 sy'n ddifwng i gyda'r adeithio. Rwy'n dechrau a'r adeithio yn ei ddweud o'r adeithio yn anyfodol eu bwrdd sydd yn oed yn gweithio'r adeithio. Efallai bod rhaglen cyflete ichi gwybodol o'r adeithio yn angen yn dod i ddibwng o gynnig y teir Suche Ie ddweud yw'r adnod am yr adnod pwydau a'r adnodd gwiaithio'r adnod a'r adnodd gwiaithio ar y Cymru, gefynol'r adnodd y ffyrdd ddweud y ffyrdd yn ddiolch ar gyfer i ddweud. Ond mae gennym i'r wrthmod i'r adnodd lleol. Gofyn i'r adnodd lleol Pwydau, mae'r adnodd lleol ar gyfer anyrdd gyda'r ddweud. ac mae dyma i gynhyrch yn ddau llunio'r ddigon, ddau'r gweithio, ddau'r ddau'r gwybwys. Ond ydych chi, mae'n ddweud cangwch o'r ddau, a mae'n ddau'r gweithio. Felly rydyn ni'n ddau'r ddau. Dyn ni'n ddau'r ddau, mae'n ddau. Dyn ni'n ddau o'r ddau o'r ddau'r ddau'r ddau, o'r ddau'r ddau'r ddau. That's an idea. Now Hume, I think reasonably, thinks that this usage is too broad. And he suggests a different terminology. So he coins the term impression. And an impression is a sensation or a feeling. So for example, if I see the blue sky, I smell a flower, I feel angry. Those are impressions. And they are distinguished from ideas. And ideas are essentially thoughts. So if I think about the sky, that's an idea. As opposed to seeing it, which is an impression. Hume uses the term perception for anything which is either an impression or an idea. So where Locke had used the word idea for whatever is in the mind when a man thinks, Hume uses the term perception. Perception is a more general term. And you need to be a bit careful about that because it's quite natural for us to think of perception as meaning something like a sensation. But Hume is using it more generally. Impressions he divides into two kinds. Impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. So some impressions come directly from sensation. If you look at something yellow, you get the impression of yellow. But other impressions only come when you think or reflect on what's going on in your mind. So those are impressions of reflection. For example, I may think about something I desire. And then that impression of desire, that feeling, comes as a result of thinking about something else. So that's a secondary impression, an impression of reflection. Now when he talks about impressions of reflection, Hume tends to say that they are all passions or emotions. And incidentally, Hume isn't terribly consistent on this terminology. You might think when he says they're either passions or emotions, he must be drawing a distinction between passions and emotions. Unfortunately, sometimes when he writes about these things, he seems to be using the word passion and emotion equivalently. This is not the last time that we will find Hume using more than one word to mean apparently the same thing. And it can be confusing. But anyway, when he talks about impressions of reflection, he normally is thinking about what we would call feelings or desires. There's a little bit of a problem there, as we'll see later, because he seems to be leaving something out. Suppose, for example, that I suggest the notion of an argument or reasoning or belief. Those all look like the sorts of things that we are aware of going on in our minds. But they're not really feelings. They're not really desires. So there is a risk here that Hume's categorisation is a little bit narrow. He seems to be thinking on the model of sensation. Sensations straight forward enough. You see a colour, see the colour yellow, right, fine. That just impinges on my mind and I get that sensation. Now, a feeling is a bit like that. I feel hot. That's kind of halfway, isn't it? Halfway between a sensation and a feeling. Now, I feel angry. A bit more complicated because I'm feeling angry at something. But let's leave that aside. But once you talk about things like belief, that doesn't look like a feeling at all. But we'll see that sometimes Hume does talk about it as a feeling. And I think what's going on here is simply that he's got a rather impoverished view of the contents of the mind. He started out with this model of everything being a perception, either an impression or an idea. So when he gets something that is clearly not a sensation but looks like it's more than an idea, it's something that we're actually aware of, he shoehorns it into the box of internal impressions. So we'll come up against examples of that later. So what's the distinction between impressions and ideas? Well, in his official statements, as it were, Hume tends to give the impression, excuse the word, but the distinction between them is based purely on force and liveliness. All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the force and liveliness with which they strike upon the soul and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those which enter with most force and violence we may name impressions. Hume at least hints that things aren't always that simple. Sometimes our thoughts can be as vivid as our impressions. This example is inspired by my daughter. During the recent vacation, one night I was woken by a blood-curdling scream and it turned out that she was dreaming of being attacked by spiders, which for her would be about the worst thing that could possibly happen in the world. Now compare the force and vivacity of a thought like that with the force and vivacity of a sensation such as watching paint dry, which is more forceful and vivacious. So there seems to be a problem here. Hume is saying on the one hand that impressions are more lively than ideas, more forceful and vivacious. On the other hand if you compare impressions and ideas in detail it doesn't seem to hold up. A friend of Hume has put another similar problem to him and his text does show some awareness of this sort of issue. So sometimes he says things like this I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Everyone of himself will readily perceive the difference between feeling and thinking. Now that gives the impression that the difference between the two is not just a matter of force and vivacity. Essentially when he talks about impressions he's trying to capture feeling and sensation. When he talks about ideas he's trying to capture thinking and I think in general we understand best if we take this as the real basis of the distinction rather than force and vivacity. Now some of our ideas can be divided up into components. So for example suppose you see an apple and maybe you give it a smell, maybe you taste it and all these different components of the apple impression can be divided up. So when you sense an apple you have a complex impression but you can divide it up into simpler parts. We'll be seeing quite a lot more about that next week. Notice that the shape of an apple is itself complex. You've got the round bit, maybe you've got the stalk and again each of those can be divided up further. Having divided up our ideas into simpler parts we can put those parts together in different ways. So for example we can take the idea of gold and a mountain put those together, get the idea of a golden mountain. The idea of a horse and a horn, put those together we get the idea of a unicorn. And we can invent all sorts of strange imaginary things like a ban apple, the shape of a banana, the taste of an apple. I'd be surprised if it turned out to be one but I can imagine what it would be like to taste the banana and it turns out to taste like an apple. So I've got the complex impression of a banana most of which is copied from here and then I add to it an impression that I've got from elsewhere. He divides all ideas and impressions into simple and complex. He suggests that if we do this business of dividing up our ideas into simpler parts if we carry on doing that eventually we'll come to ideas or impressions that are perfectly simple. This is not uncontroversial. If you actually imagine trying to do it in practice it becomes very tricky. And we'll see that Hume's view of how it should be done or what it implies has quite profound implications next week. As any rate he thinks in the treatise at least that this can be done. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these and may be distinguished into parts. Interestingly in the enquiry he seems less committed to this. He does talk a little bit about simpler or more complex ideas but he doesn't seem to be so convinced that all ideas are either simple or complex and I'll be suggesting a reason for that. Back to the origin of ideas. LOX essay. The whole of the book one of LOX essay is devoted to arguing against innate ideas and principles. Here his target is clearly people like Descartes. Descartes wanted to argue that we have an innate idea of God and an innate idea of extension. LOX wants to say against that that all of our ideas are derived from experience. And the bulk of the essay or at least a major part of it is in book two. Book two is the part probably where you're likely to study most if you study LOX. What he's doing there is explaining how all the various ideas that we have can be explained as coming from experience. Many myself included actually think you're probably better off without book one of LOX essay. The real work is done in book two. If all our ideas can be explained as coming from experience then the notion that any of them are innate just falls out as redundant. If you can give a good explanation for the origin of all our ideas which explains their nature and how we get them and when we don't get them and so forth. We have then a good psychological account of what's going on and there's no need to postulate any innate ideas. Incidentally just in passing this distinction between those who think there are innate ideas and those who deny it is probably the biggest distinction between those who are commonly classed as rationalists and those who are commonly classed as empiricists within that period. Personally I think it's a very misleading distinction but if you want a basis for it this would be the main basis. In general trying to categorise philosophers in this way is not terribly helpful and if you look at somebody like Malabranche who's a follower of Descartes in many ways classed as a rationalist look at Barclay who is one of the paradigm empiricists you'll find that they're much closer together than almost any other pairing and yet they're cast on different sides of this divide. But in this respect when it comes to idea empiricism that is our ideas innate or do they come from experience here Locke and Hume are definitely on the empiricist side and Hume presents this copy principle as the first principle of his philosophy. All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent. Now that's a pretty big claim and he's making that claim in the very first section of the treatise. Seventh paragraph. That's quite striking. I think part of the explanation why Hume goes to this so quickly is it is at that point a pretty orthodox opinion. Most people are Lockeans. Most of Hume's audience will be taking Locke as the orthodox position not the discredited data for various reasons. At the inquiry Hume actually puts in a footnote saying basically that this doctrine that all ideas are derived from impressions is essentially a clarification of what Locke was saying. Those who deny innate ideas this seems to be what they're saying that really all our ideas come from impressions. Just to clarify this a little bit I mean suppose somebody were to say that anger is not innate that seems a little bit odd. It is very very natural in certain circumstances for anger to arise or fear sir. You stand at the end of a precipice what could be more natural than to feel fear. Possibly we have innate fear of spiders and snakes. So it seems rather strange to deny that our impressions our feelings have an innate character to them. So what Hume's saying is Locke wouldn't have had any problem with that the real essence of Locke's thinking when he says that all our ideas derived from experience is that all our ideas in Hume's sense are derived from impressions. So when we sense something when we feel something that can give rise to an idea which we can then use for thinking and that Hume thinks greatly clarifies Locke's in Pyrrhus's doctrine. Now this is quite famous as the copy principle particularly because of the enquiry actually. There's a bit of an irony here Hume doesn't use it much in the enquiry but on the other hand he makes a lot of noise about it. So we get this famous passage when we entertain therefore any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea as is but too frequent we need but enquire what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any this will serve to confirm our suspicion. So it looks like what Hume's going to do armed with the copy principle all ideas are derived from impressions these philosophers come out with these supposed ideas I Hume am going to show that this idea cannot be derived from any impression therefore it's bogus that looks like he's going to do that in practice he doesn't in practice it's actually rather hard to find clear examples of him doing that he employs the copy principle a lot in the treatise but actually it's nearly always to clarify our ideas not to say that there is no such idea So for example I'm the most famous case of this is the idea of necessary connection and Hume does not say we have no idea of necessity not at all he actually traces what he takes to be the impression of that idea and he thus actually vindicates the idea he says there you are that's the origin of the idea now we can see its nature again take the idea of substance Hume is commonly thought to have dismissed the idea of substance on these sorts of grounds but if you actually look at the text it's not so clear at all what he says is we have no idea of substance distinct from the collection of properties now does that mean there is no idea of substance or does it mean the idea of substance just is the idea of a collection of properties yeah this can be controversial but there aren't that many clear cases where Hume says this is a completely bogus idea I think essence and substantial form are probably the clearest at any rate it looks as though from this very forthright statement in the enquiry he's going to be using a copy principle as an aggressive weapon what basis does he have for that well he gets two arguments for the copy principle both in the treaties and the enquiry he seems to be pretty consistent on this first of all he says there are no counter examples go on look at all your ideas can you see any for which there's not a corresponding impression well maybe you've got the idea of a unicorn that had no corresponding impression you've never seen a unicorn but the idea of a unicorn is made up of simpler ideas which are derived from experience okay so have you got any simple ideas that are not derived from impressions that are not copied from impressions I bet you haven't you can't produce any can you no nor can I there we are that's a good argument moreover not only do we find that there's this correspondence between simple ideas and simple impressions the impressions always come first they must be the cause of the ideas then not the other way round second argument for the copy principle is that if you take someone who doesn't have the appropriate senses who have no means of getting the relevant impressions we find they don't have the ideas either so someone who's blind has no visual ideas if you've never tasted pineapple quite an exotic fruit in that time of course you don't necessarily have tasted pineapple you can't form any idea of the taste of pineapple so there we are no impression, no corresponding idea these arguments aren't actually that strong I think amongst the arguments that make it into the inquiry these are probably the weakest and that's a bit of a puzzle why are they so weak or why just do you not see the weakness and I suspect it's because again we have the locky and orthodoxy more or less all philosophers in Britain at that time seem to have accepted the doctrine that our ideas are derived from experience locks essay have been extremely influential when Thomas Reid later 1764 wrote his inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense attacking Hume he saw himself as fighting against a tradition which accepted the theory of ideas and in particular this part of it so maybe Hume was a little bit too complacent about that first argument look at your simple ideas you can't find any of them that doesn't have a corresponding simple impression can you? yes well which one? essence no that's bogus idea that's a bogus idea because it doesn't have a corresponding impression hang on Hume you challenged me to produce an idea which didn't have a corresponding impression I've done that, essence and now you're saying it isn't a legitimate idea because it doesn't have a corresponding impression you're just begging the question so actually that argument just doesn't look like a strong argument it's no good throwing a challenge to people if immediately they rise to the challenge you're just going to dismiss it on the grounds of the principle that you're arguing for what about the second argument? well okay it's plausible isn't it it's plausible that a blind man who's never seen red has no idea of red it's plausible but how do we know? how could you possibly know? you go to the blind man and you say have you had an idea of red? what? an idea of what? red oh I don't know what that word means I've had all sorts of ideas goodness knows what one you're talking about how do you communicate with that person how do you find out whether they have or haven't had an idea of red? there's another problem here too suppose a blind man dreams in red maybe they do they have a dream which includes some kind of red sensation is this ever so much like Hume's just going to say oh well that's an impression not an idea because that's what gives them the idea so the first time the red appears in their dream it's their mind creating an impression would he say that? I don't know but it looks like his arguments really are pretty unsatisfactory certainly the very cursory way in which he presents them is nothing like sufficient to establish them now some authors, Jonathan Bennett in particular suggests that what's going on here is something different from what appears on the surface Hume presents this as a sort of empirical hypothesis that our ideas are derived from impressions here's some experimental evidence for it Bennett suggests the arguments are so poor actually we ought to read him as doing something different think back to the blind man where you say to him have you got an idea of red and he says I've no idea what you're talking about precisely you cannot understand the word red because you cannot tie it in with your experience so no matter what's going on in your mind the idea of red as in the meaning of the word red is something that's unknown to you so it does look quite suggestive here in the light of 20th century logical empiricism and so on it looks quite tempting to interpret Hume's arguments here as to do with meaningfulness of terms rather than the occurrence of ideas in the mind now I'm not going to adopt that view it's interesting but there's a lot of controversy here Don Garrett in his book I gave a citation of that defends Hume on this and it's an open question to what extent he can be defended the problems don't end there immediately after he's presented his arguments to the copy principle Hume gives a counter example that's very strange he said all our ideas are derived from impressions oh hang on here's an exception and the exception is the famous missing shade of blue so the way this goes is you imagine somebody who's encountered lots and lots of shades of blue during their life and you imagine all of these shades of blue put in a spectrum from the darkest to the lightest except there's one missing there's one shade of blue that he's never encountered and there's this little gap in the spectrum and Hume asks could he fill that gap would he be able to form an idea of blue intermediate between the two sides of the gap and Hume suggests yes he probably could there's this little exception never mind let's leave that aside and go on that seems a slightly strange way of proceeding I mean again I think here actually it's easier to defend Hume but I think we can see little chinks opening in his armour how would you defend Hume what would you say about this well I think the most obvious thing to say is something like this look this isn't really a serious problem I mean if what you want to say that all the materials of our thought are derived from experience which seems to be the gist of what Hume and Locke's empiricism amounts to then this particular idea is derived from experience it's derived from mixing ideas if you like merging ideas which are themselves copied from impressions so where's the problem well the problem actually comes in Hume's account of simplicity and complexity the problem is that those two ideas on each side of the gap those simple images of blue slightly different blues are both supposed to be simple ideas so if you merge them what you get must be a complex idea but hang on a second that idea surely is just as simple as the others they're just different shades of blue so actually I think it's quite easy to defend Hume if you're prepared to relax the simple complex distinction in the treatise at least Hume wants to hang on to the simple complex distinction but this kind of thing may be part of the pressure that seems to have made him less committed to it The theory of ideas informs a lot of what is going on both in Locke's philosophy and in Hume's the basic idea is roughly that thinking consists in having ideas or perceptions in Hume's sense in front of the mind and to distinguish between the different kinds of thinking essentially what one looks at is the objects the ideas you don't think in terms of mental activity so much as these ideas that are on the mental stage so seeing a tree is having an impression of the tree in front of the mind thinking of a tree involves having an idea in front of the mind feeling a pain is having an impression of pain and so on this is a very limited conception of human thinking particularly when you combine it with the copy principle because Hume's copy principle says that all our ideas are direct copies of impressions they're just fainter copies and if thinking just is a matter of having ideas in front of the mind then thinking is just like a fainter kind of perception so it looks like all thinking is essentially being reduced to perception and again we can see hints of that in Hume's use of the word perception for the general contents of the mind so we'll see that this leads to difficulties later on another thing that will be very important later on is Hume's theory of the association of ideas he introduces that in treatise 114 in other words book 1 part 1 section 4 and there he identifies three main principles of association so he wants to say that when we dream when we tell a story when we think of one thing followed by another typically our thoughts are led by these three relations either resemblance, contiguity in other words closeness in time and place or cause and effect and Hume is going to explain as we shall see later a lot of mental effects in terms of this association of ideas in particular Hume attributes the association of ideas with the formation of a lot of complex ideas and he points out that different languages have very similar complex ideas he suggests this is because there are natural associations of ideas which pull them together to form those complex ideas and we'll be going on later to see what he has to say about these different kinds of complex ideas I shall just end with a reference back to John Locke a very important difference between Hume and his predecessors is the positive role that Hume gives to the association of ideas and indeed Hume trumpets this in the abstract when he's talking about what he's done in the treatise notice the very strong contrast with John Locke John Locke wants to say that the association of ideas is a kind of madness something which leads our thoughts quite contrary to reason Hume as we'll see actually wants to explain a lot of our reason in terms of the association of ideas that's it for today, see you next week