 Ladies and gentlemen, Vice President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice President, Mr. Dombrowski's, and the incoming President, Ms. Lagarde. Based on our regular economic and monetary analysis, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to but below 2% within our projection horizon, and such convergence being consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics. As decided at our last meeting in September, we will restart net purchases under our asset purchase program at a monthly pace of 20 billion euro, as from November 1. We expect them to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of our policy rates, and to end shortly before we start raising the key ECB interest rates. We also intend to continue reinvesting in full the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time, past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favorable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. The governing council reiterated the need for a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy for a prolonged period of time to support underlying inflation pressures and headline inflation developments over the medium term. In particular, the governing council's forward guidance will ensure that financial conditions adjust in accordance with changes to the inflation outlook. In any case, the governing council continues to stand ready to adjust all of its instruments as appropriate to ensure that inflation moves towards its aim in a sustained manner in line with its commitment to symmetry. The incoming data since the last governing council meeting in early September confirm our previous assessment of a protracted weakness in the euro area growth dynamics, the persistence of prominent downside risks and muted inflation pressures. At the same time, ongoing employment growth and increasing wages continue to underpin the resilience of the euro area economy. The comprehensive package of policy measures that we decided at our last meeting provides substantial monetary stimulus, which will contribute to a further easing in borrowing conditions for firms and households. This will support the euro area expansion, the ongoing buildup of domestic price pressures, and thus the sustained convergence of inflation to our medium term inflation aim. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail starting with the economic analysis. Euro area real GDP growth was confirmed at 0.2% quarter on quarter in the second quarter of 2019 following a rise of 0.4% in the previous quarter. Incoming economic data and survey information continue to point to moderate but positive growth in the second half of this year. This slowdown in growth mainly reflects the ongoing weakness of international trade in an environment of persistent global uncertainties, which continue to weigh on the euro area manufacturing sector and are dampening the investment growth. At the same time, the services and construction sectors remain resilient despite some moderation. The euro area expansion is supported by favorable financing conditions, further employment gains in conjunction with rising wages, the mildly expansionary euro area fiscal stance, and the ongoing, albeit somewhat lower, growth in global activity. The risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook remain on the downside. In particular, these risks pertain to the prolonged presence of uncertainties related to geopolitical factors, rising protectionism, and vulnerabilities in emerging markets. The euro area annual HICP inflation decreased from 1% in August 2019 to 0.8% in September, reflecting lower food and energy price inflation. On the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to decline slightly further before rising again at the end of the year. Actors of underlying inflation remained generally muted, and indicators of inflation expectations stand at low levels. While labor cost pressures have strengthened amid tighter labor markets, the weaker growth momentum is delaying their pass-through to inflation. Over the medium term, inflation is expected to increase, supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing economic expansion, and robust wage growth. Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money M3 growth increased to 5.7% in August 2019 after 5.1% in July. Rate rates of broad money growth reflect ongoing bank credit creation for the private sector and low opportunity costs of holding M3. The narrow monetary aggregate M1 continues to be the main contributor to broad money growth on the components side. The growth of loans to firms and households remained solid, benefiting from the continued pass-through of our commodity monetary policy stands to bank lending rates. The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations increased to 4.3% in August from 4% in July, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained unchanged at 3.4% in August. The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey for the 3rd quarter of 2019 indicates a slight easing of credit standards and increasing demand for loans to our households, while demand for loans to firms remained broadly stable. Our Accommodative Monetary Policy Stands will help to safeguard favorable bank lending conditions and will continue to support access to financing, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is still necessary for the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below but close to 2% over the medium term. In order to rip the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute more decisively to raising the longer-term growth potential, supporting aggregate demand at the current juncture, and reducing vulnerabilities. The implementation of structural policies in Euro Area countries needs to be substantially stepped up to boost Euro Area productivity and growth potential, reduce structural unemployment and increase resilience. The 2019 country-specific recommendations should serve as the relevant signpost. Regarding fiscal policies, the mildly expansionary Euro Area fiscal stance is currently providing some support to economic activity. In view of the weakening economic outlook and the continued prominence of downside risks, governments with fiscal space should act in an effective and timely manner. In countries where public debt is high, governments need to pursue prudent policies and meet structural balance targets, which will create the conditions for automatic stabilizers to operate freely. All countries should intensify their efforts to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of public finances. Likewise, the transparent and consistent implementation of the European Union's fiscal and economic governance framework over time and across countries remains essential to bolster the resilience of the Euro Area economy. Improving the functioning of economic and monetary union remains a priority. The governing council welcomes the ongoing work and urges further specific and decisive steps to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. And now we are at your disposal for questions. Mr. Weisberg? I have two questions. The IMF just at their last meeting raised concerns about the effects of low interest rates on the financial system. So my first question would be what makes you so confident that more of negative rates and quantitative easing or asset purchase program is doing more good than harm? And my second question would be on your legacy and whether you feel it's being tarnished by the recent discussion which were unusually public about the rift in the governing council and the disagreement about the policy action taken. Thank you very much. Thank you. Well, the IMF didn't say that negative rates are ineffective. As a matter of fact, the overall assessment of negative rates is generally positive. For us, it's very positive. It's been a very positive experience. Negative rates have stimulated the economy, have affected positive employment, and so all in all, we're exactly in the direction we wanted them to be. The IMF also raised concerns about potential side effects of negative rates for very negative for a long time. The discussion really didn't go into too much detail, but we are also aware of that and we are monitoring these risks. I should say that so far, first of all, we should distinguish different categories, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other intermediaries. The overall assessment has been clearly positive. In other words, the improvements in the economy have more than offset negative side effects from low rates. But the fact that we are monitoring constantly is shown by our decision in early September of introducing a tiering system, which basically partly compensates the banks from the negative rates. Now, your second question, frankly, the answer is no. We have discussions. Everybody has discussions. All jurisdictions have disagreements when monetary policy decisions come to be discussed, and these disagreements are often made public, often they are not, so I think it's not been the first time. So I've taken this as part and parcel of the ongoing debate and discussions. Thank you. Ms. Bufaki? Isabella Bufaki from Solaventi Quattrore, I have two questions, Mr. President. The first one is about the fact that the governing council tasked the relevant euro system committees with examining options for the size and composition of potential new net asset purchases. Taking into account eventual committees options, and even if the governing council did not discuss this topic, given that the markets give the APP and firepower crucial, what is your opinion on the options that could be considered in enlarging the APP? And my second question is looking forward. What do you see are the main risks from your risk rather that you can foresee for the European economy and for the financial markets? In other words, what should we all worry about the most on the short-term and long-term horizon? Thank you. Thank you. I mean, since you're going back to the issue of voting and committees, let me just give you a few highlights. First of all, and I will read sentences from the public account, the account you've seen. So first, all members agreed that the further easing of monetary policy stance was warranted. Then we had an open discussion about the choice of instruments best suited to address current challenges. And we give account of these discussions. Then we start going bit by bit, saying what sort of majority was by each part of the discussion. And we say a clear majority of governing council members supported the broad package of measures that was ultimately decided upon in September. A large majority of members agreed to change the modalities of the new series of teltrose. All members concurred with continued reinvestment. Members generally agreed with the proposal to enhance the state-based component of the governing council for our guidance on interest rates. A clear majority of members agreed with the proposal to restart net purchases under the asset purchase program with the modalities that I've just explained. And a very large majority of members agreed with the proposal to lower the rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points. Finally, a majority of members went along with the proposed introduction of the two-tier system for reserve remuneration. This comes straight from the public account that you've seen. So no surprise that today basically the proposal of the chief economist, namely to maintain the monetary policy stance, went basically through approved unanimity. So there was no... So it's not surprising given these majorities. Now coming to your point about the committees, let me again go back to the IES in July, where we tasked the committees with examining options, including ways to reinforce our forward guidance on policy rates, mitigating measures such as the design of a tiered system for reserve remuneration and options for the size and composition of potential new asset purchases. This is the introductory statement in July. So and then we have already gone through this on other occasions, but the function of the committee is to provide technical advice to the governing council. And that's what they did. And then the governing council, of course, decides as it deems appropriate. It's not the first time that the governing council has a different mind, it's up many other times. So no surprises there. And it's all, in a sense, confirmed by the maintaining the monetary policy stance today. What are the main risks? Well, the main risk from all viewpoints, but especially also from a financial stability viewpoint, is a downturn in the economy. And it's the, whether it's global or it's Eurozone, but that's, I think, would be the main risk from all viewpoints, from the side of convergence of inflation to our objective. Obviously, from the angle of maintaining a high level of employment and of economic activity and of a nominal wage growth, as we are seeing today. And from the angle of financial stability itself. Because clearly, one of the great benefits that are, that the banking sector, actually all players in the financial system had from this accommodated monetary policy, was the extraordinary improvement in the quality of their credit, of their assets more generally. Which comes with the recovery. Which basically affected positively the profitability of the banking system. So, thank you. Mr. Corani. Thank you very much. Balash Corani from Voyagers. Did Christine Lagarde take part in the discussion? Did she express views on monetary policy and what she, in full agreement with the ECB's policy stance? One question is about what's been happening on the market since your September meeting. Interest rates have gone up, market-based inflation expectations have gone down. Are you worried about this? Is the market misreading your policy or are you comfortable with what the markets are pricing in? Thank you. No, Christine Lagarde didn't take part to the discussions, but she was there. Without taking part to the discussions or the deliberations on your second question. No, I don't think the, basically, let's assess what was the main goal of the September Monetary Policy Decisions was to cement the accommodative monetary policy stance that was embedded in the expectations as they had been affected by the weakening, regularly, continuously weakening, medium-term outlook. And the governing council today, in the discussion, felt that this has been largely, very largely achieved. In other words, we saw the flattening of the yield curve, we saw the complete, now complete, transmission of a lower DFR, deposit-facility rate, into lower short-term rates. So what we have observed there, it's partly due to the fact that there may be a part of these expectations, which was not warranted by the weakening economic outlook, which went, in a sense, beyond the economic developments, which might have been disappointed. But it's a very small part. But the second and probably more important reason for the developments we've seen is the overall uncertainty. In one way, in a sense, one has the sense that somehow the lower likelihood of a hard Brexit over Cliff Edge has improved the overall situation. On the other, the uncertainty is still there. And by the way, on this specific point, it's true that it's improved in the short-term. The likelihood of having a Cliff Edge has gone down. At the same time, the medium-term uncertainty is considered with concern. So and the rest of the geopolitical uncertainty has continued to affect markets. So I would read the market developments in this way. I think actually, I don't think the market misread. The market showed that they understood perfectly well our reaction function. Thank you. Ms. Lehert. Thank you. Mr. Draghi, the Bundesbank has recently said that they see a chance of a German recession this year. Given the discord on the council, which you discussed earlier, does that eliminate or narrow your policy options where I know you set rates for the whole of the eurozone, but Germany is the biggest economy count to be ignored? Second question is we've... I'm sorry, what's the question? What policy, given the discord amongst policy governing council members, do you feel that you have the same number of options? Should Germany pull other countries into some kind of a downturn? The second question is, given that central bankers have become less popular with their governments, and I'm thinking in the U.S. as well, we've talked over the years about the G20 cooperation on linking together monetary policy, fiscal policy, inter-country and intra-country. Given what's happening in the U.S., given the difficulties that central bankers are having with their own governments, can that cooperation be duplicated if there's another global downturn? No, your first question, let me say this, unfortunately, everything that's happened in September since our monetary policy decisions has shown abundantly that the governing council's determination to act in a substantive manner was justified. We had all kinds of survey indicators and now also some few, but some data showing further weakening of the economy. Just one number that I remember is the PMI in manufacturing is now at the lowest level since 2012. And another point of observation that I would say everybody uses to assess the resilience of the economy is to look at what extent the weakness in the manufacturing sector is actually spreading to the sales sector. And until a month and a half, two months ago, we could say the service sector was fully resilient and now we've seen the PMI services also declining sharply in, I think it was September reading. So and then we have many other indices pointing into that direction. Now regardless of the development in the German economy, I think that the decisions taken in September fully justify the continuation of an accommodate monetary policy stance and the maintaining of favorable financing conditions for the non-financial corporations, companies and the small and medium-sized enterprises. Now the second point, it's quite clear that central banks ought to continue to cooperate no matter what happens in other parts of our institutional system. Cooperation of central banks within their mandate, within their mandate, is essential. And the fora like G20 or other multilateral fora are more important, more essential than ever. Thank you. Mr. Jackech? Mr. Jackech, A.D. German Television, Mr. President, please allow me to raise our personal questions on this particular day. Your colleague Peter Pratt once told me that by the time he and you are leaving, you both would prefer to have monetary policy back to a kind of normality. We know that this unfortunately hasn't happened. Can you give us some insight? How do you feel about it? And whether you perhaps also feel that politicians could have helped you a little bit more. And the second question, please. We have right now in the last weeks a lot of reviews of your German office and a lot of speculation. But I think what population would like to know is how you actually feel about this term. Thank you very much and all the best. Thank you. Thank you for your wishes. I think it's just one question really. And well, first of all, let me just refer to Peter Pratt's words. It is true. Yes, so much so that during 2017, 2017, we gradually changed our monetary policy stance and we were preparing to exit that stance of monetary policy. But then conditions changed. And what prevails under everything else is the determination to pursue the mandate for which this institution was created and we work for it. And therefore, we had to change course and get back into the present stance. Let me also add one thing that if there is one take from the recent IMF meetings, is that the paradigm of reference, the paradigm of references changed until not long ago, the IMF and all the observers would say that, yes, interest rates are low and they may stay low for some time, but then they will go up. Now, the sense of many discussions at the IMF is actually that they will stay low for a long time. They will stay low for a long time because the real rate of interest is also declined. And this implies that the exit from unconventional monetary policies is shifted in time, shifted forward in time. So the way I feel, I feel like someone who would try to comply with the mandate the best possible way. Thank you. Mr. Arnold? A couple of similar questions in the same kind of vein. The first question is, what's your biggest regret, Mario? And the second one is, what advice are you giving to Christine Lagarde? You can tell us about anyway. Well, I'm sorry, I can't answer either question. But saying that I always focus on things that can be done, not things that you can't change. And you can't change the past unless you are a historian. So I focus on what's been done and assessed by facts. And here, well, the second question I'll answer immediately, no advice is needed. She knows perfectly well what she has to do. And by the way, she has a long period of time ahead during which she will have to form her own view together with the governing council about what to do. But I stop here, really, because this question is going to pop up again and again. What are, how do you judge the past? So if nobody's asking this question, I'll come back to you later. Mr. Malin? Jan Malin, Handelsblatt. Mr. Draghi, I have a question on the issuer limit. Many people think that the limit will be reached quite soon with the new purchases, especially for Germany. Philipp Laine recently said, according to the ECB's calculations, this may not become a problem for an extended period of time. And could you maybe explain why the ECB's calculations are more optimistic than other calculations? And my second question is on Germany. In Germany, there's a more open discussion about the so-called debt break, which restricts the federal government deficit to no more than 0.35% of GDP, unless there's a downturn hit. Do you think such a rule makes economic sense? Yeah. Thank you. Thank you for that. And thank you for all the other questions over the last eight years. Thank you. Thank you. First, let me respond to the first question. Yeah, that was raised because it's open-ended. And so naturally, people ask, when are you going to bump into these limits? And then what happens? The answer is, Philipp Laine is right. It's going to take quite a bit of time before this issue will realistically present itself as a problem. And the, but all estimates, by the way, have to assume something about the issuance of bonds. And clearly there, you make some assumptions about what fiscal policy is going to be. Under reasonable assumptions, not extreme either way, there is enough time. Frankly, what I think I said in the last press conference, I don't see this problem coming up again anytime soon. So that's the answer. Different calculations may reflect different assumptions about issuance. But so that's one part of the answer. The other part of the answer is that clearly these limits, and I've said this again many times, these limits are specific, first of all, are self-imposed. And second are specific to the contingency in which they were originally stated. So the ECJ has granted ample discretionary power within the mandate to the ECB. I think that is, finally, there's one other part to my answer. We have capital key rules in the way we purchase bonds. And the relevant key is the stock of capital. So even though we may observe deviations in terms of flows, it's the stock that we have to look at. And there, frankly, we don't foresee substantial material deviations in the aggregate in the months and years to come. Now, your second question I'm afraid I can't answer. I would never dare to judge fiscal policies in one specific country. Thank you. And thank you very much for your kind words before. Thank you. Mr. Stumpf? I am just a student from Espansion. You have been asked about something that you regret with no answer. Maybe you could tell us one thing that you are proud of. And another question. The same thing. I would like to go back to your famous London speech. After all, did the Eurobumblebee, as you call it, then graduated into a real bee? Well, I think about the first question I have the same answer. There isn't any specific. I'm actually, if there is one general thing I'm proud of, is the way in which the governing council and myself have constantly pursued our mandate. This is something we collectively should be very, very proud. And in a sense, now we can talk about legacy and all this later, but in a sense, this is part of our legacy. Never give up. Now, the second question is about the bumblebee. Now, I should say, now I can't really answer this question because I was immediately, well, there was someone of great authority who said immediately that this was dubious biology. And so I would not really develop this concept any further. Thank you. Jean-Philippe Lacour from Agence France Press. After the former meeting in September, the governors, Weidmann and Knoth, expressed very publicly how they felt with their decisions. And what was your reaction or did you contact them to say stop this cacophony, please? Or was it your duty then as president of ECB to bring Cam in this governing council back? So maybe you can say what was the flavor today after during the meeting? And the second question regarding maybe your future, the question was asked to your predecessor what you will do after being a ECB president. Mr. Trichet said I have four grand children and I want to take more care about them and I want to read some poetry. So can you tell maybe we want to share with us what you will do in the next future? Thank you. Thank you. No, there was no reaction on my side. So there was no reaction at all. And today, as I said before, the discussion was basically supportive about the chief economist about Philip Lane's proposal, of the Philip Lane's proposal. And as a matter of fact, some of the centers, one of the centers called for unity and implementation, full implementation of the policy package and other dissenters said by guns are by guns. So one thing you can get out of this meeting besides the various substantive issues being discussed was a general sense that general call to unity. On the next question, as you know, I generally speaking, I don't have any set idea about that, but if you want more information, just ask my wife, she would know. Ms. Etel? I hope she does. I hope so too. Anya Etel from Welt and Welt am Sonntag in March 2012, you got a so-called Prussian spiked helmet, a Pickelhaube. And what do you plan to do with it now that Bill Zeitung has claimed it back today? Will he leave it here? Will he take it with you? And really how glad are you to finally leaving Germany and all those fierce critics behind you? And is there maybe one last thing you want to tell them, especially here, but maybe also with view to those former ECB council members who recently published a very negative memorandum on ECB policies. Thank you. Thank you. Well, on the gift I received way back in 2012, in March, I think there's an old German saying that says, Geschenkt ist geschenkt. So that is, I plan to keep it. The other issue, I think there is ultimately, it's really, it's the reality that speaks more strongly than any other voice. It's the reality together with the conviction that we did what we did always in pursuing our mandate. We never, if anything, that's a distinctive thing. Very often, criticisms address issues that really are not pertinent with our mandate. And we stayed firmly on this course, on pursuing our mandate. And that's what the only thing I feel like saying today. Thank you. Mr. Ferles? Thank you, Tom Ferles from the Wall Street Journal. Just to follow up on this comment about the helmet that you're keeping. Do you think that, clearly you do have a number of critics in Germany, do you think you could have spent longer trying to address those criticisms in Germany? Is that something that perhaps Christine Lagarde could prioritize, should prioritize? And a second question was about, I suppose, the political pressure on central banks, and also, inversely, the way that the ECB seems to be also putting pressure on governments. I mean, does this suggest that in future, there should be closer ties between governments and central banks or the ECB? Should it become more of a political act, given that it's the Eurozone's main federal institution? Thank you. Thank you. I'm sorry, the first question is about the political pressure, or? Address criticism in Germany, Mr. Lagarde. Sorry, the? Address criticism in Germany, no. Oh, yes, yes, yes. No, I don't, that's why I don't remember the question, because I have no answer to that. So it's, no, I have no advice for Christine. She knows, as I said, she knows better than anybody else what to do and what to say. And now, on the second point, is there political pressure on central banks? That's true. You can actually see more political pressure in the last year than in many years before. And, but is it also, is it equally true for the ECB? Much less so, frankly. We had, I had occasional exchanges with this or that finance minister, but it never became anything comparable that you see in other countries today. So that's, now, what's the relationship between ECB and governments? Now, especially at this time in this instance, this question is quite important because, as I said last time, I repeated today, monetary policy will continue to do its job. So don't think that monetary policy just relaxes and stops working, but it's quite clear that with fiscal policy, the objectives of monetary policy will be reached sooner and will less side effects. And the reason lies mostly in what I said before, being the real rate, the natural rate of interest declining, that's where the space for fiscal policy comes in. So if one wants to see higher rates sooner, fiscal policy should be active, although probably monetary policy will continue to be accommodative, even if fiscal policy will become more expansionary in the early stages of this expansion, at least. So given that that's the situation, that's probably gonna stay like this for some time in the future, what is the relationship? I, in some of the speeches I gave, I spoke about, yes, central banks are independent, but they are independent in an interdependent world. So to the extent that fiscal policy, that an active fiscal policy doesn't prejudge the objective or price stability, there is no contradiction, there is no threat to the monetary dominance of the central bank. Thank you. Mr. Haydn? Luke Haydn, Market News. Mr. Draghi, my first question was on fiscal policy, again, I'm afraid. How confident are you that your pleas for greater fiscal policy action are actually being listened to and will be acted upon in a timely fashion in Europe's capitals? And do you have an idea of how much stimulus would be needed in the next couple of years in order to meet the ECB's inflation objective? And then secondly, would the UK, Japan and the US all doing their own QE programs in a public reverse auction format? And financial markets best practices moving to a greater level of transparency. Why does the ECB continue doing its PSPP program in a primarily opaque fashion with minimal transparency? Well, the answer to the second question was part of the design when the PSPP and the was introduced years ago. And at that time, it was deemed that to follow the other channel, the reverse auction system would not be proper, would not be suitable in this present situation in Europe, in the Eurozone. So it's a matter of, there isn't any special policy reason, but it was very much a matter of technical convenience. On the first question, I don't wanna make anticipations on whether fiscal policies will react sooner. Also because the issue is far from being simple. We know, we say, we said in the introductory statement that the countries with fiscal pay should act and countries without fiscal space should create the conditions for their automatic stabilizers to operate freely. Now, would that be, what does it mean exactly? Would there be stimulus which spills over outside the countries that actually undertake fiscal policy if they do so? How much of this would go into the countries that need this? And this is very much intertwined with the progress that the EMU, the Economic and Monetary Union, will make on designing a central fiscal capacity with genuine capacity to stabilize the economy over the cycle, which doesn't exist yet. So it's far from being a discussion like you might have in one country, jurisdiction, where the issue is whether expanded deficit today or not. It has to do with governance of the institution. By the way, the previous question I had about the debt break was asked about whether it makes sense, you asked me that. It's part of the same questions, really. In this part of the world, to have an active fiscal policy of the size that might be required, by the way, the present fiscal stance is mildly expansionary, but if a broader fiscal action were to be required, it's the governance issues which are the most important ones. Thank you. Ms. Pia. I had a lot of questions, but they were made. It's Mariangela Pira from SkyTG24. Nice to meet you in person. My question is, I've heard a lot about you talking to economists. We journalists define you as Super Mario, but my question is, what are you taking with you? Not as Super Mario, but as Mario Draghi, a person who had a very important job. What are you taking with you with this experience as a president of the ECB? And on a more personal note, my friends tell him that following monetary policy is boring, but with your presidency, it wasn't boring at all. I've learned a lot. Thank you. Thank you. Thanks for the compliments. That's one of the most important things that all should attempt to be not boring, but no, I mean, the other question is really very deep, not easy to answer. Certainly this experience has been very intense, profound, and fascinating, and I take this with me. Then how much of this we'll get into personal reflections is too early to say. So thank you. Yes, Mastro Buoni. Thank you, Mr. Draghi. Tonya Mastro Buoni, La Repubblica. I will try again the question about the future because one year ago, I asked Christine Laga what we would do after the IMF, and she told me I would be grandmother. It didn't exactly go like this. So I'd like to ask you if you would exclude any political rule in the future, for example. There is much, of course, discussion. I'll tell you about you coming back as President of the Republic in two years or maybe any political role. And the second question is Germany appointed a new member of the board now. It's Isabelle Schnabel, and there are rumors about the fact that Germany, the government, might have understood that it's weakness to have lost so many members of the ECB in these years. How do you view the fact that in the last, I think 10 years, Germany has three German members of the board have stepped down. Is it weakness? Is it strength? Is it something that signalizes an anomaly in the ECB? Thank you. Thank you. So, but your first question is I have no, I mean, just I don't know. I said this many times. And for much of what, much part of what I'm gonna do next, as I said before, just ask my wife. She'll know better, I think. On the second question, Isabelle is an excellent economist and she will do very well. She has all the capacities to do very, very well. Enhance the discussions outside, inside ECB, actively participate into the work of the ECB. So we should welcome her appointment very warmly. Thank you. Ms. Annunziata. Hello, Francesca Nava, Italian public television, RAI-3. I had some questions, they have already been done. A recent survey by the Bank of America reveals that impotence and ineffectiveness of central banks, including European central banks, are the second risk perceived by investors. My question is, do you think that these investor concerns are justified? And in other words, is there a risk of financial bubble? Thank you very much, and good luck. Thank you, thank you. But I'm sorry, you asked whether the expansionary monetary policies of central banks is the second largest risk. I can answer for the eurozone. In the eurozone, and that's a question we ask ourselves every day, many times a day. And we monitor, I'm saying this because we monitor the market developments very closely. And we see some segments of financial markets where valuations are overstretched. One case is real estate, for example, and especially prime commercial real estate. Now, the causes of these overstretched valuations often don't lead directly to our monetary policies. For prime commercial real estate is the action of international investors that are investing heavily in that. For real estate, certainly the low interest rates are important. However, when we go and look at how the mortgage market is actually behaving, in other words, there has been a spike in mortgage lending. We don't see that. We see some increase in mortgage lending in the new mortgages. But overall, if you take the aggregate figures, still they really show a solid expansion, nothing in the soul. We may have other sexes, but frankly, all in all, we don't see bubbles. And when we see some bubbles, they are local bubbles that should be, for example, some segments of the bond market, the high yield, the leveraged bond market, which, by the way, is not a big issue in Europe. It's more of a big issue in other jurisdictions. But we have to make sure that our banks don't invest into this market, as they used to do before the financial crisis, where they bought lots of stuff that then didn't perform well. So for that, the remedies, the answers for many of these potential local bubbles are macroprudential policies, supervisory policies. And certainly, the other important issue is that much of this danger, much of this risk, much of this search for yields happens in the known banking sector and more specifically in the so-called shadow banking sector. And unfortunately there, the perimeter of macroprudential policies does not include that sector. So we have some visibility, pretty good visibility into what happens in the banking sector, which, by the way, still is about 80% of credit intermediation in this part of the world. But we don't have much visibility for the rest of the financial sector. I mean, I'm talking for the known banks, so for the shadow banking sector. Mr. Hewing? Thank you. Well, first of all, I just wanted to say thank you for your candor and composure over the years and patience with all of our questions. So a couple of last questions. I'm talking about that in a moment. So I just, I'm sorry. Go ahead. When you started this job, you know, Greece was at the center of a debt crisis, completely frozen out of the debt market. There was a big restructuring. And then a couple of weeks ago, Greece sold short-term debt at a negative yield. Do you see that as a success or a risk? And then second question, if there's one thing you could fix about the way that the eurozone functions, so what would that be? Thank you. Yeah. Well, the first question is a clearly success. And it's a success of first and foremost of Greece, of the policies that the Greek governments have undertaken together with the eurozone. The eurozone solidarity and under the advice of the IMF, the SM and for the limited extent the ECB. For the, as far as the banking and financial sector is concerned, the ECB as well. But the main efforts being done by the governments and by the Greek citizens that certainly had to pay a very, very high price, terrible price as a matter of fact, especially in the early stages of a debt deficit financing, debt deficit finance bubble. So this is a success. It's also in a sense a risk if these policies are not continued. And but we see all the developments there in Greece basically targeted to continue these policies. So it's a good time for Greece now. And it's frankly, if you compare with three, four years ago, it's a good time for Europe, for the eurozone countries. We often tend to be rightly anxious about our objectives when we consider them now. But in fact, some historical perspective, especially when we judge countries and governments is very important. I'm sorry? Oh, I'm sorry, yes. You had a second question about what to fix in the eurozone. Right. Sorry. There is one thing that all the successful monetary unions have. And that's a central fiscal capacity. In other words, whether this should be a budget or should be a system of insurance. So it's very important to have something of that nature of an adequate size, something that can be used counter cyclically, something that basically would take care of the fact that national fiscal policies have, in my view, limited spillovers on the rest of the eurozone. So one needs to have a central fiscal capacity. And of course, this should be designed in a way that doesn't create moral hazard. I think that's one of the main reasons for the slow progress on that front is the risk that the mechanisms would be used for increasing moral hazard. So the design of the rules is very important. I think that's the main thing. Mr. Taino? The question is about the quality of the ECB staff. How important has it been? And how important will be for Mrs. Lagarde who doesn't have experience as a central banker? Oh, believe me, it's been important for me a lot. So even though I've been central bank governor before for six years, I had the privilege of sitting in the governing council under the presidency of Mr. Trichet, the quality of our deliberations is so much, owes so much to the quality of the work of the staff. So it's important. And it's been, I think that's the, in my view, that's the main ingredient of everything we've done and everything we've done. And it's the main ingredient in the success of the ECB in its being a credible central bank. And it's the main ingredient in the big changes that ECB had in the past. So I think we ought to be very, very grateful to our standing staff. And the final question to you, Yana Randall. Yana Randall with Bloomberg. Mr. Draghi, you have been widely credited with saving the euro with three very simple words at a time when many people were betting for a breakup. At the same time, the ECB's policies, your policies are widely criticized across the region. And there is a risk that one day, one country might decide that the euro is not irreversible and will decide to leave. Have you paid too little attention to reaching out to the public, to the people behind or beyond financial markets? And I have a second question for you and I would like to read something to you. It's from a speech that York Asmussen, a former executive board member gave in late 2013. He said, Italy is too big to be rescued from the outside. It has to make the turnaround on its own. Its fate will critically determine the fate of the euro area. In this sense, the future of the euro area will not be decided in Paris or Berlin or in Frankfurt or in Brussels. It will be decided in Rome. What do you think of this statement and do you think that Italy will ever fix itself? Thank you. When was he saying that? It was in late 2013 in Milan, a speech in Milan. Exactly, he was absolutely right. And would you say the same thing today? I'm asking you. No, I mean just of course not. Things have changed completely. And frankly, everybody now in Italy said and stated that the euro is a reversal. And so while there may have been sort of hypothetical doubts in one part of the governance of the country, there aren't any more. So it's been accepted. Also, you see, it's part of the normal euro zone developments, the popularity of the euro. You said that in your first question, the criticisms are across the region. Well, in a sense, they are across a region. But the point is that at the same time, the popularity of the euro has never been so high. So what's happening in Italy is actually where the euro popularity had gone up. It's also part of the general phenomenon. On your first question, that's an important question. Of course, I mean, I've tried to do as much as one can be in here. But I think the more can be done, should be done, and one should never be tired of doing it. The, we here in a multi-country monetary union have a difficult, many things are better here than they are in other jurisdictions in one country monetary jurisdiction. But it's one thing, it's clearly more difficult, namely to reach to the public of 19 different countries. And clearly here, central banks, national central banks are key for communication. And they can do and they do much more in a sense than a single president or board members can do because it's a constant communication. So in this sense, it's very important what you said. There is one other aspect I would just dwell a moment. The natural counterpart of central bankers are the ones who have to implement the monetary policy decisions. And they are naturally the banks and the financial markets and other financial intermediaries. At the same time, the independence of a central bank is also based on the support that it enjoys. And therefore, what happened in communication by central banks over the last 10, 15 years is complete transformation. Nowadays, nobody would pride himself or herself of saying, if you have understood me, you are stupid. Nobody would say that today. We all strive for transparency. And as you see, as you just thank you for having said that, for candor. So that has changed. But would we be naturally speaking to the large public? One has to be cautious about that because as soon as you change your audience, you change your language and you naturally step into a different realm, the realm of politics. So yes, to an open, broader communication, certainly, but it should be done with caution. Thank you. Now that it's finished, may I say something to you and say how thankful I've been to all of you in these eight years? It's been, I think it was actually, it was originally an obligation. Then it became a welcome obligation and then even a pleasure. So I should thank you. And it's the thanks are actually substantive. They are not formal only because of what I just said about communication. Communication has become a tool of monetary policy. So your interaction has been essential in our monetary policy decisions all throughout these eight years. And the other thing, frankly, is that with your inquisitive questions, you have stimulated the strive towards greater transparency and greater candor. Again, compare through the last 20 years, communication in central banks communication, how it did change. And I think it did change for a great part because of your role. I don't think it by itself central bankers would have changed by themselves. Central bankers would have changed communication if left free to be opaque. So thank you for that. Thank you very much. And all the best to all of you.