 File 50 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book 3 of Morals. Part 3 of the Other Virtues and Vices. Section 2 of Greatness of Mind. It may now be proper to illustrate this general system of morals by applying it to particular instances of virtue and vice, and showing how their merit or demerit arises from the four sources here explained. We shall begin with examining the passions of pride and humility, and shall consider the vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just proportion. An excessive pride or overweening conceit of ourselves is always esteemed vicious, and is universally hated, as modesty or a just sense of our weakness is esteemed virtuous, and procures the goodwill of everyone. Of the four sources of moral distinctions, this is to be ascribed to the third, that is, the immediate agreeableness and disagreeableness of equality to others, without any reflections on the tendency of that quality. In order to prove this, we must have recourse to two principles which are very conspicuous in human nature. The first of these is the sympathy and communication of sentiments and passions above mentioned. So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls that no sooner any person approaches me than he diffuses on me all his opinions and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree. And though on many occasions my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments and way of thinking, yet its seldom is so weak as not to disturb the easy course of my thought and give an authority to that opinion which is recommended to me by his assent and approbation. Nor is it anyway material upon what subject he and I employ our thoughts. Whether we judge of an indifferent person or of my own character, my sympathy gives equal force to his decision, and even his sentiments of his own merit make me consider him in the same light in which he regards himself. This principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature that it enters into most of our sentiments and passions, and often takes place under the appearance of its contrary. For it is remarkable that when a person opposes me in anything which I am strongly bent upon and rouses up my passion by contradiction, I have always a degree of sympathy with him, nor does my commotion proceed from any other origin. We may here observe an evident conflict or encounter of opposite principles and passions. On the one side there is that passion or sentiment which is natural to me, and it is observable that the stronger this passion is, the greater is the commotion. There must also be some passion or sentiment on the other side, and this passion can proceed from nothing but sympathy. The sentiments of others can never affect us but by becoming in some measure our own, in which case they operate upon us by opposing and increasing our passions in the very same manner as if they had been originally derived from our own temper and disposition. While they remain concealed in the minds of others, they can never have any influence upon us, and even when they are known, if they went no farther than the imagination or conception, that faculty is so accustomed to objects of every different kind that a mere idea, though contrary to our sentiments and inclinations, would never alone be able to affect us. The second principle I shall take notice of is that of comparison, or the variation of our judgments concerning objects according to the proportion they bear to those with which we compare them. We judge more of objects by comparison than by their intrinsic worth and value, and regard everything as mean when set in opposition to what is superior of the same kind. But no comparison is more obvious than that with ourselves, and hence it is that on all occasions it takes place and mixes with most of our passions. This kind of comparison is directly contrary to sympathy in its operation as we have observed in treating of compassion and malice. In Book 2, Part 2, Section 8. In all kinds of comparison, an object makes us always receive from another to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compared with our own. His pain, considered in itself, is painful, but augments the idea of our own happiness and gives us pleasure. Since then those principles of sympathy and a comparison with ourselves are directly contrary, it may be worthwhile to consider what general rules can be formed beside the particular temper of the person for the prevalence of the one or the other. Suppose I am now in safety at land, and would willingly reap some pleasure from this consideration. I must think on the miserable condition of those who are at sea in a storm, and must endeavor to render this idea as strong and lively as possible in order to make me more sensible of my own happiness. But whatever pains I may take, the comparison will never have an equal efficacy as if I were really on the shore. Footnote 26. Reader's note. The Latin from Lucretius is not read here, rather the English translation. There is something pleasant in watching from dry land, the great difficulties another man is undergoing out on the high sea, with the winds lashing the waters. This is not because one derives delight from any man's distress, but because it is pleasurable to perceive from what troubles one is oneself free. End of footnote 26. And saw a ship at a distance tossed by a tempest and in danger every moment of perishing on a rock or sand bank. But suppose this idea to become still more lively. Suppose the ship to be driven so near me that I can perceive distinctly the horror painted on the countenance of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each other's arms. No man has so savage a heart as to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or withstand the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy. It is evident, therefore, there is a medium in this case, and that if the idea be too faint, it has no influence by comparison, and on the other hand, if it be too strong, it operates on us entirely by sympathy, which is the contrary to comparison. Sympathy being the conversion of an idea into an impression demands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite to comparison. All this is easily applied to the present subject. We sink very much in our own eyes when in the presence of a great man, or one of a superior genius. And this humility makes a considerable ingredient in that respect which we pay our superiors according to our foregoing reasonings on that passion. In Book 2, Part 2, Section 10. Sometimes even envy and hatred arise from the comparison, but in the greatest part of men it rests at respect and esteem. As sympathy has such a powerful influence on the human mind, it causes pride to have in some measure the same effect as merit. And by making us enter into those elevated sentiments which the proud man entertains of himself presents that comparison which is so mortifying and disagreeable. Our judgment does not entirely accompany him in the flattering conceit in which he pleases himself, but still is so shaken as to receive the idea it presents and to give it an influence above the loose conceptions of the imagination. A man who in an idle humor would form a notion of a person of a merit very much superior to his own would not be mortified by that fiction. But when a man whom we are really persuaded to be of inferior merit is presented to us, if we observe in him any extraordinary degree of pride and self-conceit, the firm persuasion he has of his own merit takes hold of the imagination and diminishes us in our own eyes in the same manner as if he were really possessed of all the good qualities which he so liberally attributes to himself. Our idea is here precisely in that medium which is requisite to make it operate on us by comparison. Were it accompanied with belief and did the person appear to have the same merit which he assumes to himself, it would have a contrary effect and would operate on us by sympathy. The influence of that principle would then be superior to that of comparison contrary to what happens where the person's merit seems below his pretensions. The necessary consequence of these principles is that pride or an overweening conceit of ourselves must be vicious, since it causes uneasiness in all men and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison. It is a trite observation in philosophy and even in common life and conversation that it is our own pride which makes us so much displeased with the pride of other people and that vanity becomes insupportable to us merely because we are vain. The gay naturally associate themselves with the gay and the amorous with the amorous, but the proud never can endure the proud and rather seek the company of those who are of an opposite disposition. As we are, all of us, proud in some degree, pride is universally blamed and condemned by all mankind as having a natural tendency to cause uneasiness in others by means of comparison. And this effect must follow the more naturally that those who have an ill-grounded conceit of themselves are forever making those comparisons nor have they any other method of supporting their vanity. A man of sense and merit is pleased with himself independent of all foreign considerations, but a fool must always find some person that is more foolish in order to keep himself in good humor with his own parts and understanding. But though an over-weening conceit of our own merit be vicious and disagreeable, nothing can be more laudable than to have a value for ourselves where we really have qualities that are valuable. The utility and advantage of any quality to ourselves is a source of virtue as well as its agreeableness to others. And it is certain that nothing is more useful to us in the conduct of life than a due degree of pride which makes us sensible of our own merit and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprises. Over capacity any one may be endowed with it is entirely useless to him if he be not acquainted with it and form not designs suitable to it. It is requisite on all occasions to know our own force, and were it allowable to err on either side it would be more advantageous to overrate our merit than to form ideas of it below its just standard. Religion commonly favors the bold and enterprising, and nothing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves. Add to this that though pride or self-applies be sometimes disagreeable to others, it is always agreeable to ourselves, as on the other hand modesty, though it give pleasure to everyone who observes it produces often uneasiness in the person endowed with it. Now it has been observed that our own sensations determine the vice and virtue of inequality as well as those sensations which it may excite in others. Thus self-satisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable but requisite in a character. It is however certain that good-breeding and decency require that we should avoid all signs and expressions which tend directly to show that passion. We have, all of us, a wonderful partiality for ourselves, and were we always to give vent to our sentiments in this particular we should mutually cause the greatest indignation in each other, not only by the immediate presence of so disagreeable a subject of comparison, but also by the contrarity of our judgments. In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature in order to secure property in society and prevent the opposition of self-interest, we establish the rules of good-breeding in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. Nothing is more disagreeable than a man's overweening conceit of himself. Everyone almost has a strong propensity to this vice. No one can well distinguish in himself betwixt the vice and virtue, or be certain that his esteem of his own merit is well founded. For these reasons all direct expressions of this passion are condemned, nor do we make any exception to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit. They are not allowed to do themselves justice openly in words no more than other people, and even if they show a reserve and secret doubt in doing themselves justice in their own thoughts, they will be more applauded. That impertinent and almost universal propensity of men to overvalue themselves has given us such a prejudice against self-applauds that we are apt to condemn it by a general rule wherever we meet with it, and it is with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even in their most secret thoughts. At least it must be owned that some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite, and that if we harbor pride in our breasts we must carry affair outside and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour. We must on every occasion be ready to prefer others to ourselves, to treat them with a kind of deference, even though they be our equals, to seem always the lowest and least in the company where we are not very much distinguished above them, and if we observe these rules in our conduct men will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments when we discover them in an oblique manner. I believe no one who has any practice of the world and can penetrate into the inward sentiments of men will assert that the humility which good-breeding and decency require of us goes beyond the outside, or that a thorough sincerity in this particular is esteemed a real part of our duty. On the contrary we may observe that a genuine and hearty pride or self-esteem, if well concealed and well founded, is essential to the character of a man of honour, and that there is no quality of the mind which is more indispensibly requisite to procure the esteem and approbation of mankind. There are certain differences and mutual submissions which custom requires of the different ranks of men towards each other, and whoever exceeds in this particular, if through interest, is accused of meanness, if through ignorance, of simplicity. It is necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be fixed by our birth, fortune, employments, talents, or reputation. It is necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride and conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And should it be said that prudence may suffice to regulate our actions in this particular without any real pride, I would observe that here the object of prudence is to conform our actions to the general usage and custom, and that it is impossible those tacit errors of superiority should ever have been established and authorised by custom unless men were generally proud, and unless that passion were generally approved when well grounded. If we pass from common life and conversation to history, this reasoning acquires new force when we observe that all those great actions and sentiments which have become the admiration of mankind are founded on nothing but pride and self-esteem. Go, says Alexander the Great to his soldiers when they refuse to follow him to the Indies, go tell your countrymen that you left Alexander completing the conquest of the world. This passage was always particularly admired by the Prince of Khande as we learn from Saint Evrimand. Alexander said that Prince, abandoned by his soldiers among barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire that he could not believe it possible anyone could refuse to obey him, whether in Europe or in Asia, among the Greeks or Persians, all was indifferent to him, wherever he found men he fancied he had found subjects. In general we may observe that whatever we call heroic virtue and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind is either nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem or partakes largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity and all the other shining virtues of that kind have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them and derive a great part of their merit from that origin. Accordingly we find many religious disclaimers decry those virtues as purely pagan and natural and represent to us the Excellency of the Christian religion which places humility in the rank of virtues and corrects the judgment of the world and even of philosophers who so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this virtue of humility has been rightly understood I shall not pretend to determine. I am content with the concession that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride which secretly animates our conduct without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity as may offend the vanity of others. The merit of pride or self-esteem is derived from two circumstances, that is, its utility and its agreeableness to ourselves by which it capacitates us for business and at the same time gives us an immediate satisfaction. When it goes beyond its just bounds it loses the first advantage and even becomes prejudicial, which is the reason why we condemn an extravagant pride and ambition, however regulated by the decorums of good-breeding and politeness. But as such a passion is still agreeable and conveys an elevated and sublime sensation to the person who is actuated by it, the sympathy with that satisfaction diminishes considerably the blame which naturally attends its dangerous influence on his conduct and behavior. Accordingly we may observe that an excessive courage and magnanimity, especially when it displays itself under the frowns of fortune, contributes in a great measure to the character of a hero and will render a person the admiration of posterity at the same time that it ruins his affairs and leads him into dangers and difficulties with which otherwise he would never have been acquainted. Heroism or military glory is much admired by the generality of mankind. They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their praises of it. The infinite confusions and disorder which it has caused in the world diminish much of its merits in their eyes. When they would oppose the popular notions on this head they always paint out the evils which this supposed virtue has produced in human society. The subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, the sack of cities. As long as these are present to us we are more inclined to hate than admire the ambition of heroes. But when we fix our view on the person himself who is the author of all this mischief there is something so dazzling in his character the mere contemplation of it so elevates the mind that we cannot refuse it our admiration. The pain which we receive from its tendency to the prejudice of society is overpowered by a stronger and more immediate sympathy. Thus our explication of the merit or demerit which attends the degrees of pride or self-esteem may serve as a strong argument for the preceding hypothesis by shooing the effects of those principles above explained in all the variations of our judgments concerning that passion. Nor will this reasoning be advantageous to us only by shooing that the distinction of vice and virtue arises from the four principles of the advantage and of the pleasure of the person himself and of others, but may also afford us a strong proof of some underparts of that hypothesis. No one who duly considers of this matter will make any scruple of allowing that any piece of ill-breeding or any expression of pride and haughtiness is displeasing to us merely because it shocks our own pride and leads us by sympathy into a comparison which causes the disagreeable passion of humility. Now as an insolence of this kind is blamed even in a person who has always been civil to ourselves in particular, nay in one whose name is only known to us in history, it follows that our disapprovation proceeds from a sympathy with others and from the reflection that such a character is highly displeasing and odious to everyone who converses or has any intercourse with the person possessed of it. We sympathize with those people in their uneasiness, and as their uneasiness proceeds in part from a sympathy with the person who insults them, we may here observe a double rebound of the sympathy, which is a principle very similar to what we have observed on another occasion. Having thus explained the origin of that praise and approbation which attends everything we call great inhuman affections, we now proceed to give an account of their goodness and shoe once its merit is derived. When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive that the generosity of men is very limited and that its seldom extends beyond our compassion. We want their friends and family, or at most beyond their native country. Being thus equated with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him, but confine our view to that narrow circle in which any person moves in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character and love his person by a sympathy with the sentiments of those who have a more particular connection with him. We are quickly obliged to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind by reason of the perpetual contradictions we meet with in society and conversation from persons that are not placed in the same situation and have not the same interest with ourselves. The only point of view in which our sentiments concur with those of others is when we consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those who have any immediate connection or intercourse with the person possessed of it. And though this advantage or harm be often very remote from ourselves, yet sometimes it is very near us and interests us strongly by sympathy. This concern we readily extend to other cases that are resembling. And when these are very remote, our sympathy is proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame fainter and more doubtful. The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance, but though the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard by which we judge of them, yet we do not say that they actually diminish by the distance, but correcting the appearance by reflection arrive at a more constant and established judgment concerning them. In like manner, though sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves and the sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous, yet we neglect all these differences in our calm judgments concerning the characters of men. Besides that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons who are in a different situation from ourselves and who could never converse with us on any reasonable terms where we to remain constantly in that situation and point of view which is peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments therefore in society and conversation makes us form some general inalterable standard by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart does not always take part with those general notions or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. From these principles we may easily account for that merit which is commonly ascribed to generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality, and all those other qualities which form the character of good and benevolent. A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of life, and gives a just direction to all his other qualities which otherwise may become prejudicial to society. Courage and ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. It is the same case with judgment and capacity and all the qualities of that kind. They are indifferent in themselves to the interests of society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind according as they are directed by these other passions. As love is immediately agreeable to the person who is actuated by it and hatred immediately disagreeable, this may also be a considerable reason why we praise all the passions that partake of the former and blame all those that have any considerable share of the latter. It is certain we are infinitely touched with a tender sentiment as well as with a great one. The tears naturally start in our eyes at the conception of it, nor can we forbear giving a loose to the same tenderness towards the person who exerts it. All this seems to me a proof that our approbation has in those cases an origin different from the prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others, to which we may add that men naturally, without reflection, approve of that character which is most like their own. The men of a mild disposition and tender affections informing a notion of the most perfect virtue mixes in it more of benevolence and humanity than the men of courage and enterprise who naturally looks upon a certain elevation of mind as the most accomplished character. This must evidently proceed from an immediate sympathy which men have with characters similar to their own. They enter with more warmth into such sentiments and feel more sensibly the pleasure which arises from them. It is remarkable that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship where a person is attentive to the smallest concerns of his friend and is willing to sacrifice to them the most considerable interest of his own. Such delicacies have little influence on society because they make us regard the greatest trifles, but they are the more engaging, the more minute the concern is, and are a proof of the highest merit in anyone who is capable of them. The passions are so contagious that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another and produce correspondent movements in all human breasts. Where friendship appears in very signal instances my heart catches the same passion and is warmed by those warm sentiments that display themselves before me. Such agreeable movements must give me an affection to everyone that excites them. This is the case with everything that is agreeable in any person. The transition from pleasure to love is easy, but the transition must here be still more easy since the agreeable sentiment which is excited by sympathy is love itself, and there is nothing required but to change the object. Hence the peculiar merit of benevolence in all its shapes and appearances. Hence even its weaknesses are virtuous and amiable, and a person whose grief upon the loss of a friend were excessive would be esteemed upon that account. His tenderness bestows a merit as it does a pleasure on his melancholy. We are not, however, to imagine that all the angry passions are vicious though they are disagreeable. There is a certain indulgence due to human nature in this respect. Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution. The want of them on some occasions may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility, and where they appear only in a low degree we not only excuse them because they are natural, but even bestow our applause on them because they are inferior to what appears in the greatest part of mankind. Where these angry passions rise up to cruelty they form the most detested of all vices. All the pity and concern which we have for the miserable sufferers by this vice turns against the person guilty of it, and produces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion. Even when the vice of inhumanity rises not to this extreme degree our sentiments concerning it are very much influenced by reflections on the harm that results from it. And we may observe in general that if we can find any quality in a person which renders him incomodious to those who live and converse with him, we always allow it to be a fault or a blemish without any further examination. On the other hand, when we enumerate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts of his character which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society, and love or hate him according as he affects those who have any immediate intercourse with him. And it is a most certain rule that if there be no relation of life in which I could not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allowed to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue. End of file 51. File 52 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, volume 2. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book 3 of Morals. Part 3 of the Other Virtues and Vices. Section 4 of Natural Abilities. No distinction is more usual in all systems of ethics than that betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues, where the former are placed on the same footing with bodily endowments and are supposed to have no merit or moral worth annexed to them. Whoever considers the matter accurately will find that a dispute upon this head would be merely a dispute of words, and that though these qualities are not altogether of the same kind, yet they agree in the most material circumstances. They are both of them equally mental qualities, and both of them equally produce pleasure and have, of course, an equal tendency to procure the love and esteem of mankind. There are few who are not as jealous of their character with regard to sense and knowledge as to honor and courage, and much more than with regard to temperance and sobriety. Men are even afraid of passing for good-natured, lest that should be taken for want of understanding, and often boast of more debauches than they have been really engaged in to give themselves heirs of fire and spirit. In short, the figure a man makes in the world, the reception he meets within company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance. All these advantages depend almost as much upon his good sense and judgment as upon any other part of his character. Let a man have the best intentions in the world and be the farthest from all injustice and violence, he will never be able to make himself be much regarded without a moderate share, at least, of parts and understanding. Since then, natural abilities, though perhaps inferior, yet are on the same footing, both as to their causes and effects, with those qualities which we call moral virtues, why should we make any distinction betwixt them? Though we refuse to natural abilities the title of virtues, we must allow that they procure the love and the esteem of mankind, that they give a new luster to the other virtues, and that a man possessed of them is much more entitled to our good will and services than one entirely void of them. It may indeed be pretended that the sentiment of approbation which those qualities produce, besides its being inferior, is also somewhat different from that which attends the other virtues. But this, in my opinion, is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the catalog of virtues. Each of the virtues, even benevolence, justice, gratitude, integrity, excites a different sentiment or feeling in the spectator. The characters of Caesar and Cato, as drawn by solace, are both of them virtuous in the strictest sense of the word, but in a different way, nor are the sentiments entirely the same which arise from them. The one produces love, the other esteem. The one is amiable, the other awful. We could wish to meet with the one character in a friend, the other character we would be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner, the approbation which attends natural abilities may be somewhat different to the feeling from that which arises from the other virtues without making them entirely of a different species. And indeed we may observe that the natural abilities, no more than the other virtues, produce not all of them the same kind of approbation. Good sense and genius beget a steam, wit and humor excite love. Footnote 27. Love and esteem are at the bottom the same passions and arise from like causes. The qualities that produce both are agreeable and give pleasure. But where this pleasure is severe and serious, or where its object is great and makes a strong impression, or where it produces any degree of humility and all, in all these cases, the passion which arises from the pleasure is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both, but is connected with love in a more eminent degree. End of footnote 27. Those who represent the distinction betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues as very material may say that the former are entirely involuntary and have therefore no merit attending them as having no dependence on liberty and free will. But to this I answer first that many of those qualities which all moralists, especially the ancients, comprehend under the title of moral virtues, are equally involuntary and necessary with the qualities of the judgment and imagination. Of this nature are constancy, fortitude, magnanimity, and, in short, all the qualities which form the great man. I might say the same in some degree of the others. It being almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any considerable article or cure itself of a passionate or splenetic temper when they are natural to it. The greater degree there is of these blamable qualities the more vicious they become, and yet they are the less voluntary. Secondly, I would have anyone give me a reason why virtue and vice may not be involuntary as well as beauty and deformity. These moral distinctions arise from the natural distinctions of pain and pleasure, and when we receive those feelings from the general consideration of any quality or character we denominate it vicious or virtuous. Now I believe no one will assert that equality can never produce pleasure or pain to the person who considers it unless it be perfectly voluntary in the person who possesses it. Thirdly, as to free will we have shown that it has no place with regard to the actions no more than the qualities of men. It is not a just consequence that what is voluntary is free. Our actions are more voluntary than our judgments, but we have not more liberty in the one than in the other. But though this distinction betwixt voluntary and involuntary be not sufficient to justify the distinction betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues, yet the former distinction will afford us a plausible reason why moralists have invented the latter. Men have observed that though natural abilities and moral qualities are in the main on the same footing, there is however this difference betwixt them that the former are almost invariable by any art or industry while the latter or at least the actions that proceed from them may be changed by the motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame. Hence legislators and divines and moralists have principally applied themselves to the regulating these voluntary actions and have endeavored to produce additional motives for being virtuous in that particular. They knew that to punish a man for folly or exhort him to be prudent and sagacious would have but little effect, though the same punishments and exhortations with regard to justice and injustice might have a considerable influence. But as men in common life and conversation do not carry those ends in view but naturally praise or blame whatever pleases or displeases them, they do not seem much to regard this distinction but consider prudence under the character of virtue as well as benevolence and penetration as well as justice. Nay, we find that all moralists whose judgment is not perverted by a strict adherence to a system enter into the same way of thinking and that the ancient moralists in particular made no scruple of placing prudence at the head of the cardinal virtues. There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation which may be excited in some degree by any faculty of the mind in its perfect state and condition and to account for this sentiment is the business of philosophers. It belongs to grammarians to examine what qualities are entitled to the denomination of virtue nor will they find upon trial that this is so easy a task as at first sight they may be apt to imagine. The principal reason why natural abilities are esteemed is because of their tendency to be useful to the person who is possessed of them. It is impossible to execute any design with success where it is not conducted with prudence and discretion nor will the goodness of our intentions alone suffice to procure us a happy issue to our enterprises. Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason and they are the degrees of the same faculty which set such an infinite difference betwixt one man and another. All the advantages of art are owing to human reason and where fortune is not very capricious the most considerable part of these advantages must fall to the share of the prudent and sagacious. When it is asked whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable whether one that at first view penetrates into a subject but can perform nothing upon study or a contrary character which must work out everything by dent of application whether a clear head or a copious invention whether a profound genius or a sure judgment in short what character or peculiar understanding is more excellent than another it is evident we can answer none of these questions without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world and carries him farthest in any of his undertakings there are many other qualities of the mind whose merit is derived from the same origin industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy with other virtues of that kind which it will be easy to recollect are esteemed valuable upon no other account than their advantage in the conduct of life it is the same case with temperance, frugality, economy, resolution as on the other hand, prodigality, luxury, irresolution, uncertainty are vicious merely because they draw ruin upon us and incapacitate us for business and action as wisdom and good sense are valued because they are useful to the person possessed of them so wit and eloquence are valued because they are immediately agreeable to others on the other hand, good humor is loved and esteemed because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself it is evident that the conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory as a cheerful good-humored companion defuses the joy over the whole company from a sympathy with his gaiety these qualities therefore being agreeable they naturally beget love and esteem and answer to all the characters of virtue it is difficult to tell on many occasions what it is that renders one man's conversation so agreeable and entertaining and in others so insipid and distasteful as conversation is a transcript of the mind as well as books the same qualities which render the one valuable must give us an esteem for the other this we shall consider afterwards in the meantime it may be affirmed in general that all the merit a man may derive from his conversation which no doubt may be very considerable arises from nothing but the pleasure it conveys to those who are present in this view, cleanliness is also to be regarded as a virtue since it naturally renders us agreeable to others and is a very considerable source of love and affection no one will deny that negligence in this particular is a fault and as faults are nothing but smaller vices and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation which it excites in others we may in this instance, seemingly so trivial clearly discover the origin of the moral distinction of vice and virtue in other instances besides all those qualities which render a person relatively or valuable there is also a certain je ne sais quoi of agreeable and handsome that concurs to the same effect in this case as well as in that of wit and eloquence we must have recourse to a certain sense which acts without reflection and regards not the tendencies of qualities and characters some moralists account for all the sentiments of virtue by this sense their hypothesis is very plausible nothing but a particular inquiry can give the preference to any other hypothesis when we find that almost all the virtues have such particular tendencies and also find that these tendencies are sufficient alone to give a strong sentiment of approbation we cannot doubt after this that qualities are approved of in proportion to the advantage which results from them the decorum or end decorum of equality with regard to the age or character or station contributes also to its praise or blame this decorum depends in a great measure upon experience it is usual to see men lose their levity as they advance in years such a degree of gravity therefore and such years are connected together in our thoughts when we observe them separated in any person's character this imposes a kind of violence on our imagination and is disagreeable that faculty of the soul which of all others is of the least consequence to the character and has the least virtue or vice in it several degrees at the same time that it admits of a great variety of degrees is the memory unless it rise up to that stupendous height as to surprise us or sink so low as in some measure to affect the judgment we commonly take no notice of its variations nor ever mention them to the praise or dispraise of any person it is so far from being a virtue to have a good memory that men generally affect to complain of a bad one and endeavoring to persuade the world that what they say is entirely of their own invention sacrifice it to the praise of genius and judgment yet to consider the matter abstractedly it would be difficult to give a reason why the faculty of recalling past ideas with truth and clearness should not have as much merit in it as the faculty of placing our present ideas in such an order as to form true propositions and opinions the reason of the difference certainly must be that the memory is exerted without any sensation of pleasure or pain and in all its middling degrees serves almost equally well in business and affairs but the least variations in the judgment are sensibly felt in their consequences while at the same time that faculty is never exerted in any imminent degree without an extraordinary delight and satisfaction the sympathy with this utility and pleasure bestows a merit on the understanding and the absence of it makes us consider the memory as a faculty very indifferent to blame or praise before I leave this subject of natural abilities I must observe that perhaps one source of the esteem and affection which attends them is derived from the importance and weight which they bestow on the person possessed of them he becomes of greater consequence in life his resolutions and actions affect a greater number of his fellow creatures both his friendship and enmity are of moment and it is easy to observe that whoever is elevated after this manner above the rest of mankind must excite in us the sentiments of esteem and approvation whatever is important our attention fixes our thought and is contemplated with satisfaction the histories of kingdoms are more interesting than domestic stories the histories of great empires more than those of small cities and principalities and the histories of wars and revolutions more than those of peace and order we sympathize with the persons that suffer all the various sentiments which belong to their fortunes the mind is occupied by the multitude of the objects and by the strong passions that display themselves and this occupation or agitation of the mind is commonly agreeable and amusing the same theory accounts for the esteem and regard we pay to men of extraordinary parts and abilities the good and ill of multitudes are connected with their actions whatever they undertake is important and challenges our attention nothing is to be overlooked and despised that regards them and where any person can excite these sentiments he soon acquires our esteem unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable and of file 52 file 53 of a treatise of human nature by David Hume volume 2 this Libra Vox recording is in the public domain recording by George Yeager book 3 of morals part 3 of the other virtues and vices part 5 some further reflections concerning the natural virtues it has been observed in treating of the passions that pride and humility love and hatred are excited by any advantages or disadvantages of the mind body or fortune and that these advantages or disadvantages have that effect a separate impression of pain or pleasure the pain or pleasure which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind constitutes its vice or virtue and gives rise to our approbation or blame which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred we have assigned four different forms of this pain and pleasure and in order to justify more fully that hypothesis it may here be proper to observe that the advantages or disadvantages of the body and of fortune produce a pain or pleasure from the very same principles the tendency of any object to be useful to the person possessed of it or to others convey pleasure to him or to others all these circumstances convey an immediate pleasure to the person who considers the object and command his love and approbation to begin with the advantages of the body we may observe a phenomenon which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous if anything could be trivial which fortified a conclusion of the importance or ludicrous which was employed in a philosophical reasoning it is a general remark that those we call good women's men who have either signalized themselves by their amorous exploits or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigor of that kind are well received by the fair sex and naturally engage even of those whose virtue prevents any design of ever giving employment to those talents here it is evident that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females at the same time that the women who love and esteem him have no prospect of receiving that enjoyment themselves and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one that has a commerce of love with him this instance is singular and merits our attention another source of the pleasure we receive from considering bodily advantages is their utility to the person himself who is possessed of them it is certain that a considerable part of the beauty of men as well as of other animals consists in such a conformation of members as we find by experience to be attended with strength and agility and to capacitate the creature for any action or exercise broad shoulders a lank belly firm joints taper legs all these are beautiful diseases because they are signs of force and vigor which being advantages we naturally sympathize with they convey to the beholder a share of that satisfaction they produce in the possessor so far as to the utility which may attend any quality of the body as to the immediate pleasure it is certain that an air of health as well as of strength and agility makes a considerable part of beauty and that a sickly air in another is always disagreeable upon account of that idea of pain and uneasiness which it conveys to us on the other hand we are pleased with the regularity of our own features though it be neither useful to ourselves nor others and it is necessary for us to set ourselves at a distance to make it convey to us any satisfaction we commonly consider ourselves as we appear in the eyes of others and sympathize with the advantageous sentiments they entertain with regard to us how far the advantages of fortune produce esteem and approbation from the same principles we may satisfy ourselves by reflecting on our precedent reasoning on that subject we have observed that our approbation of those who are possessed of the advantages of fortune may be ascribed to three different causes first to that immediate pleasure which a rich man gives us by the view of the beautiful clothes equiped gardens or houses which he possesses secondly to the advantage which we hope to reap from him by his generosity and liberality thirdly to the pleasure and advantage which he himself reaps from his possessions and which produce an agreeable sympathy in us whether we ascribe our esteem of the rich and great to one or all of these causes we clearly see the traces of those principles which give rise to the sense of vice and virtue I believe most people at first sight will be inclined to ascribe our esteem of the rich to self-interest and the prospect of advantage but as it is certain that our esteem or deference extends beyond any prospect of advantage to ourselves it is evident that that sentiment must proceed from a sympathy with those who are dependent on the person we esteem and respect and who have an immediate connection with him we consider him as a person capable of contributing to the happiness or enjoyment of his fellow creatures whose sentiments with regard to him we naturally embrace and this consideration will serve to justify my hypothesis in preferring the third principle to the other two and ascribing our esteem of the rich to a sympathy with the pleasure and advantage which they themselves receive from their possessions for as even the other two principles cannot operate to a due extent or account for all the phenomena without having recourse to a sympathy of one kind or other it is much more natural to choose that sympathy which is immediate and direct than that which is remote and indirect to which we may add that where the riches or power are very great and render the person considerable and important in the world the esteem attending them may in part be described to another source distinct from these three that is, they're interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude and the importance of their consequences though in order to account for the operation of this principle we must also have recourse to sympathy as we have observed in the preceding section it may not be amiss on this occasion to remark the flexibility of our sentiments and the several changes they so readily receive from the objects with which they are conjoined all the sentiments of appropriation which attend any particular species of objects have a great resemblance to each other though derived from different sources and on the other hand those sentiments when directed to different objects the feeling though derived from the same source thus the beauty of all visible objects causes a pleasure pretty much the same though it be sometimes derived from the mere species and appearance of the objects sometimes from sympathy and an idea of their utility in like manner whenever we survey the actions and characters of men without any particular interest in them the pleasure or pain which arises from the survey with some minute differences is in the main of the same kind though perhaps there be a great diversity in the causes from which it is derived on the other hand a convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of appropriation even though the source of our approbation be the same and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility there is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings but it is what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments End of File 53 File 54 of a treatise of human nature by David Hume Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain Recording by George Yeager Book 3 of Morals Part 3 of the Other Virtues and Vices Section 6 Conclusion of this book Thus upon the whole I am hopeful that nothing is wanting to an accurate proof of the system of ethics We are certain that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature We are also certain that it has a great influence on our sense of beauty when we regard external objects as well as when we judge of morals We find that it has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation when it operates alone without the concurrence of any other principle as in the cases of justice allegiance chastity and good manners We may observe that all the circumstances requisite for its operation are found in most of the virtues which have for the most part a tendency to the good of society or to that of the person possessed of them If we compare all these circumstances we shall not doubt that justice is the chief source of moral distinctions especially when we reflect that no objection can be raised against this hypothesis in one case which will not extend to all cases Justice is certainly approved of for no other reason than because it has a tendency to the public good and the public good is indifferent to us except so far as sympathy interests us in it We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues which have a like tendency to the public good They must derive all their merit from our sympathy with those who reap any advantage from them as the virtues which have a tendency to the good of the person possessed of them derive their merit from our sympathy with him Most people will readily allow that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous because of their utility This way of thinking is so natural and occurs on so many occasions that few will make any scruple of admitting it Now this being once admitted the force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged Virtue is considered as means to an end Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone To that principle therefore we are to ascribe the sentiment of approbation which arises from the survey of all those virtues that are useful to society or to the person possessed These form the most considerable part of morality Were it proper in such a subject to bribe the reader's assent or employ anything but solid argument we are here abundantly supplied with topics to engage the affections All lovers of virtue and such we all are in speculation however we may degenerate in practice must certainly be pleased to see moral distinctions derived from so noble a source which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of human nature It requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition But this sense must certainly acquire new force when reflecting on itself it approves of those principles from whence it is derived and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind may defend the cause with sufficient authority but want the advantage which those possess who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind According to their system not only virtue must be approved of but also the sense of virtue and not only that sense but also the principles from whence it is derived so that nothing is presented by the mind but what is laudable and good This observation may be extended to justice and the other virtues of that kind Though justice be artificial the sense of its morality is natural It is the combination of men in a system of conduct which renders any act of justice beneficial to society But when once it has that we naturally approve of it and if we did not so it is impossible any combination or convention could ever produce that sentiment Most of the inventions of men are subject to change They depend upon humor and caprice They have vogue for a time and then sink into oblivion It may perhaps be apprehended that if justice were allowed to be a human invention it must be placed on the same footing But the cases are widely different The interest on which justice is founded is the greatest imaginable and extends to all times and places It cannot possibly be served by any other invention It is obvious and discovers itself on the very first formation of society All these causes render the rules of justice steadfast and immutable at least as immutable as human nature And if they were founded on original instincts could they have any greater stability The same system may help us to form a just notion of the happiness as well as of the dignity of virtue or nature in the embracing and cherishing of that noble quality Who indeed does not feel an accession of alacrity in his pursuits of knowledge and ability of every kind when he considers that besides the advantage which immediately result from these acquisitions they also give him a new luster in the eyes of mankind and are universally attended with esteem and approbation And who can think any advantages of fortune a sufficient compensation for the least breach of the social virtues when he considers that not only his character with regard to others but also his peace and inward satisfaction entirely depend upon his strict observance of them and that a mind will never be able to bear its own survey that has been wanting in its part to mankind and society But I forbear insisting on this subject such reflections require a work apart very different from the genius of the present The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude or expression There is even something hideous or at least minute in the views of things which he presents and it is necessary the objects should be set more at a distance and be more covered up from sight to make them engaging to the eye and imagination An anatomist however admirably fitted to give advice to a painter and it is even impracticable to excel in the latter art without the assistance of the former We must have an exact knowledge of the parts their situation and connection before we can design with any elegance or correctness and thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature were cold and un-entertaining become subservient to practical morality and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts and more persuasive in its exhortations Readers note while this section is titled Conclusion of this book the LibriVox reading conclusion is actually the appendix which follows this section End of File 54 File 55 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 2 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Sharon Riscadal Appendix There is nothing I would more willingly lay hold of than an opportunity of confessing my errors and should esteem such a return a reason to be more honorable than the most unerring judgment A man who is free from mistakes can pretend to know praises except from the justness of his understanding but a man who corrects his mistakes shows at once the justness of his understanding and the candor and ingenuity of his temper I have not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings delivered in volumes except on one article but I have found by experience that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen as to guard against all mistakes in the readers and it is chiefly to remedy this defect I have subjoined the following appendix We can never be induced to believe any matter of fact except where its cause or its effect is present to us but what the nature is of that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect few have had the curiosity to ask themselves in my opinion this dilemma is inevitable either the belief is some new idea such as that of reality or existence which we join to the simple conception of an object or it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment that it is not a new idea the simple conception may be evinced from these two arguments first we have no abstract idea of existence distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects it is impossible therefore that this idea of existence can be annexed to the idea of any object or form the difference betwixt a simple conception and belief secondly the mind has the command over all its ideas and can separate unite mix and vary them as it pleases so that if belief consisted merely in a new idea annexed to the conception it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleased we may therefore conclude that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment in something that depends not on the will from certain determinant causes and principles of which we are not masters when we are convinced of any matter of fact we do nothing but conceive it along with a certain feeling different from what attends the mere reveries of the imagination and when we express our incredulity concerning any fact we mean that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere conception whatever objects were presented by the wildest imagination would be on an equal footing with the most established truths founded on history and experience there is nothing but the feeling or sentiment to distinguish the one from the other this therefore being regarded as an undoubted truth that belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling different from a simple conception the next question that naturally occurs is what is the nature of this feeling or sentiment and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind this question is important for if it be not analogous to any other sentiment we must despair of explaining its causes and must consider it as an original principle of the human mind if it be analogous we hope to explain its causes from analogy and trace it up to more general principles now that there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions which are the objects of conviction and assurance then in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle builder everyone will readily own they strike upon us with more force they are more present to us the mind has a firmer hold of them and is situated and moved by them it acquiesces in them and in a manner fixes and reposes itself on them in short they approach nearer to the impressions which are immediately present to us and are therefore analogous to many other operations of the mind there is not in my opinion any possibility of evading this conclusion but by asserting that belief beside simple conception consists in some impression or feeling distinguishable from the conception it does not modify the conception and render it more present and intense it is only annexed to it after the same manner that will and desire are annexed to particular conceptions of good and pleasure but the following considerations will I hope be sufficient to remove this hypothesis it is directly contrary to experience and our immediate consciousness all men have ever allowed reasoning to be merely an operation of our thoughts or ideas and however those ideas may be varied to the feeling there is nothing ever enters into our conclusions but ideas or our fainter conceptions for instance I hear at present a person's voice whom I am acquainted with and this sound comes from the next room this impression of my senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person along with all the surrounding objects I paint them out to myself as existent at present with the same qualities and relations that I formerly knew them possessed of these ideas take faster hold of my mind than the ideas of an enchanted castle they are different to the feeling but there is no distinct or separate impression attending them it is the same case when I recollect the several incidents of a journey or the events of any history every particular fact is there the object of belief its idea is modified differently from the loose reveries of a castle builder but no distinct impression attends every distinct idea or conception of matter of fact this is the subject of plain experience if ever this experience can be disputed on any occasion it is when the mind has been agitated with doubts and difficulties and afterwards upon taking the object in a new point of view or being presented with a new argument fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion and belief in this case there is a feeling distinct and separate from the conception the passage from doubt and agitation to tranquility and repose conveys a satisfaction and pleasure to the mind but take any other case suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion while some interposed object conceals the rest of his body here it is certain the imagination spreads out the whole figure I give him a head and shoulders and breast and neck these members I conceive and believe him to be possessed of nothing can be more evident than that this whole operation is performed by the thought or imagination alone the transition is immediate the ideas presently strike us their customary connection with the present impression varies them and modifies them in a certain manner but produces no act of the mind distinct from this peculiarity of conception let anyone examine his own mind and he will evidently find this to be the truth secondly whatever may be the case with regard to this distinct impression it must be allowed that the mind has a firmer hold or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact than of fictions why then look any farther or multiply suppositions without necessity thirdly we can explain the causes of the firm conception but not those of any separate impression and not only so but the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole subject and nothing is left to produce any other effect an inference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object that is frequently conjoined or is associated with a present impression this is the whole of it every part is requisite to explain from analogy the more steady conception and nothing remains capable of producing any distinct impression fourthly the effects of belief in influencing the passions and imagination can all be explained from the firm conception and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle these arguments with many others enumerated in the foregoing volumes sufficiently prove that belief only modifies the idea or conception and renders it different to the feeling without producing any distinct impression thus upon a general view of the subject there appear to be two questions of importance which we may venture to recommend to the consideration of philosophers whether there be anything to distinguish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling or sentiment and whether this feeling be anything but a firmer conception or a faster hold that we take of the object if upon impartial inquiry the same conclusion that I have formed be assented to by philosophers the next business is to examine the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind to find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception and this I do not esteem a difficult task the transition from a present impression always enlivens and strengthens any idea when any object is presented the idea of its usual attendant immediately strikes us as something real and solid it is felt rather than conceived and approaches the impression that it is derived in its force and influence this I have proved at large I cannot add any new arguments I had entertained some hopes that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be it would be free from those contradictions and absurdities which seem to attend every explication that human reason can give of the material world but upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity I find myself involved in such elaborance that I must confess I neither know how to correct my former opinions nor how to render them consistent if this be not a good general reason for skepticism it is at least a sufficient one if I were not already abundantly supplied for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions I shall propose the arguments on both sides beginning with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being when we talk of self or substance we must have an idea annexed to these terms otherwise they are altogether unintelligible every idea is derived from preceding impressions and we have no impression of substance as something simple and individual we have therefore no idea of them in that sense whatever is distinct is distinguishable and whatever is distinguishable is separable by the thought or imagination all perceptions are distinct they are therefore distinguishable and separable and may be conceived as separately existent and may exist separately without any contradiction or absurdity when I view this table and that chimney nothing is present to me but particular perceptions which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions this is the doctrine of philosophers but this table which is present to me and that chimney may and do exist separately this is the doctrine of the vulgar there is no contradiction there is no contradiction therefore in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions in general the following reasoning seems satisfactory all ideas are borrowed from preceding perceptions our ideas of objects therefore are derived from that source consequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects which is not so with regard to perceptions but it is intelligible and consistent to say that objects exist distinct and independent without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion this proposition therefore can never be absurd with regard to perceptions when I turn my reflection on myself I never can perceive this self without perceptions nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions it is the composition of these therefore which forms the self we can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster supposed to have only one perception as of thirst or hunger consider it in that situation do you perceive anything but merely that perception have you any notion of self or substance if not the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion the annihilation which some people suppose to follow upon death and which entirely destroys this self is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions love and hatred pain and pleasure and sensation these therefore must be the same with self since the one cannot survive the other is self the same with substance? if it be how can that question have place concerning the subsistence of self under a change of substance if they be distinct what is the difference betwixt them for my part I have a notion of neither when conceived distinct from particular perceptions philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle that we have no idea of external substance distinct from the ideas of particular qualities this must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind that we have no notion of it distinct from the particular perceptions so far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence but having thus loosened all our particular perceptions when I proceed to explain the principle of connection which binds them together and makes this attribute to them a real simplicity and identity I am sensible that my account is very defective and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it if perceptions are distinct they form a whole only by being connected together but no connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding we only feel a connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another it follows therefore that the thought alone finds personal identity when reflecting on the train of past perceptions we oppose a mind the ideas of them are felt to be connected together and naturally introduce each other however extraordinary this conclusion may seem it need not surprise us most philosophers seem inclined to think that personal identity arises from consciousness and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception the present philosophy therefore is an interesting aspect but all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head in short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent nor is it in my power to renounce either of them that is our distinct existences and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences did our perceptions either in here in something simple and individual or did the mind perceive some real connection among them there would be no difficulty in the case for my part I must plead the privilege of a skeptic and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding I pretend not however to pronounce it absolutely insuperable others perhaps or myself upon more mature reflections may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions I shall also take this opportunity of confessing to other errors of less importance which more mature reflection has discovered to me in my reasoning the first may be found in volume 1 page 106 where I say that the distance betwixt two bodies is known among other things by the angles which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other it is certain that these angles are not known to the mind and consequently can never discover the distance the second error may be found in volume 1 page 144 where I say that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity I believe there are other differences among ideas which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms had I said the two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling I should have been nearer the truth end of file 55 end of appendix end of volume 2 end of a treatise of human nature by David Hume