 The sequence of events is the following and you can go back on elements in this sequence in that the time frame that has been given to me. First we have asset quality reviews and stress tests for the banks that are in the list by the ECB and at national level by the national authorities, National authorities. At ECB level, these are to be completed by the end of October next. When that is done to the extent that capital strengthening is revealed as necessary for any of the banks reviewed Time lines will be set. In the ECB's note it says that capital strengthening a'r bwysig rydw i'r bwysig amser yn y cyhoeddus cyhoeddus cyhoeddus yng Nghymru yn ddigon. Bydd y cyhoeddus cyhoeddus yng Nghymru yn gydag o'r rhan o'r rhan o'r rhan o'r gwneud â'r rhan o'r rhan o unrhyw o'r anhyw. Yn oed yn yma ymlaen, ac mae'r anhywethau yma o'r anhyw o'r anhyw o'r anhyw o'r anhyw o'r arweinydd. The intention is that if banks are fully compliant on emerging from the stress tests, the next consideration will be to look at the prospects of their being able to meet the Basel 3 requirements when they become obligatory. Member States must announce before the completion of those stress tests that backstops are available to support strengthening where that's required. The Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive that was agreed to be agreed in the course of this year or in the first half of next year will come into effect at the beginning of 2015 with the features that Vitor Constantio mentioned earlier this morning. Under the terms of that directive, Eurozone Member States will then begin to levy financial institutions in order to set up this fund amounting within 10 years to 0.8% of covered deposits in those institutions and to set up national deposit guarantee funds amounting to 0.5% of covered deposits. We begin to have a levy to put in place the capacity to provide these ex ante backstop funds. The BRRD directive comes into force at the beginning of 2015. In the case of a bank resolution, that directive requires that there be a mandatory bail-in of capital, that is of shareholders and of subordinated bondholders. Member States are free to bail in other categories of creditor, but that's a matter. One of the flexibilities that Pat talked about earlier on, that will be a matter for each individual member state. But shareholders and subordinated bondholders are mandatory included in the bail-in. If a bank resolution in that period requires a publicly provided backstop, the financial institutions will be required to make contributions to reimburse the public authorities for that cost. This will be ex post contributions. No timelines are set out for this process, or at least no timelines are set out for it yet. And I can imagine that that would be rather a difficult discussion. From the beginning of 2018 resolution will require the bail-in of all creditors apart from guaranteed deposits. Some Member States have proposed that that process should operate from the beginning of 2016. It's impossible at this stage to say where that argument will come out. It is intended that there will be a conclusion to the debate on the form and content of a deposit guarantee before the single resolution mechanism comes into effect. It's not yet possible to say with any confidence when that debate will be concluded. In fact, there are some who say it's not possible to say with any confidence whether that debate will be concluded because opinion seems to vary between Member States on the desirability of a common deposit guarantee measure. It can be anticipated that in the transition period leading up to the implementation of the single resolution mechanism equity strengthening and reorientation of funding resources will be difficult given the hierarchy of bail-in steps. First, shareholders are bailed in. That will be something that will affect the way people look at capital-raising ventures by banks which are shown to need strengthening. Second, subordinated bondholders are bailed in. Again, I think we can expect investors to price that into the kind of risk premium they will look for. Third, senior bondholders may be called upon in the transition period if the option to bring that in in 2016 is actually adopted. And again, there will be an expectation that that will affect the returns that will be expected. So we can expect that over that period these factors will be priced in to the way that people look at the banks that are shown to need some capital strengthening. The elements of this very briefly are the following. First of all, asset quality reviews have to be undertaken for all of the banks that are in their list, the 128 banks. They include, in our case, our two pillar banks plus three others. While asset quality reviews have been concluded here, that is not necessarily the final word of the asset quality reviews because the ECB will be looking again at the work that's been carried out. Whether anything will change is very difficult to say. The ECB has made the point that while there will be no full scale assessment of the bank's internal models for risk weighting of assets, the outcome of the exercise may well lead to a different view being taken of risk weighting in the banks. So it's leaving open the possibility that there may be a different conclusion or a somewhat different conclusion from the ECB's asset quality reviews to those carried out by the national authorities. Again, arguably asset quality reviews are at the heart of day-to-day good governance in banks, so this will be a very important issue. Then we have the issue of the stress tests. These tests will be designed to provide a forward-looking view of the banks, shock-absorbing capacity under stress. We don't know yet how the parameters for the stress tests will be defined. I think there have been two comments already this morning to the effect that these stress tests should perhaps be more severe than ones that were carried out on the last three occasions. The European Central Bank has certainly articulated that view, but I think we need to suspend our judgment on that until we see, as I say, the parameters that are set for these stress tests. Without wishing to reign on the parade, I have to say that if you look back at the history of forecast of economic growth in the Euro area for the last four or five years, they have been successively reduced at every review. I think those who decide on the parameters for the stress tests should perhaps take the pessimistic view of the future when they draw up their worst-case scenarios and that they should perhaps be more rigorous than they've been in the past. The issue of the banks' models of risk-weighting will come up again in deciding on those stress tests. There is quite an argument in the theoretical part of the trade, at least, on the ways that we carry out risk-weighting and, indeed, on whether risk-weighting or leverage ratios are a more valuable tool to use. That discussion, I think, is currently going on in the ECB. There is a body of opinion that feels that risk-weighting, as carried on up to now, is too subject to gaming by banks to be the only basis on which these parameters should be drawn. The backstops issue, I think, would be very important. The ECB has made the point, and I quote, for the success of the exercise, the ex-ante availability of backstops is critical. That will, I think, colour the way that Member States will have to deal with the outcome of these asset quality reviews and stress tests. If private sources of capital are insufficient, the ECB says, are not readily available, public backstops might need to be drawn upon in compliance with national policies and European rules. There's a fair bit of definition to be done there. The corrective measures that the ECB foresees include recapitalisation through profit retention, equity issuance, reorientation of funding sources, asset separation and sales. Looking at each one of those in turn, I think we can expect that, as a result of the asset quality reviews and the stress tests, a number of banks in the ECB system will be pursuing capital strengthening over the transition period I've been talking about. That will mean that there will be competition in when it comes, if people choose equity issuance as one of the measures of capital strengthening. What the effect of that will be on the prospects of any individual bank succeeding is open to question. In a fairly sluggish economic environment, which doesn't look like brightening up too quickly, I wouldn't expect profit retention to be a major source of provision of backstops. Reorientation of funding resources, which is the term used by the ECB, which I take to mean either bond issues or a return to interbank financing to the extent that that's deemed to be wise, could be problematic, part from short dated bonds. The ECB mentions asset separation and sales as a further possible source of capital strengthening. My observation would be that, given what's happened since 2008, most of the asset separation and sales that can be envisaged has probably by now already been done, and that's one of the reasons for the market fragmentation that people have been talking about. So, just to conclude on this very brief review of the transition period, my feeling is that it's going to be a fairly tense period, perhaps a bit less tense than it's been since 2008, but certainly no comfort will rise for anybody involved. Thank you.