 Today, I'm speaking about the topic of electoral cycles in macro-prudential regulation. And what I'm trying to address is the fact that when we think about how we can prevent future financial crises, people have spent a lot of time thinking about the kind of technical details, or should you be thinking about monetary policy or macro-prudential policy, what can we do to prevent these crises, and what are the nitty-gritty technical details? A lot less focus has been on the politics of actually implementing such policies. So when you think about macro-prudential policies, what people usually have in mind is something like tools that might cut off people that want to get a mortgage from actually getting that mortgage, especially if we think that those people might be particularly risky. But of course, those same people are also going to vote in elections. So obviously, for politicians, there might be a political economy constraint in actually implementing those types of policies. And so what I do is I look around the world at around 60 countries and 220 elections over a 15-year period. And what I find is that there's a very clear pattern in the data that in the run-up to those elections, so in the quarters immediately before elections, particularly when those elections are closed, so when the outcome of the election is unclear up front, you see that macro-prudential policies, especially those targeted at households, seem to be systematically looser. And so the kind of takeaway, I think, from my paper is that we have to think very carefully not only about the technical details of how we can prevent financial crises, but also what is actually implementable in a way that works with the politics.