 Good morning. I would like to start first with the common factors that are played in political and economic transition with respect, specifically reference to South Sudan. I identified eight common factors and I categorized them into two, three primaries and then five secondaries, secondary factors. The first three are injustice, inequality and when the injustice and inequality in the society leads to ethnic tension. And that's what the three I would say and they lead to violence, so you look at the violence as a secondary common factor as a result of the primary ones. So in South Sudan, the tension between two ethnic groups, the DINCA, it seems to be the largest, they are not necessarily the majority but they are the largest within the 64 ethnic groups constituting South Sudan. And the second largest is the NUERD and there's been conflict between the two where the NUERD feels or whether real or perceived that they are being denied since 205 but you can go back since the conflict started in South Sudan in 1903 where the NUERD felt that they should also lead instead of the DINCA as always leading. And after independence from Sudan in 2011, the DINCA continued to lead the country and the second person was from the NUERD but they kind of dissatisfied with that. So that led to what I would say violence. The second is the, within the secondary is justice where again that ethnic tension people feel that there's no justice prevailing in the society. And there's also institutional dimensions when you have weak institutions, whether institutions in the security sector, in the economic sector, in the justice sector, if they are weak then people feel that they are not being served. So that is a third dimension and then economic foundations whereby again access resources, certain groups feel that there's dominance or they are being denied to have access because of they belong to a certain group. And the fifth one in the secondary common factors is the capacity of the state to act or to respond, take preventive measures before the crisis is set on. So those are what I would call aid in the case of South Sudan. And let me look then at the, why recently about two months ago in July, this year after one year of peace agreement which was signed on 26 August 2015 and the government took time almost nine months for the government to be formed after that peace agreement. And then three months into the formation of the new government of national unity, conflict erupted again. And what I would say here is the way and it relates to the role of the actors, some most of the South Sudanese analysts, including the signatories to the agreement, felt that this particular peace agreement was imposed on them. And actually there was an earlier attempt because the conflict arose within the ruling party called the SPLM Sudan People Liberation Movement and this is where the conflict started. In 2014 through efforts of CMI with the ruling party in Tanzania and the ANC in South Africa felt that let us resolve first the conflict within the party. But unfortunately some powerful actors in the international community felt no, they better go for the peace agreement between the ruling parties outside the party and what I would say the powerful, the troika, that's the US, UK, Norway and they have a special invoice. We were supporting the negotiation in Addis Ababa while the party intra SPLM party arrangement was taking place in Russia and the South Sudanese themselves felt that we need to sequence first since it was a political disagreement within the party, let us resolve the unity of the party first. But then the other actors who were supporting the peace agreement being initiated by EGAT in Addis Ababa felt that this was a delay, would delay the process and not only that they felt that the SPLM was already a dead monster that must be buried and forget about and moved. Now so what happened is the this particular peace agreement ignored the call for unity of the party and it got imposed and called it agreement for the resolution of currencies in the Republic of South Sudan. And the way it was structured is built in crisis because you have the first vice president who is coming from another party who was fighting and given a number of ministries but not only that if he's outside the country he appoints one of his ministers to act for him. If the president is not in the country he cannot act, it will be the second vice president who acts. So you could see in-built conflict and that's why the agreement, the conflict erupted again on the 8th of July and the first vice president fled the country, there was a rift within his party, they replaced him but then the conflict continues. So in, I will not talk about other experiences but in Africa and especially in the case of Sudan and South Sudan I think external actors, mediators, they need to sit back a bit and try to understand the cultures of those in conflict and it is not because I'm sitting in the panel of the CMI but I thought the CMI approach which was also supported by Tanzania ruling party which because Tanzania, South Africa, they are not neighbors to South Sudan so there's no immediate conflict of interest. While they got countries that are the neighbors of South Sudan there's immediate conflict of interest in my view and so CMI approach in my view was the correct one because it addresses first the root causes in a set of addressing the systems, the symptoms of the conflict and so the responding to crisis in my view requires a correct diagnosis of the crisis itself. We need to understand what are the root causes or the common factors at play as I've already mentioned, the eight of which three are primary in the case of South Sudan because of ethnic tension is the primary factor at play and which also affects both political and economic because it's political, the fact that the people who are ruling belong to a different ethnic group, it is also economic because the group feel that they are denied access and need to tension. Thank you. Thank you very much and well for my part I have to say that even though this crisis may seem very different with each other they also have some common ground for instance the power struggle and struggle and fight for resources for instance in the case of Ukraine you can see also the struggle for especially in the energy sector. So Jochen Yassar do you have some quick comments on that? I think from my point of view is that there are core factors that are common across a number of conflicts and well Dr. Dan was speaking I wrote down the ones that immediately ticked my list of my experience of conflict and that was a number one and I will talk about it in my comments is weak institutions which is a fundamental absolutely fundamental reason why conflicts occur and why they are then difficult to resolve. The second one is definitely economic justice and in some cases a perception of economic justice not necessarily that there are terribly difficult different income levels that depends on the crisis but certainly it can be a concept of it. I think the third one is the capacity of the state to respond and prevent crisis by recognising the early signs and the possible direction that those early signs can take in terms of escalation and if you fail the Ukrainian situation certainly is if you fail to respond quickly to it to this escalation question then then you end up with a full-blown conflict as we have. Thank you. I think I would just have a quick note on a very fundamental in my opinion point that was addressed by my colleague Dr. Lowell and that is the issue of addressing the causes rather than the symptoms and this is something based on our experiences in the region is fundamentally crucial to basically take into consideration because it's much easier to follow the symptoms thinking that you're solving problems and then realising after all that it's simply you know has been a waste of time process and waste of efforts and the quick example is for instance now in the region where I come from in the Middle East one of the biggest problems is corruption so many people address this issue thinking that you know they have certain ideas and strategies to tackle corruption for getting that corruption is a symptom rather than a cause and in order to tackle and solve corruption you need to tackle and address the causes which so many governments have failed to do so far so I think it is very important to highlight this point this fundamental point and make sure that it's not only highlighted and taken into consideration at a hypothetical level but also within the level of you know implementation of any policy actions or strategies with regards to conflicts