 Well, good morning everyone. My name is Bill Burns, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and it is truly an honor to welcome our distinguished guest this morning, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Scheuble. We're very fortunate to have Minister Scheuble with us at a dramatic moment of reckoning for Europe, for transatlantic relations, for the global economy, and indeed for the entire international system. Over more than four decades of public service, Minister Scheuble has been one of the central protagonists in Europe's evolution, from the reunification of Germany to the establishment of the European Union and the management of the Eurozone crisis to Brexit. In Germany, he has helped navigate through the policy and political cross-currents at the intersection of security, openness, and economic growth and inequality that have challenged so many Western democracies. And on the world stage, he has been a vocal advocate of transatlantic ties, European integration, and free trade at a time when strong forces have been pulling in the opposite direction. As one of the world's wisest and most experienced politicians, Minister Scheuble has immense perspective on the many political and economic challenges before us, and we could all benefit from his insights. On the eve of the World Bank and IMF spring meetings with important elections looming across Europe and with Germany hosting the G20 this summer, today's conversation could not be time-lear. So please join me in giving a very warm welcome to a remarkable statesman, Minister Wolfgang Scheuble. Thank you very much, Ambassador Burns. Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying something that we all actually know already. Only if we take a multilateral approach do we have any chance of solving the major problems in the world, of which there are many. These problems include climate change, energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, asymmetric warfare, growing strengths of competing powers and regions, the crisis across the Arab world, the Islamic war against Western modernity, poverty and genocide part in parts of Africa, and so refugee flows around the world. As finance minister, of course I could also add the lack of resilience in the global economy and the need for more economic convergence and prosperity in the world. Global governance is therefore more important than ever and the G20 is the most important forum for this kind of global governance and the European Union is the world's most advanced model for promoting governments across international borders, something I was talking about this morning at John Hopkins. This multilateral approach has produced great achievements since 2008, especially when it comes to regulating financial markets and coordinating global economic policy. We have agreed on important measures to regulate the financial sector so as to put an end to wrong incentives for the financial industry and prevent future bailout at taxpayer's expense. We have agreed on important rules against base erosion and profit shifting in the international taxation and on the necessary exchange of information. We have developed and maintained a well-functioning rules-based global financial architecture which has successfully dealt with many problems and crises. Long-term global stability and growth cannot be achieved without a well-functioning system of global financial market regulation based on transparency, proportionality and constructive international cooperation. But there is no question that financial market regulation also needs to be continually renewed. We must not have too little regulation, but neither should we have too much. It would hamper the financial markets and their key role of supporting the real economy. Nonetheless, we should not forget the lessons we have learned from the global financial crisis. We should stick to hard-won, internationally agreed arrangements. Germany assumed the presidency of GTZ-20 last December and I would like to briefly outline our priorities in the GTZ-20 financial strike. We are focusing on three areas. First, making our economies more resilient. Second, improving investment conditions, especially in Africa. And third, shaping digitalisation. We have to make our economies more robust. The world is still feeling the effects of the last financial crisis and we cannot rule out the possibility of further turbulence. It's therefore crucial that we increase the resilience of our economies and build buffers to absorb any future shocks. Global debt, both public and private, has risen to historic levels. We need to gradually reduce levels of debt and stop relying on gross fuel by debt-financed consumption. This requires gross friendly consolidation, restructuring of the banking sector and structural reforms. Some try to discredit the approach by applying populist labels such as austerity. But this only serves to distract from an uncomfortable fact, namely we simply have too much debt. The ultra-lose monetary policy in place in many regions is not helpful. It's encouraging and jurist-taking, political complacency, capital misallocation and asset price bubbles. If it is not reversed in time, it will continue to do so. In fact, it might even increase, rather than reduce, the risk of yet another crisis. High debt levels would severely restrict the ability of many countries to respond appropriately to future crises. Debt has initiated the exit from loose monetary policy. It wouldn't be a bad idea if the European, Central Bank and others were to start following its example. We are happy to hear that this is now being debated. During our presidency of the G20, we have already made progress and agreed on principles to enhance the resilience of G20 members and the global economy, including actions to increase resilience in our national growth strategies and an effective and consistent implementation of agreed policy measures on regulatory reforms. Shaping globalization also means dealing with poverty and creating opportunities. We intend to address these improving investment opportunities, especially in Africa. Our partners in Africa want and must improve the environment for private investment, including investment in infrastructure. This would reduce barriers to investment and make them more secure, rendering private investment in Africa more attractive. We, the G20, will support these efforts by providing a political platform to advertise these changes, and we will support efforts as bilateral partners. We call this a compact with Africa. Five African countries have already committed to such compacts, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia. The objective is to boost growth and jobs, promote inclusion and give people economic perspectives at home so they do not have to leave their home country to look for subsistence elsewhere. The third focus is on the opportunities and challenges that digitalization brings for the financial sector. Digital innovation improves efficiency, supports growth and enhances global financial inclusion. We can reap huge benefits if we embrace the full potential of digital finance. Of course we will also have to monitor the implications for financial stability and we are necessary, actively address those implications as we did at the meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Baden-Baden some weeks ago. For instance, we agreed at this meeting that ensuring cyber security is essential for international financial stability and said to do so is thus in our common interest. There was a consensus that the G20 should launch an initiative to improve cyber security in the financial sector and promote the resilience of financial services and institutions to protect themselves against the malicious use of information and communication technology. We are confident that all G20 states are deeply committed to doing everything they can to prevent cyber attacks originating in their jurisdiction. In addition, the G20 Finance Minister and Senegal Bank Governors mandated the Financial Stability Board to take stock-existing cyber security regulation and supervisory practices. Above all, I would like to emphasize the following. The main drivers of growth and prosperity are still openness, free trade, integrating national economies into the global system, undertaking efforts to make national economies more competitive and developing attractive products for the global market. The discussion on these topics that you are holding here in your country and the discussions that we are conducting with international fora which allow us to reach solutions that lie in our common interest, because this interest is still a common interest. We will not be able to profit at each other's expense. Peace and prosperity in one country cannot come on the cost of peace and prosperity in another country. Germany, I am encouraging people to trust in American democracy. I am encouraging people to observe your discussions here with a sense of understanding, partnership and confidence. In turn, I would ask you to show the same calmness and trust when you observe developments in Europe and Germany from here. I recently had some productive discussions with Secretary Mnuchin where I explained that Germany's trade surplus is a result of the quality and attractiveness of German products and not of political or currency manipulation. By the way, according to our own statistical office, according to your own statistical office, not ours, your own, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the US trade deficit with Germany already declined significantly in 2016, dropping by 9 billion from 77 billion to 68 billion. As you see, we are on the right track. Germany's overall current account surplus is also already shrinking. A reduction in the current account balance can be expected in the coming years due to dynamic domestic demand and trends on the commodity markets. There are no sensible measures that would reduce Germany's current account balance, nor do we need active economic policy measures to achieve this. For example, increased spending by the German government is not going to solve the structural problems in other countries. Incidentally, the strength of the German economy is an important basis which helps Europe and the US contribute to the global economy. 800,000 jobs in the US have been created by German companies. German value chains transfer jobs and technology, and German companies are very active in spreading our successful dual education system abroad. It's true that the euro being undervalued from a German perspective, not from a Eurozone perspective, but from a German perspective, it benefits our exporters. However, it can also harm the economy, not least because it can lead to complacency. I tell everybody, and I will say it particularly with relation here too, it's not the German government that determines the monetary policy of the eurozone, but the European central bank. It's being clear for a long time that I would not mind if our monetary policies reflected a bit more self-confidence highlighting the success of our policy in the euro economy. When Mario Draghi began loosening monetary policy, and when the US and others supported this move, by the way, it was supported by this move, I told them that this would drive up German export surplus. At the time, I promised not to criticize this approach, and I do not. But I do not want to be criticized for the consequences either. You will allow me, and by the way, the problem of the value of the exchange, value of the euro can also be solved. In this regard, I agree 100% with Mario Draghi. By strengthening European economies, especially in the southern parts of Europe, by structural reforms, we have said it again and again. The only thing that is missing a little bit is implementation, what has been agreed. Last observation. Liberal world order needs the commitment of the United States. Some of you, and here there is some continuity with recent years, might take a skeptical view of your country's role in maintaining the global order. I would regard this as a call to action directed at Europe, including Germany, as well as other liberal economically powerful democracies around the world to do more to uphold the liberal democratic order. All of us have benefited greatly from this order in recent decades, an order which has led and guaranteed by the United States. And I doubt that the people of the United States would conclude that the world order would remain equally sound if you were to suddenly stop leading and constantly challenging others. The changes in China and Russia over the past three decades, the spread of freedom, market economies, and prosperity of historic dimensions would not have come about without this. And without your leadership, further change, further proliferation of our liberal world order will not happen. It's an order which is still the best of all possible worlds for ethical, political, and economic reasons. By the way, it's an order which enjoys huge attractiveness all over the world. Look at China, look at Arabic Spring, and all these things. The order and the values are very attractive. We only must to stick and to continue to deliver them. And then we want to continue seeing this order propagate itself or at least not seeing weakened. After all, it's surely in Americans own interest to ensure security and economic stability in America's market in Europe and around the world. This is the basic condition for the U.S. to increase its exports and reduce its trade deficit. Looking out for good deals for one's own country is completely legitimate. However, experience shows that the best deal for one's own country is ultimately the deal that also benefits other parties. A good deal is a mutually beneficial deal. We should, and we will arrive to see this new deal together. Thank you very much. Mr. Minister, thank you very much for a characteristically thoughtful presentation, and we'll have just a few minutes to have a conversation up here, and then I'll open it up to questions from the wider audience, but the minister's on a tight schedule, so we'll try to finish before noon. But Mr. Minister, I guess I wanted to start with a broad question. You talked very eloquently about some of the changes that you see across the international landscape today and the challenges to liberal international order. You've played a central role in the last big transformative moment at the end of the Cold War, Germany's reunification, the enormous evolution of the European Union. As you look at this moment of change, what do you think are the most distinguishing features? We talked earlier a little bit about challenges within both European societies and American societies from people who feel left behind by globalization, that sense of frustration that emerges from that. How does this period of change differ from that earlier period of change at the end of the Cold War? What do you see to be its defining characteristics? Maybe it's a philosophical question, and I can one hour to answer, but with only a few remarks. So one is success is always a temptation to become tired. And if I look to some European countries, including myself, it's a long-going success for decades and decades. If awareness of the success weakening, I'll give you a very stupid example. When I became Finance Minister in late 2009, we had designed a deficit for our federal budget at about 300 billions. And the deficit for 2010 has been drafted by 86 billion. And as I said, we have to reduce it continuously in an economically reasonable way that someday we will come to because we have an aging demography. That is one of our major events. We have been rather successful. We have been very lucky. In the last general election in 2013, my party, enthusiastic of its Finance Minister at that time, promised that we will stick and we will deliver a budget in the years to come without deficit. And nobody believed. We have achieved it. Since 2014, we make no deficit. No. It's frustrating, stupid to mention no deficit because don't you have no other idea that has already been achieved? That is the way. Long success makes and enhances complacency. Number two. And that means for the values, Western values, for freedom, democracy. You can see it in polls after German reunification. Polls examined the values between the population in the former GDR and the former GDR was the eastern part of Germany and the former federal republic that was the western part of Germany. Of course, in the former, in the population of the former federal republic, which was accustomed to living freedom and democracy, the biggest value was always social equality. In the former GDR, by far, the biggest value was democracy, freedom. In the years to come, it was reduced. Number two, of course, we may have as elites, political, economic, whatever. Academic, we lost a little bit of a link to parts of our population. On a lot of reasons, difficult, not too easy to explain it exactly, but it must be happened something not only in the United States, but also in European societies, especially in western society. Maybe in eastern part of Europe, we underestimated the speech of change for societies living in the socialist system after the 1990s, the revolution of the 1990s. Number three, the change, the speed of the change by the couple of digitalization and globalization, with all these disruptive changes, with all this, if you look at an average city, it's changing. It's a daily life of people, it's changing terribly. In Germany, I don't know, maybe you are much more modern in the United States. Germany, my generation, put different ways of communication and information than the younger generation. That is a good split between generations. You never have, we never have had in society. And since we have seen, even my fellow colleagues, all the best experts in the economy and so on, all over the world in the IMF and wherever, they have no answer why global economy shows lower inflation rates since decades. And it's not only on the stupid financial policy of the German finance minister, that the world economy since decades and decades shows lower inflation, lower interest rates, and lower growth, lower growth by the way, with all the innovations. And the answer, whether the digitalization of the economy we deliver more jobs or not, is not really serious. And all these uncertainties make people a little bit anxious. And what are you doing if you become nervous and anxious? If you are sitting in a plane, you scratch your seat if you feel some danger. And that is the reaction of populations. My explanation number two, I will stop it. Thanks. No, no, it's fascinating. Let me just ask a question, Mr. Minister, about the transatlantic economic agenda. You know, you've argued in recent years that the transatlantic trade and investment partnership was the most important transatlantic project for the foreseeable future. If, in fact, that particular effort is at least stuck for the foreseeable future, how do you see the transatlantic economic agenda unfolding? I think maybe we have made efforts for transatlantic free trade agreement a little bit too ambitious and too complicated not to be understood. We have underestimated in Europe the matter of fact the trade agreement has to be negotiated with the European Union. But given on the complex structure of the European Union, it's also a matter of fact that it can only be ratified not only by European institutions, but also by national parliament. Therefore, you can imagine how difficult it is to get an agreement in all this. And so far, it was so easy for everyone who wanted to fight against, because it was for protection, environment protection, to make a lot of demagogic text against. And therefore, issue was not very popular all over Europe. But even in US, it was not very popular. I, in last, during an electoral campaign for presidential elections, if I get it right, most candidates promise not to stick to the transatlantic agreement. So now we will learn, yeah, we have learned again, again, free trade is a precondition for growth for any economy, internationally and national as well. Therefore, we will restart, okay, maybe we may make it a little bit more simple, more transparent, more... Yes, maybe we'll start not with... We have achieved the transatlantic agreement with Canada, by the way. Difficult, but we did it, Europe and Europe. So I'm quite optimistic we will have the same with Asia. And I got it from Japan that will stick to the Asian-Pacific agreement as well. Well, and of course, I'm quite sure I know my Japanese colleague very well. And therefore, I can make you sure the Japanese don't want to exclude United States. We want US involved. But as we understand, maybe UNS will take some times to examine and to take some things a little bit more easier. Maybe some things must be corrected in some way. But at the end, I'm quite optimistic because I always say there's a reason I can't stay myself in politics for some time. I've enjoyed to be a member of parliament since 45 years. But having said this, without believing that crises are always opportunities, that is the lesson of Karl Popper. And the bigger the crisis, the bigger is the opportunity. And if you look at it in that way, Europe is a huge opportunity. And the transatlantic relations are a huge opportunity. In the same spirit of huge opportunities, I mean, you highlighted in your remarks quite rightly the impact that technology and advances in the digital world are having on the global economy and how societies interact with one another. And I saw the paragraph that you referred to in the G20 Finance Minister's Communique that talked about the dangers of malicious use of information and communications technology in a shameless bit of self-promotion for the Carnegie Endowment. My colleagues just released a very good paper, which talked about the importance of establishing a global norm against the manipulation of the integrity of financial data. What role, Mr. Minister, do you think the G20 can play in helping to bridge the gap between the rapid pace of innovation and public policy, the establishment of rules of the road? I think the role of the G20 the G20 can play is to get governments of member states as much involved as possible. We tried and we are working again to, let's say, and self-commitment of any government not to use those instruments to manipulate or to attack in finance. We didn't get it done in button-button. I think we will not give up this issue. And of course we have to to enhance our cooperation, because everyone will understand it. It reminds me in times of Cold War when we needed cooperation. You have much more experience than myself. But we know it. The biggest problem in the global world can only be treated in a way which the global major players find some way to compromise and to have common position. Having said this, not to be forgotten. When I have been Minister of Interior and I have been last time for from 2005 to 2009, I tried to convince I failed or was not so very successful. And a call of especially in the United States said we in the western world have much more, if we take our values serious, how we can make our values work in a digitalized world. The human rights, the fundamental rights in the digitalized world are not grounded. And if there is a room for a common western discussion, because no one has a solution, everyone has a problem, we should think about this, how we can make our values even to work in the digitalized world. I read the book of, I think it's Harari, Homo Deus in German language and Israel, do you know it in US as well? Okay. And reading this book I said it's of urgency, that we care how we can make our basic values working even in a digitalized world. And a last question for me before we open up to questions from the audience, Mr. Minister, is about another issue that as you may have noticed is central in the debate in Washington these days and that's Russia. Given all the complexities of Russia and its evolution, how do you see the future of, you know, over the next couple years of Germany's relations with Russia and of Europe's relations more generally given the different voices, you know, across Europe about how best to manage relations with Russia? I think the first part of the answer has given Chancellor Merkel in the reaction of the occupation of Green Peninsula and the raising the crime crisis. She said again and again we will never accept the violation of international law and rules by violence, never ever. We will not. But she said we will never fall back into old behavior before you may remember the crisis in the Ukraine started in the year when we wanted to celebrate 100 year first world war and we never will have such a problem. We had to change our celebration ceremonies because it was not impossible that it would happen. She said never ever will we make the same mistakes we did in the last, in the end of the 19th century. We will not react on provocation with more provocation and reaction and more reaction on them. And then we came to the sanction. I always, I am the one of the finance minister, which is always, will be asked by everyone, can you make discussions, can you bring together the Ukraine and the Russian finance minister? I am the only one who can. And what I say, but what I have to discuss on this, but we have some specific issues. And I am telling my Russian colleague who is not a political responsible man in Russia as similar to me. I am not a political decisive man in German government. But I am saying, look, we were very much in favor of good cooperation with you. I know Russian economy is much enough to know it would be much better as a Russian interest to cooperate. But there are some preconditions and there must be deliver. I know it's complex and everything that's this. The position of Germany and Europe will be, you have seen we have, even in the last some weeks ago, it has been once again, again, all the doubts and skeptics and unanimous decision of all European members that to renew the sanctions, including to say we don't like these sanctions. We would be happy if you could move it. But you have to do something else. It depends. You know it's much better than me on the broader political, geopolitical game, therefore we will happen. And therefore the relations between, I'm sorry for this, United States are crucial. You like it or not, you are. You can't be the strongest political and economic power in the world and not to be crucial for all these problems. I'm sorry for this. And so far, but I think the time is moving in the direction that even Russia will learn that we have better chance. Of course, we have a lot of problems in the Middle East. Turkey, what's going on with Turkey, problem in Syria is by far not solved. But let's hope that it will move. And the sooner the better. We can have a better relations with the constructive relations with Russia as well. That is in our common European interest. By the way, dangerous to say this in the presence of you, you have much more experience. I have had the feeling already in the late 90s that the way in which we, the Western world, treated a weakening Russia was on the long term not the most, the best way. Because sometimes you must be generous to a partner who is timely weak. Even when I followed the sentence of President Obama and saying, and he said it with by intention, Russia is a regional political. I thought I had doubt whether this was the wisest sentence you could say as a president of UNISY with all the respect and admiration to any American president, of course. Certainly a pretty big region. If Russia is a regional power. So, thanks, Mr. Minister. We have about 15 minutes left for your questions. If you'd please raise your hand, wait for a microphone to come to you. And then if you'd identify yourself, please be concise and remember to end with a question mark. Yes, sir. Mr. Minister, thank you very much for a very enlightening talk. I have been attending your talks here for many years. And one thing one has to say that one ever has to read between the lines to the point and brief. Thank you very much. I have a question because I refer to the migration problem. Europe is and will continue to be one of the richest regions in the world. And the likelihood that it will become less attractive for people who want to better themselves, especially from Africa, is not very high. You said that one way of handling is to create conditions in Africa that will make young people stay in Africa. Most African countries have been independent for more than a half a century. The aid from international agencies has been as long, yet they still seem to find it attractive enough to leave for Europe, even if the conditions improve dramatically. Business conditions, freedom, economic environment, the most skilled and qualified are likely to leave and be welcomed by European countries because they like to attract skilled people, which makes an even better environment in Africa, even worse because of the best in young leave. How do you see this in the future over the last 20, 50 years, assuming that climate change will add to the pressure to leave? I mentioned in the beginning of my remarks some of the major problems which cannot be solved without global governance. And the climate change is one of the biggest issues, of course. And the migration problem from Africa cannot be solved with one instrument. To do it in the short term, we need a partnership especially of countries of transition and origin, because we have to manage the control of our borders. But the cooperation with countries of transition and origin means especially that we must find solutions like we did in the EU-Turkey agreement, that people who will be brought by criminal human trafficking organization, organized crime, to Europe will be brought back, will be brought back in cooperation with second. As I've already said, this is a problem in the Mediterranean. We cannot accept that thousands and tens of thousands of people die. But we cannot accept that the organized crime is deciding how many hundred thousands or millions of people are coming to Europe. That is to Europe to decide. Of course, that is only one step. The other step is to help these member states to support them in managing the problem. That is the other content of the Turkish agreement with the Turkish. By the way, the agreement with the Turkey has a very specific advantage for Turkey as well. Turkey is doing with all the criticism on Turkey a good job in integration refugees. Therefore, it's okay and it's fair that Europe supports Turkey in this regard. But an additional profit for Turkey is that the root for human trafficking from people from East Africa or from Afghanistan, Pakistan and so on. So Turkey has stopped. As soon as the organized crime gets imagined, it stopped. Turkey didn't suffer as a trafficking group on the server. This is the first step. The second step is to give more assistance for the countries of stabilized and the third ground of working is to stabilize Africa as a whole. And if we do all things together, it is doable. You may have been seen this new book from Paul Collier who worked all his lifetime. You may not know that he is the advisor for Africa and for the company with Africa from the German Finance Minister engaged. And therefore, we are looking for this, but we can't do it alone for us. Therefore, I'm very happy that we do it at the 21st level. Thanks. Yes, ma'am. Very much. Gail Maddox, I'm at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. My question really is a good follow on to the one that just came. So I'll leave that part of it out. But just domestically on the refugees in Germany, how are you paying for it all? And what do you see? What are the financial implications for Germany sort of long term? And is there, do we just leave out the EU other than some of the measures that you talked about, or is there any kind of hope for some longer term EU, more multilateral approach? I think there is some hope for some, for more multilateral approach in the US as a whole, because Europe has understood that this problem can only be solved by Europe in a fair way, and that it's not a proportional way of distribution and so on. That is not the beginning. But having said this, we have seen until now we have some problems, mistakes, blah, blah, blah. But at the end, until now, we have managed it. We have spent a lot of money. That is one of the advantages of a very stupid fiscal policy is that you have some room of reaction if you need it. I have, I must say, and I will say to my colleagues again and again, I will not believe it. I know it, but I don't like it to listen. If you have too much debt, you have no buffer to react if you have a crisis, we had. We could act. I think we have spent, the numbers are a little bit to be discussed and that's all, but let's say federal state, states and local communities together in Germany have spent something above 30 billion Euro last year for this refugee crisis and so on. The numbers we're coming down, of course, but we did it and we did it even. Nevertheless, we are criticized by our huge surplus, which has by the way nothing to do with the trade surplus, but if you, not to be mentioned. Therefore, we will continue. We, of course, we will strengthen our efforts to bring some people which are not refugees, not from Syria, not from wherever, but especially from North Africa, for example. We will tell them with all the respect, you must go back and we will bring you back. That is also important that if you, we had similar situation by the way with countries of Western Balkan and since we made clear that people from Western Balkan countries will not get by asylum and unlimited access to Germany, but they will get access if they have a job and so on, but they can ask for a job from their home country. From this day, people even living in Germany have been ready to go back voluntarily. Otherwise, we have told them, if you will do it not voluntarily, we will assist you to do it not involuntarily and that must be done in North Africa because it's also important not to lose the confidence of the rest of the population because they are something become nervous and you can, Demagogues can always take this issue of xenophobia if they want to do so, but it's dangerous and therefore we have, but until now we have done rather well and never with all this crisis the expectation that we have a chance to win next elections are not close to zero. At bad news for my colleague Foreign Minister. We have time I think just for a couple of more questions. Yes, sir. Thank you, Minister. My name is Jared Anglin with the US International Trade Commission and I just wanted to know with a lot of financial services companies in London looking at other opportunities in Europe what can European cities do to make themselves attractive to that sector. Thank you. Of course, we have had a lot of discussions. My position, position of German government is to, we tell everyone we are happy to get you in Germany, but our, our politics is not to, to damage London and UK as much as possible. Of course, if that is a matter of negotiation, if the, if the Brexit means that UK will not be part of the common market, then of course they have no, they have no free access to the digital, to the financial services in Europe. That is clear. What is meaning in concrete must be negotiations. Therefore, we have said, we agreed with the UK government that is of importance that the principles of the Brexit must be agreed as soon as possible, even to limit uncertainty in the financial institutions in London. Of course, parts of the business will be, will have to be moved from, from, from Europe, from London to continental Europe. In this regard, we are, of course, France is saying Paris is the most attractive city of Europe. Milano is saying the, well, the same and we are saying Frankfurt is the best place to be. Of course, the center of field. But that is, but the general message is we want only those who, who must move parts of their business to Europe because there must be under European regulations. That cannot be delivered in, in UK after Brexit. We have time for just one last question. Yes, ma'am. Hi, minister. Jenny Leonard with Inside US Trade. I was wondering if you could, you mentioned the trade deficit, also TTIP in your remarks. Do you think that the US administration understands your stance on the trade surplus, on Germany's trade surplus, or do you think there must be more conversations to be had? And second on TTIP, you sounded optimistic that there is a path forward, but I was wondering if you could elaborate on how and why and when. Passport for what? TTIP. TTIP. Yeah. Okay. I think it's not, and it's not a good behavior of a member of a government to make public advice to another well respected government, by the way, and the most important government for, for, for some government is of course US government. It's quite clear. We try to explain again and again why we think it is like our view is to see, but of course we respect the view of the American administration. You have seen, I discussed very openly and very confidentiality with, with Stephen Newtson, which is my counterpart in the government in the US administration, and I said we have not taken decisions until now that this has to be respected. I told him our arguments, our reasoning, and of course we, all European have explained, and I think this is a matter of fact, which has been, which must not be disputed. If the exchange rate of the euro is part of the problem, if you listen to what Madame Lagarde has said on the German surplus, she has said a surplus by 4% would be, would be fine as a surplus, a surplus by 8% or 7 plus above, it's not in line. I'm, I bet if the exchange rate would only stick to the competitiveness, competitiveness of the German economies, and our surplus would not be above 4%. And it is by far not manipulated, but if there will be administration will tell us something, we, we say, oh no, look, then we will, of course we will take care, but we have not seen it. We are asking again and again, but for the monetary policy there is no responsibility of German government. That is even well known in Washington DC. TTIPS, it's a little bit early to, to, to make it more concrete as I, I, I, I, I try to do it in, in, in my remarks on the question of our president in saying I am optimistic that after the, for the, for the time being TTIPS has failed. But I think it has not failed forever, but we will have a new, a new initiative and, and I think the sooner the better, and maybe we will learn lessons from this. And in this regard, so Europeans will have a lot of lessons to learn, to make it not too complex. I can't imagine that Europe can be ready to make trade agreements with all parts of, of the global economy except United States. I have always seen it ridiculous. And therefore, let's try again. But it's not only in the, in the responsibility of the finance minister as well. And we are in, in time of, of campaigning for general elections by the way. And so main competitors are both members of our government. Of course, the better part of the government is the part I represent. A good note, I think on which to end, Mr. Minister, I want to thank you once again for your thoughtfulness and your honesty and your generosity today. Thank you all for coming and please join me in expressing our appreciation.