 Yn dweud, mae'r cyffredinol wedi bod ydych chi'n iawn i'r tro, ond yw'r cyffredinol yn ei cyflogio ar gyfer gwaith. Fy, rwy'n cael ei wneud i chi'n gwneud y pwn i'w cyfrannu. Ond byddwn i'n gwerthu'n gwneud i chi'r gweithio. Mae'r gwneud i chi'w gwneud i chi'r gweithio. Mae'n gweithio'n gwneud yn ddwy'r cyffredinol, ond rwy'n ddwy'n gwneud i chi. Yn ystod, mae yna'r adres yw'r record ac yw'r Q&A'r rule honno ar Chatham House. Ac mae'n golygu wrth gweithio'r edrych yn cael eu gymryd yn ystod, i'n ddyn ni'n dweud i'r bwrdd. Rwy'n cymdeithio'n cyd-wyddo i'r Cyflaedd Sir Julian King, cyfnodd y Cyfrifiadau Gyfarwyr Cymru, ddiwylo'n gweithio yma ar 2016. report worked in the US commission, but he has also been EU commission chef for Cabinet to the Commission for Trade United, UK representative on EU political and security committee, graduate of Oxford University, a call National Administration Paris. He is somebody who is dealing with the topic that we've had to say as an official ambassador to EU development for both countries. Felly, mae'n ddifenio'r ddyddai, ond hefyd yn ddysgu sy'n gweithio'r ddeithaswn ar y ddweud ym mhwylwyr, ond yn gweithio'r dyfynigioner, mae'n ddiddordeb yn gallu'n gweithio'n gweithio'r ddweud ymlaen o'u gwneudoddau yn gweithio'r ddechrau, cyfnwylwyr, cyfnwylwyr. Mae'n ddweud ar gael ddweud, a'n ddweud, ond mae'n gweithio'n gwaith o'r rhai rebysig, Felly mae'n cael ei ddweud, mae'n dyn gyda'r cyfnodol ac mae'r cyfnodol yn credu iawn. Fyddo chi'n bwysig ar ychydig yn ei gwybod, ond dydig yn y dweud ar розol yn y ddefnyddio cymdeithas ar y cyfrifiad, y cysbethau cyfrifyddy o'r gynhyrchu cyfrifyddy fathau gydag ywame lanydd. Wrth fynd, mae'n bwysig ar cyfrifiddodau cyfrifydd, ac â ddweud ar wychwil cyfrifydd. Felly, maeFinallym yn candwyd i'r gweld ymgrifiad gan gweithio'r ffordd o bob unigent ar y cyfnodd yn mynd i ddweud o'r mynd i'r gweithio'r gweithio'r ddesgrifennu. Rydyn ni'n gweithio'r ffordd o'r ffordd a'r ffordd o'r llyfr Covid, yn ymgyrch gwaith ymgyrch yn Arland, mae'n defnyddio'r blaen o'r ddechrau, a dyna yma. Ond mae ffraith o'i gweld yn yma, mae'n rhaid i'r oeswerd o'i ei gweld yn gweithio'i gweithio. Ond, oes yma, oherwydd yn ymgrifennu i'r gweld yn gweithio. Dyna dwy'n amlwg bod yr ydw i'n dechrau tarod rideaeth rhyngwyr Khwong Jump yn yw'r ystyried, ac oherwydd mae'ch yn bwynt at imre gyda gwbl cynniol pob hynny o'r cyffredinidd tyfion. Graf ymlaen. Graf ymlaen, mae'n gweithio'r ddiddordeb yn dweud arall. Ac rydyn ni'n diweddol ar gyflwydoi ar yr et赤nid, fe wnaeth beg yn cael ychydig. Byddwn ni wedi eu cyflwyr hwnnw i, Mae'n gweithio yma sydd am ymwneud yn yma yw yn amlwg am ymddangos. Mae'n gweithio gweithio hwn yn cymdano gyrdeddau sydd yn ymddangos eich bod nhw'n gweithio. Rwy'n meddych chi'n dewis i chi'n gwneud i chi'n mynd i'r gweithio. A gyd yn amlwg ar ffadoedd yma, ddydd i chi wedi ganddo i'n gweithio, i parys yn 2016, ydych chi'n gwirioneddau sy'n fyrddio'n gweithio hefyd, I'm not sure I would have believed you then. I have had an opportunity to speak once before here since I started as Commissioner for the Security Union and when I spoke last time my main focus was on the work we were doing to counter terrorism in particular the Islamist extremist terrorist threat and I just wanted to say before I talk about other things that that threat has not gone away and remains a challenge for us all and a real and alive concern even as the last remnants of the Daesh Caliphate are rolled up in Iraq and in Syria. There was still 26 Islamist extremist terrorist incidents across Europe last year, a small number of attacks but a much larger number of failed or foiled attacks. We all of us face the challenge of what to do about returning foreign terrorist fighters and non-combatant women and children that is a security and indeed a societal challenge and there is still a lot of very pernicious radicalising material that is having an effect with particularly vulnerable young people being turned down the route of violence. This is still far too much of that material online for example so this this is a challenge that remains and I don't want to overlook it but today I wanted to accept your invitation to focus on some of the the newer challenges facing Europe and what we're trying to do about them and in particular to talk a little bit about cyber challenges, cyber enabled challenges particularly around disinformation in the political space that you mentioned, how we do better to ensure or assure the integrity of our critical digital infrastructure, what we need to do to take seriously some of the unconventional illegal means that are used to attack us including chemical attacks and what the shifting threat picture means for what we can do in the EU around defence. So starting with cyber and cyber enabled threats as you said these have grown significantly in recent years and awareness around them has increased as they've had more and more of an impact on our everyday lives. The emergence of these non-conventional means as a channel for aggressive action without having to have resort to traditional military measures has I think fundamentally changed the role and indeed the responsibility that the EU has and can play even as it remains predominantly a civilian organisation but it does have this role now in security and defence matters because the threats that we're talking about subvert civilian infrastructure and democratic processes as much as any other and they are real security challenges because of their power to generate chaos, descent and disruption. In our reaction to the increase in cyber threats we in the commission began by tackling the challenge posed by what you might call classic cyber security threats, those which target systems and data. We developed a new cyber security strategy back in 2017 and since then we've been rolling it out and trying to get it implemented through agreement with the Member States and with the European Parliament around three pillars of resilience, deterrence and boosting international cooperation and in practice that's included the creation of a first genuine EU cyber security agency at European level which will help develop a new EU wide certification system to boost resilience and cyber security of online services and consumer devices in particular those billions of internet of things devices that are going to be a bigger and bigger part of our lives as well as to coordinate the response to large-scale incidents if and when they take place because resilience also relies obviously on technology the close you are to the cutting edge of technology the more resilient you are we've proposed a network of competent centres across Europe with a hub at its centre to drive to stimulate and drive the development and deployment of necessary cyber security R&D and technologies going hand in hand with the aim of turning cyber security into something of a competitive advantage for European industry. Last year also saw the deadline for the coming into force of some key building blocks of our cyber security a directive on security of networks and information systems that says you have to have plans and preparations for dealing with cyber security of your key infrastructure and the famous GDPR that we were talking about a little bit downstairs these are very important measures they do need to be effectively implicated by all of the member states at the same time we took some important steps on deterrents to create some better more credible disincentives for those who might contemplate attackers through cyber means so we're stepping up cooperation and sharing of expertise reinforcing cyber forensics and detection capabilities across the European Union we've taken steps to increase law enforcement access to the kind of evidence electronic evidence that they need to prosecute these attacks including when it's hosted in a different country and we are putting in place a set of measures for a joint EU diplomatic response a political response as well as a law enforcement response to malicious cyber activities the so-called cyber diplomacy toolbox which includes working together with third countries and if necessary taking sanctions when you can attribute with confidence an attack to a third country or in the process actually finalizing a set of cyber sanctions to that end so that's the panoply of things that we've been doing on classic cyber as well as that of course we've also seen the continued growth and evolution of cyber enabled threats especially those aimed at manipulating our democratic processes casting a shadow over our democratic institutions there has been i'm afraid a pattern of interference in elections both sides of the Atlantic we've documented 30 different examples of attempted or in some cases successful interference in democratic processes over recent years and obviously we're conscious that the upcoming European parliamentary elections late this spring in at least 27 Member States present a particularly tempting target with potential if successful to deadlock the EU's legislative capacity for much of the next five years so in response we've brought forward a series of proposals aimed at tackling disinformation and manipulation of data and behavior in the political space now we're calling for action on longer term challenges which are very important such as ensuring media diversity building critical awareness but we also need to take some action now we need to see an improvement in how we detect and call out disinformation we need to better protect elections in particular by working with the Member States to develop a rapid alert system for spotting mapping and reacting to coordinated disinformation campaigns but perhaps most importantly we need to see the big internet platforms the big social media platforms step up and play their role in what is an international first we've agreed a code of good practice with some of the major social media platforms facebook google and twitter have joined us in that and i want to recognize their engagement but they need now to follow through on what they agreed to in the code of practice we urgently need to see improvements in how political adverts are placed online greater transparency around sponsored content the rapid and effective identification and deletion of fake accounts clearer rules around bots i machines not humans circulating political content more effective promotion of alternative narratives and greater clarity around how this is working how the algorithms that push information are working greater openness to independent scrutiny we're in a process now of reporting each month on progress in the run up to the european parliamentary elections and we've done two rounds reporting and i have to say unfortunately that there's still a lot to be done in the latest reporting despite some progress rather than improve overall the platforms have fallen further behind where we need to be given the prospect of the elections so facebook have i'm afraid failed to provide hard data and information including any data on the actions it's taken at the last part of last year and the beginning of this year on scrutiny of ad placements or efforts to disrupt advertising and monetization incentives for those who are peddling disinformation twitter have not reported on any additional efforts at the beginning of this year to improve ad placement or information on the implementation of its ad transparency centre in the EU google ffair'd slightly better reporting on scrutiny of ad placement a policy for election ads dedicated teams to prevent election related abuse of its services but even they didn't provide any data on enforcement of their policies so we've called again on the platforms to go further and faster in order to have the necessary impact before may's elections and to meet the commitments that after all they signed up to in the code it's not something that we invented and to give us the information we need to be able to work with them to hold them to account frankly uh as someone said in a different context the clock is ticking uh if we're going to ensure those elections are fair and free then we need some real action on this now as well as those cyber and cyber enabled threats europe also needs to look at and be thinking about the security and integrity of its underlying critical digital infrastructure now this is an issue that's been in the headlines recently um you have all read about a particular company from a particular country where there are questions uh to do with the 5G networks but for me it's a larger question than that it's about building and strengthening our digital resilience digital resilience after all is crucial for protecting government information industrial research intellectual property business plans elections our democratic institutions as well as our own personal data and in order to have faith in your digital resilience the plumbing of your uh society of our modern connected lives you need to protect the digital infrastructure as well as 5G that means the cloud internet of things devices and uh AI the possibility to use artificial intelligence to process for goods or for ill huge amounts of personal data and all of those changes are happening at the same time which is why this debate has bubbled up in europe from a european perspective i think we need to discuss whether we're happy to continue as now to see our own cutting edge technologies sold off one after another we need to consider um how to minimize the risk of allowing one dominant supplier to emerge across the whole continent in these crucial sectors and we need to look at whether deeper european coordination would allow our collective investment in something like AI and other vital technologies quantum computing cryptography to be more than the sum of their parts and these are going to raise some very challenging issues around national decision making all of these are core national decisions we also have to recognize that pretending we can protect everything isn't realistic it won't work but we do need to decide what really matters in terms of our digital resilience and this core digital ecosystem and whether greater transparency around suppliers supply chains foreign investment is going to be enough to offset the security risks or whether it may be that some pieces of backbone digital infrastructure are simply too critical to risk now as i said at the start alongside these digital issues we also have to face a challenge from unconventional illegal risks like cbrn something which was thrust back into the spotlight a year ago today when the scepals were poisoned by russian agents using a military grade nerve agent on the streets of a small city in the united kingdom if it can happen on the streets of solsbury it can happen anywhere in europe we'd already reviewed a little bit before that our provisions on chemical biological radiological and nuclear risks but i have to say we'd concluded that they were low probability high impact unfortunately solsbury showed that they weren't such low probability and that's why we've been pressing for urgent progress on these challenges reducing the accessibility of cbrn materials bolstering our preparedness and resilience building stronger links with key regional and international partners nato uh and the us we have i'm glad to say made some progress in concrete measures to address the chemical threat by working together with member states to develop a list of chemical substances posing particular threat and improving our detection capacity and launching a public private dialogue to explore ways of better controlling access to these dangerous chemical substances but there's still a lot more to do in that field which brings us closer to the world of traditional defence i just want to say a few words given that the set of rapidly evolving threats that i've been describing the clear sense that those are challenges that transcend national borders and frankly the shifting global geopolitical landscape to put it politely uh we have i think seen a new sense in europe amongst europeans that we need to take uh more ownership for ourselves in defending and protecting uh our citizens that that said core defence of course remains the responsibility of the member states uh and they exercise it in europe uh very largely through nato while the european union can't act as a substitute for member states national defence programmes it can encourage collaboration in developing the technology and equipment needed to address common security and defence challenges while of course fully respecting the different national positions on defence including here in 2015 europe was the world's second largest military spender at 210 billion euros half the us figure but more than three times what russia was spending even after brexit it will still be the second largest spender worldwide and yet we've always got less bang for our buck than these other uh us russia and others we have too much overlap and duplication collectively that's led us to punch below our weight our lower investment per soldier in terms of equipment and r&d proliferations of different types the same sort of equipment that's why some of the initiatives that we've sought to promote from the commission like permanent structured corporation or pesco and the european defence fund have the potential to be so useful we're not talking about tanks and guns here but rather areas such as metamaterials encrypted software drone technology and the aim is to help member states reduce duplications in spending and get better value for money in some of these cutting edge areas all of this in full respect of our core values so all the projects under the european defence fund for example will have to comply with international law and be implemented in accordance with the highest ethical standards if the member states agree what we propose for the budget for the future the period 2021 to 27 the edf would be funded to the tune of 13 billion and would be a significant player in driving corporation in these fields pesco meanwhile offers a way for willing member states to cooperate more closely in particular on security and defence projects funding developing deploying military capabilities together we've got about 34 different projects on the go at the moment and i'm very glad the island is investing and engaging in those now you've listened very patiently and i owe it therefore to you i think to say something briefly about the elephant in the room everything we've done so far has been beginning with c or d as someone once said there are only two tragedies in life one is not getting what one wants and the other is getting it i suppose there might be a message about brexit in there somewhere it's not really for me as as you know to major on this subject and the wider situation because you know i don't speak for the UK government and my Michelle Barnier is in charge of things on the on the EU side but i do want to say that whatever else happens with this story and in particular whatever difficult discussions lie ahead on for example economic issues and future economic partnership when it comes to security and the security dimension of the future EU UK partnership i hope i sincerly hope that we can keep in mind the overwhelming shared self-interest of maintaining and indeed in some of these fields that are moving fast strengthening the deep intertwined practical corporation that's developed over recent years but because an objective is clear doesn't necessarily mean that it's easy or straightforward to achieve once the UK leaves the EU it ceases to be a member state it becomes a third country outside of Schengen that is the logical consequence of what is being debated in in the house of parliament again next week that doesn't mean there will cease to be a relationship but that relationship and corporation will need to be forged anew negotiated and agreed on a new basis and that relationship will need to respect the position of both parties HMG but also of the EU 27 building a deep relationship in security and defence will mean finding ways to tackle some quite complex issues around rules and safeguards for example on data and on dispute settlement and enforcement vital in this as in other areas again it'll be difficult to ignore that the EU has a desire for greater autonomy in some aspects of defence and security so the challenge is to find the right basis for corporation there are a number of hurdles that need to be cleared if we're going to do this but for the reasons we all know and for some of the reasons I've just set out it is profoundly in our shared interests that we make a joint effort to try and clear those hurdles because we live in uncertain times whatever happens with the rest of of brexit in the coming weeks and months I do remain positive optimistic that the close and lasting partnership between the UK and Ireland and the UK and indeed the rest of Europe will endure something which is vital if we're going successfully tackle the security and defence challenges that we face today may the roof above us never fall in may we friends beneath it never fall out thank you