 quality to our conferences, but the conversation is so good I don't want to miss waste any time. So we just had a very sobering assessment of the challenges that the transatlantic community faces. So now we turn to our attention of, so how does Europe and the United States together reconstruct its policy towards Russia and the neighbors? My theory is that for the last 25 years for its many flaws and its accomplishments, transatlantic policy has been designed to integrate Russia into the West, whether that's WTO, the G8, and various institutions. That policy has now come to an end, and we have yet to articulate what this future policy will look like. So we've assembled some colleagues to help us think through what that new policy approach must look like. And we are delighted to have with us Ambassador Paul Jones, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Paul has responsibility and his capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship. Thanks to this assignment, Paul served as U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia from 2010 to 2013, and also served in a variety of senior diplomatic postings as Deputy Chief of Mission Orchardier to the Philippines, to the OSCE in Vienna, and to the Republic of Macedonia. Paul also served as Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. So we also saw the Russian relationship through a lot of interaction on Afghanistan. Ambassador Jones gives his comments. We are going to turn to Roman Kuzniar, who has been a foreign policy advisor to the Polish president since 2010. Roman has served in a variety of senior advisory capacities, advisor to the Polish Minister of National Defense. He has also led, ably led the Polish Institute of International Affairs for several years, and has also had a distinguished career in areas where we focus on, which is strategic planning and policy planning. And we are delighted that you could be with us. And last but not least, Ambassador John Herbst is with us. John is currently just around the block as Director of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center. Prior to Ambassador Herbst's position at the Atlantic Council, he served as Director of the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University. But John served with distinction as US Ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006. And prior to that was US Ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2000 to 2003. So he really knows the diplomatic opportunities and challenges. We'll put it that way in both Ukraine and in Central Asia. My only one sort of time constraint, Ambassador Herbst has to depart a little bit before noon. So we're going to quickly go through the comments. After Ambassador Herbst is done with his comments, I'm going to immediately open the floor for questions which you can target at Ambassador Herbst before he goes. And then we will remain, Ambassador Jones and Mr. Kuznariak will remain and have a little conversation again and answer questions. But I just wanted you to be aware of that time constraint. So with that and without further ado, Ambassador Jones, help us with the roadmap to a new US policy towards Russia. Great. Thank you, Heather, and delighted to be here. I'll just sort of sketch out and then we'll have a discussion. I think going forward we will be guided by the same principles that have served us for a long time and particularly over this last year or so. And in the relationship between the United States and Europe and the transatlantic relationship with regarding Russia, I think those are very clearly a unity of purpose and action. Consistency in policy and reliance on the fundamental values and principles which we share. Those values and principles as was mentioned earlier are enshrined in many international documents and agreements. We have an anniversary coming up of the OSCE at 40 next year. And I think the Helsinki principles are ones that we hold dear in this context and form a commonality between us. So in short, and this will inform the next comments I make. I don't think the big picture is so hard. I think it does require a lot of legwork and we have, I think, been successfully sort of implementing our unity and our consistency in a lot of different areas that I'll touch on. But I think the big picture is sort of a natural. The coordination on exactly how we do it and how it weighs is the part where it requires effort. But that has proven, I think, successful so far. So just to pause for a moment and look back a little bit before looking forward. Just over a year ago, I had the honor of being with Secretary Kerry when he went to Vilnius in Lithuania to an informal meeting of the EU, where there was discussion at that time about Middle East peace. But also a discussion about how the United States could be as supportive as possible of the EU's Eastern Partnership agenda. This came just after conversations, which I also was able to participate in in Stockholm with President Obama meeting with the leaders of the Nordic and Baltic countries there, where even at that time, there was a lot of discussion about how we deal with Russia today. At that time, we began sort of, we have a long standing, the United States has a long standing record of support for the countries throughout the world, and particularly countries of the former Soviet Union. In their desire to enact democratic reforms, economic reforms. And we also added in an element as we looked at our assistance and our political relationships is how to support their aspirations to have closer relationships with the EU for their economic benefits and for the purposes that they have long stood for. And we always believed this policy was beneficial to Russia that the economic growth and the strengthening of institutions in this country would serve Russia, there are a variety of ways to serve Russia economically, as well as in its security and stability in its region. Skipping ahead to events in Ukraine, which is not the subject of the conversation now, but we were, I think, collectively surprised at the level of reaction that Russia had to the impending signing of the Association Agreement that Ukraine had negotiated with the European Union. And after those events and during those events, I think together the United States and our European allies and partners in the EU came up with a very clear policy that I would articulate this way, there are a variety of ways of articulating it, but it basically has four elements as we've said many times and from the beginning all the way till today. And those are to support Ukraine in this case, in its own desire to determine its own future and its right to do that financially, politically, in a variety of different ways. Secondly, to impose costs on Russia for its attempt to annex and occupy Crimea and later to intervene in eastern Ukraine. Those costs come in terms of sanctions and in terms of political isolation or downgrading of diplomatic relations. Number three and really vitally important, along with the others, is always to maintain a real, current, respectful diplomatic choice for Russia to, or off-ramp as it's been called, to encourage Russia to return to respect for international norms, Helsinki principles, and to cease violating Ukraine's territorial integrity. And then fourth, to support allies, NATO allies and partners in security to address their security concerns that they have particularly heightened out of the crisis in Ukraine. And I think you've seen in a number of different ways, I won't go into how this has been articulated, but I think it's, what I think is important is that all four of these elements are vibrant and relevant sort of day in and day out. And in Secretary Kerry's conversations, as he just had another one today with Minister Lavrov, we really address all of this constantly in our diplomacy and in our efforts. Coordination between the United States and the EU and our partners is hard work because you've got to get everyone on board. And so it comes at a certain cost of sometimes things moving a little slower than the reactions and responses moving a little slower than some would like. But we believe that the impact of our joint effort, particularly you can see it in terms of sanctions, but in other coordination, is well worth that effort and the time that it takes to come together in responses. I think Russia has been surprised by this unity and consistency in the length and the resolve in terms of, in all the terms that I've outlined. And I think that, I think Russia still has a certain expectation that we will not retain this consistency in unity. But I think going forward, it will see that we do. In this context, obviously, and I don't want to dwell on Ukraine, but there's been discussions that we think are important between President Poroshenko, President Putin and Russia and Ukraine, and Minsk agreement, which is the basis of, we believe the diplomatic way forward, the off-ramp that I referred to earlier, that if that were implemented, there would be a good reason to reduce sanctions and strengthen peace in Ukraine and stronger diplomatic relations internationally. We haven't seen any signs that so far, or we haven't seen serious effort from the Russian side or the separatist side of implementing the Minsk agreement, but we remain hopeful and we continue to press on that. Now, going forward, as we're here to talk about, I think the agenda between the United States and Europe with regard to Russia is to maintain this unity, to maintain this consistency, make sure that our sanctions are as long as necessary and are flexible to go up or down depending on the requirements, maintain our downgraded political relations and diplomatic isolation that we've spoken about. And there are a number of specific areas that we're in contact about that are part of this legwork. I'd say I identify just sort of no in particular order identify a few. One is energy, obviously, is an issue and our mutual goal is in trying to reduce dependence on Russia in some cases almost exclusively for some countries. Another area, anti-corruption, which corruption breeds vulnerabilities both in allies and partners and obviously is a vulnerability for Russia, but there are work we can do together that strengthens our joint efforts there. Countering the propaganda and ensuring support for free media, the propaganda emanating from Russia oftentimes masquerading as objective news. Continuing to strengthen NATO and the security of partners of NATO that have been long-term partners. Supporting civil society and human rights within Russia, we don't forget that aspect because we're focused a lot on international impacts of the current situation. We continue to see a clamp down within Russia on freedoms that we all hold dear. There was mention earlier about what we should continue and not isolating Russia. People-to-people ties we think are crucial. Anyway, unfortunately our high school exchange program in the case of the United States and some of our American corners and libraries and outreach has been downgraded but we're looking for every opportunity to increase our ties, particularly with the younger generation so that there's foundation and understanding for the future. Crucially, we need to continue to cooperate on global security issues where we share a mutual interest with Russia. These are Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, a series of them where Russia is an important player. This was a subject of a conversation that Secretary Kerry had with Minister Lavrov in Paris a couple of weeks ago. It continues to be a subject of conversations as well and we want and I believe Russia wants to retain those areas of cooperation that are important for our mutual interest in global security. We believe we cannot throw out the prospect that Russia can become, again, interested in integrating globally and politically in the international system in a productive way. And so we want to hold out that prospect at all times. It's on hold right now, obviously. We are instead in sanctions but we can return to that. It's Russia's choice. And in all these areas, using our diplomacy at all levels to have these conversations both with Europe and with Russia. So just in conclusion, I think Russia's actions clearly unified and NATO and increased the level of commitment and focus that NATO countries have reinvigorated the OSCE. The OSCE I'm really delighted to see is playing the role it was called upon and at its creation hoping it would play. It is monitoring and giving us objective information about what's happening inside Ukraine. I think Russia's actions has created a lot of concern among Russia's neighbors, not both immediate neighbors and longer neighbors. But I think in general the institutions and our cooperation is working. And while we don't, none of us I think on either side of the Atlantic, seek conflict with Russia. And we want to hold out the prospect of greater cooperation. I think it will be going forward. We will maintain the consistency and unity of effort in all the areas I mentioned that until the time as Russia chooses to take a different approach to respecting international norms. So I'll leave it there. That was super great. Thank you. The view from Warsaw. Thank you, Madam Chairperson. Thank you very much. Well, I do agree with the panelists from the previous panel that we are indeed in deep trouble regarding our relations with Russia because the question is not about Ukraine. Obviously, it is important and serious enough. Aggression, annexation, all these things, kind of things. But the question is obviously about European, even more Euro-Atlantic international order with many serious implications concerning global one, global order. And I'm afraid that we will continue to be in trouble since I see no common Western strategy to answer provocative and aggressive and dangerous Russian policy. To the contrary, what I see is rather a search already for compromise for some kind of appeasement which would allow the West to come to terms with Russia as it is and at the same time to allow the West to save its face. I do strongly believe that what could be seen as just intellectual extravaganza of one professor from Chicago, John Meshimer, is indeed an important part of Western thinking about relations with Russia and others who follow him. In the present issue of foreign affairs, you see mainstream scholars and experts like Richard Haas, whom I really appreciate, is continuing his thinking on the matter. So they say that the important part of the responsibility for the bad shape of our relations with Russia belongs to us. And thought number one, as you know, is the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe. And then the second, our wish, our attempt to bring closer to the EU and NATO former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and Georgia. And third, because we have been promoting democracy and human rights throughout the post-Soviet space including Russia. And what they continue to say is that in the situation that we've created, we have to first accept what Russia has already done, annexation, aggression, annexation. But also we have to respect its zone of influence around its borders. And we have to offer Russia some new arrangements in Europe which would better suit Russian aspirations and which would offer Russia a better regard and insight and influence over the European Union, over NATO and other institutional frameworks. We should do this not only because of the thought and errors we have made against Russia in the past, in the recent past, during the last 20 years or so, but also because it is in our economic interest, first business interest. And we need Russia's help in solving different international problems. And we in Europe, especially in Poland, we are under the pressure of those who pretend to better understand Russia, to better understand the Western interest, European interest in relation with Russia. And after all, we have also to recognize Russia's special interests, Russia especially, I would say, sensitivity because we have to understand its feeling of humiliation after the fall of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the West. Even Mr Gorbachev, a few days ago in Berlin, he criticized the strongly the so-called Western triumphalism after the fall of communism, after the collapse of communism and Cold War. And all of them in Europe and some voices, important voices here, they say we should do everything, we should do everything to avoid another Cold War. Should we? I'm not sure. I'm not sure. My reading of the source and of the reasons of the recent and present travels with Moscow is different. First reason is that Soviet Union and its direct successor Russian Federation has never been held accountable for its terrible evil politics for gigantic crimes committed against nations which occupied, with Russia occupied, with Soviet Union occupied as a result of the Second World War. Post-Soviet Russia did not see neither moral nor political desorbitization. Nobody asked her to admit the criminal nature of the system and its policy toward the peoples of the Soviet camp. To the contrary, to the contrary, Russia declared quickly that Russians, that Russia was the first victim of the communism and at the same time paradoxically they feel humiliated, Russia is humiliated, Russia is humiliated by the very fall of communism, fall of the Soviet Union. And Russians smartly sold this mantra, this paradoxical mantra to the West and many here accepted it. While the real reason for Russians to be humiliated, for Russia to be humiliated is that Russia is not in a more position to oppress, to persecute the nations that were able, that did manage to become free and democratic after the fall of communism in 89. And nobody wants anymore to feel vis-a-vis Russia as it was the case of the Soviet Union, our feeling, Western feeling towards Soviet Union in the past. And the second important source of our today's problem with Russia is that the West has offered to Russia very generous royal treatment after the Soviet Union collapsed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The West immediately after Russian Federation replaced Soviet Union started to believe in a smooth transition, smooth transformation of Russia into regular democracy, free market economy and so Russia should be given as much help as possible including tolerance to whatever sin, to whatever crime would accompany this process. Corruption, crimes in Chechnya, twice suppression of civic society, increasing authoritarianism, et cetera, et cetera. So despite all that, the West was stubbornly proposing privileged dialogue, strategic partnerships, close relations with NATO, with the EU membership in G8, in the Council of Europe. Although Russia was not meeting criteria to belong to, to be invited to. And to some extent I see that understandable because that could have been seen as an investment, decent investment into Russia's responsible partner of the West in global affairs. But that has gone too far and to which no result whatsoever as we know. And all that has deeply demoralized and polluted Russia. And President Putin decided to go for much more because he has come to the conclusion that the West, after the crisis 2008 economic financial crisis and after the serious errors we have made in Iraq, in Libya, et cetera, the West is too divided, too weak to oppose, to show unity to resolve and resolve vis-à-vis Russian demands, too weak both economically and politically, strategically. And in Russia's strategy to divide us, to divide, to weaken the West, special praise, special role was given, was assigned to energy, to fuel supply, gas, especially. Gasprom in my eyes replaced SS-20 missiles. As a tool to breaking European unity and Western unity, gas supply, gasprom has become a Russian smart weapon. We in NATO, we were talking about smart weapons, they were using it. They were using it. They were applying it. And great part of Western attitude, especially Western European attitude and reaction towards Russia with regards to Russian aggression against Ukraine has much to do. Has much to do with gas, oil and other business Western companies are doing with Russia and in Russia. So some Western governments, they thought in the past that thanks to the trade and their dependence they could somehow influence Russia, they could educate, teach Russia, et cetera, et cetera. What happened is just the contrary. We are dependent upon economic relations. I mean, some of them with Russia, not the vice versa. So what should be done? Well, I know we all know how risky it is to refer to the past, to see, to try to see in the present situation to the prism of the past experience of the past situation. I strongly believe, however, that there are enough similarities between the present situation and the beginning of the 80s in the relations between the West and the Soviet Union. And since President Putin is quite open in his attempt to reconstruct the Soviet Union to zero and to revise Euro-Atlantic and global order, we should not be afraid to develop modern version of containment policy. Somebody mentioned that in the previous panel. And if someone wants to call it New Cold War, no problem for me, no problem. I wouldn't call it Cold War because today's Russia is not strong enough to be part of another Cold War, obviously. It is simply a rock state, a rock power which should be contained, stop from continuing its aggressive policy, stop from its wrongdoings, questioning fundamental principles and international law and norms and international relations. By the way, Professor Rothfeld rightly underlined the meaning of the Putin speech during the recent vital forum. You remember the title of the forum? New rules or a game with no rules at all? Significant, much telling. So what should be done? Well, in security, as has been said already by my predecessor, we have to stay vigilant and to implement strong, to implement a Newport decision within the Atlantic Alliance in economy and energy dependence and sanctions. Sanctions must be kept even weak as they are today. They do have some impact. In politics, I see no place. I see no room for a high-level dialogue with Russia, with Moscow, because the only thing Putin wants from the west during these high-level meetings is to accept aggression, to accept its rules. So today, to meet him directly at the high level, at the summit level, that means that offers him legitimacy. There is no need to take part to that. So it should come back to G7 and things like that, the privileged, intimate summit meetings. We don't. The West doesn't need Russia to solve to manage any, that's wrong, any international problems, Korea, Syria, Iran, that's false. So sometimes break, sometimes silence does good because it will give the chance to Moscow to think. And for this new containment to succeed, the West needs first to show results, then to stay together, to stay coherent and to be patient, just to sustain. And so the results would come faster than in the previous case of containment policy. And as conclusion, I would say, I would refer to the TAMOS for the clause of it saying that in strategy, everything is simple, but nothing is easy. But that's the only way to maintain our international identity, our Western international identity and to defend international system, international order, which is not only in our interest, which is not only reflecting our values, but which is also in the interest of the whole international community. Otherwise, we will find our place in the economic handbooks as the community of nations alliance, which was much stronger, much richer, much more developed, which lost against its opponent, its rival out of lack of political will and out of strategic myopia and laziness. Thank you. Well, you certainly provoked us, so I'm sure we're going to have a great conversation after the discussion. Ambassador Herbs, over to you. I'm going to speak in very general terms, and you may think I'm simplifying things, to try and give a perspective as to how we got to this point of conflict with Moscow. If you look at our policy towards Russia since the Soviet Union fell, there are some key elements. We saw Russia as a partner. We wanted to integrate Russia into the world society in all of its aspects. We wanted to work with Russia on problems outside of the European theater. And we saw the rulers in Moscow as would-be Democrats and would-be market reformers. That was our policy since 1991. You could argue it's our policy to this moment, almost. At the same time, however, naively or not naively, we pursued our democratic vocation in Europe. If you look for a quick way to phrase it, we pushed for a Europe, Poland free, which meant expanding NATO, expanding the EU. And it's precisely these two poles of Western policy which help explain why we are where we are today. Now, why do I say that? If you go back and look carefully at activities from the Kremlin, statements by Russian leaders from 1991, you will see the seeds that grew into the conflict today. I was working on the post-Soviet space from 94 to 97. And I remember the first time I engaged in the Cerex I had worked in the Soviet Union going to Moscow and interacting with Russians how they wanted to do everything they wanted to do. I thought, this is like really crazy. But even in 1994, as I was analyzing Russian policy, I noticed there was one area where this didn't apply. And that's the phrase which everyone knows now but only experts knew 20 years ago, which is frozen conflicts. You know, from the very first days of the post-Soviet space, the intelligence and security apparatus says in Moscow, maybe without the approval of Yeltsin or pursuing the policies in Georgia playing on ethnic differences to ensure maximum Russian influence in Tbilisi, doing the same in Transnistria, vis-a-vis Ankishinau, not to mention NK, vis-a-vis principally Baku. And you know, I've been doing a lot of reading lately on this area and you read Dmitry Trenin's book on the end of Eurasia and while he's arguing there that Russia's turning away from the concept of this plots down, this base in Eurasia opening up to the world, he talks about the other arguments and all those other arguments are the arguments we're hearing today and we see in Russian policies. And you go back and read about the decline, the late end days of the Soviet Union, Sergey Plovy's excellent book. You see how Gorbachev, when he still had some power and Yeltsin's first days were quick to use the same concepts and arguments that Putin has now made Russian policy. So you might say that Mr. Putin is the id of the Russian imperial class. He's the guy who's actually doing it in a wild and crazy way. And if we want to have good relations with Mr. Putin we'll simply have to let him do whatever he wants in his backyard. So we face, we face a choice. Now, there are voices and Professor Kuzniar put some of them before us today who argue for a hard-nosed real politic understanding of the situation and say, let Moscow do what it wants in its part of the world. Intellectually, that's not necessarily a disreputable argument, although it's one that would be hard for any western politician, even in central Europe where we've had our doubts lately to accept at face value. And let's remember that there's a very important connection between the national security side of this problem and the domestic side of this problem. In other words, Mr. Putin would be, I mean, I was in Ukraine for the Orange Revolution and I've been in Ukraine since the events of the Maidan this past year. And it's absolutely clear that it's Mr. Putin's concept of a managed democracy and his statement, this is what Slavs do, to play a role in his reaction to what's happening in Ukraine or put in plain language. It's the urge for democracy in Ukraine that has been every bit as important as the western orientation in driving Kremlin policy. Because if Ukraine moves in the way its people manifestly want to move, this is not just a strike against an old-school geopolitical analysis in Moscow, but against the very system that Putin has created for his own rule. And we must not forget that. I think you can tell, by the way I framed this issue, that I think that the West has to come down on the side of standing up for democracy and free markets and for the right of peoples, including peoples who happen to live close to borders with Russia to choose their own destiny. And if we come down to that, then clearly the policies we pursued for the last 20-plus years are inadequate. And the residue of those policies, you heard some of the panelists today who are usually in critical mode, we have to have a panned outreach to the Kremlin. We have to make sure that we take care of Mr. Putin's interests. I don't disagree with that. But as long as that's what we're talking about principally, we are telling Mr. Putin, go ahead. Do what you want in your neighborhood in ways that we consider unacceptable. So what does that mean for us? It means, first, understanding that this is not a Ukraine problem. This is a Kremlin problem. And if Mr. Putin has his way in Ukraine, it's not going to end there. So our policies... Actually, let me just dilate on this for a moment. I missed the first session, so if I'm repeating something I said earlier, I apologize. But evidence that this is not just a Ukraine problem is all over the place. In the area of doctrine, it's the fact that Mr. Putin claims a special right to protect not just ethnic Russians, but Russian speakers wherever they may be. And he's been saying that since the moment he became president. And again, remember, as I just said, Yeltsin and Putin and Gorbachev were talking about this in the early 90s. Amazingly, even as he's trying to keep the West from going over the top and responding to him in Ukraine, he's committing provocations in the Baltics. The very day the NATO summit ended, he seized the counterintelligence officer from Estonian territory. A day after that he delivered a diplomatic note to Lithuania demanding they extradite to Russia the 2000s of Soviet Lithuanians who refused to sign up for the Soviet army in 1990. And just to make sure they didn't forget what he meant to do, he seized Lithuanianship in international waters. And let's not forget Central Asia, right? Presumably... Actually, let me back up a little bit here too. I think you could make the case that the most successful leader in the post-Soviet space is Nazarbayev for a variety of reasons. Nazarbayev has been successful because on the one hand he's been able to do what's necessary to develop his country, which is principally getting Western companies to develop his hydrocarbons and developing an alternate to Russian pipelines for exporting his oil. At the same time, he's done just about everything else Putin has wanted in the area of integration of Eurasia. But the Eurasian Union is not such a good idea for Kazakhstan's economy. So the Russian engagement in Ukraine has been an object lesson in Astana. But just in case Nazarbayev didn't get it, he lines up that question in Valdai, which lays out that Kazakhstan's an artificial country which exists only because Nazarbayev is a genius. And Nazarbayev has been good at treating ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, but if after Nazarbayev passes the scene this doesn't happen well, Russia may just have to act. So he's sending messages all over the place about his ambitions to go beyond Ukraine. Okay, so that's the challenge. What do we do? It's actually, Klausowitz is right. It's hard, but it's simple. First, understand that Ukraine is the front line. So we have two tools directly for Ukraine which we should use. One we've used in a reasonably efficient way, one we should have, and the White House has done very well and it's not sanctions. Europeans have not done as well, but the White House and the State Department deserve great credit for pulling the Europeans along. The second thing where everyone's been off duty and the White House has been, in my mind, irresponsible has been the refusal to provide Ukraine the defensive weapons to defend themselves. With France trying to sell misdraws where the West is the unusual place of supplying the aggressor and not the victim. We have a, actually, a very important point here. Putin is vulnerable to sanctions but he has an even greater role of vulnerability. His people do not want Russians killing Ukrainians. His people do not want Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. You had a poll done by Lavade at the end of July which said only 10% of the Russian people would accept this. There's a poll done by someone else a few weeks later which said only 5%. We all know what happened to the Committee of Mothers of Russian Soldiers when they announced that Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. We know that Putin is burying his dead in secret. I was in Ukraine three weeks ago and I was told that there are mobile crematoria in the LNR and the DNR to dispose of Russian soldiers, dead Russian soldiers. Giving Ukraine weapons makes it less likely, excuse me, makes it more likely to be more casualties which imposes higher cost on Putin and may force him to back down because while his people may celebrate the taking of Crimea they do not celebrate Russian soldiers killing Ukrainians. Okay, so that's what we should be doing on Ukraine. But we need something broader. We need to understand that Mr. Putin's aims also go towards dividing the alliance, NATO, and dividing Europe. The Wales Summit will go down in history as I think at best weak tea. I was amazed at how many of my NATO friends were delighted with the outcome. They said we got this rapid response force. We're doing more in the Baltic states and so on. Which is true. However, I worked on that rapid response force as a third string consultant over a year ago when I was at NTU not doing Russia and Ukraine. So this was in the works before Putin decided to invade Ukraine. The deployments to the Baltics have been helpful but tiny. They should be serious. They should be much larger. We shouldn't be talking about a company of troops in the Baltics. We're talking about a battalion or more. Air force and tanks and other things. The idea is to make it crystal clear that this is a red line. And equally important, where are the ops plans for a Russian hybrid war for the appearance of the little green men in Narva? This is something we absolutely need to do. So we have to do stuff like that in NATO. And finally, the EU. The EU needs to understand that the wonderful regulations that is built up in the energy sphere and elsewhere need to be applied so that Russia cannot play off Slovakia and Hungary against Germany and Britain in manipulating oil and gas supplies. These are the sorts of policies we need. At the same time, we should say to Moscow, we would love to be your partners once you start to act like one. Thank you. Wow, fantastic. Thank you. Well, thank you to all three panelists. I don't want you to feel like this is in any way an attack on the US government policy. We're so delighted that you could be part of this discussion. You're part of the answer. I feel like I have to protect you. Excellent. Excellent. Are you about to? No, I'm not. But, no, I'm extremely grateful. Thank you so much. Wonderful comments for all three. Again, very mindful of John's time. I want to just put the chapeau out and question to all three panelists and then start pulling some questions. And if you could please, if you have questions specific to Ambassador Herbst, if we could take those first. And then as Ambassador Herbst has to go and then we will turn our attention to Roman and to Paul. I think to bridge the presentations, Paul, the outline that you gave us, I think was important policy for the beginning of this crisis. It was reactive. It had costs, strengthened NATO, and tried to find a way out of this. Try to give Mr. Putin the off-ramp. For my view, it just feels insufficient for what's going to be going forward in the next 10 years. And part, some of the conversation is to both Ambassador Herbst and Mr. Kuznalli's point, how this, now we need to get really serious here. If Mr. Putin does not believe of the sanctity of borders, we have a fundamental disconnect on the international legal norms as we have defined them. And in some ways that is the choice. Do we defend this system and perhaps confront Mr. Putin, which, with all the dangers that that implies, or do we try to accommodate, consolidate, and I would argue that we would be back at it again eventually, potentially in the future. So my question is, if this feels insufficient, how are we working with Europe developing the longer term instead of weak tea, a little bit of stronger tea, stronger messages, putting our principles forward and with clarity saying, this is what we will do, it's not offensive, it is defense of our values. So I put that to all three, how we can do that. And now I open the floor for questions for Ambassador Herbst. I'm going to take James and the minister first, too, and there's a microphone coming too. If you could, again, identify yourself. Although James, you don't need identification. And just keep your questions crisp so we can grab John for the next five minutes. James Scher were acquainted. If I may, you know, Ambassador, I firmly endorse 90% of what you said, but I have to allow myself one point of dissent. And it's about the EU. The European economies are immeasurably more exposed to the Russian economies and suffer deeply and directly from the sanctions, particularly the level three sanctions. And I think that Angela Merkel, who told German business interests and members of parliament flat out Europe's security interests matter more than Germany's business interests, has taken a very bold and resolute step that the Kremlin absolutely did not expect. And also, there has been no more serious package of measures against Russian energy policy than the third energy package. Of course the European Commission cannot throw out the government of the governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, and some other countries. But the commission is tying them up in knots. And the legal process against Gazprom is relentless. So I think not for the first time the American perception, the mainstream American perception of what the EU is and is not doing needs some correction. Thank you. Excuse me, but I would like to address what Ambassador Jones said. It's possible, yes? Thank you. Thank you so much for your position of the government towards Ukraine due to this brutal Russian aggression against my country. This is of course very important, but being very frank, I can tell you that we have expected a little bit more, especially in the context of the Budapest obligations of the United States, for example. But you have just mentioned that you are going to help Ukraine in the further developments. Mike, I have in this sense two small but very concrete questions. When are we going to have the status of major not NATO alive for Ukraine? And secondly, when we will be in a position to have American military assistance? Thank you. Ambassador Hertz, I'm going to turn to you to respond, and then I know you need to go, and then Paul, I'll ask you to respond. I agree, Jamie, that the European reaction has been much better than Putin expected or, for this standpoint, much worse. And I agree that Europe has taken greater hits. I know that the sanctions would have been more effective if they came in a more timely fashion. And if the EU were willing to tee up sanctions as they set red lines, because a red line was set, for example, at the G7 summit involving principal European leaders, and while that red line was crossed, it took about a month after it was crossed for the sanctions to kick in, and if they had kicked in sooner, the result would have been better. But I'd by and large take your points. And I agree with my friend from Ukraine that the US should be sending military spies to help them ward off additional Russian aggression. Thank you so much, John. Paul. Thank you. I want to respond briefly to your points, Heather, and to take up the following. I think what the discussion up to this point today has reflected is that this is a marathon, not a sprint. This is a long-term challenge that we face. I think we, the United States, and I think together the EU, our NATO allies and partners, frankly, around the world and the G7 are confronting President Putin over what Russia has done in Ukraine. Sanctions have, we have enacted several different levels of sanctions, each one building on the previous one and their impact is cumulative and their impact is magnified by the state of the Russian economy. So I don't see the response we have today as our response early to the crisis. The response we have today has built over time and its impact, I believe, has grown. I don't think anyone was expecting that we would have a miraculous change of heart in the Kremlin out of the policies we imposed, but they're meant to impose costs, meant to change over time the calculus. With regard to the specific questions, I think we have been, we have provided and we have programs to provide security assistance to Ukraine that we think and in consultations with the government are most effective at confronting the threats that Ukraine faces. I think you'll see more of that as the threats change, obviously the responses will change as well. On the specific issue of the non-NATO major non-NATO ally status, that is primarily designed for countries outside of the European theater and countries that have aspire to a sort of a separate relationship with NATO from the one that Ukraine has been pursuing some time and we haven't seen any specific benefits that that status would provide to Ukraine beyond what we are already doing, working well together. So I'll leave it there. Let's take a few more questions. Yes, we have one, two. Oh, I'm sorry. I think the military assistance. Yeah, no, I mean we... I'm sorry. Minister, I think you're speaking of lethal assistance. Yeah. Yes, lethal assistance. Yeah. As I said, we have providing assistance and we have programs to grow that assistance over time that we think are most appropriate to the threats that Ukraine is facing. And I don't have... I was looking for some of the details because I had to rattle off a lot of assistance we've provided in the military field. I understand it doesn't fit with every, you know, system that people may suggest, but we're in very close contact to provide what we think mutually is most effective. Okay. Alex, if we could start on the table over here. And again, I think colleagues, if it's okay, I'm going to bundle a few questions and then we can respond to them. I see lots of hands. So we want to get to everybody. Please, sir. Yeah, on the George Nestor check, on the question of the major non-NATO status, it would be a tremendous step up over what Ukraine is getting right now. Ukraine should be so lucky as to be a thousand miles from the Russian border. Unfortunately, it's not. And the NNA status would be a tremendous help. For one thing, it would open up access to surplus military equipment. All the stuff in Afghanistan, Iraq that was declared surplus would be accessible to Ukraine. All kinds of other military equipment would be accessible to Ukraine, not just from the U.S., but from all NATO members. Right now, the doors are shut for all of that. NNA status would be hugely significant for Ukraine. Thank you. Ricardo Bruckings. I will sound a different note here. And I would like to talk about the issue of containment because it is not absolutely clear to me what its elements would be and how it would really increase our security, Ukraine security, global security. As far as I understand, several panelists have talked about containment, having different components, not only security components, but particularly economic components. I do agree with Jim Scher that the issue of economic sanctions is particularly critical for Europe, not only because it affects its economic interests, but because it affects its political will and political will does not come from nothing. It comes from the issue of, from the problem of convincing your own public opinion that in this time of crisis because there is this crisis in Ukraine, you have to damage your economy by imposing sanctions on Russia. This is, this might be perhaps morally true, this is not going to fly. So the idea that you can actually go as far in Europe as the sanctions, as the sanction Russia, for instance, on the energy sector is just contrary to reality. So let's, let's put it aside, please, because this is fueling something which is not going to happen. It's not going to happen. Much more effective is the third package, is the energy third package probably, but it is not the kind of sanctions you actually advocating or you think that could force Russia to back down. Second, the key issue here is the political unity of the West. If, if there is a limit to that political unity, better to aim for a, for a lower threshold than the optimal threshold or what you think would be the optimal, optimal threshold. What the Europeans and the Americans have been doing in this last year it was absolutely unthinkable one year ago. The idea of having sanctions imposed on Russia in countries such as Italy, Germany, France and many others actually, even the UK for that matter would have been, would have been this maze is utterly unrealistic and I would like to remind you all that Europe is in, is in deep economic crisis and the problem of Ukraine and the list of priorities of Italians or French is probably number 20 or number 30. There are much more pressing priorities for them. So if you want to keep the unity of the Western Front which is much more important today than advancing a much more aggressive agenda vis-a-vis vis-a-vis Russia, better to aim to a lower threshold. Thanks Ricardo. I think we have one over here. Alex and I'll take the, then we'll pause and let you all take a, have some answers. I'm Paul Gardner American University of Paris. I'd like to remind us the containment strategy worked in the Cold War in part because the U.S. was able to play the China card and I would suggest that if we try to reactivate containment today it's the Russians that are going to be playing the China card and we've already seen that in their, in their oil deal. Anthropical and strategic point of view I think we have to think very much about the Russian and the Russian-Chinese connection. Second point I would get, I would also say that the Islamic movements will gain strength from the more we have tensions with Russia. The third point is that we have to show the Russians the absurdity of forming the sphere of influence in the north from Trans-Denis to Crimea, Abkhazia, etc. This is not in the greater Russian interest. It doesn't create a pre-trade zone in the Black Sea. So we have new policies towards the Black Sea that would incorporate Russian interest but, but not entirely exclude them. We can't simply divide the Black Sea into NATO areas and Russian spheres of influence. Thank you very much. Thank you. Great, great point. So I hear, you know, a question again, sort of returning back to that. How do we support Ukraine militarily, the urgency of that, and then the elements of containment and making sure that, you know, political unity, if that's our center to comment on some discussion. Well, we have to be patient because it seems to me that we all think that, well, yesterday Russia invaded Ukraine and today we are ready to have a ready-made recipe how to react and how to counter, etc. I would like to remember you that the previous containment strategy, well, it took some time. The thinking started after a famous Stalin speech in February 1946 and the famous NSC 68 report was adopted by here in the States only in April 50. So it has taken some time for the West and for the US to realize how serious the challenge was and what should be done in order to counter it, in order to contain Soviet Union and the communist system. And again in the 80s, again, Europe was in crisis and the United States decided to finally with Donald Reagan, well, that was started, that started, I mean, US started this and other than, I would say during the last two years of the Carter administration. But again, it has taken some time for Western Europe to adjust and to follow the United States and which, as we all know, at the end turned out to be successful. So I don't think we might see full containment strategy like that during the what is important is, as already been said, is to be consistent, is to be coherent and I wouldn't and from the very beginning, I'm not emphasizing the meaning of the economic dimension. Not only because the EU is in crisis, most of the countries of the EU for the mistakes which were and had been made before, but but also because of some kind of interdependence. Obviously, some price might be paid, but the collapse of the system would be much more costly, so some price might be made. And again I mean, Western Europe is getting more and more aware. It's few with few example, with few exceptions. Few want to countries still I'm not going to name them but who seem not to be ready. And existing functions not very much damaging for European economy and in my eyes low prices for oil may do more than sanctions. Just to you see to stay with that for few years more. What matters in your right, political unity, political dimension to send to Russia to put in the message that we do not accept this kind of behavior, you are not in a more partner to anything, to absolutely anything because we don't need you. So to keep him in the corner for a while to give them the chance to think, to rethink, year two, three, as much as he or his environment, his million needs to have the time to recover, to regain sober thinking, sober assessment of the situation and then they may be back. That would be the best service we can offer not only to ourselves but also to Russia. So not to be too much impatient but to be careful, take time and do it what we think. On the table, you know, but the question is to transform it into strategy and just to sustain for a while for as much time. This may really last in few years but nothing and you will see if we are on this consistent and if we show a result nobody else would follow. But the question is that to prevent others if Putin's case is successful, I mean other would in Asia in few other regions would be ready to follow. And that obviously the whole internal system which had been worked by us would then collapse. So if we are efficient enough to stop him, to keep him in the corner, nobody else would there to follow his destructive example. And really we don't the West, the US does not need Russia to solve problems like Korea, Syria and because Russians are interesting in prolonging all these difficult problems as long as possible because these are your problems Western problems, American problems. So why we should help you to solve what is bothering you. So they would not they would never play constructive role, never in solving the problems like that. Forget about that. Paul, I want to turn to you but I just as a two finger on that. I think for me it's very difficult sometimes to hear Secretary Kerry as he's talking with Secretary Lavrov sort of compartmentalizing these issues. Here's the wrong negotiations, here's Islamic State issues. Because my criticism of the reset policy when it was unveiled, it did exactly that. It said we can agree on all these strategic objectives, New Start Treaty, Afghanistan, Iran but it never dealt with the neighborhood issues. It never dealt with it had working groups but it never got at that great issue and in some ways do we perpetuate that compartmentalization and does it send that message to Mr. Putin that it's one policy when they said it the big table, the P5 plus one table and then we have a different. I grapple with that a great deal as I look from it from afar and I welcome your thoughts on that just to pull on Roman's comments. Okay, just a couple of very brief comments reflecting all the various comments. First, the United States is and will remain the leading security assistance provider for Ukraine. Second is picking up on Roman's comments you know I think it was Chancellor Merkel who has obviously played a crucial role in Europe on the response to Russia over Ukraine and other issues. I think when she came out of meeting with the Finnish Prime Minister said you know we had to wait 40 years in East Germany we don't want to wait 40 years but we're willing to go the distance in sticking to our policy and building on it together with our European allies and partners. I don't get the sense that Russia has a geostrategic card to play vis-a-vis China. I sense that China is while there are obviously business deals that you referred to I don't think China is entirely comfortable with Russia's actions in Ukraine and I don't see that as a strategic alliance and then finally on compartmentalization while I you know I appreciate the desire to not deal with Russia on global security issues the fact is they do play a role in certain issues that are important not only for our two countries but for a lot of other countries including many of our allies and partners so I I don't see a way in fact I think their participation is needed and we that does not mean that we don't pay attention to the clamp down on media civil society on political opposition in Russia nor that we don't pay attention to the countries in Russia's immediate neighborhood and particularly those of the eastern partnership I think we've shown a great deal of emphasis and support in fact the focus of our policy on that in many ways but you know there are global security issues out there where Russia is a player and it's difficult but one has to you know similarly I mean we had talks on a number of issues during the time of the Soviet Union as well alright let's take some more questions I don't want to ignore this side of the so we have question Caroline right there one two and then we'll do three and then I promise I'm going to do one more swing on that right hand corner oh that's a microphone sorry question for Roman Kuzhnyar in your presentation you mentioned that neither the Soviet Union nor the nor its successor the Russian Federation has been held account to date for war crimes perpetuated during World War II and notably those perpetuated against the Polish nation in as much as world public opinion now sees that the Kremlin is violating international norms do you think the time is now ripe to call for a review certainly on procedural grounds of the Smolens disaster of April 10th night of 2010 take the question yes right David sorry hi David Riley from the British Embassy wanted to pick up on one of Paul's points I mean I think unity today between Europe and the US has been remarkable frankly when you think of the economic stake that Europe has and the diversity of its interest cultural business historical with Russia but I want to pay down to a scenario that I think is perhaps likely and unhelpful which is one under which Russia continues to sort of inch forward in its aggressive adventurism in Ukraine the now Republican controlled Congress begins to sort of build the pressure on the US to legislate for sanctions or to legislate for lethal military support we arrive at the review of European sanctions next the middle of next year I think June May time and frankly the situation has not changed dramatically for the worse we probably see a dilution of EU sanctions at that point that's not something my government would support frankly under the current scenario but that is a scenario under which the division between the EU and the US that Putin begins to take advantage of so I mean perhaps for Paul or for Roman how do we mitigate the risk of that perhaps scenario playing out thanks so much David we had one question over here Caroline over there oh thank you Alex my name is Frank Barum I'm a private American investor so I'm going to talk a little bit about it from a different perspective for a moment here for a long time we have been making major investments in our coalition partners as well as the NATO partners in that European theater huge investments military resources equipment political time so on and so forth right now we do have an Air Force General who commands the NATO forces and is a stronger ally it disturbs me somewhat that we're hyper jumping our NATO investment to go to the front of the line and be the direct interface to the Ukrainian solution here I would ask the question of the State Department for a moment here why are we not working this problem hard with NATO regardless of all the problems that have been brought up by these other gentlemen we made major investments in NATO because I would read this as an investor to say that we are undermining NATO which means we're basically writing off the investments we've done with these coalition partners our five eyes and our seven eyes all of our long-term partners here are now being flushed out because once again we are stepping to the front of the line to be the direct interface thank you Roman do you want to tackle the question of the sensitive issues well again obviously I would wish Americans in the United States to have constructive contribution of Russia in solving various international problems pertaining to global security although the past experience does not bring or testify to the validity of that position but it's not I would say my problem on one side I wish good luck to the United States Administration concerning this but on the other hand I would like that all these things you believe in the States you need Russia to contribute to solving to be in should not affect Western American position vis-à-vis what's going on in Europe especially with regard to Russian so that the only point I'd like to write as to the Russian crimes in the past and to what in my introduction the question was not about how to say because I see no ground today for running for any compensation for what Russians did to the former satellite or the Soviet republics which are now independent countries I use that argument only as the source as the reason which or factor which has been spoiling Russian politics that's the meaning of the argument I used today I see no reason I see no ground to bring back this question to the agenda of our relations which Russia would be in we have unfortunately unfortunately to put it aside to keep it aside for the reason I said and as to the prospect of the division between US and Europe concerning the common possible common strategy to the towards Russia well as in the past we will see no doubt some differences because Western Europe is in no doubt deeper economic and not only economic interdependence with Russia and Western European both business and political elites some of them have been corrupted have been spoiled by Russian business and propaganda and we see this in a number of Western European countries and the role of let's say Rotterdam sit some contracts between France and Russia Germany no doubt softening the position but still as it was in the time of the previous Cold War somehow the West did manage to keep unity to the point which as I said at the end and eventually brought to the positive results that's why this risk, this prospect is always real unfortunately we see this from our first health experience and we have some problems with our Western neighbors to one big country as you know very well who was opposing to remove any reference or was trying to keep a number of references in the final documents communique and other documents to be adopted at the end of Newport Atlantic Alliance summit reference to the founding act on the relations between Atlantic Alliance and Russia completely that was completely unrealistic unrealistic position which was difficult to understand why this big country so much acting on behalf of Russian interest in keeping all reference while Russia violated most important parts of this document finally with the help with the assistance of the United States we were we succeeded to remove all this redundant things from the final from the documents but to avoid or to diminish the risk you are referring to obviously what is important is American strategic and political presence and in Europe especially what we have in mind there are a number of things which could be strengthened relations between Western Europe and US also in the context not only in the context of Asia for example TTP it's very much important it was strengthened the integrity of the of the western community and we are very much in favor of so American presence in Europe very important from that point of view thanks really quickly and then we'll grab three more questions just briefly how do you mitigate the risk of divisions I think through leadership through clarity of information and sharing of perspectives reliance on principles I frankly disagree that Europe will or some European countries will somehow think that it's in their interest to sort of set aside European security interests and I think as you say it's been remarkably effective so far and I continue to think it will be in that way on the basis of very close consultations and very close discussions about exactly I think how to respond to each situation and we do this surgically in a targeted way our sanctions have been very careful to respond to impose much greater costs on Russia than to any of the countries that are doing the sanctioning and to do that in a way that as I said builds in the future on NATO I think NATO is paying off every NATO ally is a contributor to the reassurance mission for the frontline NATO states there are rotational deployments, exercises on levels that have not been in recent memory have not been in existence and the partnership arrangements that NATO has have also been upgraded and I think they're very important in this crisis great we're going to take a lightening question around and I know I saw some hands over there yes Mike and I see a question in the corner so Alex we're going to start right over there weaving around the tables there thank you thanks so much Mike Peasner senate intelligence committee on the lethal assistance question I think somebody already mentioned that I think members of farm relations committee and armed services have already expressed support for lethal assistance senator mccain is going to be most likely the incoming chairman for armed services I imagine there will be some pressure on the administration to provide lethal assistance two quick questions on that do you believe that lethal assistance to Ukraine would be effective against the Russian military that's number one number two is I think more of a psychological question that Mr. Putin seems to have a lower threshold for risk than some of the western powers I think this is amply demonstrated by the MH17 Malaysian Airlines downing as well as the recent overflights in Europe by the Russian Air Force do you believe that he has levers that he would be willing to use should this lethal assistance be provided thank you great question there's one Alex right in the corner there thank you I'm going to be truly from ambassador to NATO my question is on the whale summit since this was the first summit since we were facing the Russian crisis I think that it was very carefully watched so on the positive side one of the outcome of the summit was reinvigoration or strengthening the collective defense pillar of NATO though I agree with the speakers insufficiently but it was a still a positive step forward but my question is is ambassador johns do you think that on the not complimenting this step with the enlargement policy somehow left the NATO partners more vulnerable in front of the emerging Russian threat this is the first part of the question and on the top of that leaving an impression that Ukraine is not getting sufficient defense capabilities especially in light of the president Poroshenko's recent visit in DC even strengthened the vulnerability of partner countries rather than rather than somehow assisting the partner countries the NATO summit and the recent visit of Poroshenko led to the perception that today those partner countries like Georgia Ukraine and Moldova are more vulnerable than they were before thank you thank you we have one question right there in the back Alex and then James I'll give you a quick two finger thank you President of Belarus Lukashenko since the beginning of crisis of the conflict in Ukraine has been balancing between Russia and the West he remains very vulnerable to Russia's will in all possible dimensions at the same time he continues his repressive practices in Belarus will the United States government and European Union change their policies with regard to Belarus regardless of the continued repressive practices in Belarus thank you thank you and James real quick we'll Alex run the microphone two finger comment on the weapons issue I am concerned about the propensity the addiction in the West to silver bullets and I'm equally concerned about all the factors that conspire and liberal democracies against strategic thinking what's clearly needed with Ukraine is a strategy for helping that country rebuild its military and make it more effective strategy weapons plays a part but the real locus of that strategy coming back to an earlier question I think has to be NATO and a real investment needs to be made there so Paul particularly if I could ask you for your comments on that I'd be grateful thanks I think the next CSA seminar needs to be on Ukrainian lethal assistance in the grander strategy thank you note to self but Paula let you have a quick crack and then Roman and I just want to remind you you span between them and their sandwiches so we're going to keep this very proud happy to do that thank you and that seminar we should invite experts in weapons systems and lethal assistance look obviously you know the response to the comments here the Russian military is highly capable especially in the in its region I'm just not going to get into or try to get beyond my expertise in specific weapons systems and what you know what would be most effective I can I just go back to what I said look at this situation very closely we consult very closely with with our partners in Ukraine and and we provide security assistance that we think will have the most stabilizing and effective be most effective at the at each moment along the way I agree it needs to be nested in a broader strategy and I think that's what we're doing but as we as we seek to protect Ukraine sovereignty and its ability to make its own choices so that's why folks with with great deal of specifics there but on the open door the open door remains and it you know countries you know we have Montenegro who's going to be looking at a intensified dialogue toward the 2000 towards a look at membership next year I think the NATO summit well it didn't accept any new partners and clearly made it obvious that NATO is ready to accept new partners when they are meeting the standards and think that the the assistance to Ukraine has an impact frankly on the on the security of others I think NATO stands for its partnerships as articulated at the summit so I think thank you I'm sorry but I have to disagree with my colleague from State Department regarding the divisions between the US and Western Europe on security matters because unfortunately how difficult were the battles concerning the wording in Newport documents rotational persistent but not permanent 25 years after the collapse of the Cold War 15 years we are in NATO and you say our Western partners they were saying we are not allowed to host on our soil permanent NATO the presence how should we do this in the document from having this in the document our Western European allies because you were on the other on our side but it's only the case that an example of the difference between the perception and reaction what should be done persistent or permanent that's a very stupid thing this we were fighting over the words before in the run up to the answer to say some and obviously there is a psychological dimension this situation today's situation between the West and Russia can be reflected in very simplistic terms as a kind of a chicken game Americans used to be masters in chicken game today they are losing or we are losing against Russia because what is the logic of the game because the West Western Europe but also the states very many signs in advance to the guy from the other side approaching us in his way not a perfect car absolutely at the very last moment turn the side so he can safely drive on there is a second because our bad language bad language of what we sent on how we define the situation wording and all other things tells him that he can well needless to say this morning was an incredibly rich discussion provocative informative highly enlightening and our audience has been so fantastic you have earned a lunch break but the taskmaster continues we're going to take about a half an hour for break but I would like everyone to be back in their seats very promptly at one o'clock because Dr. Brzezinski is going to give us a brilliant dissertation on Russia and the international system not to be made