news, but such attitudes in an area as sensitive and inflammatory as this feed Negro alienation and intensify white prejudices. We suggest that a top editor or news director monitor his news production for a period of several weeks, taking note of how certain stories and language will affect black readers or viewers. A Negro staff member could do this easily, then the staff should be informed about the problems involved. The problems of race relations coverage go beyond incidents of white bias. Many editors and news directors plagued by shortages of staff and lack of reliable contacts and sources of information in the city have failed to recognize the significance of the urban story and to develop resources to cover it adequately. We believe that most news organizations do not have direct access to diversified news sources in the ghetto. Seldom do they have a total sense of what is going on there. Some of the blame rests on Negro leaders who do not trust the media and will not deal candidly with representatives of the white press, but the real failure rests with the news organizations themselves. They, like other elements of the white community, have ignored the ghettos for decades. Now they seek instant acceptance and cooperation. The development of good contacts, reliable information, and understanding requires more effort and time than an occasional visit by a team of reporters to do a feature on a newly discovered ghetto problem. It requires reporters permanently assigned to this beat. They must be adequately trained and supported to dig out and tell the story of a major social upheaval among the most complicated, portentous, and explosive our society has known. We believe, also, that the Negro press, manned largely by people who live and work in the ghetto, could be a particularly useful source of information and guidance about activities in the black community. Reporters and editors from Negro newspapers and radio stations should be included in any conference between media and police city representatives, and we suggest that large news organizations would do well to establish better lines of communication with their counterparts in the Negro press. In short, the news media must find ways of exploring the problems of the Negro and the ghetto more deeply and more meaningfully. To editors who say, we have run thousands of inches on the ghetto which nobody reads, and to television executives who bemoan scores of underwatch documentaries, we say, find more ways of telling this story, for it is a story you as journalists must tell, honestly, realistically, and imaginatively. It is the responsibility of the news media to tell the story of race relations in America, and with notable exceptions the media have not yet turned to the task with the wisdom, sensitivity, and expertise it demands. Negroes in Journalism The journalistic profession has been shockingly backward in seeking out, hiring, training, and promoting Negroes. Fewer than five percent of the people employed by the news business in editorial jobs in the United States today are Negroes, fewer than one percent of editors and supervisors are Negroes, and most of them work for Negro-owned organizations. The lines of various news organizations to the militant blacks are, by admission of the newsmen themselves, almost non-existent. The plaint is, we can't find qualified Negroes. But this rings hollow from an industry where only yesterday jobs were scarce and promotion unthinkable for a man whose skin was black. Even today there are virtually no Negroes in positions of editorial or executive responsibility, and there is only one Negro newsman with a nationally syndicated column. News organizations must employ enough Negroes in positions of significant responsibility to establish an effective link to Negro actions and ideas and to meet legitimate employment expectations. Tokenism, the hiring of one Negro reporter, or even two or three, is no longer enough. Negro reporters are essential, but so are Negro editors, writers, and commentators. Newspaper and television policies are, generally speaking, not set by reporters. Editorial decisions about which stories to cover and which to use are made by editors. Yet very few Negroes in this country are involved in making these decisions, because very few, if any, supervisory editorial jobs are held by Negroes. We urge the news media to do everything possible to train and promote their Negro reporters to positions where those who are qualified can contribute to and have an effect on policy decisions. It is not enough, though, as many editors have pointed out to the commission, to search for Negro journalists. Journalism is not very popular as a career for aspiring young Negroes, the starting pay is comparatively low, and it is a business which has, until recently, discouraged and rejected them. The recruitment of Negro reporters must extend beyond established journalists or those who have already formed ambitions along those lines. It must become a commitment to seek out young Negro men and women, inspire them to become and then train them as journalists. Training programs should be started at high schools and intensified at colleges. Summer vacation and part-time editorial jobs, coupled with offers of permanent employment, can awaken career plans. We believe that the news media themselves, their audiences, and the country will profit from these undertakings. For if the media are to comprehend and then to project the Negro community, they must have the help of Negroes. If the media are to report with understanding, wisdom, and sympathy on the problems of the cities and the problems of the black man, for the two are increasingly intertwined, they must employ, promote, and listen to Negro journalists. The Negro in the media. Finally, the news media must publish newspapers and produce programs that recognize the existence and activities of the Negro, both as a Negro and as part of the community. It would be a contribution of inestimable importance to race relations in the United States, simply to treat ordinary news about Negroes as news of other groups is now treated. Specifically, newspapers should integrate Negroes and Negro activities into all parts of the paper, from the news, society, and club pages to the comic strips. Television should develop programming which integrates Negroes into all aspects of televised presentations. Television is such a visible medium that some constructive steps are easy and obvious. While some of these steps are being taken, they are still largely neglected. For example, Negro reporters and performers should appear more frequently at prime time, in news broadcasts, on weather shows, in documentaries, and in advertisements. Some effort already has been made to use Negroes in television commercials. Any initial surprise at seeing a Negro selling a sponsor's product will eventually fade into routine acceptance, an attitude that white society must ultimately develop toward all Negroes. In addition to news-related programming, we think that Negroes should appear more frequently in dramatic and comedy series. Moreover, networks and local stations should present plays and other programs whose subjects are rooted in the ghetto and its problems. Institute of Urban Communications The Commission is aware that in this area, as in all other aspects of race relations, the problems are great, and it is much easier to state them than to solve them. Various pressures—competitive, financial, advertising—may impede progress toward more balanced, in-depth coverage and toward the hiring and training of more Negro personnel. Most newspapers and local television and radio stations do not have the resources or the time to keep abreast of all the technical advances, academic theories, and government programs affecting the cities and the lives of their Black inhabitants. During the course of this study, the Commission members and the staff have had many conversations with publishers, editors, broadcasters, and reporters throughout the country. The consensus appears to be that most of them would like to do much more, but simply do not have the resources for independent efforts in either training or coverage. The Commission believes that some of these problems could be resolved if there were a central organization to develop, gather, and distribute talent, resources, and information, and to keep the work of the press in this field under review. For this reason the Commission proposes the establishment of an Institute of Urban Communications on a private non-profit basis. The Institute would have neither governmental ties nor governmental authority. Its board would consist in substantial part of professional journalists, and for the rest of distinguished public figures. The staff would be made up of journalists and students of the profession. Funding would be sought initially from private foundations. Ultimately it may be hoped financial support would be forthcoming from within the profession. The Institute would be charged in the first instance with general responsibility for carrying out the media recommendations of the Commission, though as it developed a momentum and life of its own it would also gain its own view of the problems and possibilities. Initial tasks would include, one, training and education for journalists in the field of urban affairs. The Institute should organize and sponsor, on its own and in cooperation with universities and other institutions, a comprehensive range of courses, seminars, and workshops designed to give reporters, editors, and publishers the background they need to cover the urban scene. Offerings would vary in duration and intensity, from weekend conferences to grants for year-long individual study on the order of the Neiman fellowships. All levels and all kinds of news outlets should be served. A most important activity might be to assist disc jockeys and commentators on stations that address themselves especially to the Negro community. Particularly important would be sessions of a month or more for seasoned reporters and editors comparable to middle management seminars or mid-career training in other callings. The press must have all of the intellectual resources and background to give adequate coverage to the city and the ghetto. It should be the first duty of the Institute to see that this is provided. Two. Recruitment, training, and placement of Negro journalists. The scarcity of Negroes in responsible news jobs intensifies the difficulties of communicating the reality of the contemporary American city to white newspaper and television audiences. The special viewpoint of the Negro who has lived through these problems and bears their marks upon him is, as we have seen, notably absent from what is on the whole a white press. But full integration of Negroes into the journalistic profession is imperative in its own right. It is unacceptable that the press, itself the special beneficiary of fundamental constitutional protection, should lag so far behind other fields in giving effect to the fundamental human right to equality of opportunity. To help correct this situation, the Institute will have to undertake far-ranging activities. Providing educational opportunities for would-be Negro journalists is not enough. There will have to be changes in the career outlooks for Negro students and their counselors back to the secondary school level. And changes in these attitudes will come slowly unless there is a change in the reality of employment and advancement opportunities for Negroes in journalism. This requires an aggressive placement program, seeking out newspapers, television and radio stations that discriminate, whether consciously or unconsciously, and mobilizing the pressures, public, private and legal, necessary to break the pattern. The Institute might also provide assistance to Negro newspapers, which now recruit and train many young journalists. Police Press Relations The Commission has stressed the failures in this area, and has laid out a set of remedial measures for action at the local level. But if reliance is placed exclusively on local initiative, we can predict that in many places, often those that need it most, our recommended steps will not be taken. Pressure from the Federal Government for action along the lines proposed would be suspect, probably by both press and local officials. But the Institute could undertake the task of stimulating community action in line with the Commission's recommendations without arousing local hostility and suspicion. Moreover, the Institute could serve as a clearinghouse for exchange of experience in this field. Review of Media Performance on Riots and Racial Issues The Institute should review press and television coverage of riot and racial news, and publicly award praise and blame. The Commission recognizes that government restraints or guidelines in this field are both unworkable and incompatible with our Constitution and traditions. Internal guidelines or voluntary advance arrangements may be useful, but they tend to be rather general, and the standards they prescribe are neither self-applying nor self-enforcing. We believe it would be healthy for reporters and editors who work in this sensitive field to know that others will be viewing their work and will hold them publicly accountable for lapses from accepted standards of good journalism. The Institute should publicize its findings by means of regular and special reports. It might also set a series of awards for especially meritorious work of individuals or news organizations in race relations reporting. Urban Affairs Service Whatever may be done to improve the quality of reporting on urban affairs, there always will be a great many outlets that are too small to support the specialized investigation, reporting, and interpreting needed in this field. To fill this gap, the Institute could organize a comprehensive urban news service, available at a modest fee to any news organization that wanted it. The Institute would have its own specially trained reporters, and it would also cull the national press for news and feature stories of broader interest that could be reprinted or broadcast by subscribers. 6. Continuing Research Our own investigations have shown us that academic work on the impact of media on race relations, its role in shaping attitudes, and the effects of the choices it makes on people's behavior, is in a rudimentary stage. The Commission's content analysis is the first study of its type of contemporary riot coverage, and it is extremely limited in scope. A whole range of questions needs intensive scholarly exploration, and indeed the development of new modes of research and analysis. The Institute should undertake many of these important projects under its own auspices, and could stimulate others in the academic community to further research. Along with the country as a whole the press has too long basked in a white world, looking out of it, if at all, with white men's eyes and a white perspective. That is no longer good enough. The painful process of readjustment that is required of the American news media must begin now. They must make a reality of integration in both their product and their personnel. They must insist on the highest standards of accuracy, not only reporting single events with care and skepticism, but placing each event into meaningful perspective. They must report the travail of our cities with compassion and in-depth. In all this the Commission asks for fair and courageous journalism, commitment and coverage that are worthy of one of the crucial domestic stories in America's history. Section 48 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Abahi in February 2020. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Chapter 16. The Future of the Cities. Part 1. Introduction. We believe action of the kind outlined in preceding pages can contribute substantially to control of disorders in the near future. But there should be no mistake about the long run. The underlying forces continue to gain momentum. The most basic of these is the accelerating segregation of low income, disadvantaged Negroes within the ghettos of the largest American cities. By 1985 the 12.1 million Negroes segregated within central cities today will have grown to approximately 20.3 million, an increase of 68%. Prospects for domestic peace and for the quality of American life are linked directly to the future of these cities. Two critical questions must be confronted. Where do present trends now lead? What choices are open to us? The Key Trends. Negro Population Growth. The size of the Negro population in central cities is closely related to total national Negro population growth. In the past 16 years about 98% of this growth has occurred within metropolitan areas and 86% in the central cities of those areas. A conservative projection of national Negro population growth indicates continued rapid increases. For the period 1966 to 1985 it will rise to a total of 30.7 million, gaining an average of 484,000 a year or 7.6% more than the increase in each year from 1960 to 1966. Central Cities. Further Negro population growth in central cities depends upon two key factors, immigration from outside metropolitan areas and patterns of Negro settlement within metropolitan areas. From 1960 to 1966 the Negro population of all central cities rose 2.4 million, 88.9% of total national Negro population growth. We estimate that natural growth accounted for 1.4 million or 58% of this increase and in migration accounted for 1 million or 42%. As of 1966 the Negro population in all central cities totaled 12.1 million. By 1985 we have estimated that it will rise 68% to 20.3 million. We believe that natural growth will account for 5.2 million of this increase and in migration for 3 million. Without significant Negro outmigration then the combined Negro populations of central cities will continue to grow by an average of 274,000 a year through 1985, even if no further in migration occurs. Growth projected on the basis of natural increase and in migration would raise the proportion of Negroes to whites in central cities by 1985 from the present 20.7% to between an estimated 31 and 34.7%. Largest Central Cities. These however are national figures. Much faster increases will occur in the largest central cities where Negro growth has been concentrated in the past two decades. Washington DC, Gary and Newark are already over half Negro. A continuation of recent trends would cause the following 10 major cities to become over 50% Negro by the indicated dates. New Orleans 1971, Richmond 1971, Baltimore 1972, Jacksonville 1972, Cleveland 1975, St. Louis 1978, Detroit 1979, Philadelphia 1981, Oakland 1983, Chicago 1984. These cities plus Washington DC now over 66% Negro and Newark contained 12.6 million people in 1960 or 22% of the total population of all 224 American central cities. All 13 cities undoubtedly will have Negro majorities by 1985 and the suburbs ringing them will remain largely all white unless there are major changes in Negro fertility rates in migration, settlement patterns or public policy. Experience indicates that Negro school enrollment in these and other cities will exceed 50% long before the total population reaches that mark. In fact, Negro students already comprise more than a majority in the public elementary schools of 12 of the 13 cities mentioned above. This occurs because the Negro population in central cities is much younger and because a much higher proportion of white children attend private schools. For example, St. Louis's population was about 36% Negro in 1965. Its public elementary school enrollment was 63% Negro. If present trends continue, many cities in addition to those listed above will have Negro school majorities by 1985, probably including Dallas, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Harrisburg, Louisville, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Missouri, Hartford, New Haven. Thus, continued concentration of future Negro population growth in large central cities will produce significant changes in those cities over the next 20 years. Unless there are sharp changes in the factors influencing Negro settlement patterns within metropolitan areas, there is little doubt that the trend toward Negro majorities will continue. Even a complete cessation of net Negro in migration to central cities would merely postpone this result for a few years. Growth of the young Negro population We estimate that the nation's white population will grow 16.6 million or 9.6% from 1966 to 1975, and the Negro population 3.8 million or 17.7% in the same period. The Negro age group from 15 to 24 years of age, however, will grow much faster than either the Negro population as a whole or the white population in the same age group. From 1966 to 1975, the total number of Negroes in this age group nationally will rise 1.6 million or 40.1%. The white population aged 15 to 24 will rise 6.6 million or 23.5%. This rapid increase in the young Negro population has important implications for the country. This group has the highest unemployment rate in the nation, commits a relatively high proportion of all crimes, and plays the most significant role in civil disorders. At the same token it is a great reservoir of underused human resources which are vital to the nation. The location of new jobs Most new employment opportunities do not occur in central cities, near all Negro neighborhoods. They are being created in suburbs and outlying areas, and this trend is likely to continue indefinitely. New office buildings have risen in the downtowns of large cities, often near all Negro areas. But the outflow of manufacturing and retailing facilities normally offsets this addition significantly, and in many cases has caused a net loss of jobs in central cities, while the new white collar jobs are often not available to ghetto residents. Providing employment for the swelling Negro ghetto population will require society to link these potential workers more closely with job locations. This can be done in three ways. By developing incentives to industry to create new employment centers near Negro residential areas. By opening suburban residential areas to Negroes and encouraging them to move closer to industrial centers. Or by creating better transportation between ghetto neighborhoods and new job locations. All three involve large public outlays. The first method, creating new industries in or near the ghetto, is not likely to occur without government subsidies on a scale which convinces private firms that it will pay them to face the problems involved. The second method, opening up suburban areas to Negro occupancy, obviously requires effective fear housing laws. It will also require an extensive program of federally aided, low-cost housing in many suburban areas. The third approach, improved transportation linking ghettos and suburbs, has received little attention from city planners and municipal officials. A few demonstration projects show promise but carrying them out on a large scale will be very costly. Although a high proportion of new jobs will be located in suburbs, there are still millions of jobs in central cities. Turnover in those jobs alone can open up a great many potential positions for Negro central city residents if employers sees racial discrimination in their hiring and promotion practices. Nevertheless, as the total number of Negro central city job seekers continues to rise, the need to link them with emerging new employment in the suburbs will become increasingly urgent. The increasing cost of municipal services. Local governments have had to bear a particularly heavy financial burden in the two decades since the end of World War II. All US cities are highly dependent upon property taxes that are relatively unresponsive to changes in income. Consequently, growing municipalities have been hard pressed for adequate revenues to meet rising demands for services generated by population increase. On the other hand, stable or declining cities have not only been faced with steady cost increases but also with a slow growing or even declining tax base. As a result of the population shifts of the post war period, concentrating the middle class in residential suburbs while leaving the poor in the central cities, the increasing burden of municipal taxes frequently falls upon that part of the urban population least able to pay them. Increasing concentrations of urban growth have called forth greater expenditures for every kind of public service, education, health, police protection, fire protection, parks, sanitation, etc. These expenditures have strikingly outpaced tax revenues. The story is summed up below. Local government revenues, expenditures and debts, in billions of dollars. Revenues 1950, 11.7, 1966, 41.5, increase plus 29.8. Expenditures 1950, 17.0, 1966, 60.7, increase, 43.7, debt outstanding, 1950, 18.8, 1966, 77.5, increase, 58.7. Despite the growth of federal assistance to urban areas under various grant in aid programs, the fiscal plight of many cities is likely to grow even more serious in the future. Local expenditures inevitably will continue to rise steeply as a result of several factors, including the difficulty of increasing productivity in the predominantly service activities of local governments, together with the rapid technologically induced increases in productivity in other economic sectors. Traditionally, individual productivity has risen faster in the manufacturing, mining, production and agricultural sectors than in those involving personal services. However, since all sectors compete with each other for talent and personnel, wages and salaries in the service-dominated sectors generally must keep up with those in the capital-dominated sectors. Since productivity in manufacturing has risen about 2.5% per year, compounded over many decades and even faster in agriculture, the basis for setting costs in the service-dominated sectors has gone up too. In the post-war period, costs of the same units of output have increased very rapidly in certain key activities of local government. For example, education is the single biggest form of expenditure by local governments, including school districts, accounting for over 40% of their outlays. From 1947 to 1967, costs per pupil day in US public schools rose at a rate of 6.7% per year compounded, only slightly less than doubling every 10 years. This major cost item is likely to keep on raising rapidly in the future, along with other government services like police, fire and welfare activities. Some increases in productivity may occur in these fields and some economies may be achieved through use of assistance such as police and teachers' aids. Nevertheless, the need to keep pace with private sector wage scales will force local government costs to rise sharply. This and other future cost increases are important to future relations between central cities and suburbs. Rising costs will inevitably force central cities to demand more and more assistance from the federal government. But the federal government can obtain such funds through the income tax only from other parts of the economy. Suburban governments are, meanwhile, experiencing the same cost increases along with the rising resentment of their constituents. Choices for the future. The complexity of American society offers many choices for the future of relations between central cities and suburbs and patterns of white and negro settlement in metropolitan areas. For practical purposes, however, we see two fundamental questions. Should future negro population growth be concentrated in central cities, as in the past 20 years, thereby forcing negro and white populations to become even more residentially segregated? Should society provide greatly increased special assistance to negroes and other relatively disadvantaged population groups? For purposes of analysis, the Commission has defined three basic choices for the future, embodying specific answers to these questions. The present policy's choice. Under this course, the nation would maintain approximately the share of resources now being allocated to programs of assistance for the poor, unemployed and disadvantaged. These programs are likely to grow, given continuing economic growth and rising federal revenues, but they will not grow fast enough to stop, yet alone reverse, the already deteriorating quality of life in central city ghettos. This choice carries the highest ultimate price, as we will point out. The Enrichment Choice. Under this course, the nation would seek to offset the effects of continued negro segregation and deprivation in large city ghettos. The Enrichment Choice would aim at creating dramatic improvements in the quality of life in disadvantaged central city neighborhoods, both white and negro. It would require marked increases in federal spending for education, housing, employment, job training and social services. The Enrichment Choice would seek to lift poor negroes and whites above poverty status and thereby give them the capacity to enter the mainstream of American life. But it would not, at least for many years, appreciably affect either the increasing concentration of negroes in the ghettos or racial segregation in residential areas outside the ghettos. The Integration Choice. This choice would be aimed at reversing the movement of the country toward two societies, separate and unequal. The Integration Choice, like the Enrichment Choice, would call for large-scale improvement in the quality of ghettos life. But it would also involve both creating strong incentives for negro movement out of central city ghettos and enlarging freedom of choice concerning housing, employment and schools. The result would fall considerably short of full integration. The experience of other ethnic groups indicates that some negro households would be scattered in largely white residential areas. Others, probably a larger number, would voluntary cluster together in largely negro neighborhoods. The Integration Choice would thus produce both integration and segregation. But the segregation would be voluntary. Articulating these three choices plainly oversimplifies the possibilities open to the country. We believe, however, that they encompass the basic issues, issues which the American public must face if it is serious in its concern not only about civil disorder but the future of our democratic society. The Present Policies Choice Powerful forces of social and political inertia are moving the country steadily along the course of existing policies toward a divided country. This course may well involve changes in many social and economic programs but not enough to produce fundamental alterations in the key factors of negro concentration, racial segregation and the lack of sufficient enrichment to arrest the decay of deprived neighborhoods. Some movement toward enrichment can be found in efforts to encourage industries to locate plants in central cities, in increased federal expenditures for education, in the important concepts embodied in the War of Poverty and in the Model Cities program. But congressional appropriations for even present federal programs have been so small that they fall short of effective enrichment. As for challenging concentration and segregation, a national commitment to this purpose has yet to develop. Of the three future courses we have defined, the present policies choice, the choice we are now making, is the course with the most ominous consequences for our society. The Probability of Future Civil Disorders We believe that the present policies choice would lead to a larger number of violent incidents of the kind that have stimulated recent major disorders. First, it does nothing to raise the hopes, absorb the energies or constructively challenge the talents of the rapidly growing number of young negro men in central cities. The proportion of unemployed or underemployed among them will remain very high. These young men have contributed disproportionately to crime and violence in cities in the past, and there is danger, obviously, that they will continue to do so. Second, under these conditions a rising proportion of negroes in disadvantaged city areas might come to look upon the deprivation and segregation they suffer as proper justification for violent protest, or for extending support to now isolated extremists who advocate civil disruption by guerrilla tactics. More incidents would not necessarily mean more or worse riots. For the near future, there is substantial likelihood that even an increased number of incidents could be controlled before becoming major disorders, if society undertakes to improve police and national guard forces, so they can respond to potential disorders with more prompt and disciplined use of force. In fact, the likelihood of incidents mushrooming into major disorders would be only slightly higher in the near future under the present policies choice than under the other two possible choices. For no new policies or programs could possibly alter basic ghetto conditions immediately, and the announcement of new programs under the other choices would immediately generate new expectations. Expectations inevitably increase faster than performance. In the short run, they might even increase the level of frustration. In the long run, however, the present policies choice risks a seriously greater probability of major disorders, worse possibly than those already experienced. If the Negro population as a whole developed even stronger feelings of being wrongly penned in and discriminated against, many of its members might come to support not only riots, but the rebellion now being preached by only a handful. Large-scale violence, followed by white retaliation, could follow. This spiral could quite conceivably lead to a kind of urban apartheid with semi-martial law in many major cities, enforced residents of Negroes in segregated areas, and a drastic reduction in personal freedom for all Americans, particularly Negroes. The same distinction is applicable to the cost of the present policies choice. In the short run, its costs, at least its direct cash outlays, would be far less than for the other choices. Social and economic programs likely to have significant lasting effect would require very substantial annual appropriations for many years. Their cost would far exceed the direct losses sustained in recent civil disorders. Property damage in all the disorders we investigated, including Detroit and Newark, totaled less than $100 million. But it would be a tragic mistake to view the present policies choice as cheap. Damage figures measure only a small part of the costs of civil disorder. They cannot measure the costs in terms of the lives lost, injuries suffered, minds and attitudes closed and frozen in prejudice, or the hidden costs of the profound disruption of entire cities. Ultimately, moreover, the economic and social costs of the present policies choice will far surpass the cost of the alternatives. The rising concentration of impoverished Negroes and other minorities within the urban ghettos will constantly expand public expenditures for welfare, law enforcement, unemployment and other existing programs, without arresting the decay of all their city neighbourhoods and the breeding of frustration and discontent. But the most significant item on the balance of accounts will remain largely invisible and incalculable, the toll in human values taken by continued poverty, segregation and inequality of opportunity. End of section 48. Section 49 of the Kerner Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Avahi in February 2020. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission Report. Chapter 16. The Future of the Cities. Part 2. Polarization. Another and equally serious consequence is the fact that this course would lead to the permanent establishment of two societies. One predominantly white and located in the suburbs, in smaller cities and in outlying areas and one largely Negro located in central cities. We are well on the way to just such a divided nation. This division is veiled by the fact that Negroes do not now dominate many central cities. But they soon will, as we have shown, and the new Negro mayors will be facing even more difficult conditions than now exist. As Negroes succeed whites in our largest cities, the proportion of low-income residents in those cities will probably increase. This is likely even if both white and Negro incomes continue to rise at recent rates, since Negroes have much lower incomes than whites. Moreover, many of the ills of large central cities spring from their age, their location and their obsolete physical structures. The deterioration and economic decay stemming from these factors have been proceeding for decades and will continue to plague all the cities regardless of who resides in them. These facts underlie the fourfold dilemma of the American city. Fewer tax dollars come in as large numbers of middle income taxpayers move out of central cities and property values and business decline. More tax dollars are required to provide essential public services and facilities and to meet the needs of expanding lower income groups. Each tax dollar buys less because of increasing costs. Citizen dissatisfaction with municipal services grows as needs, expectations and standards of living increase throughout the community. These are the conditions that would greet the Negro-dominated municipal governments that will gradually come to power in many of our major cities. The Negro electorates in those cities probably would demand basic changes in present policies. Like the present white electorates there, they would have to look for assistance to two basic sources, the private sector and the federal government. With respect to the private sector, major private capital investment in those cities may have seized almost altogether if white-dominated firms and industries decided the risks and costs were too great. The withdrawal of private capital is already far advanced in most all Negro areas of our large cities. Even if private investment continued, it alone would not suffice. Big cities containing high proportions of low income Negroes and block after block of deteriorating older property need very substantial assistance from the federal government to meet the demands of their electorates for improved services and living conditions. It is probable, however, that Congress will be more heavily influenced by representatives of the suburban and outlying city electorate. These areas will comprise 40% of our total population by 1985, compared with 31% in 1960, and central cities will decline from 32% to 27%. Since even the suburbs will be feeling the squeeze of higher local government costs, Congress might resist providing the extensive assistance which central cities will desperately need. Thus, the present policy's choice, if pursued for any length of time, might force simultaneous political and economic polarization in many of our largest metropolitan areas. Such polarization would involve large central cities, mainly Negro, with many poor and nearly bankrupt, on the one hand, and most suburbs, mainly white, generally affluent, but heavily taxed, on the other hand. Some areas might avoid political confrontation by shifting to some form of metropolitan government designed to offer regional solutions for pressing urban problems such as property taxation, air and water pollution, refuse disposal and commuter transport. Yet, this would hardly eliminate the basic segregation and relative poverty of the urban Negro population. It might even increase the Negro's sense of frustration and alienation if it operated to prevent Negro political control of central cities. The acquisition of power by Negro-dominated governments in central cities is surely a legitimate and desirable exercise of political power by a minority group. It is in an American political tradition exemplified by the achievements of the Irish in New York and Boston. But such Negro political development would also involve virtually complete racial segregation and virtually complete spatial separation. By 1985, the separate Negro society in our central cities would contain almost 21 million citizens. That is almost 68% larger than the present Negro population of central cities. It is also larger than the current population of every Negro nation in Africa, except Nigeria. If developing a racially integrated society is extraordinarily difficult today when 12.1 million Negroes live in central cities, then it is quite clearly going to be virtually impossible in 1985 when almost 21 million Negroes, still much poorer and less educated than most whites, will be living there. Can present policies avoid extreme polarization? There are at least two possible developments under the present policy's choice which might avert such polarization. The first is a faster increase of incomes among Negroes than has occurred in the recent past. This might prevent central cities from becoming even deeper poverty traps than they now are. It suggests the importance of effective job programs and higher levels of welfare payments for dependent families. The second possible development is migration of a growing Negro middle class out of the central city. This would not prevent competition for federal funds between central cities and outlying areas, but it might diminish the racial undertones of that competition. There is, however, no evidence that a continuation of present policies would be accompanied by any such movement. There is already a significant Negro middle class. It grew rapidly from 1960 to 1966. Yet in these years 88.9% of the total national growth of Negro population was concentrated in central cities, the highest in history. Indeed, from 1960 to 1966 there was actually a net total in-migration of Negroes from the urban fringes of metropolitan areas into central cities. The commission believes it unlikely that this trend will suddenly reverse itself without significant changes in private attitudes and public policies. The Enrichment Choice The present policies choice plainly would involve continuation of efforts like model cities, manpower programs, and the war on poverty. These are in fact enrichment programs designed to improve the quality of life in the ghetto. Because of their limited scope and funds, however, they constitute only very modest steps toward enrichment, and would continue to do so even if these programs were somewhat enlarged or supplemented. The premise of the Enrichment Choices performance. To adopt this choice would require a substantially greater share of national resources, sufficient to make a dramatic, visible impact on life in the urban Negro ghetto. The effect of enrichment on civil disorders. Effective enrichment policies probably would have three immediate effects on civil disorders. First, announcement of specific large-scale programs and the demonstration of a strong intent to carry them out might persuade ghetto residents that genuine remedies for their problems were forthcoming, thereby allaying tensions. Second, such announcements would strongly stimulate the aspirations and hopes of members of these communities, possibly well beyond the capabilities of society to deliver and to do so promptly. This might increase frustration and discontent, to some extent cancelling the first effect. Third, if there could be immediate action on meaningful job training and the creation of productive jobs for large numbers of unemployed young people, they would become much less likely to engage in civil disorders. Such action is difficult now, when there are about 585,000 young Negro men aged 14 to 24 in the civilian labour force in central cities, of whom 81,000 or 13.8% are unemployed and probably two or three times as many are underemployed. It will not become easier in the future. By 1975, this age group will have grown to approximately 700,000. Given the size of the present problem, plus the large growth of this age group, creation of sufficient meaningful jobs will require extensive programmes, begun rapidly. Even if the nation is willing to embark on such programmes, there is no certainty that they can be made effective soon enough. Consequently, there is no certainty that the enrichment choice would do much more in the near future to diminish violent incidents in central cities than would the present policies choice. However, if enrichment programmes can succeed in meeting the needs of residents of disadvantaged areas for jobs, education, housing and city services, then over the years this choice is almost certain to reduce both the level and frequency of urban disorder. The Negro middle class. One objective of the enrichment choice would be to help as many disadvantaged Americans as possible, of all races, to enter the mainstream of American prosperity, to progress toward what is often called middle class status. If the enrichment choice were adopted, it could certainly attain this objective to a far greater degree than would the present policies choice. This could significantly change the quality of life in many central city areas. It can be argued that a rapidly enlarging Negro middle class would also promote Negro outmigration and that the enrichment choice would thus open up an escape hatch from the ghetto. This argument, however, has two weaknesses. The first is experience. Central cities already have sizable and growing numbers of middle class Negro families, yet only a few have migrated from the central city. The past pattern of wide ethnic groups gradually moving out of central city areas to middle class suburbs has not applied to Negroes. Effective open housing laws will help make this possible, but it is probable that other more extensive changes in policies and attitudes will be required, and these would extend beyond the enrichment choice. The second weakness in the argument is time. Even if enlargement of the Negro middle class succeeded in encouraging movement out of the central city, it could not do so fast enough to offset the rapid growth of the ghetto. To offset even half the growth estimated for the ghetto by 1975, an outmigration from central cities of 217,000 persons a year would be required. This is eight times the annual increase in suburban Negro population, including natural increase, that occurred from 1960 to 1966. Even the most effective enrichment program is not likely to accomplish this. A corollary problem derives from the continuing migration of poor Negroes from the southern to northern and western cities. Adoption of the enrichment choice would require large-scale efforts to improve conditions in the south sufficiently to remove the pressure to migrate. Under present conditions, slightly over a third of the estimated increase in Negro central city population by 1985 will result from in-migration, 3.0 million out of total increase of 8.2 million. Negro self-development. The enrichment choice is in line with some of the currents of Negro protest thought that fall under the label of black power. We do not refer to versions of black power ideology which promote violence, generate racial hatred or advocate total separation of the races. Rather, we mean the view which asserts that the American Negro population can assume its proper role in society and overcome its feelings of powerlessness and lack of self-respect only by exerting power over decisions which directly affected its own members. A fully integrated society is not thought possible until the Negro minority within the ghetto has developed political strength, a strong bargaining position in dealing with the rest of society. In short, this argument would regard predominantly Negro central cities and predominantly white outlying areas not as harmful but as an advantageous future. Proponents of these views also focus on the need for the Negro to organize economically as well as politically, thus tapping new energies and resources for self-development. One of the hardest tasks in improving disadvantaged areas is to discover how deeply deprived residents can develop their own capabilities by participating more fully in decisions and activities which affect them. Such learning by doing efforts are a vital part of the process of bringing deprived people into the social mainstream. Separate but equal societies. The enrichment choice by no means seeks to perpetuate racial segregation. In the end, however, its premise is that disadvantaged Negroes can achieve equality of opportunity with whites while continuing in conditions of nearly complete separation. This premise has been vigorously advocated by Black power proponents. While most Negroes originally desired racial integration many are losing hope of ever achieving it because of seemingly implacable white resistance. Yet they cannot bring themselves to accept the conclusion that most of the millions of Negroes who are forced to live racially segregated lives must therefore be condemned to inferior lives, to inferior educations, to inferior housing or inferior status. Rather, they reason, there must be some way to make the quality of life in the ghetto areas just as good or better than elsewhere. It is not surprising that some Black power advocates are denouncing integration and claiming that, given the hypocrisy and racism that pervade white society, life in a Black society is, in fact, morally superior. This argument is understandable, but there is a great deal of evidence that it is unrealistic. The economy of the United States and particularly the sources of employment are preponderantly white. In this circumstance, a policy of separate but equal employment could only relegate Negroes permanently to inferior incomes and economic status. The best evidence regarding education is contained in recent reports of the Office of Education and Civil Rights Commission, which suggests that both racial and economic integration are essential to educational equality for Negroes. Yet, critics point out that certainly until integration is achieved, various types of enrichment programs must be tested, and that dramatically different results may be possible from intensive educational enrichment, such as far smaller classes or greatly expanded preschool programs or changes in the home environment of Negro children resulting from steady jobs for fathers. Still others advocate shifting control over ghetto schools from professional administrators to local residents. This, they say, would improve curricula, give students a greater sense of their own value, and thus raise their moral and educational achievement. These approaches have not yet been tested sufficiently. One conclusion, however, does seem reasonable. Any real improvement in the quality of education in low-income, all-Negro areas will cost a great deal more money than is now being spent there, and perhaps more than is being spent per pupil anywhere. Racial and social class integration of schools may produce equal improvement in achievement at less total cost. Whether or not enrichment in ghetto areas will really work is not yet known, but the enrichment choice is based on the yet unproven premise that it will. Certainly enrichment programs could significantly improve existing ghetto schools if they impaled major innovations. But separate but equal ghetto education cannot meet the long-run fundamental educational needs of the central city Negro population. The three basic educational choices are providing Negro children with quality education in integrated schools, providing them with quality education by enriching ghetto schools, or continuing to provide many Negro children with inferior education in racially segregated school systems severely limiting their lifetime opportunities. Consciously or not it is the third choice that the nation is now making, and this choice the commission rejects totally. In the field of housing it is obvious that separate but equal does not mean really equal. The enrichment choice could greatly improve the quantity, variety and environment of decent housing available to the ghetto population. It could not provide Negroes with the same freedom and range of choices whites with equal incomes. Smaller cities and suburban areas together with the central city provide a far greater variety of housing and environmental settings than the central city alone. Programs to provide housing outside central cities however extend beyond the bounds of the enrichment choice. In the end whatever its benefits the enrichment choice might well invite a prospect similar to that of the present policies choice. Separate white and black societies. If enrichment programs were effective they could greatly narrow the gap in income, education, housing, jobs and other qualities of life between the ghetto and the mainstream. Hence the chances of harsh polarization or of disorder in the next 20 years would be greatly reduced. Whether they would be reduced far enough depends on the scope of the programs. Even if the gap were narrowed from the present it still could remain as a strong source of tension. History teaches that men are not necessarily placated even by great absolute progress. The controlling factor is relative progress whether they still perceive a significant gap between themselves and others whom they regard as no more deserving. Widespread perception of such a gap and consequent resentment might well be precisely the situation 20 years from now under the enrichment choice for it is essentially another way of choosing a permanently dividing country. The integration choice. The third and last course open to the nation combines enrichment with programs designed to encourage integration of substantial numbers of negroes into the society outside the ghetto. Enrichment must be an important adjunct to any integration course. No matter how ambitious or energetic such a program may be relatively few negroes now living in central city ghettos would be quickly integrated. In the meantime significant improvement in their present environment is essential. The enrichment aspect of this third choice should however be recognized as interim action during which time expanded and new programs can work to improve education and earning power. The length of the interim period surely would vary for some it may be long but in any event what should be clearly recognized is that enrichment is only a means toward the goal. It is not the goal. The goal must be achieving freedom for every citizen to live and work according to his capacities and desires not his color. We believe there are four important reasons why American society must give this course the most serious consideration. First future jobs are being created primarily in the suburbs while the chronically unemployed population is increasingly concentrated in the ghettos. The separation will make it more and more difficult for negroes to achieve anything like full employment in decent jobs. But if over time these residents began to find housing outside central cities they would be exposed to more knowledge of job opportunities would have much shorter trips to reach jobs and would have a far better chance of securing employment on a self-sustaining basis. Second in the judgment of this commission racial and social class integration is the most effective way of improving the education of ghetto children. Third developing an adequate housing supply for low income and middle income families and true freedom of choice in housing for negroes of all income levels will require substantial out movement. We do not believe that such an out movement will occur spontaneously merely as a result of increasing prosperity among negroes in central cities. A national fair housing law is essential to begin such movement. In many suburban areas a program combining positive incentives with the building of new housing will be necessary to carry it out. Fourth and by far the most important integration is the only course which explicitly seeks to achieve a single nation rather than accepting the present movement toward a dual society. This choice would enable us at least to begin reversing the profoundly divisive trend already so evident in our metropolitan areas before it becomes irreversible. Conclusions The future of our cities is neither something which will just happen nor something which will be imposed upon us by an inevitable destiny. That future will be shaped to an important degree by choices we make now. We have attempted to set forth the major choices because we believe it is vital for Americans to understand the consequences of our present drift. Three critical conclusions emerge from this analysis. One, the nation is rapidly moving toward two increasingly separate Americas. Within two decades this division could be so deep that it would be almost impossible to unite a wide society principally located in suburbs in smaller central cities and in the peripheral parts of large central cities and a negro society largely concentrated within large central cities. The negro society will be permanently relegated to its current status possibly even if we expend great amounts of money and effort in trying to guilt the ghetto. Two, in the long run continuation and expansion of such a permanent division threatens us with two perils. The first is the danger of sustained violence in our cities. The timing, scale, nature and repercussions of such violence cannot be foreseen. But if it occurred it would further destroy our ability to achieve the basic American promises of liberty justice and equality. The second is the danger of a conclusive repudiation of the traditional American ideals of individual dignity freedom and equality of opportunity. We will not be able to espouse these ideals meaningfully to the rest of the world to ourselves to our children. They may still recite the pledge of allegiance and say one nation indivisible but they will be learning cynicism not patriotism. Three, we cannot escape responsibility for choosing the future of our metropolitan areas and the human relations which develop within them. It is a responsibility so critical that even an unconscious choice to continue present policies has the gravest implications. That we have delayed in choosing or by delaying maybe making the wrong choice does not sentence us either to separatism or despair but we must choose. We will choose indeed we are now choosing. End of section 49. Section 50 of the Kerner Commission report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Mark Guja Adelaide South Australia. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Kerner Commission report. Recommendations for National Action Part 1. The commission has already addressed itself to the need for immediate action at the local level. Because the city is the focus of racial disorder the immediate responsibility rests on community leaders and local institutions. Without responsive and representative local government without effective processes of interracial communication within the city and without alert well trained and adequately supported local police national action no matter how great its scale cannot be expected to provide a solution. Yet the disorders are not simply a problem of the racial ghetto or the city. As we have seen they are symptoms of social ills that have become endemic in our society and now affect every American. Black or white, businessman or factory worker, suburban commuter or slum dweller. None of us can escape the consequences of the continuing economic and social decay of the central city and the closely related problem of rural poverty. The convergence of these conditions in the racial ghetto and the resulting discontent and disruption threaten democratic values fundamental to our progress as a free society. The essential fact is that neither existing conditions nor the Garrison state offers acceptable alternatives for the future of this country. Only a greatly enlarged commitment to national action, compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the will and resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth can shape a future that is compatible with the historic ideals of American society. It is this conviction that leads us as a commission on civil disorders to comment on the shape and dimension of the action that must be taken at the national level. In this effort we have taken account of the work of scholars and experts on race relations, urban condition and poverty. We have studied the reports and work of all commissions of congressional committees and of many special task forces and groups both within the government and within the private sector. Financing the cost. The commission has also examined the question of financing. Although there are grave difficulties we do not regard them as insoluble. The nation has substantial financial resources not enough to do everything some might wish but enough to make an important start on reducing our critical social deficit in spite of a war and in spite of current budget requirements. The key factors having a bearing on our ability to pay for the cost are the great productivity of the American economy and a federal revenue system which is highly responsive to economic growth. In combination these produce truly astounding automatic increases in federal budget receipts provided only that the national economy is kept functioning at capacity so that actual national income expands in line with potential. These automatic increases the fiscal dividend from the federal revenue system range from 11 billion dollars to 14 billion dollars under conditions of steady economic growth. The tax surcharge requested by the president including continuation of excise taxes would add about 16 billion dollars to the fiscal dividend of about 28.5 billion dollars over a two-year period. While competing demands are certain to grow with every increase in federal revenues so that hard choices are inevitable these figures demonstrate the dimension of resources apart from changes in tax rates which this country can generate. Federal program coordination the spectacle of Detroit and New Haven engulfed in civil turmoil despite a multitude of federally aided programs raised basic questions as to whether the existing delivery system is adequate to the bold new purposes of national policy. Many who voiced these concerns overlooked the disparity between the size of the problems at which the programs are aimed and the level of funding provided by the federal government. Yet there is little doubt that the system through which federal programs are translated into services to people is a major problem in itself. There are now over 400 grant programs operated by a broad range of federal agencies and channeled through a much larger array of semi-autonomous state and local government entities. Reflective of this complex scheme federal programs often seem self- defeating and contradictory. Field officials unable to make decisions on their own programs and unaware of related efforts. Agencies unable or unwilling to work together. Programs conceived and administered to achieve different and sometimes conflicting purposes. The new social development legislation has put great strain upon obsolescent machinery and administrative practices at all levels of government. It has loaded new work on federal departments. It has required a level of skill a sense of urgency and a capacity for judgment never planned for or encouraged in departmental field officers. It has required planning and administrative capacity rarely seen in state houses, county courthouses and city halls. Deficiencies in all of these areas have frustrated accomplishment of many of the important goals set by the president and the congress. In recent years serious efforts have been made to improve program coordination. During the 1961-65 period almost 20 executive orders were issued for the coordination of federal programs involving intergovernmental administration. Some two dozen interagency committees have been established to coordinate two or more federal aid programs. Departments have been given responsibility to lead others in areas within their particular competence. OEO in the poverty field, HUD in model cities. Yet despite these and other efforts the federal government has not yet been able to join talent, funds and programs for concentrated impact in the field. Few agencies are able to put together a comprehensive package of related programs to meet priority needs. There is a clear and compelling requirement for better coordination of federally funded programs, particularly those designed to benefit the residents of the inner city. If essential programs are to be preserved and expanded this need must be met. The commission's recommendations. We do not claim competence to chart the details of programs within such complex and interrelated fields as employment, welfare, education and housing. We do believe it is essential to set forth goals and to recommend strategies to reach these goals. That is the aim of the pages that follow. They contain our sense of the critical priorities. We discuss and recommend programs not to commit each of us to specific parts of such programs but to illustrate the type and dimension of action needed. Much has been accomplished in recent years to formulate new directions for national policy and new channels for national energy. Resources devoted to social programs have been greatly increased in many areas. Hence few of our program suggestions are entirely novel. In some form many are already in effect. All this serves to underscore our basic conclusion. The need is not so much for the government to design new programs as it is for the nation to generate new will. Private enterprise, labour unions, the churches, the foundations, the universities, all our urban institutions must deepen their involvement in the life of the city and their commitment to its revival and welfare. Objectives for national action. Just as Lincoln a century ago put preservation of the union above all else, so should we put creation of a true union, a single society and a single American identity as our major goal. Toward that goal we propose the following objectives for national action. Opening up all opportunities to those who are restricted by racial segregation and discrimination and eliminating all barriers to their choice of jobs, education and housing. Removing the frustration of powerlessness among the disadvantaged by providing the means to deal with the problems that affect their own lives and by increasing the capacity of our public and private institutions to respond to those problems. Increasing communication across racial lines to destroy stereotypes, halt polarization, end distrust and hostility and create common ground for efforts toward common goals of public order and social justice. There are those who oppose these aims as rewarding the rioters. They are wrong. A great nation is not so easily intimidated. We propose these aims to fulfill our pledge of equality and to meet the fundamental needs of a democratic and civilized society, domestic peace, social justice and urban centers that are citadels of the human spirit. There are others who say that violence is necessary that fear alone can prod the nation to act decisively on behalf of racial minorities. They too are wrong. Violence and disorder compound injustice. They must be ended and they will be ended. Our strategy is neither blind repression nor capitulation to lawlessness. Rather, it is the affirmation of common possibilities for all within a single society. 1. Employment. Introduction. Unemployment and underemployment are among the most persistent and serious grievances of our disadvantaged minorities. The pervasive effect of these conditions on the racial ghetto is inextricably linked to the problem of civil disorder. In the Employment Act of 1946, the United States set for itself a national goal of a useful job at a reasonable wage for all who wish to work. Federal expenditure for manpower development and training have increased from less than $60 million in 1963 to $1.6 billion in 1968. The president has proposed a further increase to $2.1 billion in 1969 to provide work experience, training and supportive services for 1.3 million men and women. Despite these efforts and despite sustained general economic prosperity and growing school demands of automated industry, the goal of full employment has become increasingly hard to attain. Today there are about 2 million unemployed and about 10 million underemployed, 6.5 million of whom work full-time and earn less than the annual poverty wage. The most compelling and difficult challenge is presented by some 500,000 hardcore unemployed who live within the central cities like a basic education, work not at all or only from time to time and are unable to cope with the problems of holding and performing a job. A substantial part of this group is Negro, male and between the ages of approximately 18 and 25. Members of this group are often among the initial participants in civil disorders. A slum employment study by the Department of Labor in 1966 showed that as compared with an unemployment rate for all persons in the United States of 3.8 percent, the unemployment rate among 16 to 19 year old non-white males was 26.5 percent and among 16 to 24 year old non-white males 15.9 percent. Data collected by the commission in cities where there were racial disorders in 1967 indicate that Negro males between the ages of 15 and 25 predominated among the writers. More than 20 percent of the writers were unemployed and many of those who were employed worked in intermittent, low status, unskilled jobs, jobs which they regarded as below their level of education and ability. In the riot cities that we surveyed Negroes were three times as likely as whites to hold unskilled jobs which are often part-time or seasonal and dead end. A fact that's as significant for Negroes as unemployment. Goals and objectives, we propose a comprehensive national manpower policy to meet the needs of both the unemployed and the underemployed. That policy will require continued emphasis on national economic growth and job creation so that there will be jobs available for those who are newly trained without displacing those already employed. Unified and intensive recruiting to reach those who need help with information about available job, training and supportive aids. Careful evaluation of the individual's vocational skills, potentials and needs. Referral to one or more programs of basic education, job training and needed medical, social and other services. Provision for transportation between the ghetto and outlying employment areas and continued follow-up on the individual's progress until he no longer needs help. Concentrated job training efforts with major emphasis on on the job training by both public and private employers as well as public and private vocational schools and other institutional facilities. Opening up existing public and private job structures to provide greater upward mobility for the underemployed without displacing anyone already employed at more advanced levels. Large-scale development of new jobs in the public and private sectors to absorb as many as possible of the unemployed again without displacement of the employed. Stimulation of public and private investment in depressed areas, both urban and rural, to improve the environment, to alleviate unemployment and underemployment and in rural areas to provide for the poor alternatives other than migration to large urban centres. New kinds of assistance for those who will continue to be attracted to the urban centres both before and after they arrive. Increasing small business and other entrepreneurial opportunities in poverty areas, both urban and rural. Basic strategies To achieve these objectives we believe the following basic strategies should be adopted. Existing programs aimed at recruiting, training and job development should be consolidated according to the function they serve at local, state and federal levels to avoid fragmentation and duplication. We need a comprehensive and focused administration of a unified group of manpower programs. High priority should be placed on the creation of new jobs in both the public and private sectors. In the public sector a substantial number of such jobs can be provided quickly, particularly by government at the local level, where there are vast unmet needs in education, health, recreation, public safety, sanitation and other municipal services. The National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress estimated that there are 5.3 million potential jobs in public service, but the more difficult task is to provide jobs in private industry for the hardcore unemployed. Both strategies must be pursued simultaneously, with some arrangements for a flow of trainees from public sector jobs to on-the-job training in private companies. Creation of jobs for the hardcore unemployed will require substantial payments to both public and private employers to offset the extra costs of supportive services and training. Basic education and counselling in dress, appearance, social relationships, money management, transportation, hygiene, health, punctuality and good work habits, all of which employers normally take for granted may have to be provided. Productivity may be low for substantial periods. Special emphasis must be given to motivating the hardcore unemployed. A sure method for motivating the hardcore unemployed has not yet been devised. One fact however is already clear from the experience of the job core, neighborhood youth core and manpower development and training projects. The previously hardcore unemployed trainee or employee must understand that he is not being offered or trained for a dead-end job. Since by definition he is not eligible even for an entry-level position, he must be given job training. He must be convinced that if he performs satisfactorily after the training period he will be employed and given an opportunity to advance, if possible, on a clearly defined job ladder with step increases in both pay and responsibility. Artificial barriers to employment and promotion must be removed by both public agencies and private employers. Racial discrimination and unrealistic and unnecessary high minimum qualifications for employment or promotion often have the same prejudicial effect. Government and business must consider for each type of job whether a criminal record should be a bar and whether a high school diploma is an inflexible prerequisite. During World War II industry successfully employed large numbers of the previously unemployed and disadvantaged by lowering standards and by restructuring work patterns so that the job fit the level of available skills. We believe that too often government, business and labor unions fail to take into account innate intelligence and aptitudes which are not measurable. Present recruitment procedures should be reexamined. Testing procedures should be revalidated or replaced by work, sample or actual job tryouts. Applicants who are rejected for immediate training or employment should be evaluated and counseled by company personnel officers and referred to either company or public remedial programs. These procedures have already been initiated in the steel and telephone industries. Special training is needed for supervisory personnel. Support needed by the hardcore unemployed during initial job experience must be provided by specially trained supervisors. A new program of training entry level supervisors should be established by management with government assistance if necessary. End of section 50.