 Financial markets, intermediaries, there's somebody in the middle there between maybe a borer and a lender, and somehow the money goes through these intermediaries. This is a simple system where maybe the borer pays to the bank and the bank pays back the depositors or the investor, and obviously they make some money. What we have today is a much, much, much, much more complicated system that has lots and lots of intermediaries in between a lot of layering, and somehow somebody wanted to create that institution outside the other institution, and somehow they all managed to live in this environment or they had enough incentives to create this. This picture comes from Iceland, from their commission on what happened in their crisis. This is 300,000 people, only the big businesses and how they're interconnected through ownership. These are various cross-holding pyramid structures, and this is not debt. What we have in the other system, in the bigger global system, is a house of cards made of lots, lots and lots of pieces of institutions with lots of interconnection through various debts and derivatives and lots and lots of connections that spread across the world. As a result of that, what you can have is, if the system is very fragile, it can collapse easily. So a small adjustment in prices of housing in the U.S., combined of course with a lot of very risky borrow or lending, created a global financial crisis as we saw in 2008. So five years ago, this system really imploded, and a lot of people got harmed from this. There is a recession that we're still recovering from throughout the world, and some of the tremors coming from one country really spill over to the others, even the Fed policy, the whole world is looking at that. After a crisis like that, the stories come, and the narratives come. So you start reading them, and there you would think, oh, it was just a plumbing problem, it was just this complicated system with all these pipes. Something went wrong with those pipes, and we just got to flush it with water, and it was just a liquidity problem, or the image is brought up. It was just, stuff happens sometimes, you can't prevent these things, it's just like earthquakes, this is natural disasters, they're just hoping, and that justifies doing absolutely everything to save the system, which you'd think if there's an earthquake, we want the government to step in and provide the safety nets and send the ambulances. But what if the story is a little bit different? Yes, maybe there was a little bit of a tremor, but maybe this house was shoddy, maybe this house was not well constructed. Maybe it really collapsed from the slightest of earthquakes while the other houses nearby survived. There are good bridges, and there are shoddy bridges. In airplane crashes, you also have something like that. If an airplane was to crash, people do die, then there are lots of questions about why this happened. Was it flying too low? Was there just some bird that came? Did the pilot fall asleep? However, there are only so many stories you can tell about an airplane crash. There is a black box, which is actually orange, a flight recorder, and the flight recorder is going to quite constrain the kind of stories people tell you about what happened. People care about that. Now in banking, in fact, the banking emperors are naked if you look more closely, and that's what I did. They say lots of things that are convenient narratives for them. They'll start it from when it just happened and how we saved you. They don't start it with how we failed to protect you before that. They'll tell you all kinds of other stories. Instead, actually, what's going on is a lot of actions of the people in this system are polluting the system. There are harmful actions that actually create more fragility in the system for their own good of the individuals there. In fact, it's a system that's got in it certain addictive behaviors, like boring too much and taking too much risk, that ends up benefiting the people who make those decisions and harm lots of other people. This is about secondhand smoking. Of course, the tobacco industry at the time denied this. What we need for this kind of system is good refereeing, good rules and good regulations. What you have here is one side of this game lobbying with the rule makers to prevent being kicked out of the game here. What we have the challenge is how can the other side, which is the public, get the policy makers, the referees to protect us from this industry. That's the challenge, the big political challenge.