 Question 62 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 62 of Restitution in eight articles. We must now consider Restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry. First, of what is it an act? Second, whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away. Third, whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away. Fourth, whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away. Fifth, whether it is necessary to make Restitution to the person from whom something has been taken away. Sixth, whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it. Seventh, whether any other person is bound to Restitution. Eighth, whether one is bound to restore at once. First article, whether Restitution is an act of commutative justice. Objection one, it would seem that Restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore Restitution is not the act of any part of justice. Objection two, further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and passions which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore Restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice. Objection three, further, Restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation but also in distribution as when in distributing one gives a man less than his due. Therefore Restitution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice. On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations. I answer that, to restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in Restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence Restitution is an act of commutative justice occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance, on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft. Reply to Objection one, that which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time, wherefor it is a mere gift rather than a Restitution when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is, however, somewhat like a Restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same. Yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man, and so it is not Restitution properly so called. Reply to Objection two, insofar as the word Restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But even as the term Commutation has passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so to the term Restitution is applied to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect. Whether this touches body as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words. Reply to Objection three, Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due, and consequently it pertains to commutative justice. Second article, whether Restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation. Objection one, it would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken away, as when a man has taken limb or life, therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another. Objection two, Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible without sin to restore what has been taken away, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another. Objection three, Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him, so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. Objection four, Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all, as the philosopher says in Physics 2.5. Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefits or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefits, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken. On the contrary, Augustine says in his letter 143, Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven. I answer that, Restitution, as stated above in Article 1, is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Therefore Restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken, since it is by giving it back that equality is re-established. If however it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for Restitution for justice consists inequality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly. Apply to Objection 1. When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the philosopher states in Ethics 814. Wherefore, when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible. For instance, if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man. Reply to Objection 2. There are three ways in which one may take away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another's sin while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to Restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarially to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth. For instance, by saying that he spoke ill or that he defamed him unjustly, or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases as stated above in the first reply. Reply to Objection 3. The action of the man who is defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible by showing him deference to undo its effect, notably the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of other men. Reply to Objection 4. There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefit. First, justly. For instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good of the church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefit has been definitively assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it not be conferred on him. One is bound to make some compensation after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person. But one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefit and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If on the other hand, the benefits had already been assigned to a certain person, and someone for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however to his means. Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken. Objection 1. It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount taken, for it is written in Exodus 22.1. If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep. Now everyone is bound to keep the commandments of the Divine Law. Therefore, a thief is bound to restore four or fivefold. Objection 2. Further. What things so ever were written were written for our learning. Romans 15.4. Now Zacchaeus said to our Lord in Luke 19.8. If I have wronged any man of anything, I restore him fourfold. Therefore, a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken unjustly. Objection 3. Further. No one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of his theft under the head of damages. Therefore, a man is bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount. On the contrary, restitution re-establishes equality, where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore, there is no obligation to restore more than the exact amount taken. I answer that, when a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the part of the thing as when a person intends to use violence but fails. As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since thereby equality is re-established, and for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge, and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty. Hence, it is clear how to answer the first objection, because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ, no man is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above in the Parse Primesicunde, question 104, article 3. Nevertheless, the same might be determined by human law, and then the same answer would apply. Reply to Objection 2. Zaccheus said this, being willing to do more than he was bound to do. Hence he had said already, Behold, the half of my goods I give to the poor. Reply to Objection 3. By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by way of damages, and yet this was not due before the sentence. Fourth article. Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now, it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the thing taken. For instance, if you dig up a man's seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore, a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. Objection 2. Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the stated time would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore, it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not take. Objection 3. Further, human justice is derived from divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from him, according to Matthew 25-26. Now newest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where I have not strewed. Therefore, it is just that one should restore to a man also something that one has not taken. On the contrary, restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not take, there would not be equality. Therefore, it is not just to make such a restitution. I answer that, whoever brings a loss upon another person seemingly takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the philosopher in Ethics 5-4, loss is so called from a man having less than his due. Therefore, a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon another. Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what he actually has, and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by repayment in equivalent. For instance, if a man damnifies another by destroying his house, he is bound to pay him the value of the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in equivalent, because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually. And to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially. And so were he to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid not the exact value taken from him, but more. And this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. However, he is bound to make some compensation according to the condition of persons and things. From this we see how to answer the first and second objections, because the sower of the seed in the field has the harvest not actually, but only virtually. In like manner, he that has money has the profit not yet actually, but only virtually, and both may be hindered in many ways. Reply to Objection 3. God requires nothing from us but what he himself has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of his gifts, which fruit is from him and from us, although the gifts themselves are from God without us. Fifth article. Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. Objection 1. It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken, for it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself or to others, for one to restore to him what has been taken from him, if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore, restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. Objection 2. Further. If a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully, that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore, it is not always necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something. Objection 3. Further. No man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. Objection 4. Further. We owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others, our parents for instance, than from a lender or depositor. Therefore, sometimes we ought to sucker some other person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something. Objection 5. Further. It is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something from the church and makes restitution to the church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the church's property. Therefore, he ought not to restore to the church from whom he has taken, and so restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away. On the contrary, it is written in Romans 13.7. Render to all men their do's, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom. I answer that restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above in Article 2, as well as in Question 58, Article 10. Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his do receive what is lacking to him. And for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. Reply to Objection 1. When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely. Reply to Objection 2. A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First, through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives a thing through Simon. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him. And since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly, a man gives unlawfully through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful as when a woman receives payment for fornication, wherefore she may keep what she has received. If however she has extorted over much by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution. Reply to Objection 3. If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare, whether he be dead or living, but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and can be easily sent, else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact. Reply to Objection 4. A man is bound, out of his property, to succour his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits. But he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others. And he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succour a parent. Reply to Objection 5. There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the church of her property. First, by laying hands on church property which is committed not to him but to another. For instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that he is bound to restitution by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly, by transferring to another person, for instance a relative or a friend, church property committed to himself, in which case he must make restitution to the church and have it under his own care so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on church property merely in intention, when to it he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the church, in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention. Sixth Article. Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution. Objection 1. You would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice by taking away from him that is more and giving to him that is less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it. Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime, but by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime as in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution. Objection 3. Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution. On the contrary, he that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it. I answer that, with regard to a man who has taken another's property, two points must be considered. The thing taken and the taking. By reason of the thing taken he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his should be taken away from him and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another man's property may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, that is, against the will of the owner as in theft and robbery, in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person. Although to he that is guilty of theft or robbery is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off. And in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another's property for his own profit but without committing an injury, that is, with the consent of the owner as in the case of a loan. And then the taker is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing. For he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself as in the case of a deposit, wherefor he that takes a thing thus incurs no obligation on account of the taking. In fact, by taking he grants a favor. But he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently, if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be if he were to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part. Reply to Objection 1. The chief end of restitution is not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently, although he that has taken something from another may have ceased to have what he took through having transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing on account of the injurious taking and he that has it on account of the thing. Reply to Objection 2. Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet he is bound to reveal it to God in confession, and so he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he confesses. Reply to Objection 3. Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further restitution in his regard. Rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who nevertheless may excuse them from so doing. 7. Article Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken Objection 1. It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now, none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore, none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken. Objection 2. Further, Justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing, but also on all those who co-operate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person co-operates towards a thing being taken away from someone without its being taken away in effect. Therefore, the others are not bound to restitution. Objection 3. Further. No man is bound to expose himself to danger in order to safeguard another's property. Now, sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death were he to betray a thief or withstand him. Therefore, one is not bound to restitution through not betraying or withstanding a thief. On the contrary, it is written in Romans 132. They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them. Therefore, in like manner, they that consent are bound to restitution. I answer that as stated above in Article 6. A person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone's else's property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. And whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken by taking part in the theft or robbery as a fellow evildoer. Indirectly when a man does not prevent another from evildoing, provided he be able and bound to prevent him, either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows. By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing. It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command, because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent, namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving, when to which a man is a receiver of thieves and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation, when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so, for instance persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth are bound to restitution if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below. In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution, because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence, the counselor or flatterer is bound to restitution only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes. Replied to Objection 1. Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counseling or by commanding or in any other way whatever. Replied to Objection 2. He is bound chiefly to restitution who is the principal in the deed. First of all, the commander, secondly, the executor, and in due sequence the others. Yet so that if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured. Replied to Objection 3. He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged in virtue of his office to do so. As in the case of earthly princes, who do not incur any great danger thereby, for they are invested with public authority in order that they may maintain justice. 8. Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution or may he put it off? Objection 1. You would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore, man is not bound to immediate restitution. Objection 2. Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible, but it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore, no man is bound to immediate restitution. Objection 3. Further, restitution is an act of virtue, notably of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once. On the contrary, all matters of restitution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage earner must not delay compensation, as appears from Leviticus 1913. The wages of him that have been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning. Therefore, neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once. I answer that, even as it is a sin against justice to take another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since to withhold the property of another against the owner's will is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time, and one is bound to renounce one sin at once, according to Ecclesiasticus 21.2, flee from sin as from the face of a serpent. Consequently, one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing. Reply to Objection 1. Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to withhold another's property. Reply to Objection 2. When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution, even as a person is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite. Reply to Objection 3. Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to virtue, that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to observe it. And since delay of restitution involves a sin of unjust detention, which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate. End of Question 62. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 63 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 63 of Respect of Persons in four articles. We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First, we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to distributive justice. Secondly, we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether respect of persons is a sin. Second, whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities. Third, whether it takes place in showing honor. Fourth, whether it takes place in judicial sentences. First article, whether respect of persons is a sin. Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word person includes a reference to personal dignity. Confer Paris Prima question 29 article 3 second reply. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore, respect of persons is not a sin. Objection 2. Further. In human affairs, persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less therefore is respect of persons. Objection 3. Further. No injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons Since of two men circumstance to like, He sometimes appraises one by grace and leaves the other in sin, according to Matthew 2440. Two shall be in a bed, one shall be taken, and one shall be left. Therefore, respect of persons is not a sin. On the contrary, nothing but sin is forbidden in the divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden in Deuteronomy 117. Neither shall you respect any man's person. Therefore, respect of persons is a sin. I answer that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property, by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 6.9, There is no respect of persons with God, says that. A just judge regards causes, not persons. For instance, if you promote a man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause not the person. But if in conferring something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man, for example, Peter or Martin, then there is respect of the person. Since you give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift is to be referred to his person. For instance, if a man promote someone to prelacy or professorship because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another. Thus, consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority. Wherefore, consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows accordingly that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now, nothing but sin is opposed to virtue. And therefore, respect of persons is a sin. Reply to Objection One. In distributive justice, we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons, we consider circumstances that do not so result. Reply to Objection Two. Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them by reason of certain things pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were, and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard. Reply to Objection Three. There is a twofold giving. One belongs to justice and occurs when we give a man his due. In such, like, givings, respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis, that which is not a man's due. Such is the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving, there is no place for respect of persons because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, according to Matthew 20, verses 14 and 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? Take what is thine and go thy way. Second article. Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. Objection One. It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispension of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefits on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefit. Yet this is apparently not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are want to do so. Therefore, the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods. Objection Two. Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons according to James 2, verses 2 and 3. Nevertheless, dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore, the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. Objection Three. Further, according to jurists, it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore, respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. Objection Four. Further, according to the law of the church in the chapter cum delectus, the person to be chosen should be a member of the flock. Now, this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore, respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. On the contrary, it is written in James 2, verse 1. On these words, a gloss of Augustine says, Augustine, letter 167, to Jerome. I answer that, as stated above in article one, respect of persons is a sin insofar as it is contrary to justice. Now, the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin, so that spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his desserts, it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and absolutely. And in this way, the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to the common good. For it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good on account of worldly authority or activity or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12-7, the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit. It follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities, the simply less good or sometimes preferred to the better without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less worthy. Reply to Objection 1. We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's kinsfolk. For sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to the common good. And then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereas the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Corinthians 4-1. Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God. Sometimes, however, the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons, he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business of the church. Yet you would have to forgo so doing for fear of scandal if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of the church to their kindred without regard to their deserts. Reply to Objection 2. Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace, and this is more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to such persons. Reply to Objection 3. In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the better man because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause has something to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will in this respect be more competent. And if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons. Reply to Objection 4. The man who is taken from among the members of a particular church is generally speaking more useful as regards to the common good, since he loves more the church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded in Deuteronomy 1715. Thou mayest not make a man of another nation, King, who is not thy brother. Third article, whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect. Objection 1. It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue, as the philosopher states in Ethics 1.5. Now, prelates and princes should be honored, although they be wicked, even as our parents of whom it is written in Exodus 20 verse 12, honor thy father and thy mother. Again, masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 1 Timothy 6.1. Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor. Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. Objection 2. Further. It is commanded in Leviticus 1932. Rise up before the horny head and honor the person of the aged man. But this seems to savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous, according to Daniel 13.5. Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. Objection 3. Further. On the words of James 2.1. Have not the faith with respect of persons. A glass of Augustine in his letter 167 to Jerome says, If the saying of James, if there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, et cetera, refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all. Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches. For Gregory says in a homily, his homily 28 on the Gospel, Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth. So that wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. On the contrary, a gloss on James 2.1 says, Whoever honors the rich for their riches sins. And in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savers of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing honor. I answer that to honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, where for virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's. Thus princes and prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place and as representing the community over which they are placed according to Proverbs 26-8. As he that casteth a stone into the heap of mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool. For since the Gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to mercury, the heap of mercury signifies the casting up of an account when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble. Lapulus or calculus, whence the English word calculate, for 100 marks. So too is a fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community. And in the same way parents and masters should be honored on account of their having a share of the dignity of God who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored because old age is a sign of virtue, though the sign fail at times. Wherefore according to wisdom four verses eight and nine, venerable old age is not that of long time nor counted by the number of years, but the understanding of a man is gray hairs and a spotless life is old age. The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community, but if they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respective persons. Hence the replies to the objections are clear. Fourth article, whether the sin of respective persons takes place in judicial sentences. Objection one, you would seem that the sin of respective persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respective persons is opposed to distributive justice as stated above in article one, whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore, respective persons does not take place in judicial sentences. Objection two, further penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore, respective persons does not take place in judicial sentences. Objection three, further it is written in Ecclesiasticus 410, in judging be merciful to the fatherless. But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. And therefore, in judicial sentences, respective persons is not a sin. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 18.5. It is not good to accept the person in judgment. I answer that as stated above in question 60 article one, judgment is an act of justice in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respective persons involves a certain inequality insofar as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Therefore, it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respective persons. Reply to Objection one, a judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice. Because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment in as much as even in the commutative justice the judge takes from the one and gives to another and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way, respective persons may take place in any judgment. Reply to Objection two, when a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person there is no respect of persons because the very difference of persons causes in that case a diversity of things is stated above in Question 58, Article 10, Third Reply and in Question 61, Article 2, Third Reply. Reply to Objection three, in pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice. Else the saying of Exodus 23.3 would apply, neither shall thou favor a poor man in judgment. End of Question 63, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC.