 Welcome, everyone. I'm Mira Rapphooper, the Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, and this is a special issue of AMTI focused on the role of air power in the South China Sea. As many of you know from recently released AMTI photos, China's air strip on Fiery Cross Reef is nearly complete, and we're here today to talk more about its implications. With me is Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation, who focuses on East Asia security topics. Tim has extensive experience analyzing China's military and national strategy. Tim, once the air base on Fiery Cross Reef is fully operational, what advantages will this air strip and facilities give the Chinese? Well, Mira, I think one of the most important advantages that the Chinese will gain from the construction of this air base is that they will be able to deploy maritime patrol aircraft on a much more persistent basis. This will give Chinese decision makers much better situational awareness of the contested waters and features throughout the South China Sea. In addition, this 3000 meter long air strip will allow the Chinese to deploy virtually any kind of combatant aircraft or military aircraft to the South China Sea, including fighters, strike aircraft, bombers, tankers, special mission aircraft. So the Chinese will have an excellent post from which to send out aircraft throughout the region. So you mentioned that China is likely to be able to land pretty much any type of aircraft it should want at Fiery Cross Reef. Are there particular types of craft that you would expect to see deployed to this island maybe first or most frequently? What would you expect would be Beijing's inclination to use this air strip for? I think the most likely candidate for a permanently stationed aircraft would be the maritime patrol aircraft, especially the Y-8 variant. In addition, I think an amphibious airplane such as this new giant aircraft that the Chinese just announced would be a very good candidate to help with search and rescue. I think the environment in the South China Sea is extremely harsh, and so sending high-end aircraft to Fiery Cross on a permanent basis, I don't think is as likely initially. We are likely to see aircraft such as the J-11 or the J-H-7 appear for training events, I think, for at least a while until they can build hangars and facilities that can better protect the airplanes. In addition, I would expect to see special mission aircraft such as the Y-8 variant for electronic intelligence collection and transport aircraft. You might also see an occasional tanker or bomber for training mission appear there as well. Tim, as you know, there have been rumors that Beijing may be building a second air strip on Subi Reef or may do so before too long. Can you tell us why China might be interested in having a second air strip in the Spratly Island group, despite the fact that all of the other claimants that have air strips have only one? There are several reasons. First, I think the Chinese are aware that a single air strip and base in the Spratly Island is very vulnerable. Having a second air strip would provide some operational redundancy and allow the Chinese to generate more sorties in a shorter amount of time in the event of a contingency. So this would both improve resiliency for the Chinese and give the Chinese more options to generate air power. Tim, how likely do you think it is that China will establish an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea and what is the role of Fiery Cross Reef and its air strip in the case that it does so? The Chinese have not ruled out establishing an ADIZ in the South China Sea. However, I think for the near term this is unlikely. First off, the Chinese already have tense relations with a lot of countries in Southeast Asia due to the construction of all these artificial islands and they are eager to try and improve relations with countries in Southeast Asia, especially because the Chinese believe that Southeast Asia is poised to become a major driver of economic growth for Asia and for the world and therefore relations with those countries are going to grow in importance to China. So they're going to be reluctant to antagonize those countries. Secondly, there isn't a real pressing need for them to do so. There is no real threat to Chinese assets in the South China Sea, so there's no real pressing military need to do so. A third reason why I think it's unlikely in the near term is that announcing an ADIZ would force the Chinese to have to explain exactly what is their nine-dash line, where are the exact parameters of this claim, and the Chinese appear reluctant to do so at this time. Could you tell us in your assessment how defensible is China's position on fiery cross-reef against potential wartime attack by the United States or against attack by other claimants if there were to be some sort of regional conflict? I think against a high-end opponent such as the United States, the facilities on fire cross are very vulnerable. A single U.S. aircraft carrier alone could generate the stories to overwhelm a squadron of J-11s or J-10s stationed on fiery cross. However, since conflict with the U.S. is less likely than conflict with a rival claimant, I think the more plausible question is what you asked, which is how does China's force on fire cross potentially stand up against a fight with a rival claimant. And there I think the picture is more favorable to China. First off, they are projecting power from the islands, whereas the other countries would have to project power to the islands from their land-based aircraft. In addition, the Chinese will be able to position air defense missiles, radars, sensors, and an array of support capabilities to allow their fighter aircraft to prevail, I think, against most of the rivals in that area. Now, the base is still very vulnerable to missile strikes, and so I would not say it's invulnerable. It is vulnerable to attacks, but in an air-to-air capability, this base really gives the Chinese some options. Tim, in closing today, I wonder if you could tell us in your assessment how much of fiery cross's role is really about wartime operations and how much of it is about peacetime coercion, symbolism, and messaging. Very good question. I think the Chinese are looking to enhance capabilities for both, but the primary emphasis will be on peacetime coercion, as you mentioned. I think that the Chinese have made clear their intent, in my view. Xi Jinping has said that there will be no compromise on the South China Sea claims. These are Chinese, and that he intends to enforce Chinese claims. On the other hand, he's been very clear that China doesn't want a war with anybody, and I think you can understand why. War with any of those claimants could easily escalate, and it'd be very difficult for China to control, and so it's not in their interest to pursue conflict. On the other hand, they have found a peacetime coercive strategy that appears to have yielded some fruit. This is known as the Scarborough Reef Model, or slimy slicing, but essentially it comes down to using co-scarred vessels like maritime law enforcement to shoulder aside or elbow aside smaller, weaker claimants. The building of fiery cross will make that strategy even more appealing to the Chinese because they'll have better situational awareness. They'll have more aircraft available at the same time that they have more co-scarred and naval vessels available, and this combined force will give the Chinese more options to coerce and shoulder aside countries, and make even harder the ability of these other countries to challenge China on its existing claims. Timothy Heath, thank you so much for your insight. My pleasure.