 Chairman Levin, thank you very much for mentioning our civilian personnel. Those are our shipmates, and we still have quite a few who are hurting from the tragedy at the Navy Yards. So I appreciate you mentioning them in your opening statement. Senator Inhofe, welcome back. It's good to have you here. And we all miss Congressman Ike Skelton, all of us in the military. Distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in the short and the long-term effects of sequestration and our perspective on the strategic choices and management review. This morning I'll address two main points. Our budget situation and our plan for fiscal year 14 and the near and the long-term impacts of sequestration. Now, Mr. Chairman, presence, that remains our mandate, your Navy's mandate. We have to operate forward where it matters, and we've got to be ready when it matters. And we have to be able to respond to contingencies with acceptable readiness. Selection events this year alone have clearly demonstrated our ability to do that with deployed forces. Navy assets were on station within a few days, where needed, and offered options of the President whenever the situation dictated in North Korea, Egypt, and in Syria as an example. Now, this ability to present, to be present reassures our allies, and it ensures that the U.S. interests around the world are properly served. In 2014, sequestration will further reduce our readiness and will surely reduce our ship and aircraft investment. The Budget Control Act revised discretionary caps will preclude our ability to execute the 2012 defense strategic guidance, both in the near term and in the long term. Restrictions associated with a continuing resolution preclude transferring funds across programs, increasing needed program quantities, and starting important new programs. The impacts of sequestration will be realized in two main categories, readiness and investment. There are several operational impacts, but the most concerning to me is that reduction in our operations and maintenance will result in only one non-deployed carrier strike group and one amphibious ready group trained and ready for contingency response. Our covenant with the combat commanders is to have at least two carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready groups deployed, and to have another three of each in or around the continental United States ready to respond to a crisis on short notice. So for example, right now we have one carrier strike group deployed in both the Arabian Gulf and in the western Pacific. And our one response carrier strike group, the Nimitz, is in the eastern Mediterranean. So consequently, because of fiscal limitations in the situation we are in, we do not currently have another carrier strike group trained and ready to respond on short notice in case of a contingency. We are tapped out. In 2014, we will be forced to cancel aircraft and ship maintenance, and this will inevitably lead to reduced life in our ships and our aircraft. As sure, we will conduct only safety essential renovation of facilities, further increasing the large backlog in that area. We will be compelled to keep a hiring freeze in place for most of our civilian positions, and that will further degrade the distribution of skill, experience and the balance in a civilian workforce, which is so critical. We will not be able to use prior year funds to mitigate sequestration cuts in our investment accounts like we did in fiscal year 2013. And without congressional action, we will be required to cancel the planned procurement of a Virginia-class submarine, a literal combat ship, and in a float forward staging base ship, and we will be forced to delay the delivery of the next aircraft carrier, the Ford, and delay the mid-life overhaul of the aircraft carrier, George Washington. Also we will have to cancel procurement of at least 11 tactical aircraft. Mr. Chairman, the key to a balanced portfolio is the spending bill, and secondarily, the option to propose to the Congress the transfer of money between accounts. This at least would enable us to pursue innovative acquisition approaches, start new projects, increase production quantities, and complete the ships we have under construction. Just to meet minimum readiness needs, we need to transfer a reprogram about a billion dollars into the O&M account and about a billion dollars into our procurement accounts, mostly for shipbuilding, and we need to do this by January. After the strategic choices and management review was completed, our focus has been on crafting a balanced portfolio of programs within the fiscal guidance that we were provided. Further details of our approach into what we call the alternative POM are outlined in detail in my written statement, which I request be entered for the record. Now, in summary, we will maintain a credible and modern sea-based strategic deterrent. We will maximize forward presence to the extent we can using ready deployed forces, and we will continue investing in asymmetric capabilities, while with this committee's help we will do our best to sustain a relevant industrial base. However, there are several missions and needed capabilities which are specified in the defense strategic guidance that we cannot perform or keep apace with potential adversaries, and these will preclude us from meeting the operational plan requirements as currently written and defined by our combat commanders with acceptable risk. These are also our detailed in my written statement. Applying one fiscal and programmatic scenario, we would end up with a result in a fleet of about 255 ships in 2020. Now, that's about 30 less than we have today. It's about 40 less than was planned in our program, our President's budget 14 submission, and it's 51 less than our force structure assessment, which we validated and submitted 306 ships. So Mr. Chairman, I understand the pressing need for our nation to get its fiscal house in order, and I'm on board with that endeavor, but it's imperative that we do so in a thoughtful manner to ensure that we sustain the appropriate war fighting capability, the appropriate forward presence, and that we be ready. Those are the attributes we depend on from our Navy. I look forward to working with the Congress to find the solutions that will ensure our Navy retains the ability to organize, to train, and to equip our great sailors and our civilians and their families in the defense of our nation. Thank you. Thank you so much, Admiral.