 Okay, well first of all thanks very much for coming particularly since it is exam time. This is not a PowerPoint presentation, I'm actually only going to use one slide. So let me though take you quickly through what this World Bank report is about. For those of you who know the context, every year the World Bank produces a report on some topic of global interest or other. So this year for example it's on gender, the last one was on climate change. This one is on conflict and development or I think more accurately on violence and development. As we go through this you'll see that there are two themes that recur and they may not be what you would intuitively think the World Bank would write about. The first is injustice and the second is legitimacy. These are political descriptions of perceptions and actions. Many people do not associate the World Bank with explicit political activity, organization or analysis. Let me take you then through four parts of this story. First of all, the price of violence, which is essentially why an institution like the World Bank looks at it. Second is the nature of modern violence. Third, causes and what we intuit and have learned about solutions, if that is indeed the right word. And then fourth, what does this all mean for us? Now us is a very broad term, but basically means the policy community in the broadest sense of the word. Ranging from civil societies through regional organizations to global institutions like my own. Let's start with the price. Why is it that an institution like the World Bank would affect to write about global violence? Obviously, this has a lot to do with how the experience of violence at a very individual level. Pain, suffering, deprivation, humiliation, the loss of loved ones. This in essence is really what development is about. And it's therefore viscerally connected with our core mandate of looking at poverty and injustice more broadly. But if we actually look at it on a global level and in terms of the kinds of aggregates that my institution tends to talk in terms of, we see a number of different things. First of all, if you look across the world and if you compose all the different kinds of violence that we see of an organized nature and you try to discern what proportion of the world's population lives in environments that are affected by severe violence, you very easily come up with a figure of 1.5 billion. This is conservative. We're talking here about 20% of the world's population. It's a very serious development issue. No society that experiences severe, protracted, sustained bouts of violence is able to really move on in terms of social integration and economic progress. A couple of figures illustrate that I think quite well. The first is, now let me just back off here and I'll come onto explaining this in a moment. Most of the data that we have and that we work with is from Civil War. It's Civil War data and there's a reason for that. Most time series data that runs over a long time originated from the Cold War period and that's why so much of the information we have today is on Civil War violence. So it's only part of the picture but nonetheless it's important. So we know for example that an average length Civil War in an average developing country will cost roughly $65 billion in absolute terms. What that means in vis-a-vis development prospects is much more severe. Essentially if you experience Civil War of a protracted nature you will lose as much as 30 years of GDP growth. Think about that and the separation that induces between societies that are locked in violence and those that are enabled that actually able to manage their affairs with a higher degree of stability. Trade levels for example tend to stick and take at least 20 years to recover to their levels prior to the conflict. This is an indication of what happens to private sector confidence in situations of conflict and violence. The perhaps the most striking statistic of all of these is that no low income country that is experiencing protracted conflict has achieved or is going to achieve one single millennium development goal. This is a great illustrator of that growing gap between what Paul Collier once called the bottom billion for our purposes the bottom 1.5 billion because we include criminal violence in the account and essentially everybody else in the world. It's also by the way a really important statistic for those who think that in situations of instability and violence you can avoid dealing with tough stuff like institutions and you can spend your money with a degree of success and optimism on health and education. These are countries after all that have seen a generation or more of health and education spending and are still failing to achieve any of these millennium benchmarks. Let's move on here to talk now about the nature of violence today having outlined for you briefly how much it all costs. I think here the key breakpoint is at the end of the Cold War and there's a distinction both in the forms of violence and also in the types of violence that we have choose to look at during the Cold War and after the Cold War. In the Cold War period the academic and policy communities were part of the Cold War. That's what they chose to focus on when they looked at violence and conflict throughout the world. So a great deal of attention as well as manifestations of violence were caught up in proxy wars between the East and the West. Now those proxy wars have attached to them if you like a stable form of sponsorship or some form of regulation that is now actually missing from the global environment. In other words, often what you would see over sustained periods of time were different movements that were financed by different political interests and because of that relatively stable financing were arguably at least more amenable to settlement than is the case today. The big change since the end of the Cold War is the increasing presence of illicit or criminal sources of finance, not only in directly criminal manifestations but also in civil war violence and political violence. If you think about that, that vastly complicates the task of conflict resolution because it knocks over the incentive structure and recreates it in another form. What we see today, and as I say, this is partly because this is what we choose to look at today, is a much more complex pattern of violence than was the case up until the mid-1990s. So on the one hand, the incidents of civil wars and casualties caused by civil war violence have declined dramatically. Casualties or battle deaths today associated with civil wars across the world, roughly running at 10,000 a year, that's around a fifth of a high point that was achieved in the mid-1980s. But alongside those more conventional forms of violence, you see a pattern that includes many others as well. One of these is a wave or a series of popular uprisings that are themselves connected with the end of the Cold War, starting first in Eastern Europe, moving into the former Soviet Union and manifest today in the Middle East. I think there's a common denominator across all these forms of violence and that is the way in which authoritarian regimes were held in place to a large extent because they had forms of international legitimacy that they subsequently lost. And you think about Tunisia and Egypt today, this is as much part of the story as was the case in East Germany and Hungary and other parts of Eastern Europe. You also see what we classify as subnational violence. What we mean by that in this report is violence or pockets of violence in otherwise relatively stable and strong countries that are to some extent contained geographically. Now, this is a particularly common phenomenon in Asia, both South Asia and East Asia. And if you think about the nature of states in that part of the world, you can see the logical connection between those forms of violence and the relatively strong nature of those states. And here I'm talking about the Tamil conflict, the Naxalite conflicts in India, the conflicts in the Chittagong Hill Tracks in Bangladesh, in the tribal areas of Burma, in the south of Thailand, in Mindanao, and in different parts of Indonesia. Another form of conflict that is much more studied today, as I'm sure you would know about, are highly localized, small-scale conflicts around ethnicity, resources, local disputes that really don't relate specifically to the state as an entity of contest. That is particularly predominant in Central Africa today, but by no means confined to Central Africa. Something that is clearly new, certainly in scale, is the reach and the extent of organized criminal violence, particularly organized crime related to the transnational drug trade. This, I think, is an aspect of globalization and also because of the interpenetration of criminal and political violence and expression of the mutation of different kinds of violence today. Quite often, criminal and political violence have tended to be studied separately. Certainly in the bank, we have different departments that deal with these different forms of violence. And when it comes to the policy community, quite often very different approaches are taken to understanding and dealing with these forms of violence. Now, our argument is that this is an increasingly irrelevant distinction. I don't want to suggest that there are no differences between rebel movements and criminally financed enterprises, but many of the distinctions, both in terms of motivation and in terms of potential interventions, are actually have more in common with each other than they have difference. Many, you see many cases of different forms of violence mutating from one to another and assuming different characteristics over time. Just to give you a comparative piece of data to illustrate how important this form of violence has become, you compare the numbers that were killed in drug-related, organized drug-related violence in Mexico in 2009 with the numbers killed in the conflict in Afghanistan that same year. The Mexican figure is double the number killed in Afghanistan. We have seen in Central America a massive rise in the numbers of homicides to levels that are unprecedented. What prevents us from getting a better fix on this is, first of all, bad homicide data globally and also poor distinctions between the different causes of homicide so that this is very partial data and some of this is work that needs a lot more investigation over time. And the final point I would make or final sort of manifestation of violence is what we call transnational ideological violence. Now, I put this deliberately last because when we entered the process of writing this report there were many expectations that we would be writing a report about global terrorism. I think it was important to point out two things that on the global scale of things this is a minor form of violence and second, it is not unique. It has a historical, there are many different manifestations of ideologically driven transnational violence in the past and what you see associated with radical Islam today is in that sense not at all unique. You only have to go back into the history of the rise of international socialism to see many points of comparison. What we also know from looking at these different forms of violence is that they commingle, they mutate and they are extremely sticky in the sense of being very hard to resolve and that I would argue though again the data has yet to be mined to really be solid on this is that many of these forms and manifestations that we see today are actually much less amenable to resolution than was the case a generation ago. Now what exactly is happening here just to reiterate I think that a lot of this has to do with two processes. One is globalization and the second is the structural shift in or the process of structural shift in global power. That I think is something that again needs a lot more work in terms to establish that solidly but that's what to me walks out from the analysis that we did. Now let's move on to the causes of violence. I don't need to tell you that there's an enormous literature on this rife with debate, controversy, different perspectives. We did our best to compose this in a very summary form and to try and draw out what we thought was useful in terms of the main part of our inquiry which is a policy inquiry. And what did we find here? First, the way we've organized these different stress factors that can provoke violence is very conventional. It's along the political, security and economic domains nothing new there. This is all familiar to you. We did distinguish and I think this is important for policy because of its policy implications between those stress factors that derive fundamentally internally from within societies and those that emanate from the regional and global environment in which countries find themselves. Now you can see that that has obvious policy implications. If you are in particular a small and relatively permeable economy or social structure, very much influenced by external factors, then resolution of the conflicts that you're engaged in has to very much involve the activities, the motivations and the actions of outside parties. But something else that came out particularly from doing that division was there's a dominant and by the way there is a PowerPoint that underpins this which you're most welcome to look at and have. It's the shortest version of the report available. One thing that jumps out to us from looking across these different forms of internal stress is the dominance of perceptions of injustice, unfairness, exclusion, inequality. Again, this is not something that we had predetermined going into this process but it really does come out of the analysis. To the extent that I would argue that that is the most dominant stress factor that provokes outbursts of violence across all of these different domains. And again, we can talk further about that if you're interested. Now how do those stress factors translate into actual violence? How do the conflicts that are manifest in all societies at all times actually break into active forms of violence? We would argue that the key factor here is the strength of a society's institutions. Now strength, strength is the wrong word. It's actually the legitimacy of those society's institutions. Now legitimacy for us combines a number of factors. It combines effectiveness with inclusiveness and accountability. So it's a fundamentally political concept of institutions. That has enormous implications I believe for the way that the international community looks at institution building which has in many cases been a very technocratic kind of inquiry. You only need to look at what's gone on in Tunisia and in Egypt in the last few months to illustrate this. By most international measures, institutions in those two countries were strong. They performed relatively well on most international scales but they sure weren't legitimate. And once the international legitimacy that had surrounded societal activities in those countries for the last generation had begun to fray at the edges what you saw, I would argue, was an expression of how those affected by those institutions perceived them in terms of their legitimacy. So the notion that this report is built on is that stress factors when met by illegitimate institutions give a much, much higher risk of the outbreak of different forms of violence. So that takes you straight away into a discussion of institutional development and therefore into the territory of what can be done for societies to armour themselves against these various forms of violence. Now here interestingly, the academic and policy literature is very thin in contrast to this vast literature on the causes of violence. There's quite a lot at a case study level but there's very little that's been aggregated. Now how could that be and why? I think the answer to that is that much of that knowledge has been locked up in the experiences of practitioners themselves. Those who have tried and in some cases succeeded and other cases failed to manage these stress factors over time to trade off the technical and the political on a constant day-to-day basis. Many of those folks don't write stuff down. I think our sort of, you know, our own Eureka point on this came about a third of the way through the research when we started to figure out looking at our own relatively technocratic measures of institutional development. We were able to identify a number of countries that appeared to have significantly strengthened their institutions and at the same time to be enjoying a far higher level of stability than in the past. And these are countries as diverse as Mali, Ghana, Liberia, Timoleste, Singapore, South Korea, Argentina, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda. Different stages of transition by no means the same process, but in all of these cases over either a relatively short or a much longer period of time, a significant process of stabilization and an improvement in public welfare as opposed to where they had been several years before. So we started to try and understand what it was that made these transitions work. And by and large, I would say we found three or four common points here. First of all, and again, this is at the level of generalization. The core of the report describes our findings in this area and gives lots of examples of the things that I'm about to talk about. And in that sense, I hope that what is a very long report will be seen as and will serve as some kind of workbook, principally for societies and for decision makers and leaders within and outside government in societies that are trying to deal with serious actual or threatened violence. We found a number of common things. First of all, an initial process of confidence building or the recreation of trust in collective activity. This is not just trust in government. It goes far beyond that. But those societies that managed the kinds of transitions that we're looking at all managed to do something along those lines that change the dynamic. It was usually built on the basis of some form of more inclusive coalition in the broadest sense of the word, not simply political coalition, but usually a political and social coalition. Inclusiveness being the key word here. Not inclusive of everybody, but sufficiently inclusive to actually have enough people invest in a new reality. Simply building a coalition, of course, doesn't guarantee you anything. And generally speaking, leaderships in these situations were able to articulate a different narrative and to substantiate that by providing various meaningful signals that were concrete and meaningful in the context in which they operated. Now you'll appreciate that just as stress factors vary enormously from one country to another and one situation to another, so too will the signals that show or that demonstrate to that society that something serious is about to be done or is being done to deal with these strongly felt stresses. So the actual menus are vastly different from one society to another. That was part of it. A process of confidence building that by the way is not just a single shot experience. It's something that needs to be done again and again and again and renewed continuously through processes of immense setback and quite often of relapse into violence. But however successfully that was done, simply to recreate confidence is not enough. You actually have to build legitimate institutions that do address these stress factors and it won't surprise you to find that in most of those transitions what you find is that the three areas of stress that I mentioned political, economic and security related were addressed by the creation of legitimate institutions, increasingly legitimate and effective that dealt with these three key areas of stress. And as we describe them in terms of providing citizen security, the emphasis being here on citizen, i.e. broad based protective security presence. Second, those that dealt with injustice. Now that again depends on context. It does not simply mean building legal and judicial systems, but very often does include that. And third, those that provided some form of economic opportunity, better livelihoods, economic prospects. It's very rare in our experience and from our analysis to find situations where one of those three key pillars was completely missed out and you actually had a productive process. Let me give you one example of this. The Palestinian peace process from 93, 94 onwards. There was a concerted effort to deal with insecurity as well as to provide a regeneration of the Palestinian economy. I think on reflection and certainly from a Palestinian perspective, and this after all is what mattered here. There was an inadequate attempt to deal with a deeply felt sense of injustice that was harbored by Palestinians since the beginning of the 67 occupation and prior to that. That process did not work out. In fact, some would argue that it was slightly worse than that. There was an attempt to use economic programs to actually substitute for dealing with deeply held sense of injustice. And the futility of that is illustrated by looking at the transformation of the Palestinian economy under occupation between 1967 and 1987, the 20 years before the outbreak of the First Intifada. That was a period of unprecedented economic transformation in the Palestinian economy in which incomes increased enormously and what had become, what had been in the West Bank, a rural backwater, became part of an increasingly dynamic part of the global economy. Was that enough on its own? Well, of course it wasn't enough. This is just one illustration and there are many others. So, we actually illustrate this process through, we draw a helix, which shows that it's intended to show not only a continuous process of establishing, maintaining, recreating confidence and of creating these increasingly strong institutions, but also this is intended to show two other things. First, that it's a highly contested process and an appreciation of that, again, is really important for international agencies that have had a tendency to look at these things from a technocratic perspective so that quite often we mistake healthy contest for technical failure. The second thing is that these processes take a very long time indeed. Let me illustrate that with reference to the ongoing transformations in Germany and Japan. Quite commonly, we start our clock-rolling in 1945 at the end of the Second War. I would argue that it's actually more useful to go back in the case of Japan to the 1860s and in the case of Germany to the 1870s and to look at the contested process of transformation from that point onwards. If you immerse yourself in the 1890s in the beginning of the 20th century in those two countries, you might be led to think that an enormous and settled transformation of those two societies had taken place. In one case, unification in the other, becoming part of a globalised economy. Well, we all know what happened there. That transformation was by no means over. Elements of what I've discussed were clearly missing and the gains that had been made were severely contested and undermined and overtaken for other purposes. It's futile to talk about an exit from conflict. Again, this is a tendency in the development literature and development programme to talk about post-conflict interventions. Very dangerous term, in my view. It leads you to think that in five and six and seven years you can actually transform a society and eradicate the root sources of violence or the stresses that actually can express in violence and I think can lead you to miss the point in terms of the sorts of things that one does need to look at. Now, I'm now coming to the final part in terms of what does this mean for the policy community. And I would just pick out here a few things that I think are significant. There are four areas that we talk about here. The first is the way that we support these national transformation processes. As you can see from what I've said earlier, it's what happens within societies that is critical. These transformations cannot be willed from outside. They have to be supported from outside and protected from outside in the sense of dealing with external stress factors, but they cannot be imagined from beyond the borders of societies. So, what is it that we need to do to support these transformations better than we have sometimes and often, in fact, in the past? I think the first thing is how we understand and analyze the relationship between conflict and violence. We in the World Bank tend to base our analytical work on the trade-off between maximizing growth and maximizing equity. Whereas I would argue that in many situations, a more relevant frame of analysis is an understanding of the stress factors that can provoke violence, of how confidence can be recreated and supported, and what types of interventions are useful in support of the growth of these legitimate institutions across these three domains that I've mentioned. Now, economics is an important part of that, but as you can see, it's by no means the whole answer. And as I've said earlier, if you tend to think of it as the whole answer, I think very often you will make mistakes in terms of the kinds of perspectives and interventions that you involve yourself in. Now, again, clearly that kind of analysis ideally needs to emanate from the societies themselves. It's not really very useful for an institution like ours, for the UN, to have a frame of analysis that it applies when the society and the government itself are using a completely different one. But this is actually asking a lot of many countries, many governments and many societies to see such a transformation take place. And as with most forms of contests, this will take a while, it will take a long time. And I think importantly, and I'll come back to this, it will take place by pure example, not by imposition from the outside. It will happen because countries and governments and societies see, or don't see, this frame of reference is useful to them. Another thing about supporting these national transformations is the way that different policy communities work together and the ways that donors coordinate. There is a lot talked about harmonisation, country-led processes, donor coordination. It's a good game to talk, but I would argue that we are not only way short of decongesting the space that governments and societies can work within, but in many ways we've complicated it and crowded it even further. And that's true both of the official development community and also of the NGO community. A stunning figure from our report relates to the number of NGOs active in Haiti today after the earthquake. It is, and I still can't believe this, 10,000. Now you think about the coordination and the nature of the exercise in support of legitimate national processes and the danger of flooding, overwhelming and actually delegitimising them. The risks are very high. So let's talk about Paris and Accra and Busan. Much more emphasis, I think, on operational coordination on the ground between agencies under whatever leadership there is from governments. Second, a whole set of internal reforms. We know that institutions like my own tend to react too slowly to outbreaks of violence and tend to withdraw too quickly from support of transitional processes. Now, what's the common point there? How come we're both too slow to get in and too quick to get out? We would argue that it is risk aversion. Risk aversion in the sense that for the World Bank, for the UN, the voice that talks loudest is the domestic constituency. The domestic constituency very often will be insistent that money does not leak. That results can be achieved quickly. In other words, that there's a story to tell that is congruent with the domestic political cycle. Now, that's not an illegitimate concern at all. It's just unbalanced. And what we have at the moment is far too little emphasis on the risks of being too slow, the risks of not taking risks, the reality that you will lose a lot of money in uncertain environments and unstable markets. And I think the adoption of a venture capital approach to intervention in situations of conflict and violence, in which you may lose three out of your four investments, but if your fourth one really resonates, you can have a disproportionate impact on the situation, as we have seen in cases like Timor-Leste and Liberia and Sierra Leone in recent years. The other thing that we argue for is that the challenge of long-term institution building requires a consistency in financing patterns that is quite often absent from the pattern of international finance. You'll see that particularly in those conflicts that are less prominent and have less attention placed on them, there's enormous volatility in year-to-year flows of financing based in part on inability to disperse, but also on short-term considerations of performance, particularly governance performance. So the tendency for aid agencies when they feel they're getting into trouble to reduce the flow of financing. Now, our argument that is not compatible with the sustained long-term institution building and what you actually need is instead of varying volumes, you should vary the oversight mechanisms that are applied to the aid process and there are many tools that are available for doing that that are underused in these situations. Third point or the third area is helping countries deal with external stresses. What are we talking about here? We're talking about things as diverse as inappropriate global economic ideologies. We're talking about spillovers of violence across borders. We're talking about transnational crime and trafficking. We're talking about irresponsible resource raiding both by private sectors and by the countries that support them. We're a small country in the west of Africa on the Pacific. You cannot handle this stuff without better forms of global oversight. Good work has been done in many of these areas, but it's still insufficient, whether we're talking about illicit financial flows or standards of corporate governance or indeed the interdiction of drugs. Now, I'll just pause and go to the side on this one of all of these areas of external stress. This is the one that, at least theoretically, has a simple solution and that's legalisation of heroin and cocaine. I realise that this is not an easy subject to discuss in most political environments, so much so that we were not able in the political economy of our own report to discuss this openly. So there is, however, a very interesting counterpoint discussion where two experts on this subject face off, one against and one for legalisation of drugs. That's worth a read. What I would say, though, and this again is one of these stunning statistics, if you look at the amount of value added to cocaine from its point of production through the transmission process in Central America, and you compare that to the total quantity of finance used to try and prevent that process, you have a ratio of 100 to 1. The 100 times as much is being earned through the value added on cocaine as is being spent on trying to prevent that. Well, guess who's winning that war? This is both the most rapidly growing form of global violence and the one for which there is certainly a technically available solution. And I would like to think that that would become a more serious subject of discussion in the future. Finally, and this in a sense comes back to the way we wrote the report, we felt from our own experience of learning that the repository of much of the wisdom and the experience on these transitions out of violence lies not with the North, with policy institutions and with academia, it lies in the experiences of those who are going through that process today. Those practitioners who have to put together the technical and the political and make those trade-offs on a continuous basis. This report, I hope, is an exemplification and an argument for a shift in global knowledge. We're now 60 years into the development era. Much of what is most valuable is out there now. It's not up in the North any longer. And what I think the role of institutions like ours is, increasingly, is to act as a conduit for the flow of information between those different societies who are at different stages of different kinds of transition. So, for example, we've just had a series of sessions in Egypt and in Tunisia. It was not a question of us going in and talking about the world development report and the lessons that we had that we felt that we could offer to those societies. What we did is we brought in practitioners from South Africa, Indonesia, Georgia, and I forget the fourth place. But the point here is that they were the ones that we gave a platform to. We can, after all, convene these kinds of discussions. They were the ones who spoke to their experiences. Those are the people that our different audiences and participants related to rather than to us directly. So I will just leave you with that thought that just as the nature of global economic power is shifting, so too, of course, is the nature of global knowledge. And I hope that this report at least does justice to that process. Thank you very, very much, Nigel. Very clear and useful. I would just like to say a couple of things. And one of them is back to front by way of an introduction to say that Nigel's presentation draws not only on the team that produced the report, but on his own long experience of some unmentionable number of years working in international development at the banks since, I think, the early 80s for much of that period resident in East Africa and in a number of Asian countries. He's now a Speller's country director for West Bank and Gaza as well. And all of that note in today's UK funding environment on the back of an English literature BA degree, so we'll power to you for that. I would also say that quite a lot of what Nigel was talking about is, in a sense, music I would think to people's ears here the emphasis on violence beyond just civil war battle death criteria is something that I think in a number of different causes, people at SOAS very much work on as researchers and teachers, as is a focus on the role of globalization and of contested transformations and indeed the emphasis on perceptions of injustice, not always easy to capture in quantitative measures, presumably. So all of those things are very, very interesting as well as the Nigel's emphasis, which again I think many of us would agree with, that the use of the term post-conflict is often something of a misnomer that we need to try and get away with. I would have questions, but I think it's best if we just open this straight up and encourage questions for Nigel from all of you. Luis down here and then a couple down there. Right. Do you want to take one at a time or a bunch of three? Let's start with one at a time. Okay. Thank you very much. Well, before my question, I'd like to tell you that I was very happy to hear your comment about the debate about legalization of drugs and because it seems like an obvious technical answer to a problem that's soluble, but it's unfortunate that it couldn't have been discussed within the confines of the report itself. But my question, I wanted to get your input from, it seems to me from your presentation that the report very explicitly acknowledges the link between, well, the A that the bank normally tends to think of terms in terms of maximizing growth at the expense of equality or that there's a relation between the two. But the report seems to me to say that, well, maybe the Washington consensus approach to economic growth may not be always the best way forward. And so, especially as it relates to the potential for that kind of approach to deligiment does, what's the word? The legitimization. Thank you very much. The state in a very important point in transition. So I was wondering how these discussions within the bank have taken shape and what have been the responses because as you know, sometimes in our world, things are comfort to mentalize so the people who work in post-conflict responses are sometimes at odds or sometimes influenced by people who work on economic policy perspective without necessarily having the linkage between two. So I'm wondering how the bank is approaching those issues. Thanks. Well, that's actually a great question and I think highly relevant because it's one thing for the bank to create an intellectual product. But to have credibility and to have legitimacy to use our own terminology, we have to do something about it or I think that essentially will undercut what we're trying to do here. Couple of points. Yes, I hope that our period of market fundamentalism is over. This in a sense is one of a series of four or five reports, a sort of sub-series about the role of the state. Now, when we talk about institutions, we talk more broadly than the role of the state but certainly we're not suggesting for a moment that these distorted markets are going to regulate themselves. That there has to be powerful forms of intervention which include the state and those institutions of governance outside the state. There are four or five of these reports that are now out there that kind of punctuate the series of WDRs. In terms of whether the bank will adopt some of these things that are in here, this I think will be a long process, it will be contested, and the outcome is uncertain. So in that sense we will shadow the kinds of things that we're writing about. But there are some initial quite hopeful signs. Let me just give you one of those. To me a key here is the way that we carry out our analytical work. Are we actually prepared to look at these situations of conflict and violence from the perspective of an analysis of stress, the creation of confidence, and the development of legitimate institutions? Are we actually prepared to do what we call political economy analysis which I guess is a polite way of saying political analysis? And I think that the answer to that at this stage is yes. So what you see now going on is a discussion about how to go about that. So initially there were those who said, okay well in fragile states we're going to do our strategies differently based on this. Well that's not a bad start except when you start to think about it. The problem there is that you're affecting to impose a certain form of analysis on states that actually can't really talk back to you. So that doesn't work. And that won't stick as a process because the key, the goal here is to work with societies and governments that actually see some value in this approach. So in fact what's going to happen I think over the next couple of years is that those countries that are beginning to say yeah actually this is quite useful to us as a way of looking at our conflicts. We will start to work with them. Initially on their national strategies and framing those strategies then we can draw from that to do our own work. So you'll appreciate that if, let's give you a specific example, the government of the Philippines says as it has done yeah we're going to use this approach for the Mindanao conflict. They then have a tool in which they can use to ask or to require the whole international community to look at things the way that they look at them. And you'll appreciate that's much more useful than one individual institution doing so. But as you know, as Jo and Lai said about the impact of the French Revolution when asked in 1972, too soon to tell. And I think that's true of how the bank will respond to this. It'll take time. What we write about when we're talking about perceptions of justice or legitimacy is not fundamentally something that is perceived from the outside. But obviously it bears relationship to international norms and standards. So we've written a fair amount about that and about the way in which many of those things that were written by, I think, much narrower global elites just after the Second War about human rights and about various forms of international norm show evidence of becoming increasingly compelling in different contexts around the world. A good example of that is the role of the OAS and of the African Union in containing coup d'etat in both of those continents. So I think first of all what we're trying to capture is something that's become increasing currency in the global conversation. Again, if I take you to the form of discourse that crosses the Middle East at the moment you can see the clear link between the kinds of demands, concerns and perceptions you see in those countries with a global discourse on human rights and perceptions of what is and is not just. Now, having said that there are obviously going to be situations in which powerful states of one kind or another try to impose what is a form or a perception of a series of norms that are compelling for them at a particular point in time. And I think the general argument would be that if that discourse does not resonate locally it's unlikely to stick. I'm at the back and then we'll spread in. I think I would argue it may not have come across as clearly as it might have done but I think that's exactly what we are saying. It's not simply about ending conflict. In fact, if you look at what we say about analyzing stress factors and looking at ways of managing those a lot of that relates to a concept of continuous conflict and of a challenge being not one of how you intervene in a post-conflict situation so much as how you manage continuous risk over time. Now, when it comes down to the specific recommendations again there's a context here so what we're looking at are ways in which business is conducted by the international community so that the reading of that does relate to a lot of the ways that these problems are perceived so it may come across in the way that you've described but that's certainly not what's intended in here. In addition to institution building and economic enhancement or that what do you do and you mentioned the case of the Palestinian territories which I found to be a remarkable admission on behalf of the use of economic means and institution building to substitute for the lack of the justice question so what do you do in a case like that where you have a very powerful state and addressing the justice question can't be done or is very difficult when the peace process itself is stalled and the aid that you want to give anyway ends up substituting. I mean these things are driven by power politics at a global level so if you ask what can institution like the World Bank do the World Bank is obviously does not devoid of context we work within our own political economy so there are going to be situations in which there is not a sufficient global will if you like to deal with distortions that perpetuate different kinds of conflict you also mentioned something else that I think is interesting I'll just elaborate on this for a moment we talk about the need to create these legitimate institutions across three domains which are those in security that deal with justice issues per se and unemployment or lack of economic opportunity I would argue again that the binding theme there just as the binding theme in the diagnosis is actually the perception of injustice across all these three domains now Chris for example wrote a fascinating background paper for us on the links between unemployment and violence and one of the things that I took from that was that unemployment per se is not a driver of violence whereas unemployment experienced as injustice or exclusion or indeed employment experienced as injustice and oppression are indeed powerful drivers potential drivers of violence and that I think is true across security and across justice systems as well I think very much so if you look at the recruiting grounds for both gangs and for rebel movements these are predominantly groups of young people who may or may not be employed but who certainly feel left out of some kind of broader national, subnational project in the broadest sense of the word those obviously provide the key recruiting grounds for those who carry out acts of violence and policy recommendations need to address themselves not only to what you or I might think their material needs are but to a much more nuanced understanding of how they see their world and their place in it and an attempt to try and address what they see as their priorities you'll appreciate that a lot of what we're talking about here requires an enormous amount of work and skills that are often in quite short supply in the international community and also a willingness for very long processes of engagement in understanding across a multiplicity of particular disciplines so if you take this seriously and take youth as a burning example of this it suggests ways of working that are going to require enormous accommodation by those who have ambition to try and influence or help with those processes that's true as much for governments as it is for international governments and also you seem to imply that one of the problems with the so-called warring drugs was that the value added on cocaine was 101 against the money spent from trying to combat it but the scientific research has shown that it's not the money which is in fact which is not able to combat drugs but the techniques employed actually the current techniques employed are the most expensive out of the whole series of possible techniques that could be employed in order to perform a joint problem so it appears that it's not actually the money spent but two, I mean... OK, on inappropriate global ideologies I'll just give you a specific country example take Solomon Islands or most of the Pacific Territories they essentially depend in terms of their global place on the export of narrow range of commodities now they have been, I would argue in the past exposed to an approach to economic development which essentially advocates the stripping away of the barriers to competition so that that will effectively allow an open interplay of private forces now in the case of relatively small and relatively powerless countries I think that often has very perverse consequences this notion that if you clear the field they will come to play very often does take place but it doesn't speak to the nature of the players or the kinds of rules that they're going to construct in societies that are not primed to dealing with them and so you see a great deal of penetration of governance of corruption of unequal deals that are essentially fostered by a very crude notion of economic development so that's an example of the sort of thing I'm talking about when it comes to drugs I think the point I was making here is not that there might not be techniques that could be used to greater effect but the economics of this are such that logically and I think this is born out in practice what you will see is that the sums of money available are so massive that they will overwhelm most of the available techniques or technologies that are out there however well they might be employed the point here is that it's the sheer illegality of the drug trade that creates both these enormous margins and also violence as the go-to form of settling disputes most of us, you know, when we get into a dispute with our neighbors or with a corporation or within the faculty probably do have violent intentions towards those that we're dealing with but there are for better or worse usually ways that mediate that now if you're thinking about business disputes in the drug trade where you simply cannot go to the court system or where the court system is such that it is permeable by the enormous amounts of money you have available it's not surprising to see this coalition of both huge sums of money and extreme forms of violence Justin? I just wanted to ask you a bit more about what the emphasis you put on building inclusive and it seems to us on the assumption of the rural peace theory here which I think particularly there as well and most recently the colleagues and solutions Yeah, that's a good question and I think it's an area in which a lot more work is required to come to a more nuanced answer to this What we have in the World Development Report and I mentioned that there was really relatively little on this other than somewhere but it's certainly fairly limited at this stage What we have is what we think is an elaborated hypothesis that we think is likely to work in many situations If you look at a number of the countries you've mentioned in fact the three of them Angola, Rwanda, Ethiopia what I would say is that they're very early in their transitional process and they're all dealing with an inheritance of extreme violence and a stabilization process in which a number of the choices they made and the number of outcomes achieved are clearly a lot better than what they were dealing with five and ten and fifteen years ago but it does beg the question of what's going to happen in those societies in another five and ten and fifteen and the argument that runs through the report as you're right is the insinuation or the implication that if those processes are not further broadened and deepened then they are likely to fall short to get interrupted and to fall down and there are many examples of this if you take a couple of African countries if you go back you wind the clock back in Kenya and in Cote d'Ivoire I choose those two now because they're both experiencing forms of violence that were certainly not dominant parts of the political landscape a generation ago they just illustrate how tentative and how prone to risk so many of these initial political settlements are in both those cases post-colonial settlements I think this is an area that requires a lot more research by the way one of the things that we sort of hope will happen as a result of this report is that people will be intrigued by some of the hypotheses in here and we'll put some effort into trying to improve them and one of the things we all said at the beginning of this is if we come back in five years and find that things have moved way beyond this and we're saying well you know not bad but they're kind of really kind of crude you know that's actually a real achievement and this is this question of the study of transitions and how they take place and the controversies within them is perhaps the least known of all of the areas it's of course the core of what we're writing about but I think a lot more work is needed there so will the bank be funding science? I would like to think so I wonder if the World Bank or for that matter any development bank is really the right kind of organization to get involved in conflict resolution and did some of the more successful sort of end of conflict situations I'm thinking perhaps of the Arche story as far as I know the bank wasn't much involved there might have been involved in some of the post tsunami reconstruction but essentially that was broken between the Indonesian government, the Archeanese and with the Finns in particular acting as mediators I mean the World Bank after all is a large bureaucracy still overwhelmingly staffed by economists now as you quite rightly say there are clear economic implications of conflict but is the bank the right sort of organization to actually get involved in ending conflict or restoring legitimacy I mean you put a lot of emphasis on this issue of legitimacy there's several ways of answering that I mean to think that we aren't a serious actor in these kinds of situations and therefore can cause an enormous amount of damage I think would be a huge mistake second point I'd make is it's one thing to broker peace and to mediate which I think is really important but that's only part of the process if you look at Liberia we tend to look at the current government and what's happened in the last seven, eight years as a signal success what we tend to forget is that this was the 12th ceasefire agreement over a period of a generation that actually began to take and to take shape if you go to Arche I agree that very often a mediation process will need or will require a third party who in some sense stands outside all that has gone before and that is not generally going to be the World Bank that has continuous relationships with many forms of government over long periods of time but the question of how you actually take a peace settlement and turn it into something that is essentially durable or has some legs there I think institutions like the World Bank can play a really critical role particularly if there's a better understanding of what is actually required and this report is an attempt to try and say there are processes that involve confidence building that involve the establishment of trust in which the international community can play a very constructive role and can also play a highly destructive role if it doesn't understand what's going on similarly with the creation of legitimate and accountable institutions I think we'll maybe take about three more and then we'll maybe carry on informally outside where we look at the score Thank you very much We talked quite a lot about state legitimacy we haven't really quite gone to state violence and I just wondered whether or not that was something that you addressed in the report both at the national level I mean if your background is in Palestine I'm sure you felt like I have but when you go to Palestine the time when you feel most insecure is in the presence of the security apparatus particularly the Israeli war and the companies but also internationally and in the state violence but I should come clean that the reason I'm here really in charge today is at seven o'clock in this same theatre as the launch of another book View of the Fire which is the book looking at the Iraq war and that difference between national security and human security and the fact that those two can often find themselves in shock with distinction in shock and having them and therefore my other question is does it not mean that in those sort of cases political violence becomes a positive and certainly from my time so as 20 years ago as a master student the understanding of the history of revolution whether it be in terms of liberation struggles China, China or whatever would say that political violence was absolutely positive because it got rid of all of the negative Yeah, a couple of points here Yeah, we do write about state violence both at the national and the transnational level but I'm sure you understand that we have a political economy that we work with in so this is actually a corporate product and has to walk a fine line in talking about very explicitly about some of these issues I, you know and these are the constraints you work with in when you produce something like this it's there alright it may not be as explicit as all audience who would like to see it but we do write for example about the loss of confidence in the enunciation of global standards of behaviour by powerful countries over the last decade I think you can all see what we're getting at here but again there are ways in which we need to write about these things that people I think can relate to and a framework that will are inconsistent with ways in which others would express these things more directly I would also agree with you that there are cases in which societies have really very little alternative other than to resort to violence and these are situations of sustained and extreme repression I think most people would argue that what is happening through these series of popular revolutions throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and today in the Middle East are fundamentally positive in terms of not positive that they had to happen but positive in the sense that they are a point of transition in an overwhelmingly negative and violent experience in a sense they represent the failure of in many cases generations of the kinds of issues that we're talking about so yes positive but positive as a last resort in many cases because no other alternatives appear to be available to these societies for the benefit of the audience here and for the benefit of the development of Africa the idea of African integration is the key driver to the development and the non entrenchment of of of development in Africa but so far the well bank has swept all that idea under the carpet and we take on the issue of violence alone but ok but people who think about African integration got the issue more than 100 can you give me a couple of specific examples of yeah could you give me a couple of specific examples trying to help me for instance if we talk about African integration in terms of law we would think about uniform law for the whole of Africa instead of making law for 54 different countries involving cost the economies of care is involved and if we think in terms of money the money the well bank has been spending since 1945 in Africa they were all going to somewhere but an African company instead of the well bank integration 10% of the money spent at the well bank Africa integration could be achieved, attained within a very short period of 4 to 5 years and the well bank is wasting is directing the energy of the world and wasting the resources of Africa and the United States of America okay that's a tough question and it's hard for me to know quite how to answer it I just make a couple of points the well bank works let's take Africa within a pattern of sovereignty that was essentially established in the post-colonial period I think many people would argue that the form in which that sovereignty takes across borders is by no means ideal from an economic perspective but nonetheless African countries themselves also defend notions of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the kinds that have been inherited and there are powerful reasons for doing that what we do talk about quite a lot in this report is how important it is particularly for small countries to work together in forms of regional integration that have not really been explored very thoroughly in the past we give a number of examples actually some from West Africa also from the Caribbean and the Pacific of where the pooling of resources and talent can produce outcomes that are superior to what small countries can manage on their own I would argue also that shortcomings of World Bank programs in Africa are not entirely attributable to World Bank they also have to do with domestic governance in Africa they also have to do with regional and global forces that are actually not under our control I don't think anyone would argue that a lot of the development money that has been spent in African countries has not been well spent but I think the reasons for that are really quite complex and you know we could spend a long time discussing that I think we'll close it off there and maybe carry on informally outside so I would just like to remind people that Nigel is making the longer version PowerPoint available so people will be able to get that out just through me probably and just ask you to join me thank you