 Welcome to Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. Our show today, Why Is America in Asia? And joining us is today's guest, Peter C. Olson, former Pentagon and CIA analyst who specializes in intelligence and is widely published in that area. Welcome to Asian Review. Thank you, Bill. Nice to be here. It's great to have you. Well, let's get right into it. What is America's position in the world today? Well, you know, ever since the Second World War, the United States has been the principal world power. It really got to that because of the devastation of so many other nations. So there really was no competitive power in the period initially following the Second World War. Of course, with the rebuilding of Europe, the rebuilding of Japan and Asia, the growth in China, the relative power of the United States to other nations is less than what it was, although the U.S. clearly remains the most powerful nation on the planet. That being said, geopolitical trends always continue, and they always change. There's nothing that's permanent, so you would expect to have a change. And I think what we've seen in the last decade or two with the United States is that there are competing economic powers, especially with the growth of the economy in China, but also elsewhere in the European Union, so that the United States may be the first among equals, but it's more that than it is the dominant hegemon. Do you see other countries beginning to form alliances with other countries that don't necessarily go accord with U.S. interests? Oh, clearly. And I think one has to expect that. You know, every nation state will pursue its own critical interests. And in the past, of course, many of them have been reluctant to, shall I say, go against the interests of the United States because of different types of dependency, whether that was in a military alliance or whether it was economic. But as that evolves, they look to what are their best interests. And frankly, and you see it in the Asia Pacific area, I think more so than any place else, that the countries that make up this area are finding that what they need to do is talk to one another and do things in their in their own interests, which may be not totally in concert with what the U.S. would like. I think, you know, a good example clearly is in the South China Sea area, you know, where some countries have, you know, are resisting Chinese encroachment on their territorial waters and economic zones. Indonesia being a good example, you know, which sees Chinese fishing vessels and sunk them, you know, versus the Philippines, where clearly Duterte, in my opinion, has been bought off by the Chinese through economic aid and maybe other means that we aren't quite aware of, so that he's been soft peddling what the Chinese have done in the Scarborough Reef area, which is clearly, you know, Philippine territory. Right, right. Well, you said a lot there, and that's a lot of really interesting, you know, comments there. Some people would say other countries, how should I say, tendency to want to form alliances with other countries has been somewhat accelerated because of the inconsistency coming out of Washington. Well, yes, and that's not surprising to me. I mean, if you're a country in Southeast Asia and you're not quite sure where the United States stands, you sort of have a choice. You can play up to the Chinese or you can try to resist them by looking who are your friends in the neighborhood. And I think we see a little bit of that with Vietnam. I think we certainly have seen that with Japan. Abe is one who even 10 years ago was looking for the kind of international structure that would be a counterweight to the increasingly aggressive Chinese actions, not just in the South China Sea, but in the East China Sea and against the Japanese islands and that type of thing. So I think it's natural. And I think the America First policy leaves a lot to interpretation and not all of it, which is comforting to other countries. You know, you mentioned the Philippines and President Duterte, as you suggested, perhaps has been bought off by the Chinese. But I also look at South Korea. And I wonder if that relationship has meandered a bit. Well, yes, I think it has. I mean, clearly the threat from North Korea with its nuclear tests and its missile firings has unnerved the South. And clearly President Moon or I think anybody who would be president of South Korea would be willing to go a long way to avoid a war that would be absolutely devastating to Seoul and South Korea. So you can understand that. And the tough talk from Washington hasn't always accorded with what is, I think, a softer, more conciliatory approach from Seoul. You know, that being said, there comes a point, as we well know, that you can't be, say, conceding to a threatening nation forever. And I think, you know, that clearly is the lesson after, you know, Chamberlain in Europe and, you know, the fact that that was sort of the end of everything and led to war within a year's time. So, you know, the problem, I think, that we face on the Korean Peninsula is a South Korea that definitely does not want to go to war. Some uncertainty as to whether the current administration in the United States is willing to go to war, even preemptively. And, you know, that's a different point of view. Right. One wonders, too, just how successful the Chinese have been in weaning Korea away from South Korea, away from the United States, and how much of a wedge factor that China has been. Well, you know, economically, South Korea looks to China as a major market, and that's quite natural. You know, the Chinese are superb at using their economic power and other things as a political lever. Of course, the United States has done that for decades, as did the British when they had the Empire and, you know, any Empire beforehand did. So, that's, it's not a surprising development. But I think the fundamental issue with South Korea is one of trying to avoid hostilities. Interesting. Really interesting. Well, Xi Jinping has been very prominently mentioned in the news this week, given that the National People's Congress has been in session and approved an amendment to the Constitution, which according to everybody's view will clear the way for him to be in power forever and ever. Sort of a la Putin. What's your take on that? Well, it's interesting. Clearly, he has interest in remaining beyond what the previous Chinese law would have permitted. It's not surprising. Autocrats always like to stay in power. Of course, in some countries, non-autocrats like congressmen also like to stay in power. But that not withstanding. I think it remains to be seen whether he'll be successful in that in a long term, maybe in a short term, maybe in, you know, a few years beyond what is his term in office. But developments in China could change. And there are a lot of internal pressures in China, particularly economic and social, between the very wealthy cities basically along the seacoast and the interior, where there's, you know, a mass of population that doesn't really share to the same degree the wealth along the coast. And there's an interesting thing in the longer term that could really affect that. And that's climate change. Because if you look at sea level rise and the projections that can come between, shall we say, one meter and three meters over the next 30, 40, 50 years, that's going to flood a lot of China's coastal areas. And climate change also has a tremendous impact on habitability. And heat temperature rise will affect China very significantly. And it'll also affect food supply, both the ability to grow things on the land, but also with the acidification of the ocean, what it may do to the ability to harvest fish upon which the Chinese population is far more dependent than just about any other major power in the world. And I think that's one of the underlying reasons why the Chinese have reached out into the South China Sea to make it their own economic zone. And that's very interesting what a view that you raise. And also it seems that the Chinese are perhaps surprisingly, but again, maybe not so surprisingly, very strong proponents of the Climate Change Treaty, Paris Climate Change. I think they recognize the danger. They certainly have seen the danger from air pollution. If you look back a couple of years ago, and I forgotten, I think they called it the smug apocalypse in Beijing. But there was one report I read at one point that said a third of all deaths in the major cities there could be attributed to air pollution. I can't confirm that, but the fact that there was a study that alleged that tells you that it's a serious problem. Wow, that is really, really interesting. Well, okay, if Xi Jinping does stay in power beyond, you know, his, you know, 10 years, what do you think will be the effect on America's position in Asia? Well, I think he's certainly, you know, pushing to weaken America relatively to China, you know, the great road initiative that they have, which really has tremendous economic implications, but also has political military implications, because, you know, armies travel over roads as well as traders. So, you know, if you build it for traders, but the armies may come, you know, that is a very long term, probably century long vision of China, of how we can make itself a true center, if not the center of power in the world. And they think in terms like that. Right. We, you know, we still think in terms of, you know, quarterly profit statements, which doesn't always allow us to, shall I say, get our arms around a strategy that's going to be particularly effective. We seem to be having a lot of trouble getting our arms around a strategy right now. So let's take a break right here. You're watching Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. My guest today is Peter Oleson. Peter has 48 years of experience in intelligent matters, intelligence matters. He worked in the Pentagon. He worked for the CIA. And he's really been giving us some really interesting things to think about. So don't go away and we'll be right back. Hi, I'm Pete McGinnis-Mark. And every Monday at one o'clock, I'm the host of Think Tech Hawaii's research in Monart. And at that program, we bring to you a whole range of new scientific results from the university, ranging from everything from exploring the solar system to looking at the earth from space, going underwater, talking about earthquakes and volcanoes, and other things which have a direct relevance not only to Hawaii, but also to our economy. So please try and join me one o'clock on a Monday afternoon to Think Tech Hawaii's research in Monart. And see you then. Aloha and Richard Concepcion, the host of Hispanic Hawaii. You can watch my show every other Tuesday at 2 p.m. We will bring you entertainment, educational, and also we tell you what is happening right here within our community. Think Tech Hawaii, Aloha. Hi, I'm Ethan Allen, host on Think Tech Hawaii of Pacific Partnerships in Education. Every other Tuesday afternoon at 3 p.m., I hope you'll join us as we explore the value, the accomplishments, and the challenges of education here in the Pacific Islands. Welcome back to Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. My guest today is Peter Oleson. Peter is a former Pentagon and CIA intelligence specialist analyst and consultant. We've been talking about America's position in Asia. And we were just talking about Xi Jinping and his apparently he's going to stay in power forever and ever, a la Putin. And we're talking about the possible ramifications of that. But on the other hand, I wonder if Xi Jinping will be assassinated. Well, there's a long history of, shall I say, violent departure from high office in Chinese history. So this is the essence of the romance of the three kingdoms. Yeah, those things are, you know, very hard to predict. But I would not be surprised. I think it could be terribly destabilizing. And therein might lie the real reason to say, you don't want to see that happen. It's not clear to me that there is an alternate power structure in China. And were that not to be, and there was a subsequent struggle. It could have major implications for the stability in the country and international trade, economics, and even military action. I see what you're saying. I mean, it would certainly create instability of this for a period of time and who wants an unstable China. I don't think anybody wants an unstable China. I think people would like to see China, you know, evolve to be more a member of the, shall I say, the liberal coalition of nations, liberal meaning that you believe in resolving issues through diplomacy and international bargaining and that type of thing and not by the use of force. But China uses a bit of both. Clearly, what we've seen in the South China Sea is a bit of force. I think even some of the reported movements of Chinese forces to the North Korean border is a signal to Pyongyang to maybe cool it a little bit. But I also think it's very defensive on the part of the Chinese who probably are worried about mass migration out of North Korea if things start to, you know, to go badly and they don't want to have to absorb a mass migration of Koreans. That's really interesting comment because it seems to me that a lot of if there was a major turmoil in North Korea, yeah, there would be some people who want to rush into China, but there also be a lot of people who want to rush into the South. Well, yeah, the question is what would block you going either way? And if things were really going badly, and there was a military confrontation along the 38th parallel, rushing to the South may be a little difficult. Rushing to the North might be the easier path, even if it might be longer. Right, right, right. Is there a possibility of rushing to Russia? That's true. And it's interesting if you look at the population mix in Russian Far East. The Russians have a somewhat tenuous grip from a population perspective, you know, in the East. And it's not too long ago that there was conflict between Russia and China along the Amur River. And Chinese claims to things that the Russians believe are theirs. So, you know, this is this is not set in concrete. That's that's very, very interesting, because while China talks about protecting its sovereignty, and we'd be willing to almost come to blows with Japan over the little islands called the Senkakus. What about that Russian Far East? I mean, that, you know, was part of the Manchu Empire. And by China's way of thinking that should be part and parcel of China today. They tend to look the other way. Well, you know, remember that Russia is a major source of military equipment for them. It's a major source of energy. They are an ally in many respects in the international arena. It would be somewhat short sighted to, I think, poke the Russian bear's nose and the Chinese think in the long term. I discussed the same issue with a very prominent international relations specialist at Fudan University, why I was there. And his comment was very amusing. You know, we never pick fights with people that we think are as strong as us or stronger. Yeah. Smart. And I think that's true. Plus, as you say, I mean, Russia is still supplies very sophisticated weapons. Yeah, I know. Well, okay. The big news everybody's talking about is this potential meeting between Trump and KGU is beginning to be called in the press. Kim Jong-un. So what do you think? Is it going to happen? Or is this just a chitter chatter? Or what's your take? I have a big question mark in my mind. And it comes down to what prompted the the invitation? And on one hand, you can think of it that the sanctions were starting to hurt, and that Kim needs to resolve the issue because it's hurting those who support him and his family dictatorship, which is what it is in the north. The other hand is it's all part of the charm offensive that we saw, you know, with starting with the Olympics and a way to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington. I believe that the basic goal that Kim and his father and his grandfather had to reunify Korea, which is something they've never been able to do. You know, the grandfather started a war to do it. Clearly, the son wasn't willing to do that, although he certainly undertook many provocations, including, you know, sending a team to try to assassinate President Park in Seoul. And the son would love his place in history of having succeeded doing what his father and grandfather couldn't do. And I don't think that thought goes away. But in the short term, he's probably worried about his survival as leader. And so he may be taking a step back in order to protect his position. But I don't think he's giving up his long term goal. How do you read President Moon, the president of South Korea? I mean, he said to have very pro United Korea stance of you, very similar to the previous president with whom he was very close President Roe. Is he being manipulated by KJU? Probably. I mean, that's that's what Kim does. I mean, he manipulates everything. If you read his propaganda, you know, it's really quite remarkable. You know, he's the greatest person who's ever lived in the history of the world. And interestingly, even the propaganda today now calls him Marshall Kim, which I thought was an interesting change from dear leader. And but it sends a message. And, you know, it's kind of kind of interesting to see. So, you know, the old analogy of the carrot and the stick, you know, he's, he's got one in each hand, and we'll have to see which one he does. If there is another nuclear test, if there is, I think, more testing of long range of ballistic missiles that might have the capability of, you know, hitting the United States, then I think any kind of meeting is off. However, my real concern is that we'll have a meeting and the US will not be well prepared for, shall I say, the very sophisticated capabilities of the North Koreans in negotiations. And the problem you have to remember is that they have never lived up to any agreement that they've done. So, you know, clearly echoed in the press. Well, it's true. Yeah. And so it makes you, you know, go back to Ronald Reagan, where he said, you know, trust but verify when we were doing strategic arms talks with the Soviets before the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the verification issue is always a tremendous sticking point. You know, that's the problem that we've had with Iran. It will be a problem that we'll have with North Korea. It's a problem that we now have with Russia because Russia is violating the Intermediate Nuclear Force Agreement with its new weapons systems and where they've placed them. And we really, you know, we can say, hey, you know, you're violating it, but we haven't done anything about it. Getting back to President Moon, you know, it seems that he is not particularly enamored with the United States, that he does have this very strong pro unified Korea stance, Korean nationalism. And I'm just not sure where the balance is with him. Well, you know, clearly, he's a Korean, you know, the people north of the 38th parallel and the people south of the parallel are basically, you know, of the same origin. I think it's a very natural thing to believe that being together is a good thing. We certainly saw that in Germany with the reunification after the wall came down. And I would think Moon would have some reservations with the United States, particularly with this administration that, frankly, has, you know, basically threatened preemptive action. And yet when you look at the military structure and in South Korea, it's a joint structure. Right. It's not a US Army and a South Korean army. It's a joint army. Right. And so, you know, I don't think he wants to be dragged into a conflict that he doesn't see as in his nation's interest. So we talked about the possible assassination of Xi Jinping. And I know that you've written a few articles about the political assassination. What about KGU? Will he be assassinated? That I think is a higher probability than Xi in China. If things get bad enough in North Korea for those who are, shall I say, close to the center of power and feel their position slipping, that may be possible. That would be really interesting. But again, I think you would have instability in the North. Sure. And that may be of great concern, not just to us, but I think to the Chinese too. That's true. We only have one minute left, as I just been informed. So let me quickly sneak in this question. I wish we had longer for this, but what's the relative importance of Asia to the United States? Why is America in Asia? Well, I mean, historically, you know, we got into Asia as the result of the Spanish-American War, you know, in terms of being a power, we'd always been trading with Asia. I mean, go back to Perry in Japan and all that. And then after the First World War, of course, we picked up a number of island territories under the trusteeship of the League of Nations. And then, of course, with the Second World War, you know, became the dominant power there. And, you know, with forces in Japan, forces in Korea, you know, we really had a major stake. I think our major stake now is economic, because Asia is our biggest trading partner, far surpassing the EU or Europe. And that's in Americans' interest. I mean, what can you buy that's not made in China? You know, for day-to-day living, and we depend upon it. And they depend upon us. So the ties that bind are economic. The others worry me that they may break that and cause us problems. Great. Well, I think we'll leave it there. I want to thank our guests for being with us today. I want to thank you for joining us. And we'll see you again next week when my guest will be Dr. Zhang Qin and his wife, Dr. Eugene Chen, coming to us from Gaoshuang in Taiwan. We'll see you then.