 So to answer this question, we need to think about the different parts of Locke's theory and kind of, you know, put them in with the different parts of the allegory. Okay, so what about the shadows? What from the, what from the shadows and Locke's, excuse me, what from Locke's account of knowledge corresponds to the shadows? Well, the shadows and Plato's allegory represented appearances for Plato. What about for Locke? What would work? Well, this would be sensation, right? The sensation, sensation, this is one kind of idea, one source of ideas. Sensations are the same thing as appearances, right? So we know sensations and that's just like Plato's appearances. Okay, cool. One part down, let's look at the rest. The next part, like working our way up, would be the cutouts, right, the puppets. And in Plato's allegory, the puppets represent a particular object. So what from Locke's account does this, right? Well, we're moving away from sensation at this point because we've already got sensations in there. How do we know these particular objects? Or for Locke, this is the first act of the mind, right? You group these appearances, these sensations to a particular object, right? So this, by now, this is something you do just kind of automatically, you've had enough experiences where you just automatically group. So right now you're having a certain set of appearances that you're grouping to me, right? You're having a certain colors, you have certain sounds that you're grouping to me, right? And then the rest are grouped to these other things, okay? So you already automatically, by this point, you automatically group sensations to in this first act of the mind to a particular object. This is something you've, by the way, you've had to learn how to do. And it's still kind of a mystery as to how we do it. We don't exactly know how we actually do this. It happens around a year and a half, I believe it's something like that. So this is the first act of the mind. This is knowledge of particular objects for Locke and that corresponds to knowledge of the particular objects according to Plato. Okay, so far so good. We've got shadows. We've got the cutouts. We've got appearances, sensation, and we've got knowledge of particular objects. This is the first act of the mind. Now let's move on to form. So we're leaving the cave and we're going to the solid objects outside. And for Plato, this represented knowledge of the forms, right? So what in Locke's account is going to do this? Well, we've already had the first act of the mind. So that's the, that's grouping the appearances to the particular object. The next two acts of the mind do the job of knowledge of the forms, right? These universals. So we still, and Locke still wants to say we know universals. We know these forms through experiences. Okay, so I've got the sensations, already have that. I've grouped it to a particular object. And remember the second act of the mind is comparison. So we're looking at very different objects or different objects, different substances to see how they're similar and to see how they're different. The third act of the mind is to abstract away from the particular objects and to abstract away those appear, those are similarities and those differences. Cool. This is how we know form, according to Locke. This is what's going to give us our abstractions, right? So how does this work? Well, suppose we have these two objects here, or these two apples, or we can have three apples, we can have four apples. So we take these apples and we compare them to each other, right? We look at their color, we look at their size, we look at the structure. Maybe we chop open apples to see the seeds that are in there. We look at the flesh of the apples. We put together the similarities and their differences. And we can even add other kinds of fruits. So we add in oranges, we can add in grapes or bananas. So we look at all these different fruits, we compare them to each other to find their similarities and to find their differences. So just taking away the apples, we have the similarities. Well, the third act is to take, to abstract away from those similarities. And then that process of abstraction, that's how we get the form. And we can even still do genus and species using, maybe following Aristotle, we can do genus and species to have our form of apple. Think about it with, we use our kind of classic example of chairs, right? So we have chairs. We have chairs with four legs. We have chairs with less than four legs. We have chairs maybe even with no legs, right? We compare chairs to other pieces of furniture to find the similarities and find the differences. And then we come up with the idea, it's like, okay, what does, then we say that the genus of chair is furniture, all right? And what makes furniture different from other, excuse me, what makes chair different from other pieces of furniture? Well, this is when we have our, we compile our similarities and our differences and we say, well, sometimes it has arms, sometimes it doesn't. So that's not going to do it. But chairs, when we look at how they're different from couches and, or look at, excuse me, different from other pieces of furniture, what are you supposed to sit on chairs? Then we compare to other things that you sit on, we got couches and love seats, like only for one person to sit. And there's other, still more pieces of furniture for only one person to sit. This is stools, but chairs always have a back. They don't necessarily have arms. So then we do all that to get our, our form of chairs, a piece of furniture with the back for one person to sit. Okay. And that's how we abstract away. So for form, for the solid objects outside using Plato's allegory, we know form through the second and the third act of the mind, right? Through preparing similarity, through comparisons to find similar and dissimilar, and then to abstract away those comparisons to, you know, kind of to have the form. Okay. Well, so we've got the shadows, we got the puppets, we got the solid objects outside. This gives us sensation for the shadows. And we've got the first, the second and the third acts of the mind for the particular objects, and then for form. But what about the sun? What about the good, the true and the beautiful? Now, if you looked at, if you look at Locke's account here, he doesn't try to give an account of truth in general, of being in general. In fact, again, I don't want to forecast too far ahead, but he says that we can't know the idea of substance, the idea, remember the knowledge of substance in general, I can know a particular substance, not a substance in general. All right. Well, knowing substance in general, be the same thing as knowing the sun. And Locke says, okay, that much I can't do. And you might say, well, hold on a second, you know, Locke didn't succeed, he didn't give us an account of knowledge that could do everything that Plato could do. And Locke here, I think, is just being honest. I mean, if we look at what Plato did, how did Plato give us an account of being in general and say, well, you know, is being? That's not an answer, right? That's just restated the word. It's existence. It's real. It's, okay, can you give me an account that's not just a synonym for the thing that we're trying to define, right? So, you know, we kind of dealt with this, we kind of talked about this already. It's not like Plato succeeded in giving an account of existence because he just says it's existence. So he didn't really succeed. And I think here, Locke's just being honest. All Locke promised to do was to give us an account as good as Plato's, and he probably did that. And, you know, at least so far, right? He didn't provide an account of the sun, but neither did Plato. He just said it's there. So, Locke, you know, at least so far, at least offensively so, he's given us everything, at least tried to give us an account of everything that Plato's account could do. And he says, but mine doesn't appeal to an innate idea.