 Mitch, thanks again for joining us here today at CSIS. This morning we had a very successful book event where we talked about your book, the Al-Qaeda Factor, Plots Against the West. Can you go ahead and give us an overview of your book and how you approach the topic? Sure, Ozzy. Yeah, essentially what I did is I wanted to look at how the Al-Qaeda threat has changed since 9-11. So I took what I deemed 16 of the most important plots against the West. In the West, I looked at North America, Europe and Australia, and looked at plots over this 18-year time period. And the idea was to try and find out if you stacked these plots against each other, what type of commonalities might come out? What were the similarities? What were the differences? And when looking at those different things, what might you be able to find out that would help you thwart future plots? So really only getting into the weeds and looking at how people radicalized in Madrid, in Copenhagen, in Sydney, Australia, in Toronto, in New York could we determine a lot of the underlying drivers for these plots. And essentially I think that's where a lot of the policy insights will come from. And essentially each chapter is a plot. So it could even be read sort of plot by plot to better understand them. And what was your primary purpose for taking this topic on? Why did you do the book? I think one of the things that I found at NYPD is the best way we've been able to help protect New York City is by understanding really the details, the anatomy of each one of these plots, learn things, and then incorporate that into our counter-terrorism efforts. So I thought if by looking at these most significant plots, there might be some insights that we might gain additional insights, and that might help New York and the U.S. and Western countries in general in trying to stop this threat. You know, Mitch, one of the things I thought was really fascinating about the book was how you discussed the evolution of the threat of al-Qaeda from 2001 basically to where we are now in the presence. For the audience, can you take us through that transformation and where you think the threat of al-Qaeda and the threats against the West is headed? Absolutely, I mean that's one of the conclusions that drops out of the plot in the sense that immediately after 9-11 it was clear who had hit the United States. It was the singular organization al-Qaeda corps. Sure, it had a few affiliates and allies in the Philippines and Indonesia and in 2004 in Iraq. But really, once we got past 2004, the threat metastasized. The threat sort of became much more disaggregated with a variety of different affiliates and allies. Groups like Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Tibah, Jayshi Muhammad, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Mahabharat. Suddenly you really had this almost spontaneous growth of other groups that were existing in sanctuaries in Yemen, in Somalia, in the North African Maghreb who had similar goals as al-Qaeda and as we saw on Christmas Day and in May 2010 some of these groups like AQAP and TTP might actually project the plot out against the West. So now in 2012 we have to be concerned about the remnants of al-Qaeda corps, some of the affiliates and allies who are only gaining strength and still the homegrown threat which is still bubbling up. One of the things that's great about the book is you actually do put some observations and some pretty specific conclusions out there about this threat. What are some of those? I think one of the main conclusions is that whereas probably we thought initially after 9-11 the al-Qaeda threat was something that happened overseas and got launched toward us, we now know that ten years later actually an important part of the threat is people who radicalize in New York, who radicalize in London, Copenhagen, Madrid. So in a sense there's an element of the problem of the threat that starts out at home. Now obviously there's a lot of changes on our way in the counter-terrorism world. The death of bin Laden in May and we now have budget restrictions inside the federal government and obviously as you're well aware state and local too. Your conclusions, what kind of implications are they going to have for U.S. counter-terrorism policy not at the federal level but specifically the state level as well? I think it's important conclusions because clearly it's resource allocation questions because suddenly there's not enough money. The pie is much smaller. So where are we going to lay down chips? Big overseas military actions are probably prohibitively expensive now. And the question is what's most cost-effective? And I think one of the conclusions is that some chips need to be laid down on the home front to potentially identifying people before they travel overseas and really become that al-Qaeda-type threat. So resource allocation issues I think. Well, Mitch Silber from NYPD's Director of Intelligence, thank you for joining us. Thanks so much.