 So, as far as our workshop was concerned, we had the benefit of having speakers. I will mention them and the main approach that they had, either KIAO on multi-dimensional vulnerabilities of the economic and financial system, a vision coming also from China, Jean-Claude Meier, a vision coming from Europe on the risks of a new global financial crisis, Jeff Frieden on the political economy of global economic and financial issues the world over in time of populism in particular, Daniel Dianou on global economic and financial fragilities in the emerging countries as well as in the global economy, as you see a lot of concentration on risks and vulnerabilities, by the way. Moto Shiga Ito on the lessons of the Japanese crisis experience, which came before the big crisis of 2007-2008, and Bertrand Badré on the necessary reset of the financial sector to address particularly environmental issues. I would say that as an introduction of our very, very rich discussion, we are all incorporating the fact that we are living in a new world of strong criticism of old multilateralism, which is coming, I would say, from everywhere, by the way, coming from the emerging world criticizing the governance of the advanced economy and the fact that the G7 passed the baton to the G20 is, of course, a case in point. It comes out of the dramatic crisis where the advanced economy proved to be very clumsy obviously because the epicenter of the crisis was in the advanced economy. It comes from the public opinion in the advanced economy themselves with strong criticism of previous leadership, previous, I would say, governments and the clumsiness of these governments in the crisis or leading to the crisis. And I would say more generally, it comes also from some executive branches, the US being a case in point where the old multilateralism is also criticized by those who were absolutely key, of course, in running the old multilateralism. So it, I would say, is making an environment which is very, very interesting in a way but also very negative on global cooperation at this stage. Now, to expose what we have discussed, I would concentrate first on the issue of the risks and vulnerabilities of the global economy and global finance first, then I will concentrate a little bit on the political economy of the financial sector and of the appreciation of what should be done or not been done at a global level, but particularly, of course, if I may, in Europe and in the United States of America, but true also in the emerging economy. And then I will mention a number of points that we discussed are clearly important and we are coming out of the discussion itself, but we are not necessarily directly linked to the two previous elements. So on the appreciation on the risks and vulnerability, as I already said, there were clearly more interventions and more remarks, more questions on the vulnerabilities and on the risks than on the assets associated with the present situation. If I sum up a very rich discussion, I would say that maybe we could separate the implicit systemic vulnerability that we are observing today in the system, the global system, and the trigger for a possible explosion. So the trigger would not necessarily represent an explosion by themselves, but they could put the explosive, if there is an explosive, in bursting out and create a big crisis. The probability of the future crisis being as demanding and as dramatic as the last great crisis that we had to cope with was more or less implicitly very high in the minds of many participants in this workshop, which has to be mentioned as an element of, I would say, full understanding of the risks that are at stake. If I concentrate a moment on the trigger very rapidly, I would say that you have a lot of mention of geopolitical risks, a lot of mentions on the fact that at a time, we will probably have a big correction on stock markets in many economies, but particularly perhaps in the US economy as a possible trigger for major difficulties. Of course, the less accommodating monetary policy and the end of extraordinary unconventional measures in particular, which is already implemented in the US and will be in Europe very soon, was also one possible trigger and I could list a number of other, but I will stop there. As regards the vulnerability of the system itself, I would say first the criticism of multilateralism in a global economy and a global finance system that are highly integrated and where contagion is extremely likely as we observed in the last crisis, but would be even, in my opinion, more extraordinary rapid in the possible new crisis. We have the overindatedness of the global economy and global finance, which has been underlined by many interventions. The proportion of data outstanding public and private over the global GDP has augmented after the crisis as it did before the crisis, which is highly paradoxical because there was a consensus to recognize that the level of leverage, the overindatedness of the economies was one of the main cause for the big crisis we had to cope with, but again leverage has continued to augment after the crisis and of course the leverage has augmented less than before in the advanced economy and much more than before in the emerging economy, which has to be underlined, but which is not particularly reassuring in a way because it has continued to augment, all taken into account, private and public debt in the advanced economy, namely putting themselves in a situation of vulnerability that is at least as vulnerable as the day before the last crisis and in the emerging world, the acceleration of leveraging has been, financial leveraging has been very, very impressive. It's not absurd to consider that it had been multiplied by five if you compare what happened before the crisis and what happens after the crisis. Another element which has to be mentioned as being part of the systemic vulnerability of the system is the fact that the advanced economy in particular, but it is true also for a number of emerging economies, the ammunitions to counter the next recession crisis is something that is deeply lacking. The fiscal ammunitions are very, very major in most economies and the monetary policy ammunitions are very, very major not to speak of zero level in the Japanese economy and the European economy and are very bigger in the US, which is in advance in the cycle, but in the US some remark was made on the fact that it is necessary to have 5% decrease of interest rates to be significant in combating a recession and it's very unlikely that the next recession will not have to, the Fed will not have this ammunition when the next recession comes. So all taken into account you see a number of observations that were all reinforcing the sentiment that all leaders, all I would say economies, all responsible private and public persons and individuals had to be very, very aware of the fact that resilience in the next possible crisis was absolutely fundamental because again the probability of new correction was quite high. On the positive element which we have also mentioned, I don't want to be entirely negative because it would not be fair, I have to mention the fact that some remarks were made on the fact that external imbalances in particular had been reduced, all taken into account since the crisis. The current account of China is less important than it was before. In the US we are living today with a minus 2.5% approximately of current account which is not the very, very important level which we are attained before the crisis. In Europe it is plus 3.5% which is probably too much by the way but does not signal a drama. So again, this is an element that we must have in mind. The credentials have been improved, I think that nobody dispute that even if there was a lot of screening of the credentials recognizing that a lot of things had been done particularly in the domain of the banks but that a lot remained to be done in the domain of the non-banks, in the domain of the prosyclical element that are implicit in for instance accounting rules or in credit rating agences, pasturing or in many other elements that are clearly not fully reassuring as regards the present level of credentials and not fully reassuring in case we have to cope with new drama. But again, I would not be fair if I would not mention the fact that a lot of hard work has been done obviously since the crisis on the basis of a global consensus. So benefiting still from this idea that we are in an integrated global economy and we have to address particularly global finance and global financial credentials through this collegial global approach which has been signaled by the G20, successive decisions and the G20 is still operating, still giving his own stamp to a number of proposals which are coming from the Basel system of credentials and from all the I would say committees that have been set up and are overseen by the G20 through the Global Financial Stability Board. Now let me turn to political economy if I still have time, then I have to say that we had a lot of discussion, introduction by Jeff Frieden as I said, and this idea that we have to cope with a new phenomenon which is linked to what I was saying, the criticism of globalization, the criticism of the old multilateralism with resentment particularly visible in the eurozone in particular, again adjustment against bailing out the banks, again transfer in general, in many public opinion we have really an element of strong criticism of what happened during the crisis and we see that in all countries practically, the remark was made that in practically all countries, the previous governments that had the responsibilities whether they were on the left side of the political persuasion, on the right side of the political persuasion were all more or less weakened in all countries, even in the countries that were successes in terms of economy and in terms of combating unemployment, attaining full employment so it's a phenomenon which is very impressive to the benefit from time to time of the extremists on the right side of the political persuasion or on the left side of the political persuasion or even the extraordinary case of centrism being, having the benefit of this rejection of previous I would say governmental political parties like in my own country but all that to mention that we have a very, very strong problems which is emerging out of the public opinion of the evolution of political persuasions in certainly Europe but I would say in all advanced economy not to mention the UK with the Brexit and the United States of America where we see a lot of strong criticism job losses being attributed to the mobility of capital which is of course part of the global economy has it as function until now a very strong still criticism of bank bailouts even if in my memory we do not have at the level of significant institution losses made by the treasury on the contrary it was also the case in Europe in most cases in Europe profits were made by the governments out of their intervention on the financial markets but nevertheless in the in the mind of the population in mind of our fellow citizens these bank bailouts were very very costly and are still considered as extremely a normal as I said including and perhaps even more in the United States of America so it is of course what I all what I say is a recognition that the main political problem in the advanced economy and perhaps if you look at Brazil and that other emerging economies in all participants in the global economy is that we have a wave of nationalism protectionism and in some respect fight against immigration which is very very important perhaps the most important political problems for leaders in all societies and nations it seems to me that it is just to say that we understood in the workshop that those complaints were fully understandable that a lot of our fellow citizens were very much in danger particularly the part of our population that is less educated less able I would say to cope with the new challenges and is hurt by not only as I already said by the competition which had intensified all over the world the global economy and of course put put those fellow citizens in a difficult situation but also science and technology that are galloping and are also new difficulty for for those of our fellow citizens the I would say education of which and the franchise of which is weakened by the digital revolution and by their enormous difficulty to catch up with the new technologies and of course we I could elaborate on on this so as you see we spend quite a lot of time on reflecting on this interaction between an obvious political problem and the global economy and global finance with a sentiment that global finance was very much at stake in all this this new era and of course call for appropriate responses I already said that we we had also a number of other views dimension of this highly multi-dimensional discussion we had we had a very interesting discussion on the Japanese experience and not forgetting that Japan had to cope with more or less the same kind of challenges as the other advanced economy but a long time in advance say more than approximately 10 years in advance and it's a little bit sad to recognize that the other advanced economy at the time we're thinking or say or saying very eloquently and publicly that the Japanese were extremely clumsy in dealing with their problem and that it was possible to solve those problems in a much more skillful way of course when they were themselves in this dramatic situation we could see that they were more less following up on the previous tools and recipes that the Japanese and invented QE was invented by Japan before it was applied by the other advanced economy and it is something which is really telling in terms of understanding exactly what is happening we had also a discussion on the overall sentiment that we could transform or reset the the terms was I would say utilized by Bertrand Badre the overall global financial potentials and approaches in order to privilege the environmental issue which is by many considered as a major one I would add myself that we probably have a lot of other dimension in the global finance that we should have in mind of course the green issue and the environmental crisis issue which is there and I have to say that Laurent Fabius was extremely reluctant on that but we have of course also a lot of issues that are associated with developments and so are more on the problem of the countries that are not yet emerging that are in the developing world not yet emerging we have also the issue which is gigantic of inequalities inequalities in the advanced economy and inequalities also in the emerging economy which is a major major issue associated with perhaps some reset of the overall approach of global finance now I see that I have only three minutes left let me conclude it seems to me that there was a consensus in that group on the fact that a lot of hard work remained to be done in the overall credentials and approaches of global finance that it would be made even more difficult at a time where we did not yet had a new multilateralism crystallizing on the basis of a new global consensus that we were in a very difficult situation from that standpoint I think that all participants were in favor of working out as soon as possible these new consensus on on the new multilateralism which would be necessarily much more multipolar much more de-concentrating if I may much less in the hands of course of the advanced economy as I already said but again the forces that are coming from executive branches from public opinions and from all the continents in the world against a rapid new consensus are there and we have to be fully aware of that I would say also that vigilance and a call for for resilience of all the economy participating in the global economy and the global financial world is was something which was considered essential taking into account that the sentiment that new correction new challenges perhaps as grave as that we had to observe in 0708 and the Lehman Brothers collapse perhaps less we all hoped of course that it would lately be less demanding but certainly putting into question nevertheless the solidity of all our economies of all our society so the reinforcement of the call for vigilance and for improving resilience in all part and parcel of the world was certainly also a consensus in that group thank you