 Good morning We'll get started here. My name is Sarang Hamasahid. I'm the director of Middle East programs here at USIP Like to thank you all and welcome you all to USIP this morning and for those and welcome those who are joining us through our live stream This event is a public event that is live streamed as I mentioned And we have a hashtag for those who want to tweet and join the part to join the discussion through social media Hashtag rucka USIP and you can see it on the on the screen For those who are new to USIP The latest incident of peace was created by the US Congress in 1984 to focus on the proposition that piece is possible that piece is practical and USIP has been working On Syria and had programs in Syria We focus on three key categories of work there one We try to inform policy discussions on Syria and this event today in this discussion is part of such efforts second we work on building Syrian capacity for Preventing mitigating and resolving conflict through nonviolent means and we support facilitated dialogues On the ground and we have done such in northeastern Syria in the al-Hassaka province specifically We experimented with a dialogue model that we have more widely Used in Iraq and we tested in northeastern Syria where we bring different actors to a conflict together through a process of facilitated dialogue and Usually the outcome of that is at preventing tensions and it also contributed to the return of internally displaced families Specifically in al-Qahtaniya or also locally known as to Raspi We have expanded that line of work to the talhamees and the Ras al-Ain the third aspect of our work is to work on the spillover effects of the Syrian Conflict and we have used our grants mechanism to support initiatives in Jordan and Lebanon to focus on the issues of refugees and host community tensions and Though those efforts have been informative again to informed policy discussions here in in Washington For the conflict or the conflicts in Syria, I should say there are many angles that we can Tackle this issue, but for today's Purpose the angle that we focus on is the liberation of lorakka and post-ISIS The governance and stabilization in this area, which is the military advances and and triumphs is important, but Stabilizations and governance as many argues probably more difficult and I'm sure we will expand to other Aspects of the Syrian conflict that the future of the law of the political framework At the national level the role of regional and international actors including the United States and for this Discussion we have a very distinguished panel and I'm really honored to join them here today first of all We have to my left Mona Jacobian who is the USIP senior advisor for? Syria the Middle East and North Africa she was with USA ID before she joined us and she has extensively Written and worked on the region Including Syria Iraq Lebanon and Jordan and the Her special excellent special report on rock and the governance challenges is an important topic that will be a key aspect of the discussion today and Then we'll we also have Hassan Hassan who's a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute For Middle East policy a think tank in Washington, and he is very well known for his work on Syria and on Islamic militants and His best-seller Isis inside the army of terror I cannot Exit recommend enough that book and the positive feedback that I have received in every discussion about Isis and And the conflict in that part of the world in Syria and in Iraq And we're also joined by Nicholas Harris who is fellow at the Center for a new American security And he is working in the Middle East security program. He has a dedicated experience also on Syria Before the uprising of 2011 and after the events that are followed. He has also Published a lot on this topic. He is a respected scholar on this and he has been tapped by many Organization agencies in the US government the US military and the media as well so Again, we are what we are starting. I was with the cell will start with a set of questions to our panelists and then I'll open it up for Questions from the audience. We have two microphones on both sides of the of the room So when you have a question, please come to the microphone and I'll remind you about that When we get there but without further ado, I'd like to turn to Mona and if you could set the stage for us Post-ISIS Why is Raka important? What are the key challenges that we should be? Thinking about and what are some of the policy considerations that we should we should look into? Thanks so much Zahang and good morning. Thank you all for coming I have to say I I think that in some ways the importance of Raka and its liberation Got lost a bit in the sort of warp speed news cycle That we all are subjected to and so I welcome the opportunity this morning To really drill down and try to understand better the significance of the fall of Raka what the challenges are that we face With its liberation and in particular what role the United States can or should play The liberation of Raka, I think marked a Significant watershed in the military campaign to defeat the Islamic State Raka's importance really cannot be overestimated. I think we have to remind ourselves this was the capital of the so-called caliphate of the Islamic State it occupied a central role in ISIS's narrative this sort of Uptopian in their view or dystopian in our view Re-establishment of the caliphate across Iraq and Syria and and perhaps even beyond It was also a location where we know external operations planning took place Particularly with attacks in in Paris and Brussels. This is a significant strategic and symbolic loss for the Islamic State When we couple it with the fall of Mosul Just a few months prior to that in July. I think this constitutes a seminal moment in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State but I also think it's very important to acknowledge that With these military wins The ultimate defeat of ISIS is still far from assured I think that is because What takes on even greater importance is what happens after the dust clears The smoke lifts from the battlefield and that's really what the meat of the special report is about It's about the governance challenges that are faced In Raka in particular after the Islamic State. I think what I hope what we've learned I hope lessons that we've absorbed from experiences in Iraq Afghanistan and elsewhere is that What is central to? anchoring military victories to consolidating gains on the battlefield is the establishment of effective governance governance that is inclusive Accountable and responsive to local populations It's it's really a critical hedge Against the return of violence and extremism effective governance without it, I think what we've seen is oftentimes these military victories are fleeting so in looking at this question specifically in Raka, I Sort of found that there are really for I say for baskets if you will of challenges to Achieving effective governance The first probably the most vexing is the strategic is the strategic basket and this really essentially is an acknowledgment that Syria there is still is still in the throes of a very complex multi-actor civil war now regional proxy conflict in the absence of a political settlement to that civil war There are all kinds of questions that are raised about what happens to Raqqa Who will ultimately rule Raqqa? Who will have ultimate authority over Raqqa? There are a number of competing forces on the ground Both local regional and even global So a slew of questions there that I suspect we're going to drill down on further in the Q&A another strategic challenge Results from the fact as we are seeing that as the campaign against Isis begins to wane. We are seeing other Conflicts subterranean conflicts come to the fore This could be in the again in the case of Raqqa There's a looming conflict between the Syrian government and the Kurds who have asserted a semi-autonomous region in the north and northeastern parts of Syria And of course the Kurds have played it a critical role in the liberation of Raqqa There's a potential conflict between the United States and Iran We are seeing that Iran and Russia of course have played a significant role in the taking of Abu Kamal The last remaining city that was held by Isis on the border with Iraq and indeed even Iraqi Popular mobilization forces took part in that battle underscoring again That this is a battlefield that has not just local or even regional Stakes, but global stakes. So those are some of the strategic challenges the second basket is looks at or refers to the ethnic tensions that are inherent in Having a Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic forces wall and again I think what's important here is not so much the breakdown the percentages what percent Arab what percent curd but who holds power who wields authority and Up until now clearly. It's the Kurds who wield this authority and yet Raqqa is an Arab Tribal city and again, I think we will delve into this further But this is very different from other parts other cities that That the SDF and that the Kurds have played a role in liberating and it sets up a clear tension between local Arab populations and Kurds that are playing a critical role in liberating the city and potentially in holding it and and also in its governance Third is the tribal issues. This is a city as I've noted that has a particular Tribal character to it ISIS Was an adaptive and learning organization. It learned lessons from what happened in on bar and I think more effectively was able to exploit divisions within Clans and sub-clans and so there's there's a certain level already of dissonance amongst the tribe And over the three years that ISIS had control of Raqqa We've also seen a breakdown in some of the traditional tribal reconciliation mechanisms and of course we have The long-standing issue that we've seen in other areas held by ISIS, which is a desire to take revenge Against those who allied with ISIS. So there's the prospect of tribal violence and revenge killings And finally last but not least are the simply the technical challenges associated with Governance It's important. I think to mention the level of destruction in Raqqa, which is significant It's estimated that maybe as much as 80% of the city is uninhabitable The extent of littering of IEDs of improvised explosive devices is Massive and will constitute a critical challenge, but then beyond that it's the actual challenge of Governing a place and here there are issues with capacity the capacity of the local Raqqa civil counsel who are the people that are in it? Do they have the skills the technocratic skills that are necessary and the challenges of Restoring essential services of restoring electricity water, etc The report highlights two particular areas that merit attention and one is the sort of the the water and Irrigation infrastructure, which is critical in this largely agricultural area. It is the lifeblood of the economy It is essential to get some of this back going so that there is an opportunity for people to get back on their feet that there There are livelihoods opportunities there and finally education Which is in many ways? I think even even more important we are talking now about the future of Syria about Syria's children and Again, and it's become a bit of a cliche, but it's important to note this fear of a lost generation Over the past three years many schools in Raqqa were closed Those that weren't were taken over by ISIS used as incubators to propagate their extremist Ideology, so there's going to be a lot of work that needs to be done in order to reinvigorate the education sector and and also I think it bears Mention the the level of trauma that Those who have lived under ISIS rule have suffered from it's reported by doctors and others to be unprecedented Particularly amongst children and so this is going to also constitute. I think a significant challenge So what do we do? Why don't I just conclude with a few recommendations that I laid out the report has a Number of recommendations that are pegged to each of these baskets I think the most important though is That it is critical for the United States to remain engaged on this To maintain its light footprint Perhaps to shift a bit more from military to a posture that's focused more on Stabilization and ultimately on assisting with the tasks of governance that I've laid out but the United States has a critical role to play and and Should resist the temptation to sort of check the box. I said you know Raqqa liberated and and Withdraw I would say precipitously A second and I think very important as well The United States has built an important relationship with the Syrian Democratic forces with the Kurds that that are playing leadership Roll a leadership role there. It's important for the US to leverage that influence to insist that Political authority be devolved to local populations to the local Arab populations in Raqqa So that you do in fact have Inclusive government governance that is representative of the people on the ground and that is not considered of the replacement of one Occupying force by another With respect to some of the tribal challenges The report notes that of course across Syria Syria's social cohesion at social fabric has been badly damaged Raqqa is one of the governance that has perhaps had the worst level of Deterioration of social cohesion and so it's really important even now to begin to think about Ideally innovate ways to engage at that local level to help begin to restore social cohesion Dialogues and reconciliation. This is something that can begin even In internally displaced persons in IDP camps in the north. This is work that really begins to that really needs to begin Immediately and then finally on the technical side I think it is just going to be incredibly important in particular to focus on the capacity of these local councils To begin to attract Some of the those council members who are in exile in Turkey who played an important role prior to ISIS taking over Raqqa And after the regime was was pushed out the there are skilled technocrats that can play a role They they need to be recruited back And again on the issues of both water infrastructure education these are areas that need to be prioritized and in particular Some of the psychosocial Interventions that various aid organizations have developed those need to be integrated Across the board and again even even beginning with people in IDP camps dealing with some of the humanitarian assistance provision and and then further as we as governance and other sectoral programs begin to take shape It's important to address the trauma that these populations have suffered and I will stop there Thank you. Thank you. That was an excellent summary of a set of very complex issues And just for for you, but we have physical copies of the report if you are interested in having Picking up a copy and also they're available online on the US IP website So with that great introduction, I would like to go for a deeper dive Hasn't given your experience especially with that part of Syria. I mean, obviously as I mentioned in the beginning There are different angles through which you can look at Syria that the composition of the the population The the character of the geographic area Could give a different angle. So is there anything special? to the composition of the community the Tribal structure there that is important for us to look at and second Especially with a in a post-ISIS environment for continuity of eyes You have written on the topic before that ISIS even before the liberation of Raqqa has been setting the stage for what comes after So what can you tell us about that per operation and what what would that look like in your view moving forward? Absolutely. Well, first of all, thank you for having me here. I want to start by saying that I Wasn't all I wasn't a big fan of the Syrian Democratic forces for a while. I've been critical of it But I have to say they are doing quite well these days in terms of governance in terms of no governance is a kind of a way of doing things but as as an opportunity for Outsiders for the international community to do something through the Syrian Democratic forces But it needs some work it needs some very important work and the two things I think that need to be emphasized head like From the outs outset when it comes to the Syrian Democratic forces that what the US should be doing is Is to emphasize the national character of the Syrian Democratic forces that it's not a Kurdish or a pkk a project but a national national Project that combines the Kurds and the Arabs and the The other like the religious minorities as well And I think there is an opportunity there. In fact, it reminds me of the period Immediately after this after ISIS took over the opportunity the window of opportunity You have today is the same opportunity that ISIS had after it took over all these areas and I'll expand on the Demographics and the nature of the area in a bit and the second thing is to prevent the regime from coming to these areas I think that's a very important thing You may like here people say, you know, some people want the regime back Some people as we discussed before before the the panel the people want to want the return of the good state You know Anything that the regime had before the state the Syrian state had Accept this intelligence services and how and their brutality Everything else. I think people long for they want it back because they want some sort of Security but to go back to the the region Eastern Syria in general is has always been an important and a kind of a disjoint part of Syria In Syria, we call it Al Jazeera The the the the Peninsular or the similar the basically the Mesopotamian sort of part of Syria, not the Levant part of Syria Although it has You know, the other side of the river belongs to the Levantine or the Levant part of part of that region and also in Syria even in Curriculum, so if you study like in high school, you get three marks Kind of advantage if you get lower than what needs to be a one that needs to take you to Study for example medicine or so-and-so and so on so forth if you were from that region you get that the extra credit Because and they call it the distant provinces so it is part of it's a it's a it's a far part of Syria. It's disjoint. It's It's separate from Syria in that sense and I say that because it has policy implications it has Popular kind of or implications related to the popularity of certain groups that come with a project that take into account That sort of dynamic on nature of that conflict. That's why ISIS and the Syrian Democratic forces Maybe the YPG or the PYD Have something in common. That's like a lot of people a lot of the support they got is because Because they they acknowledge this nature of Syria the Syria the decentralized the separate sort of part of Syria People obviously don't want to partition from Syria to leave Syria But they they I think a lot of people are fed up of how they were governed badly and poorly From Damascus Damascus is far so the the central government governance in these region. They didn't they didn't work quite well over the over the years But so so that that's an important part as a geo as a kind of a geographic nature of the region locally as or socially obviously, it's also different because it's a tribal predominantly tribal areas and There is some sort of coherence and cohesion in that region in terms of tribes in a lot of in many ways The towns are named after or or a structure in a way that acknowledge the composition of the tribal composition of these of these regions Rock is different obviously from Hasik and there is or the other two provinces that make up What we call al-Jazeera in Syria the three provinces And there is or for example There's one tribe that is that for that kind of makes up around 70 to 80 percent of the province in Raqqa It's different at the they have different dynamics because Raqqa is similar to Dar'a where they have smaller tribes And and you don't have like the kind of a majority tribe a tribe that control kind of You could say Raqqa is predominantly that that so-and-so tribe Same thing in Hasikah and obviously these two unlike there is or have other demographics They have Kurds and they have Christians and they have they have You know Other minorities like the Turkmen and so on so forth And there is or it's a separate thing, but it's it's different. They do have Christians and they have but they mostly Sunni Arabs from one big tribe in the in that region and the just kind of also a short history of the Syrian conflict the Raqqa and the place of Raqqa in the Syrian conflict before Before the SDF came came to to the scene Even when you when you talk about ISIS I think we have to acknowledge that ISIS wasn't do like we have to understand that much of the work that ISIS did in 2013 and 14 was done for it by Jabhat al-Nusra So Al Qaeda style sort of trying to win hearts and minds. That's why they they started to gain some influence and build some influence in Raqqa before ISIS came in and kind of adopted a different model when they when they announced a unification between this Islamic State of Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and they formed the ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria So we have to acknowledge that this popularity aspect the winning hearts and minds was done not by ISIS But at least the infrastructure of ISIS Was done already by by by Jabhat al-Nusra So ISIS had really two two years when they took over Raqqa they took over Raqqa by force and they a lot of the people who were with I with Jabhat al-Nusra before defected to ISIS and They they they formed the kind of the vanguard of ISIS and when ISIS took over a lot of people started joining them It's a similar phenomenon to what we see today and with the SDF and the SDF takes over an area They start to fuel and kind of recruit locally a lot of people join them after they take a town and these people start Joining them as governors or people who work with them in terms of providing services and so on so forth So there was that I just to go back to the beginning There wasn't a window for opportunity for ISIS in the beginning because a lot of people saw them as different saw them as The force that could secure an area a region expanding from Mosul or even further from Let's say from Mosul to Aleppo where you could travel from one area to another without having to fear for your life You don't have to even carry guns unlike when this Free Syrian Army governed Obviously, it's different when the regime governed But it's the people lived under the Free Syrian Army or Harsham and Jabhat al-Nusra and they didn't feel safe But I said when ISIS came in they enforced Assemblance of law and order and people a lot of people joined them and supported them and joined their other layers of their caliphate rather than just the security forces the military aspect or so and so forth joined the Municipality and so on so forth. So it expanded at the time because a lot of people joined them But then when people recognized what ISIS was was was standard for and when the campaign against it started The security forces within ISIS took the back at the front seat and they started to crack down on people and because they're power No, yeah, they start to alienate people now. This is a lesson for the Syrian Democratic forces You have a window for opportunity today where people feel This is different from ISIS This is people who treat the population respectfully and they're they're not corrupt unlike the regime unlike The Free Syrian Army or other forces. They're not they're not corrupt. So they they try to as much as they can Treat people respectfully and there's some law law and order. The problem is I don't know how long that will last Especially when people start to feel that maybe the regime is coming back or the Syrian Democratic forces is a vehicle for the regime to come back Then I think or when mistakes are made or when there's a delay in reconstruction I think things will will start to go back to to normal and we might see Iraq and other areas in Syria turning into another Fallujah where it's just a cycle You destroyed city and then militants come back and then you destroy it again And the same militants come back as if people the local population didn't learn anything and it's because them because of the mistakes They're made by by outsiders Thank you very much Really appreciated going into the diversity of these communities because and on your last note on Fallujah and the repeat that you have to go through. I think this is an important angle that we have seen in Iraq where many Of Iraq's issues were brain were blamed on Saddam Hussein, but even after he was gone other issues emerged that were Just coming as a result of the change in the system as a result of Communities working with each other and having disagreements and not having a common Consensus and then that gives the space for for the terrorists and militants to seize that space and take issues of the people So with that I would like to transition to Nick and ask you Hassan Touched on the SDF and the importance of how it needs to be promoted Can I mean you're welcome to comment on? things that Mona and Hassan talked about but I wanted to ask you to go for a deeper dive on the SDF obviously the SDF has There is the security military angle of liberating the cities and provide and taking hold of those areas And then it's the politics and this is where the tensions as long as we have seen in the context of Iraq There was common enemy in ISIS the the actors worked with each other and fought that common enemy Does the SDF still have a common enemy? Can they hold together and govern? And an important component to their success and viability has been us support What do you see the the limitation so far and the US support through in the in the model that has been used to buy with and through and Going forward. What what what do you envisage of the US role to be especially in light of recent statements and conversations between the US president and the Turkish president about stopping arming the SDF Well, thank you very much to us IP for hosting this event And it's a moment for this Excellent report and I think that this gets the the word that I've heard frequently over the course of this panel Governance really is the hot of what will determine the war over the aftermath of the war You know, I just I'll start off by saying there are three themes that I see in Mona's report That I think really ring true one is US commitment. What is the level of US commitment moving forward? How does the US build stability or as general Thomas the head of special operations command said? How does the US empower the SDF to govern in the wake of ISIS? Which as he stated sets it apart from other partners that the US has had over the last 15 years The second dynamic is the agency of local Syrian actors in this case the SDF or more broadly The Democratic federal system or the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria that overarch in sort of governance structure That's been built out as the political component of the SDF How does it implements the all the different factors that build stability in areas that have been conquered from ISIS? These factors are security the provision of humanitarian assistance Governance and administration and then economic recovery or economic Or read reconstruction How does it do that and how does the SDF? interact with other actors such as Former members of the Raqqa local council which Mona references in this report that are either Resident in Europe now or in Turkey and would like to come back and would like to contribute to the reconstruction and the Rehabilitation of their home areas and then I think the other third key point here is Turkish buy-in and Fundamentally this feeds into the other two Dynamics all these areas that we are discussing today Raqqa in particular are west of the Euphrates They are far from what we would typically consider to be the core areas of the democratic Federal system of northern Syria and this is very important So I'll use that as sort of the the launch in point when you look at when the US began to interact With the epic yeah with the Kurdish majority Kurdish Armed forces and its incipient Governance structure and what it calls Rojava Western Kurdistan the cons how the Kurds Conceived of their government was far more limited than we see today. They had three cantons one Scissory or was now Haseke was now the Jazeera region of the federal system The other which was Kobani, which is now The Euphrates region of the federal system and offering that very controversial piece of territory north of Aleppo Which is in some ways the beat-in hot of Syrian Kurdish nationalism over the course of the the partnership between the epic a and its other other armed actor Allies with the US military and the broader coalition the range of territory that has fallen under The democratic federal system is expanded immensely It has expanded southward all the way to Dara Zor on the very border with Syria and Iraq is Expanded and is expanded westward over these areas that have been claimed by ISIS Hassan had alluded to the fact that one of the dynamics at play as ISIS began to expand its influence as it really began to challenge for Control over eastern and central and northern Syria was that it was able to sort of stick its brand over local militias that had risen and against Assad that was a strategy that played to its advantage it allowed ISIS to exert the minimum required force in order to hold territory and to claim a caliphate and it was also used against ISIS as the Epic and its Arab allies and the Free Syrian Army began to work more closely with the US military Began to inter began to create sort of Systems of strike cells really this the key to the success of the SDF has been its ability It's almost uncanny ability. It's really its path breaking ability to Interact with the US military and other coalition partners and to be able to call in airstrikes and using the sort of Snowball as it rolls down a hill effect of an avalanche The SDF was able to have a type of air superiority over ISIS that played against ISIS Which allowed the SDF and its part SDF to seize villages throughout this area of Syria throughout northern and central Northern eastern and central Syria from ISIS to replace ISIS as the predominant power, but now there comes a governance challenge I think this is very important when we look at sort of the history over the last year and a half of where we are going The first the first experience that the SDF had with trying to govern in the wake of ISIS was in Tala Biyad and Northern central Syria and it did not go well and the lessons that the SDF learned from that was it needs to communicate well in advance what its intentions are for the local population particularly because there is sort of an ingrained sense Among many of the communities that the SDF is now Administering that it is a Kurdish project to try to create one contiguous territory From eastern Syria all way to Mediterranean and it'll be a Kurds are going to replace the historical wrong that was imposed upon The at them by the Arab government in Damascus So the situation as we look at it in Raqqa right now Is a is a model of how the SDF has had to approach? governance west of the Euphrates since the beginning of 2016 Learning from the Tala Biyad experience learning from the challenges in Tala Biyad Starting with Mambaj in Tabqa, which is is further west from Raqqa and now Raqqa There's been a key emphasis on Mobilized in local council and we see the Raqqa local the Raqqa Civil council as being the key sort of implementer making sure the demographic balance of these councils is correct building a local civil security force and then also being being willing to be flexible I think this is going to be very important as we move forward Where we stand right now is that there are three neighborhoods in eastern Raqqa that have been Transitioned and this is the key phrase from the SDF to the Raqqa internal security force the RISF The Raqqa civil council the RCC has authority over them But it is in a in a state of having to provide clean water food assistance Electricity health care and reconstruct in homes all in the middle of rubble and this is the challenge And so I and I think one of the key Lessons that we should take from this report is that there is a model in place The US and the SDF have a model they acknowledge that from day one from day one at the fall of ISIS They had to hand over power to the Raqqa civil council to Responsible tribal elders and to a security force that has been composed mainly to represent the demographic balance of local population But as we move forward if the level of us commitment is not there The ability for the federal system to govern far afield from its core areas will be severely challenged I think this is a dynamic that will that will require much further exploration as we begin to look at What is the long-term role of stabilized in this area of Syria because it can't just be The federal system it can't just be the SDF it has to have a US backbone of support And with that US backbone of support you can bring in other partners whether from the Gulf or potentially and this may be Me putting too much hope to the situation a condominium with Turkey when it comes to minister in areas west of the Euphrates That are have been historically areas of ISIS recruitment and could potentially serve as the basis for ISIS to reconstitute itself in Syria Thank you Thanks a lot and so actually where you end up that we have Microners if you have a question, please raise your hand and State your name and your question and please make the question a question But one the back over there Thanks, I'll expect it size. Good to see everyone. Thank you very much for the presentations I have two questions one Hassan you said that The challenge for the SDF is to build a kind of national nationalist identity and I wonder What that is going to be it's clearly not going to be a Kurdish identity and it's not going to be a Baptist identity We know that baptism was taken out of the textbooks at least somewhere near rock I'm not sure if that's across the SDF territory, but what is that national identity going to be? and I think it's it's I see no evidence that Damascus is going to offer some kind of a new Nationalist ideology which is going to bring people in in a way that baptism Probably no longer can but it's not clear me the Kurds have that capacity either. So that's the first question What is that that nationalist ideology? Or what are some of its elements and the second is sort of a point to all three Panelists and I don't want to be overly alarmist about this But we spent a lot of time in in 2012 2013 2014 Building an expansive sense from Washington of what we would achieve in liberated areas of Syria Areas liberated from the regime and in a sense we built a kind of parallel universe of activities and aspirations and hopes and goals for territory where the US political commitment wasn't there and we've seen President Trump's comments about restricting or ending military support to the SDF We've seen his comments about his comfort level with Assad We've seen his withdrawal of support Reportedly to Syrian opposition groups It doesn't seem to me that at the highest levels of the US government a commitment is there to do the broad range Of things that each of you have spoken about and so I hope rather than creating a kind of again a new parallel Aspirational universe you could at some level address. What does it look like if US support isn't there? Thank you very much and actually The your second question on the last piece of it I was gonna direct the audience as well because in your discussion. There's an assumption about I think I read two assumptions one is that there will be a US commitment to or see us presence to support some of these initiatives and second Governance by its definition probably assumes some democracy and which is May not be offered by if the US withdraws and and Alternative of the Syrian government the forces go back to some of these areas But let me start with Hassan since the first part of the question was to you and address the second as well And then come to Mona and then Nick. I'll address Alex's two questions and because I think They are related in a way So when I when I say now a national I don't mean probably a nationalist and kind of the Traditional sense, but a national meaning it's not a group project. It's not Kurdish or PKK project But something that combines and includes all these ones in fact the SDF when you talk to them But the YPG specifically and they was they will say there are certain issues That they want would like to talk to them talk about them as part of a national conversation so Maybe they are in system and the decentralization of federalism But eventually it has to be some sort of kind of consensus It can't be this situation where I nobody I think a lot of people expect some sort of deal in the future Some sort of understanding with the regime some people say it will be by Abandoning all the Arab areas and having the Kurdish autonomy Some people say no it would be turning all the American sphere of influence west of the Euphrates into Into some sort of decentralized Entity and I think the Russians accept something like cultural autonomy where people can just have the language and so on so forth But not but security forces and everyone will come back to these areas For example, the SDF would say or the YPG the PYD would say They would say for example the issue of the what we call in Syria the Arab al-Ghamr or the Arabs of the flooding Basically, this is back in the 70s when the regime displays Kurdish families And a lot of Arab Arab's from some areas and relocated them So it was a demographic change in northern Syria to build an Arab belt. So the Kurds don't have the kind of Continuous presence there and a lot of these Arab families the Kurds say they the cause the displacement of Doesn't like tens of thousands of Kurdish People in the region so they want to some sort of kind of correcting that by Displacing Arabs against some people some some call for that. But if you talk to the PYD, they would say no we want this as part of a national conversation and Obviously because a lot of these are able Arab al-Ghamr They they are loyal to the regime because the regime sent them to Hasaka and these areas, right? So the PYD wouldn't go Sorry, the the PYD wouldn't go against the regime in that sense. They wouldn't pick up fight against Arabs as a kind of an ethnic cleansing, but also against the regime as Going after their allies. So I think eventually the way I envision things is that at some point you need the return of the Syrian state to all Syria and as a unified Syria is the best way forward but Under that you could have something like decentralization I think the best way forward for that region is decentralization and in order I think the US can have that as as a As an end the exit strategy that everyone wants Which is basically a handover of these of this area to a Syrian state as part of a political settlement Not because of Iranian harassment and because they want to go because they're fed up It has to be part of a political process a settlement that they failed to do elsewhere in Syria where they they didn't want to Support anyone but now that you have a sphere of influence in Syria and that you have some leverage inside Syria What you could do is that say you know what? We're not tied to this. We're not wedded to this thing, but we want to rehabilitate these areas We can help build local capacity and enable the locals to govern their areas and then hand them over and Kind of allow them to become part of a Syrian state that is not acidist regime Sort of a state. So I think there's a way forward and I think that and that that's what I meant by national project Thank you Thanks, Alex if I could I'd like to maybe just offer a couple points on your first question as well I think it's important to acknowledge that the SDF did not start as a Multi-ethnic Force, I mean this was really something it was a bit of an artificial construct That had a very important Kurdish core But an acknowledgement and a realization For the very reasons we've discussed that it would be important to a creed to add more of an Arab Membership and so over time the SDF has evolved and I think in a positive way to include Arab forces and and I would also take Hassan's point that there has been learning And or actually next point as well that there's been learning from previous experiences and that There the governance is that the composition of the SDF is improving But that said I think we we need to again be Clear that that this was not organic and therefore because it's not it's also vulnerable and It's vulnerable in different ways. So we've had reports of forced conscription for example amongst Arabs and that that's concerning There's issues when Raqqa was first liberated with posters of Abdullah Ocalan the head of the pkk Up and Kurdish flags, etc. These are to my mind. Those are concerns That said I think your question about People yearning or searching for a nationalist identity and that's what's going to attract and and sort of build legitimacy I'm not sure that that's what people are looking for we you know I think that people on the ground are as much they're looking for security. They're looking for livelihoods They're looking for you know being able to live again and here I think we need to be careful because I do think the Syrian regime maintains inroads into these areas has paid Salaries for example throughout even under ISIS control and in the little survey that we did and I underscore It's really more anecdotal. We did a little survey as part of the report There there's some interesting and I think somewhat disturbing results that came out of that one was that 65% of those surveyed said that they preferred Syrian government influence over Raqqa to the SDF's and Related to that an equally high percentage felt that the Syrian government would be better able to meet local governance needs So I think that that's an important Red flag or that that frankly underscores why it is so important to have these alternate structures Do well in in providing for local populations And to your second point I share your concerns. I think that was part of the motivation of the report I think that there is a temptation and a desire perhaps to withdraw You know our administration has talked a lot about not wanting to sort of be deeply engaged Certainly, no nation building reconstruction, etc. That's actually a carryover from the Obama administration, which made similar points But I hope we've learned some of the lessons from what happened when we withdrew in Iraq and and I think Nick's characterization of the US Playing this important role as a backbone Really should be underscored what's interesting and what's new and what I think is really novel about Our engagement necessity is the mother of invention and I think this a whole model of by with and through That we've adopted on the ground In Iraq, but even more so in Syria is really important. So we're not we're talking about a light footprint We're not talking about a huge us presence and the by with and through model Can be adapted and has and is certainly also Relevant to how humanitarian and stabilization and ultimately governance assistance is provided So very light footprint very much focused on very nimble very focused on local partners on the ground. That's I think Critical last point. Let's not forget the global coalition to defeat ISIS And this is where I think maintaining that coalition is essential Just because the military campaign is winding down by no means is Is the job done that that if I could leave this audience with one takeaway it is that we should not Seek solace in these military victories To believe that the Islamic State has been ultimately defeated So the global coalition needs to evolve with those changes Governance to my mind is the defining challenge in the post-ISIS landscape of Iraq and Syria And it is going to be on the coalition this multi-nation coalition To think through and evolve in its mission to respond to that So I just I just would like to build off and I agree whole-heartedly With both Hassan and Mona about this idea that governance is key I'd also say just in terms of the nap the idea of a nationalist vision You know I take you know Hassan's nuance point on that. I think and you know It's incipients this governance that we're talking about when we talk about the democratic federal system of northern Syria It's so incipient if you think about if we go to the time When the US first began to engage with the epic in the late summer of 2014 In the early fall of 2014 part of what made that you know General Thomas was very blunt about saying it at the Aspen security forum in July when he said we asked them Do you have some Arabs? It has to be more than just Kurds Luckily for the epaigheh they had had over a year and a half of engage in with various free Syrian army affiliates So most famously Qua Sanadid drawn from the Shamar tribe from Hasik they had worked with the epaigheh to capture the Arabia border point in October of 2013 which is sort of one of those foundational moments in fact the epaigheh had been working with Lee with the war a rocker the rocker Revolutionary Brigade which were displaced rocken fighters In the defense of Kobani, which is sort of the seed of the the the broader SDF mission I would say that if you look at sort of the map that is created by Democratic the authorities in the Democratic federal system their concept of what's their core areas doesn't necessarily include Raqqa or Mambesh or and their Zor for example it those areas had been left out So I'm gonna raise the point about fourth of conscription That was one of the major areas of concern when you interact with with communities that have been have been liberated from ISIS Is the SDF gonna bring their Kurdish? Intelligence agency the assayation are they gonna tell us what to do are they gonna arrest us at checkpoints? Are they gonna force us to go fight for them? Are they gonna force Arabs to die for Kurdish? Suzerainty and I think you know it the SDF had some missteps and missteps in Tel Abyad It had some missteps in Papa and Mambesh for example when it came to okay now It's time we're gonna conscript you there was a pushback from local community and now they've made that that Conscription not conscription it's voluntary Service for the the the local the civilian defense force So I think this is all this is an airplane that's being built in mid-air I would say that to the second to the point about can the SDF Sustain itself without your support. No, I can't just bluntly the whole concept of the Democrat federal system in its in its most expansionary sense Wouldn't be there. You wouldn't have a you wouldn't have these sort of arrangements in Mambesh or in Thabka or in Raqqa You wouldn't have in a presence in Derazor what you might have is a more limited Sort of concept of a federal system that be centered potentially in Afrin and in Haseke But again the 800 pound elephant in the room is of course offering And and you know one of the I think one of the challenges and you know the paper refers to how do you get to a? Sort of Turkish Kurdish condominium in Syria. The problem is is that? Just in terms of the practicality the territory Particularly in Mambesh, but other areas west of the Euphrates are a launch in point for any type of connectivity To offering and although Turkey has since intervened and has created a security cord on around Afrin You can see in the sort of in the horse trading after the war of a sort of secure access road from Afrin To Mambesh it to Kobani or further areas further east so as the US has placed the sort of governance mission On the SDF and has asked the SDF to evolve You know and into this is sort of government and authority the the constituent elements within the SDF Have had to adapt and have had to assess. Okay, how do we approach governance? We've had the the commune elections that occurred two months ago We have municipal elections that are scheduled For a couple days December 1st Potentially you have sort of the people's assembly which is sort of meant to be the parliament or the federal democratic system That's supposed to happen in January All these are milestones along the road, but fundamentally At this stage without more us support or at least a US commitment that hey We're not going to stay in Syria forever That's not our objective, but we're here to build stability interim stability Which is a phrase I've heard from the administration We are going to use the US investment in Syria as a way to get to a broader agreement and the conflict And then you can talk about bringing these areas into a larger national government structure as Hassan alluded to and Without that US support none of this is possible Fundamentally without the US involved in helping every step of the way the partners on the ground you are going to see These stress factors re-emerge and it is going to be difficult to continue to keep that Conversation with the leadership of the federal system to get them to understand that there's a broader mission at play here Thank you. Do you have a follow-up? Yeah, very quickly because I think it's important So I obviously governance is important But I'm key and everything But I also I want to emphasize something else if the concern is stability After ISIS and you don't want to ice ice it to come back or Nusrah to come back Especially in some areas there were Nusrah had a strong presence before ISIS came and forced them out and they still intact as in Still a viable force that can come back because they are locals. That's a real threat Especially in their door. I think if that's the concern, I think they're more important than governance is legitimacy and and security legitimacy meaning You know The force that it's there has to be accepted by people and shouldn't be seen suspiciously even by some people because When you when you talk to people on the ground What the concern is it never comes up? For example that They are not happy with ISIS governance or with the regime governance or with the Kurdish governance, right? It's not about the governance It's not what they talk about as a day-to-day concern because they can sustain themselves. They're used to impoverished Situation that's not the more urgent thing. Obviously, that's important and I think critical to for for the legitimacy of any any force there But I think what the US the kind of the deadly mistake that the Achilles heel of all the strategy is that we get used to a model Despite its flaws and then believe that this model works because it works because on that specific day It's working and then somehow, you know, it's always Already as a philosopher would say is already good that way. They don't recognize the flaws That were you know present in that in the model The SDF like you said it wasn't an organic Effort the forces that the United States relies on within the SDF are not none of them You can't single a person who could be an acceptable public face for anybody in that region the son I did for example This guy the leader of the son I did he's respected among his tribe among some of his tribe, right? But he's known to be a thug and even the reputation is that he was Kicked out of Syria or fled Syria because he he was implicated in a drug case, right? At the time and he fled and he lived in Kurdistan, Iraq for the better part of the past Decade and then he fled and lived in Qatar before he came back After a deal with the regime and then he started working with the Kurds He didn't he didn't participate in the uprising against the regime and then the the people who are they working with now? In and there is or the guy if you to ask anyone from their is or they would say his uses Steel motorbikes, you know, he's is that a kind of a thief, right? So it's it's a band of thieves and PKK I don't want to be strong enough, but I think the model is working today because of certain conditions and this You know the obvious mistake here is that I Take for example two groups one backed by the CIA and one backed by the DOD DOD in their resort Right, let's do the show key and my lawyer. These are vetted organizations now. Ask yourself Why didn't the United States the US led coalition not cooperate with them to liberate their resort? Although they are fighter. They are local fighters. All of them are local fighters They are they fought ISIS before the before ISIS rise They were fighting ISIS and a lot of them died because they didn't want ISIS to take off to take over their their province They're vetted later on so they're good guys supposedly, right? So why why didn't the US work with these ones and chose a motorbike thief? At least that their reputation of him or the Kurds to come back there, right? That's that's a Bizarre thing to do and nobody's asking this question nobody mentions that in media although these are hundreds of fighters Cable and nicknows them a capable of taking some of these areas and and instead we have the regime coming back In some areas because the United States the United States didn't have enough forces to take their resort Soon enough in that region so I think there are that we have to understand this model that we're talking about I am positive about it today. I was a critic about it because there are their flaws It's Iran is concerned about it locals are concerned about it about it as an local armed Organization people who are battle-hardened. We're not talking about the majority of people because the majority of people if Historically they they accept anyone who comes and give them a chance and then they work with them as much as they can They don't rebel the tribes don't rebel against anyone, right? they the armed people within the tribes are the ones who are the more ideological and more like a revolutionary than the tribal elders and We've seen a situation that you know, they do you and the US officials know it when you talk to them They know this but they I don't I don't know why they They don't correct these flaws. Well, thank you. I know you have a two-finger on this But let me take the next question and then probably combine the answer the lady here Next Hi, I'm deep harvest with think progress. I have a couple questions You all mentioned the importance of of us influence Trying to leverage what what what the US has with the Kurds trying to create governance a system of governments that would somehow cherry Pick and exclude the mocha barots But I'm wondering Given that it from the outside anyway outside Syria It looks like the US has largely relinquished a lot of those rules by There's been a lot of damage with the relationship with Kurds in terms of pulling back on arming them in terms of how they dealt with the referendum in Iraq and Russia has taken a lead with Iran and Turkey in its pocket kind of dealing with a lot of issues on the ground and the US seems to be Taking a backseat. So how does this look on the ground in Syria in terms of US influence? What what possible rule can the US have and the next question is, you know Moving away from ISIS for a second say say, you know, ISIS gets driven out of Syria and goes to you know hangs out in Libya and Egypt and Maybe a little bit in Afghanistan This seems to be a When you have a country that's in such disarray, this looks like a prime breeding ground for a game of Insurgent or terrorists, whatever word you want to use whack-a-mole. So if not this group then the next group How can you provide security? How can a government provide security with? All those sorts of things that the Syrian people want in terms of having rights Accountability, you know a system of government that was maybe slightly different than the previous iteration of the Assad regime before the uprising How is that even possible? Nick we'll start with you. You got the two fingers So thank you, and that's a very very important Series of questions just to quickly sort of respond to Hassan Hassan is right Particularly in the context that there is or military counsel in terms of what we need to do is look at some of the more successful structures Of the STF that have been built over this last year and a half campaign So I would say look at the rocket internal security forces the RISF look at the approach to build in the RISF Which has had us trainers and Jordanian trainers from the ground up RISF is a very important potential model as we look at these areas that are outside of the core area of the federal system Look at the man-bash military council A form of legitimacy was legitimacy was built in man-bash to the point where you could actually have an Expeditionary Arab majority Arab force the man-bash military council that has been deployed to Raqqa It's been deployed to Deir Azor. So that's another type of model of group that you can build from the ground up I'd also look at sort of the reforms within the assay ish and the Internal security where you have the assay ish from that are drawn from the local communes and local communities This is also another key area of reform that if it is successful We'll go a long way to build a legitimacy in the broader federal system So I would just say that again because we're talking about incipient governance structure and incipient Security structures. There are some success stories that we should just highlight You know, I will very quickly in terms of the role I think it's been very clear of the Assad government and its allies had been telegraphed now for about a year and a half But particularly over the course of this last year that they are going to double down on the narrative that the US is an illegal Occupier of Syrian land that the initial Reason why the US was in Syria was because nothing was being done by ISIS has been proven Their narrative is that it's been proven false by the advances of Assad and his partners In in the Syrian desert in central Syria and in Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria that the US president the continuing US Presence in Syria is no longer about fighting. ISIS was in fact about holding on to Syrian land and more importantly Syria natural resources such as oil and gas and in fact might even be a stealth Strategy to work with Israel who never else in a conspiracy to eventually march on Damascus And so we can expect or I would assume that we can expect Over the course the next year year and a half if dependent how long the US stays even beyond that that and you already see it So the Assad government has maintained a satellite presence in Hasik it for example One commission in particular the northeastern Syria commission which serves as a de facto capital of the federal system It has tried to mobilize predominantly Arab tribal, but now increasingly also Kurdish dissident voices against Democratic federal system and it is and there you see very credible reports from people on the ground that I talked to of Some flows of Hezbollah and other Potential Iranian trainers into that area to try to create some sort of organic natural response against The democratic federal system, but also to target us. I would say that I Think the area that we should be really most concerned about right now when it comes to you know How do you begin to see sort of a rolling back or conflict between the US and Assad and Ronis and Deriz or a secretary? Mattis earlier this year referred to Delinated zones of control all along the phrase River. We are seeing them literally be informed right now And that is going to be a key challenge because with those delineated zones control comes the reality that the SDF is now become the guardian or the steward of significant Oil reserves on the north of the Jazeera side of the river and that's going to be a point of contention and conflict You know, I will defer to Hassan when we talk about sort of You know sort of issues when it comes to proto and the renewal of insurgency as a Milton South as a Milton Islamist actors When it comes to Syria, I would just say that the situation in Idlib a greater Idlib as US government terms it with the al-Qaida Filih al-Hayat al-Shem and other potential new branches of al-Qaida as a concern I would say that when it comes to sort of worrying about Insurgencies and the Syrian desert and Badiya Step areas, you know Isis and Hassan has written about this extensively and I've analyzed it in different roles You know Isis is going to try to infiltrate these local security forces. They're going to try to infiltrate municipal councils they're going to try to Engage in what they call the management of savagery to tatter all the different elements that need to be built for stability whether it's security Governance administration and just keeping people engaged in the post ISIS administration We should expect more of that and on top of that challenge. We should expect more of You know Assad and his allies trying to build up insurgencies Against not only just not against us forces But also against us partners to try to make it painful for the SDF and it's in particularly those elements Of the local population west of the Euphrates that have joined with the SDF make it painful for them to continue to engage with the Americans because if those local partners in places like Mamba, Jutabka Or or other areas like in Raqqa begin to Lose the their their willingness to continue to support the SDF in the US mission Then we're going to see a sort of broader effect throughout that region Thank you Mona Hassan do you have anything to add on this question Maybe just a cup just a couple points. I mean, I think I would agree with Nick's analysis And I do think in particular that it is clear that the Syrian regime has Very much signaled its intentions to double down on this and by the way back by the Russians and the Iranians who have also Used similar rhetoric, so it's a it's a it's a real concern I Guess a couple things one is given that given all the challenges that Nick laid out I mean, it's it's critical to manage expectations obviously what we can do and I think what I've laid out What I've been talking about is really a short and at best medium-term strategy, but it is essential. I mean, I would go back harken back to Hassan's points at the very beginning of this discussion about the windows of opportunity that exists There is a window of opportunity right now a critical one for the international community to engage With you know on these questions of post-ISIS governance in order to ensure Against the emergence of an ISIS 2.0 or in order to ensure against other Extremist groups taking advantage of power vacuums. Let's not forget that that Our primary national security objective in Syria as of 2014 shifted to Defeating ISIS and my point today is we haven't defeated ISIS and we shouldn't take military victories to to translate into that last point is I think Let's let's also be aware that again One the US presence on the ground in Syria isn't completely insignificant now open source reporting is suggesting as many as 2000 special operations forces To this by-with and through model is really an interesting one and it is a way to project power and influence Using a light footprint in a very nimble way. It's the way in which the United States operated in Syria prior to the ISIS counter ISIS campaign with respect to our provision of humanitarian assistance and stabilization Assistance, so it's an interesting model that needs to be supported I think we are in this critical moment and Some of the signaling to the SDF in particular that we might be withdrawing our support could flip them and and and result in the SDF Seeing and reading the tea leaves and deciding that may be better to put their fate in with the Syrian Regime which is not unheard of and we've certainly seen in since instances of tacit cooperation And that I think would be a real a real tragedy for this Long-standing counter ISIS campaign So I would say it's it would be sad as the president would say to You know or the sad thing is that the what the United States Has to do in Syria is actually minimal Nobody's asking the United States to send this many troops In fact all the like previous proposals about a role in the US involved more American leadership rather than Send the 2000 special forces. In fact, I think the initial policies and the neglect of Syria led to the sending of 2000 Forces if a different policy was followed before I don't think we would have needed 2000 and plus American forces on the ground I Think I spoke earlier about the positive Sentiments towards the Syrian Democratic Forces. I think it does that doesn't really have to do with the evolution of the SDF it was really about how The how locals perceived Increased American footprint inside Syria that increased American footprint that fact that the people Started to see the United States as a way as a savior as a way to prevent the regime from coming to their areas and Retake these areas with local forces and try to work with these world that perception I think let a lot of people to say we want to work with Americans We don't want the regime in Russia to keep bombing us and then take our our areas We want to work with Americans because we want to do what the Kurds did in their own areas Which is to create de facto safe zones and as Turkey later did as well and in those areas So I think that staying power that kind of footprint the ability to say we are steering this process rather than the pkk Let a lot of people to say I this SDF thing is actually working So it wasn't because the the core of the SDF Did something incredible. It was because of American role and presence in that area using this strategy By with it through through locals. I think that that that is that's a very important if the regime of I think if there's one thing that the this administration has to understand is that this Stain power is important And it's the one that you should always focus on and should kind of you know use The use like the next say eight years or four years or five years to create an equity in that area Eventually we'll go back and being incorporated into a serious serious data as I said earlier Thank you Question here, and if there are any we're at that point of time the other question I'll probably take them together for here Yeah, so I'm Rebecca Burkles from Save the Children US and Obviously this question is more pointed towards Mona given your emphasis on education as a priority moving forward for the US government So I wanted to know specifically what kind of mechanisms or paths forward. Do you see the US government taking to? Actually promote educational rebuilding and restructuring whether formal or informal in Syria And also if you could elaborate just briefly on your vision for this integrated aid and assistant packaging that you see Being your recommendation in the report and as you mentioned earlier. Thank you. Thank you question in the back Um, hi. Good morning. Thank you for your time. My name is Lily Lusada. I'm a student at Georgetown's MSFS program My question relates to the tribal basket I'm wondering if you could first just Explain a little bit more in detail about the threat of revenge killings that you currently see and then second of all if you could get a bit more technical on the sort of reconciliation tribal reconciliation reform that you're proposing and how you balance changing kind of tribal norms and tribal law like that with a light footprint perched I'm on a when I give it a start Great. So let me let me take the first question first In the paper, I think what I'm really stressing and focusing on is as we move in with our stabilization Assistance which is already starting to again to the extent possible I think we need to be very real about the extent of destruction ied's etc And the ability for people to return safely But let's just take as an example the three neighborhoods that have there there are returns taking place in that rehabilitating refurbishing even or creating safe spaces for schools is important and we've done it elsewhere in Syria We've actually had great success doing that in southern Syria when I say we have talking about USA ID and And other international donors That kind of model should be replicated working on informal Education ways to address The needs of these children who many of whom have not been in school for three years is critical And my point really in the report is to say This is as essential as traditional essential services of water and electricity and then and then of course And I know save the children you all are are are quite familiar and quite good at this But the importance of psychosocial support and addressing the trauma. I mean there are so much Sort of these invisible wounds that are so debilitating and that really have enormous implications for Rucka's ability to to stabilize and and for people to be able to heal and so again That kind those kinds of psychosocial interventions Which I think the the humanitarian and development assistance community is already quite good about thinking about But how important it is to ensure that those interventions are Integrated across the board and that they are they're engaged upon very early on Even again with folks that are in IDP camps at children that are there that these these interventions need to be taking place now I'll talk just for one moment on the on the tribal issues And I know that Hassan is extremely well-placed to deal with that, but I think I think you know USIP has had a number of interesting experiences in Iraq working with tribes in Sarhang is Extremely well-placed to talk about that For me it's an interesting question. Can we learn from those interventions those very successful interventions in Iraq? Including working on Adapting and shifting tribal customs and tribal laws. Is there a way and I don't have an answer But it's more of an open question. Is there a way to? Adapt some of that those approaches to the Syrian context and what does that look like? Particularly again understanding as you rightly point out And we don't have this enormous presence on the ground But is there a way to maybe leverage some of our Iraqi partners to help train Syrians in some of these Efforts, I don't know but it's an important question that has to at least be on the table and be thought about and for me I think it's a good point if I could to make I don't know if this is my concluding remark But I want to just make sure I get this point in before the end of today's session And that is I really think it's important to understand that we are really in a new Operating under a new model with a new set of challenges and circumstances with respect to our engagement in Syria This is not about 160,000 boots on the ground as was the case in Iraq, which by the way may not have been clearly the best way to do it It's not about Massive amounts of assistance and bags of cash being handed out. This is a completely different model That is by definition reliant on a small footprint that is organic That is heavily reliant on local partners in my view It may actually be a much better model and a much more sustainable one But I think what as we're talking about sort of managing expectations and what people are looking for I think we're really looking for us leadership less about huge numbers of troops on the ground very few actually or Huge commissions a huge commission of resources. We're not talking about reconstructing Syria We're talking about engaging in our leadership in order to help address some of these challenges going forward. I'll stop there Thank You Mona Hassan and then Nick for last Answers and we each have one minute and a half. Sorry about that. We're at the end of our time. So You know as someone from Syria from Eastern Syria I am always Pessimistic like I will propose these things and we say the US should do this and that But I think I believe that eventually it would be either the jihadist or the regime who will win It's not going to be the Kurds or the SDF or the US backed forces of the opposition It would be either those to those things and it's really relates to the bandwidth political band and policy Bandwidth of countries like the US. We know that eventually they leave or they will Have blind spots that will locals who work 24-7 rather than once a year on these issues On on the ground and keep pushing for change and breaking down society These are the ones who will win eventually But on tribes, I think so we have to and this relates really to understanding the composition of that region In the same way that Iraq we fail to understand Iraq for a long time tribal tribes as you know, I think Is the oldest Institution in the Middle East it has always existed there because there are certain things that You know that ensured their resilience You know empires and countries came and went trying to break down Tribes and they couldn't because its tribes immediately absorb whoever comes in and then they they they adapt so You know Islam and the like in the 7th century came in with a very anti-tribal Kind of sentiment, but then eventually the civil first civil war was tribal and then the it was tribalized along the way after that So I think we don't understand like in just a kind of simple fire for policy makers people either say times Either say tribes are very relevant or irrelevant And I think the reason is because when they try to work with tribes They fail and they say well tribes are not really the fighters and they don't influence the fighters So we shouldn't work with them, but I think And this applies to the Middle Eastern country by the way Saudi Arabia and the UAE and Qatar tried to work with tribes But they couldn't because the tribes require a lot of work But they save you a lot of time and save you a lot of headache down the line And another problem in Iraq and Syria is that nobody is willing to nobody understand tribes And even the people who are like the current government is working with in terms of tribes They have never lived in these these areas that don't understand tribes But they are presented themselves as the local tribal leaders or the Sheikh Masha'ikh or the chief of all chiefs Right, so I think there is a lot of that's a big Blind spot not only in Syria in Iraq, but in Sinai in Egypt in Libya and southern Libya in In West Africa a lot of these areas people don't understand the local context and they were not willing to invest and and You know spend some time there if you don't want to spend some time to Like understand these things then I think that the other choice is to just leave the whole the whole region and decide You that's too much headache. We don't want to work with locals But if you are invested in this region and you want things to work your way I think there has to be a lot of work done on the on this local level So just to very quickly build off of Hassan we should you know when we look at the SDF The SDF is Syrian Syrian democratic forces the governance inspiration Democratic confederalism that was outlined by Abdullah Ocalan was a response to the fact that the Kurdish Community and commercially was not even was not even further massacred because of the intervention of the Shamar tribe and Because of that seed Ocalan was inspired to talk about how there could be the possibility for different communities to interact The people that are part of the SDF they are Syrian they understand tribes They understand the role of tribes and tribalism because those are their neighbors There are so many mixed communities in northeastern Syria that are multi ethnic and part of the component of those communities are tribal Arabs I would say that if we look at the governance west of the Euphrates The SDF has been far more elastic than it's given credit for it has it has allowed space for order of tribal law A good example of that is that the SDF has not imposed The type of women's rights legislation on these areas like Mambaj and Tapka and Raka that that has been developed further east And I would just say that one element that's very positive when we talk about governance and building local credibility Is that on August 6th of this year 23 suspected ISIS members? That had been captured that had been imprisoned by the SDF were handed back through the intervention of tribal elders To their families and that is a sign of Flexibility I'll end on this point This past July general Thomas made a very important statement. He said about the SDF They're doing something different and unique to every other surrogate that we have worked with in the last decade and a half They are governing in their wake. They are providing representative governance I would say that as the US looks to build interim stability in the wake of ISIS It needs to continue to provide support to allow the SDF to continue to build on that successful model of Governance in the wake of ISIS Thank you very much So just to conclude quickly with key takeaways that I got from you is that we started with governance And it is governance that gave us the space to have ISIS and the other terrorist groups of that governance regardless of who Governes these areas is important That's the formula for stability and for preventing the return of ISIS 2.0 or another form of Violent extremism second that the local level matters It's the local level the bottom up is critical for stability again Whether you have a national framework or not those issues are there and the third is that the Expect opposition to come from Iran from the regime and others in the down the road and if we want to prevent And I that was a bleak scenario Hassan especially for the Syrian say okay Eventually you will have either that you had this or the regime back and I feel I understand This is a real realistic assessment that you're giving but That is not necessarily Not preventable and I think this is where our role as international community Comes in is that how do we continue and if we expect Opposition and the obstacles are their ways to adjust to deal with those opposition so that that bleak outcome of jihadist for example coming back is not Is not an inevitable outcome and second The political process. I know we did not touch upon there are multiple angles as I mentioned to discuss Syria and These will be subject for separate events and their own right, but this was mostly about Raqqa and And post-ISIS Raqqa and what lessons do we take from those and what? Light can they shed on what could be down the road and this was a definitely a rich and informing discussion for me So thank you very much and please join me in thanking our parents for their excellent remarks Thank you for joining us and staying with us. Thank you