 Okay so thank you very much for attending this debate which I'm sure will be a lively one in fact I can promise that on a very important issue which is whether our regulatory proposals have made reforms have made the financial sufficient financial system sufficiently resilient. Before we start I just awake one request you're going to need your smartphones for voting and things like that but we would rather not have calls in the middle so I would request that you put them on silent. So before we even start before I do anything that will pollute your your original views on this topic you're going to be asked to vote on the resolution that you have in front of it which is post crisis financial reforms have made the system sufficiently resilient and I think you're going to be explained I hope how you're going to go about the voting is this correct. Oh yes there is a magic channel which you have to go to the URL is there and you go on that and I presume if you it comes up with the possibility of voting I'm told it takes about two minutes so we're going to keep that going for about two minutes and we will find what you vote at the beginning and then we will take your vote at the end and we will see how your minds have been changed if at all. There was also been already a public vote on this but in order not to influence you in any way you will be told what the public votes view on this was at the end. I should remind you that this is on the record it's being webcast so everything you say if we come to it later will be known by everybody. Now secondly I want to introduce the panel very quickly we I'll do it from person immediately to my left off to further to my left so immediately to my left is Anartad Marti who is Professor of Finance and Economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business and has written a wonderful book on this topic called I think the bankers news close yes you will find her out her position if you don't know as the debate proceeds. Next to her is Pietro Carlo Paduan who is now Minister of Economics and Finance of Italy and before that was at the OECD I think that's correct and I've known for many years and next to him on his left this is likely Italian isn't it? Well that's not the worst thing is Mr. Andrea Inria who's Chairman of the European Banking Authority in London and finally to his left is Mr. Osrono's Chairman of the Board of Directors Credit Suisse Group in Switzerland and I don't think right here being here I need to explain what that is so the debate is about an incredibly important topic we have had obviously a huge crisis in 2007-08 and ongoing problems in Europe really very significant ones in the Eurozone a monumental government rescue I mean really staggering in its scale and depth and since then a whole host of very active and complex reform processes covering the capital of banks the liquidity of banks resolution processes for banks the structure of the financial system into the banking industry the the operation of the derivatives business trading more broadly and clearing houses and in addition and I this is not exhaustive also macro prudential the introduction of frameworks for macro prudential policy which are relatively formal and deliberate and the question we have is is this enough or as some people feel even too much so this is why we've got a very clear debate can we perhaps have the answer to the question now what where are we standing so it's a little bit more than 2 to 1 against you're all pretty happy with what's been done not all 2 to 1 2 of 2 3rds of you it's likely more than 2 3rds of you think that it's been okay so let's see how that I apologize sorry sorry I apologize 2 to 1 against I apologize I misread my own own own motion okay okay okay okay so 32 percent agree it's sufficiently resilient well that's funny because the way this is structured is quite a few of the speakers more of the speakers will be on the the minority position the majority position so the way we're going to proceed with it is each speaker will have the opportunity to speak for minutes or so I'm going to give the last speaker slightly more time because her position is really radically different I think and I think it's important that it be expressed so that's how we'll proceed we'll have a little discussion amongst ourselves and then opportunity for you to interject I am going to try if we've got enough time this isn't an experiment it may turn out to be very very foolish to allow you to express on one point a position on this resolution just but you have to do so very very briefly so you have to think that nobody may make her if we have get to Q&A a comment from all in about 20 seconds but you can make one point this is what I like or this is what I don't like otherwise it will be a normal questions and then a brief sum up at the end so that's how we will proceed and let me start if I may with Mr. Andrea so thank you very much and good afternoon I came this morning straight from the Asian financial forum in Hong Kong where a similar question was put to the audience two thousand five hundred market participants and the same percentage was there at the beginning and even worse at the end so bleak for regulators and actually it was coupled with another question on whether regulator reform is stifled growth and the answer was massively yes so we didn't do enough and we stifled growth so particularly I'll try to start then with a positive message but then I'll try to be very conditional in in my in my positive answer the positive message is that I look out to banks in particular because that's my job let's say what was needed was to strengthen the the banking sector strengthen the capital of the banking sector in particular Basel 3 moving that direction and most international banks now have comply with the Basel 3 fully loaded the requirements and at the end of 2011 there was a shortfall of approximately half a trillion euro so the capital strengthening that occurred has been significant has been significant also in Europe we at the EBA have done quite a lot in that direction the capital requirements have been coupled with the risk rate requirements have been coupled with the leverage ratio liquidity I mean harsher requirements for securitization and capital market activities derivatives I think that this is what we need we need sometimes the bank has argued that this is becoming too complex there are too many requirements I would argue that whenever we set a requirement there is of course a run for circumvention we need to have a belt embraces approach and try to have more requirements in place at the same time it is argued that this is stifled growth all the evidence I've seen is against this I mean banks with counties which have done the reforms more quickly are the counties which are growing faster and the banks which have stronger capital require stronger capital are the banks which are lending more into the economy which have gain market share and which have cheaper funding cost on the conditional side we would be I think wrong in saying that the job is done that we have that we have completely won the battle and that we can declare victory I think that there are at least two points on which there is still a big challenge in terms of implementation and calibration of the requirements the first one is is the to big to fail there were still quite far away from from the result and I think that the calibration of the requirements on a loss absorbing capacity will be quite key and when I mean quite key I want to say that it would be important to make it credible that also large institutions can be let fail without bailout we need to have conservative requirements for loss absorbing capacity and this should be in my view much more focused on equity than on that the second point is internal models that banks that the requirements are focused on internal models and risk weighted assets they need to be a risk based but still let's say there is a loss of confidence in these internal models and we need to fix that we are doing a lot of work in that direction we need to work in different along different strands transparency fixing the supervisory approaches a fix in the banking models we are we are quite committed to do in that but that will be also crucial to really restore credibility in the regulatory framework I will stop here thank you so it would be fair to summarize this is yes but but the conditions you brought are quite significant ones yes since they relate to both loss absorbing capacity and the viability of the internal models the risk weighting procedure very helpful if I may now turn to you mr. owner yes thank you and good afternoon everybody I would take a slightly more positive view in terms of what has been achieved so far I still have some buts as well towards the end but they may be a bit different from the ones that mr. and yeah I think that regulators can have identified strong policies to address systemic financial risks and reform agenda has in my opinion been effective in addressing the two key shortcomings that led to the 2007 financial crisis weak capital resilience and the obvious issue of too big to fail now the resilience let's look at those individually the resilience of banks has been seriously strengthened over the last couple of years capital requirements have gone up by multiple of the pre 2008 level five to ten times according to mr. Carney in addition regulators also in both America and Europe have added stress test very strenuous stress test some would say which had a new form of capital test and most often a very tough or tougher one in response to regulatory market pressures sometimes it's not just regulatory press because we had a long long period of time for phasing in but market pressure was such that banks had to restore restock capital for losses much quicker and added probably roughly a trillion to their equity base since the crisis model based risk calculations you have referred to that recently have been improved capital floors will be widely introduced to avoid the risk that risks are systematically underestimated and to ensure that the level of capital across the banking system does not fall below a certain level and stress tests that I said are used to size appropriate capital buffers for individual banks on based on their individual models that they are having which I think is a sensible approach moral hazard was addressed I think in the banking sector more has it was addressed I'm not sure it in a lot of sectors it was in the same manner addressed compensation is much more long-term oriented and clawbacks are introduced or malice provisions are exercised and I can tell you from our own experience in our company they're tough and they work conducts rules generally have been toughened and have been toughened much more even in the most recent past and are enforced and they detailed recovery and resolution plans have been introduced are maintained and have to be up kept as we go along bailing which will be accomplished through the implementation of the standard for total loss of the agency capital better known as T-LAC is now sort of the last missing piece according to the FSB there is still a debate going on on the precise calibration I think it we have always been very positive and in favor of action of T-LAC and of bailing for a long time I think it's a sensible way to address the issue so if I were to to look we have seen a paradigm shift on two fronts we have made banks more resilient with much more equity and we have a backup plan in case this is insufficient one that maintains critical functions in place for the real economy even if a bank fails that's done via on the one hand bailing and on the other hand on the other hand via resolution plans and sometimes also organizational restructuring of of banking organizations as it is currently happening in Switzerland but also in other countries where you know basically most banks or many banks move more much more towards a holding concept model I think this provides a much more resilient financial sector to support the economy and also ensures that banks are held responsible for their own mistakes just like any other company in the economy which in my opinion that was the biggest shortcoming that's something which effectively everybody had probably also here on the panel to subscribe to we have to effectively deal with now while these core reforms have been successful they are not fully implemented we are still I mean I would say in some instances on the way to doing that even though you know it's by and large clear where you have to go to there are couple of things I would like to mention that are my buts one is regulated some regulators are pursuing a so-called reforms based on national and product ring fencing I think if you do that across a global financial system I don't think that's the right solution for the system it makes it much more even more difficult more complex and I would argue as a result of the misalignment of some of the of the regulations that would eventually have from that so complex that I think the operational costs and the associated risks will increase with the result that you will probably not achieve fully what you had in mind namely to make the system more resilient I think the fixed income sector in particular is suffering from some post crisis overreaction in my opinion some of the changes have been really punitive we have reduced our fixed income sector by more than 50% but lack of market making can make markets more volatile less liquid and that's dangerous if you want to want resilient market based financing going forward and as I said intensive regulatory supervision has a lot of benefits but if you have to deal with different regulators and supervisors across the globe on the same topic in different fashion then I don't think this is what we ultimately want to get to and I would say the biggest shortcoming to this effect is the fact that we do not still not have a I would say a new a new universally accepted system for resolution or for mutual acceptance of resolution systems across the globe we have fundamental principles the FSB has come up with those and by and large we all go into a similar direction but the ultimate litmus test is that you know we have systems in place among at least the global the global syphies and the respective jurisdictions that irrespective as to where a crisis is to occur you have a system in place that will work and will work also I think over a short period of time it's achievable it's doable I think a lot of the things we have been doing in terms of single point of entry doctrine in terms of restructuring the organizational structures and so forth and bailing will help to this effect but you have to make sure that some sort of distrust that I see sometimes between different national regulators or or some jurisdictional issues can be appropriately resolved to to finally deal with that issue that's I would stop here thank you very much that's wonderfully clear and and helpful in framing the debate and position and introduces another set of really important issues with which is the relationship between us it were global institutions and national regulation broadly defined and how that works so the third speaker it is you Mr. Padau thank you Martin and good afternoon to everybody I guess I put myself in the camp of yes but as well which means it's a conditional yes conditional upon three main points first of all that we're actually looking at a process and not just a standstill point an equilibrium point and this process still ongoing second that this process is very much uneven across countries regions and sectors of the of the industry and third that my understanding of financial sector reform after a major financial crisis is that it has to do with two interconnected yet different elements one is repairing the financial system and the other one is redesigning the financial architecture sometimes we tend to mix these two things but the two things of course go hand-in-hand and the complication from the point of view the policymaker is to try to to distinguish these and take the right actions you will excuse me also given my current occupation I take a more macro perspective to this and I say that the answer to that question depends on which on very much in which macro environment you're standing and from my point of view if I look back at say five to two to six years back and I look at say European experience vis-a-vis the American experience I noticed another thing that the impact of success of financial sector repair and financial reform also depends on other policy areas including the way they're sequenced let me give you the obvious example if you take the US and you take the Euro area not just the EU but the Euro area then and if you ask the question what was done first was it financial sector repair or fiscal adjustment then the answer is exactly the opposite in the two regions this has produced a huge difference in terms of outcome of any financial sector repair you might do the exercise pardon me I'm an academic by training so I tend to be very abstract but imagine that you introduce the same financial sector measures the two regions but you change the sequencing then you have very different results in terms of how much resilient is your system at the end of the process and what does it deliver in terms of growth and jobs which is ultimately my preoccupation so in assessing one this this should be taken into account second point and here since time is running fast let me concentrate on Europe again I think we are very much looking especially in the Euro area at the interaction between financial sector repair and changing the architecture of the system in the Euro area what I have in mind is the struggle to have the banking sector back into normal functioning and this may have very different implications in different countries in the Euro area and at the same time improving the way the European and the Euro financial system not the banking system alone financial system operates so we have we have as policymakers have a task to do both and we have to do both things at the time when growth is lagging or lacking or simply absent final point policymakers have to keep this interaction in mind when they design and implement reforms they have to talk closely although keeping their independence with people responsible for macro policies because the ultimate success of the introduction of measures has to do also with the as I said with the macro economic impact my last point is where do we go from here especially in Europe well we have I think to look hard at how the division of labor between national action to regulate deregulate or repair the system go hand in hand with the European level countries still have a lot to say and lot to do in terms of improving their financial system in Europe let me put you with a piece of advertisement the Italian government yesterday approved a major banking reform which has now to be approved by Parliament I hope they will do that this of course has a lot to do in in in the way in which the Italian financial system will integrate with a rapidly changing European financial system so one challenge I had and this is my last point is that we have to think hard how national regulators national policymakers and European regulators and European policymakers interact in shaping the future of the European financial system while at the same time we finally complete the repair the repair of the financial system thank you Matt just ask one follow-up question to make sure that I understand it you were contrasting as crucial as I understood it the fact that in your view the US fixed the financial sector first and did fiscal consolidation later while the eurozone did it the other other way around would it be your view that with the measures that it's not quite clear to me that with the measures that have now been taken banking union asset quality review etc stress test that the eurozone has now caught up has now caught up but it finds itself at a much more disappointing growth environment that would have been resulted from a different sequencing because essentially of about four or five years delay well let me put it differently if you have a policy tool it be at monetary policy or fiscal policy the impact of that depends on how strong the stimulus is but also on the transmission and the transmission depends on how well the financial system operates okay this is the point and not your response thank you what has been said well I'm going to probably good afternoon everybody I'm probably going to take a bit of all the buts that were said here and add a little bit more so to the question of this panel whether the system is sufficiently resilient I strongly object to the statement I'm glad two-thirds of your almost two-thirds of you come in this way I hope to convince even more of you that that's the case because it's not just that it's not sufficiently resilient it's not resilient by any measure in fact it's incredibly fragile and that is not to say that you might find measures under which it somehow better than some other time I actually don't think it's that much better as a whole than than it was before by some measures it's it's potentially even worse so too big to fail was mentioned so let me start there there are about 28 global CIFI systemically important financial institution most of them have are much larger now than they were in 2006 so just keep that in mind they are very large by any standard just about the most the largest and the most complex corporations you can find anywhere so Mark Carney head of governor of Bank of England head of financial stability board recently declared the problem majorly solved somehow in Brisbane so and I'm glad that the resolution planning was brought up because I was going to comment on that as well so the FSB document from October 2014 and is entitled key attributes to effective resolution regimes of financial institutions a date by the way is 60 years more than six years after the Lehman brothers bankruptcy 16 years since LTCM the hedge fund and 40 years after continental Illinois all of which showed already the issue of contagion across border and the challenge of resolution and so here's what it takes us to come to just key attributes now there's the issue that it tries to tackle which I don't want to go too much into when do you start resolution who is going to decide that CIFI is non viable that point is too late fragilities will start way before that and this system is so interconnected that one of those CIFIs even suspicious of failing is going to either trigger or be accompanied by more failures there is no way there's no collateral damage from that process in the best of all cases but to see how far we are from a scenario here let me just give you a few stats on that document the word should appears 406 times in this document and sometimes the should is a list of 12 things that should happen so it's a big wish list of should think should be things in other words that I mentioned very extensively to do with information authority legal law power coordination cooperation all of those things I urge you to look at that document and just remember the financial stability board has no power of enforcement at all so all of these are just friendly suggestions to to to the members so I asked the panelists here just how many of these shoulds are actually in place how close are we to to any number of these many many many shoulds that should happen to get here let me give you the IMF's answer from just recently the summary sentence as yet orderly resolution of systemic cross-border banks is not a feasible option and then there's more statements about the need for political willingness to act incentives for corporations a week achieving progress is proving challenging so it's been a long time and I don't see any end in sight to this so I would argue that progress and resolution is way way far away from being sufficient so basically if you argue that the system is resilient or certainly sufficiently resilient you better hope that we're not getting to that point where we need that that resolution that's so so elusive so what's gonna protect us from that point of failure supposedly these tough capital requirements were told well I have a very dim view of those requirements and Andrea touched on a couple of points and I'll just be stronger on that the risk weights have been a source of more fragility and more interconnectedness because of a number of design flaws that manifested themselves measures of capital to risk-weighted assets have not been predictive of financial health or resiliency at all and there have been studies on that it's not just the manipulability it's the fact that they create concentrations on assets that regulations give very low risk weights for and other things so that system is bad and even when you go to leverage ratios which I favor more except not at these ridiculous levels they too are based on accounting numbers cannot be trusted do not give appropriate warnings of financial health so I'm not under any illusion that these capital requirements are going to help us even worse and that was also mentioned by by mr. Andrea they repeat again mistakes from the past which want to rely on non-equity substitutes call them the name that the jargon of the day cocos G lax or T lax or bailing all of those things that are basically debt instruments that magically in some scenario again in resolution or some other time will magically be there to absorb losses well our experience has been grim and that's the most frustrating thing about it we should know better than to trust these things because all the regulatory capital in Basel to that was there to absorb losses actually did not absorb losses so it just didn't work it didn't work memoir understanding nothing worked that was in place except equity and plain equity so I see the look okay I just want to mention a couple more things quickly derivatives so no capital makes sense given where we are on derivatives markets that's an incredible source of risk and opacity that's also a source of a lot of fragility in the system on derivatives one of the things that is harmful is bankruptcy codes like the one we have in the US which give preferential treatment to repose and derivatives allowing the counterparties to step ahead of every other creditor including depositors this is a huge flaw but it's not been revisited in other words there are a number of other areas I would summarize reform efforts as unfocused sometimes too much on some issues that are not relevant to the crisis and then too little on the things that really matter and then they failed to learn obvious lessons that really should know better than to be here so I'm particularly alarmed and I'm glad that there was all the buts here if policy makers congratulate themselves and believe that that we've done enough because it's very very far from the truth unfortunately so millions of people are suffering from the failures of previous regulation and I really urge those who can do it to do the obvious things and I have very specific suggestions here that can be done right away such as anybody who can't fail must not make any payouts to equity and in fact must raise equity in markets which is what they would have had to do if they had normal creditors and they were subject to normal market discipline thank you very much so we've had three yes buts and a no I don't know how that adds up actually it's an interesting a quantification you're going to have to decide that at the end but I think an art has raised some quite important questions and since it's a discussion as much as a formal debate I'd like to pursue them at least the three that we've she's raised and we and one of perhaps one or two others very briefly so I'd like to start if I may with you Mr. Rona because she made a very strong statement but she cited a an IMF saying that orderly resolution of systemically important cross-border banks is if I don't remember what the adjective is unworkable not not a feasible option not a feasible option unworkable but the same thing well you run what is certainly a G Siffy so do you agree with that statement or not would a cross-border resolution of credit Suisse be feasible well let me let me give you the Swiss answer to the proposition which is a bit different different different than what you just asked me I think in if the system the way it's designed if it's implemented up my I would I'm convinced that it's a workable system that would actually do away with the issue of of governments having to step in to resolve banks it's doable in Switzerland and that's contrary to what Mr. de Maarty said before and I don't know who gave that quote but it's certainly not somebody another Swiss legislator who did that we were relatively quick for once in Switzerland with adopting new regulation after the financial crisis we didn't have not did not have some of the difficulties that the eurozone had in terms of economic environment as such but we had one big bank that had to be bailed out and we obviously have two big banks that in comparison to the GDP are very large has no doubt about that so there was a was an expert commission was set up immediately I came up with a proposal that was then put into law and I may be a bit biased because I was one of the members of that committee although I was a minority member as you can imagine being a representative of a big bank he came up with a system that was based on based on two or three principles higher capital rules we would have additional buffers in terms of loss absorbing capital that is not strict equity but so-called contractual cocos convertible securities now this is not something which is new I mean we have had convertible securities for I know how many how many years and quite frankly it's also not new that banks can actually be resolved the FDIC actually does that now for many years things they have a very good system in place to do that at least according to what they say so we have high capital rules at the time when we agreed to it I must say that now I was criticized quite heavily by colleagues foreign colleagues that are you mad to agree to 10% CET one plus 3% high triggering cocos plus low triggering cocos so we have different categories with different attachment points and because there was at the time at least some legal issues as to who would actually decide when those cocos would trigger you had to have an objective measurement to do that because you didn't want to have just one regular way to do it over another because that could have created in an incomplete international environment could have created some havoc that coupled with a resolution planning with I would say additional organizational measures that were clearly incentivized gave a system that we felt was a very solid one we implemented it we now had done a relook of that system just recently with another expert commission it's part of the of the of how the law was set up I have come to the conclusion that you know they may we may have to do some additional changes to that in certain respects one issue that is currently debated is the issue of house house what how the leverage ratio should be precisely defined what goes in what instruments is it own is it common equity is it actually T1 instruments and then what what does T like bring but the basic principle of a combination of strong equity and bail in able that is what I think this consensus also in Switzerland that the system that is work that works now the big problem that I see or the problem that I see is it the system will still have some ramifications for being incomplete as long as we do not have an international alignment on how that on on on I would say mutual acceptance of different systems there I would say that the paper that you ridiculed a little bit actually does some help because if you have common standards it facilitates of course mutual acceptance of of any real systems and that will create in the end a safer global system but that is that is where we are coming from we are convinced that that's the right way to address the issue but isn't this a bit perhaps a good ass Mr. and Ria this it sort of sounds to me as an outsider sort of bit of you know if wishes were horses we could all right I mean the the conditions under which you could have a coordinated bankruptcy or resolution process for a major institution that is operating in many jurisdictions simultaneously all of which continue to have different laws in this area which they protect quite zealously those conditions aren't realistic are they they're certainly not where we are now what do you think Mr. even let's leave aside the transatlantic problems even within Europe have we got to that point well let me let me try to give a more optimistic picture here let's say first of all we have the bank recovery resolution directive in Europe so we are for the first time a common let's say legislative framework for a government resolution which changes the the resolution legislation in all countries in let's say now 19 countries out of 28 we have a single resolution authority and the single supervisor we should of course help in in achieving a much a much stronger in interconnection of resolution processes actually everything is built to be able to interconnect let's say the resolution system across country it is difficult in my view if you if you ask me what I would have liked in this field I would have liked to be much more ambitious I think that after a crisis like this I would have liked to have international treaties a strong legal basis to cross-border resolution for reasons that of course are evident to everybody that was not possible but let's say in terms of the regulatory dialogue we have with our colleagues again the key attributes is true they are not legally binding it's plenty of shoot and it all depends on on national implementation still let's say for instance when I have my dialogue when I go outside Europe I was mentioning I was in Hong Kong the previous days what do we do we discuss with our fellow regulators where are you with implementation of the key attributes what do you have in place and the the the point is is that if you don't have trust on the fact that you can resolve a bank what we really do is reinforcing what we have seen during the crisis is that local authorities reinforce the banks as for more capital and liquidity locally and they don't allow this capital and liquidity to move so in a sense the challenge will be to have this setting to move forward to restore this trust between home and those supervisors to allow let's say relying on each other and to make sure that if there are losses in a jurisdiction they can be escalated to the parent company and capital will be forthcoming if this will not be the case we'll have a much more segmented global market and the European market going forward so we are definitely working in Europe and with our fellow regulators outside Europe to make this happen it's a difficult challenge it's a difficult challenge because it's legislation in most cases I think this leads us very naturally to a question to Mr. Hadoan because you are you're here as a national minister and essentially what you're being told by the paraphrasing pops a little provocatively is that if only the governments were prepared to give up all these ridiculous residual sovereignty claims and cooperate in creating a fully functioning global regulatory and legal system then we could operate our global financial system with little problems that's more wishes were horses I mean my sense is that governments really rather care about how their financial systems are regulated managed and dealt with if they fail would you accept that you know national governments are in some fundamental way at fault here and if they if it you do accept it is there actually any realistic solution to that problem I think let me go back to my initial point this is again part of the process which however does not involve only interaction between different national jurisdictions it mostly involves a dialogue between national jurisdictions and European jurisdictions to be or at least your European approaches to problems that so far have been dealt on a national basis both in terms of redesigning the national system resolution mechanism and so forth of course now we have in the year in Europe some European institutions that have the mandate to develop a European not only set of rules but approach to dealing with banking resolution let's face it resolve in a bank can rely on very specific rules toolboxes and all the but of course it also always involves some judgment so we need to develop in Europe at least a common approach to how we deal with these things and starting from different national traditions different national systems and different national set of regulations as I just said countries still have a lot of homework to move their national regulations towards a more comprehensive European approach so we need to work on the implementation of the grand design of a banking union which includes a single resolution mechanism singles supervision mechanism so that we make it operational and this involves both the ECB and its supervisory arm but also Europe meaning by Europe Brussels and the Commission and competition rules and so forth so we have a lot of work to do to move towards that common view and this is why this is I don't know whether this is a horse or whatever you mentioned but this is certainly a state of mind that in my experience needs to be strengthened and so far we I haven't I understood that we could do more otherwise we may find ourselves stuck in different approaches between different national regulators and European regulators live different European authorities we have to to move towards that way and since we're doing it getting out of a crisis let's do it in a way that also benefits growth so that we can implement more easily those those rules that would be my plea you've got a minute to express how far you've been persuaded by these answers and then I will ask nice words and there's we're nowhere nowhere and I'm involved in the FDAC effort in the closest I've seen is the UK US understandings and even there there isn't a symmetry in terms of single point of entry we're nowhere if we had ours we could go through the hundreds of issues that require legal changes in many countries that are nowhere in the hopes to achieve anytime soon I'm going to allow you to participate the rules as follows you can please if you asked you to make to to speak say who you are ask a question if you want to make a point you have 20 seconds and I will be rude because there isn't much time and therefore focused on just one narrow issue and to give the opportunity to people to respond in the last few minutes so and I will take quite a number of questions or points together and that sort of decide how to allocate them so does anybody want to to inject interject yes please this gentleman say who you are and Banka if is is there a level of capital at which you you think that the system is safe I will come to that in a moment so that's a very good question and we will move to it next anybody else want to ask a question you are speechless ah no gentlemen over there sorry Alex Smith and Reuters should the banks now be broken up okay okay should banks be broken up this gentleman here wonderfully short questions I love them to chairman ronor perhaps minister pardon is there anything in the system today coming off Bulgarian Arctic Institute is there anything what justifies leading by surprise in the regulatory system particularly the last week's events if you are afraid to criticize the Swiss Bank please pass the positive minister are you talking about exchange rate management possibly I mean by surprise in the regulatory system including taking case okay I was a little stretching it but we will see how we do on that one this lady over here on the right please Sylvie Matérat de Chebanck by focusing very much on the resolution and with the risk of handing with too much fragmentation don't you think we miss the main point that for banks to be safe which would be allowed to have good risk diversification mainly we should die safely but we need to leave first okay that's a directly linked to the the broken that should banks be broken up issue yes okay that's very good we're doing very very well this gentleman here it's Richard Eger from ICV news and professor I might see I've read your book it's very simple why do you think that the gentleman to your right don't agree with you left my right sorry okay anybody a gentleman over there wences Casares from suppo what do you guys think of narrow banking okay I think I've got enough questions to keep us going for a while I'm going to start with should banks be broken up which I can tie with the question of isn't there immense advantage to risk diversification so why banks should not be broken up if you want to in that context since it obviously implies a break up you could also consider narrow banking I think those two three questions actually fit together very very well I'm going to start I'm going to start on those linked questions break up diversification narrow banking with you mr. owner if I may should you have been broken up well you wouldn't it wouldn't be surprised to hear me say yeah but the office question is why not because I think I mean risk diversification being one one crucial element I think that's and you could prove that also empirically I think it makes much more sense that do to have the risk well diversified in breaking up banks will not do anything to make the system safer and if you look at when you can actually even go back to 2008 and you look which banks have failed some of them actually were fairly focused banks they cannot rock as an example or others that had very little to do with basically either the size or particular particular businesses that were in that actually the the problems that face that that you know came up were sped around in many different segments of banking but interesting enough not typically at universal banks that had fairly diverse diversified risks there were three fairly large diversified universal banks that were very very large that didn't have to be rescued and you actually mentioned one of them one of them was in my country and one of them is the US so it wouldn't be safe to say the diversified and gigantic universal banks are completely risk-free and if they do fail the costs are rather large of course and but nobody would argue that that banking as such is a is a risk-free business per se I mean risk management is is a cardinal thing of running a bank that's part of what banks do and what what their resume that way is does anyone here want to argue in favor of thinking because it's a European discussion at the moment in terms of at least partial ring fencing breaking up of banks mr. Andrea would you have any views on this they're Lickenham proposes for example which are not break up but are sort of going in the direction of partial break up well if I may continue in the point to me is we have seen systemic problems being caused by large complex institutions which to be bailed out in Europe we have seen also big problems caused by small Irish banks or small Spanish kaha so the issue is to me resolvability so whether a bank is resolvable if you are convinced as a supervisor as an authority they need a crisis you can resolve the bank I don't think that there is a strong argument for break up if you have doubts about that and it's a tough call and and consider supervisors or maybe these type of powers but if you are not convinced that you are able to manage with the with the bank in a resolution I think that you should have the guts to break it up but not it's in the your argument if I understood your argument the very large complex cross-border banks are just much more difficult to resolve well definitely they are now I'm going to answer a few questions at once and my answer fundamentally is that I want the markets to decide on the size ideally and the markets are deciding on the sizes of most companies when we had a lot of conglomerates formed they broke up on the fact that they were too inefficient to be together as a corp as a conglomerate banks don't shrink because it pays to be big in banking more than it should because the status of too big to fail is beneficial funding is cheap and so you're enabled in the pursuit of excessive size and excessive risk so if you subject the banks to market pricing of their funding to investors in the market that care about upside and downside as well and are less able to lay the downsides on others then you might see a more natural break up of the banks and they're beginning to be a little bit noises about that because of governance problems because there seem to be out of control in terms of the fines and all these other things despite all the subsidies so my short answer here is that a whole lot more capital among the numerous benefits will reduce unsized outside subsidies and will force much more equity into this and therefore the sensibilities that come with that which is appropriate pricing of the assets and therefore less restrictions on diversification which is not touched by this diversification of assets and this is directly linked since it was a question to you how much capital is enough well I don't really go there because it's all about the measurement so the devil is in the denominator and there are many ways to do the denominator here and I mentioned derivatives and I mentioned off balance sheet and so you know there's risk-waist issues and there is thousands of calibration questions and so when we say 20 to 30 percent we say 30 percent those are ratios that we're even in banking those are issues that without any regulation corporations don't go under unless they're really on the way down so there is on the risk taking and being in there's nothing specifically risky about banks I come from Silicon Valley and there's a lot much more risk taken there much more long-term risk with the possibility of total loss and much more risky than a bunch of loans it's backed appropriately by equity of money no problem with that so there's no question that nothing about banking justifies living on single-digit equity nothing at all everything banks do they can do better with more equity so and then the size will maybe settle itself so that that's my answer I cannot get into the numbers until we we discuss seriously the calibration issues and those are just the can of worms because of accounting numbers and which signals are you using and all of that so for five years now I've been trying to get into that part but we're still in the other question which is why they don't accept the basic points it's been my mystery for five years it appears to be a combination of self-interest and and politics implicit guarantees are not on budgets very easy subsidies to give and there's a political symbiosis that takes many forms and they appear to be shocking confusions about basic things that we fail students in basic corporate finance classes that somehow haven't made their way into banking that are really bread-and-butter finance like leverage and risk and risk and return that seem to be somehow not understood I don't know why I'd like you to have the last word but I'd also like you to dress I don't want to last word I want a word you want to work on this but at the okay the responsibility of governmental institutions broadly defined for avoiding adding to the shocks in the system seems to me quite a relevant question it's unfair question but to us but possibly okay the important yeah well I can pick any answer to that because I could but before I do that let me go back to the point of breaking up banks this is one question you could turn it around and ask the opposite question shouldn't we have concerns about banks are too small to prosper it's not just too big to fail those too small to prosper the responsibility of governments from that point of view is what I would call a structural responsibility to implement reforms implement frameworks that can allow a smooth transition to a new equilibrium in size dimension allocation of the system this has to be done in Europe I'm sorry to be so boring and go back to the point both by countries and by European authorities we still don't have a clear strategy towards our view of a full banking union and a full capital markets union we must do more so this is one area where I think European policymakers we're not talking about the US another part of the world I'm talking about Europe where I see more problems with the addition of the national segmentation still very much present so this is what I see a practical challenge for policymakers okay at this stage I'm going to because I think we're coming to the end I'm going to ask you to vote again on the same motion in the light of this very deep and I think very interesting discussion which is and I this way time I will remember the way rounded is what is positive what is named we believe that post-crisis reforms have made the financial system sufficiently resilient and while you vote I would just note in a brief summary that there's been very interesting discussion but they obviously continues to be some very important concerns about the adequacy of loss absorption though obviously improved about too big to fail and the capacity to resolve very large financial globally global financial institutions that's linked with a very closely linked with the profound question about them the manageability of the global regulatory process which I think is very intimately related there are some important questions about how well this regulatory process has been integrated with them the needs of economies from a macroeconomic point of view that seems to me a very deep issue and finally obviously lots of concern expressed by at least one participant on derivatives the way the bankruptcy processes operates in relation to derivatives so so but even from those who people who basically thought yes there are really a lot of butts and that's very important so now I think have we had enough time to process the votes are you able to do so and everybody's feel comfortable so let's go and see what what it looks like now well it appears that the nose have done very well against the yes but perhaps there were so many buts with the yeses so now this is very interesting so the conclusion is 23% if you now think that it is sufficiently resilient down from was it 32 before and now the interesting thing is apparently there was a public vote among 150 people not randomly selected I presume I don't know how it was done on the on the social media platform and they didn't have the opportunity to vote twice but interestingly will be interested to know how different you are from the public at large how we you can decide because I'm of course neutral how much wiser or less you are that in the public vote 66% agreed as against your 23% and 34% disagreed against your 77% so you are a very different sample of the world and you were and you were even before you started maybe that tells you something about the people who wanted to come to this panel I think it's been a really good discussion obviously can't cover all the issues but it has allowed us to focus on the fundamental point which comes about even if you're not in quite as pessimistic as an artist or even not as pessimistic as an art that there remains a lot to do and that and that if things went seriously wrong again we could again be in a very very large mess and since that happens to be the lesson I draw in my book which of course you should have all read by now I feel very comforted by this very informed discussion that I wasn't far wrong but not comforted as far as the future of our economies is concerned because it means that we really have to hope that we won't have another major crisis because we don't seem to be too confident that that would go very well so may I thank the the panelists and the audience for particularly and all the people who manage this technology so impressively I think that it's been very enjoyable thank you very much