 The principles of war remained as if new weapons revised the concept of war. This time Germany was faced with a weapon that leaped over battle lines and frontiers and smashed at the ultimate enemy, the German workmen who equipped and fed the German soldier. This time the enemy nation was physically destroyed before its defending army was defeated. World War II witnessed the emergence of a third dimension in warfare in which the air became a primary theater of operation in addition to the land and the sea, performed a dual rule. One function involved direct cooperation with grounded service forces to defeat the enemy's armies in the field, commonly called the tactical use of air power. The function involved an independent striking force created to wage air war against the opposing air force and to destroy as the resultant exploitation of air victory its resources, industrial capacity and will to make war. 17 August 1942 strategic air power was born. At 1,526 hours the first daylight mission from a base in England was launched, and served by day against the powerful German air force. Could strategic bombing be maintained? Would it achieve its objective? The answer roared over Germany just one year later to the day. 180 forts on their way to Schweinfurt. Three months later 228 forts carried 500 tons of bombs to the same target, bringing strategic air power to an impressive peak in the campaign against German aircraft production. The factories at Schweinfurt produced 52% of the total number of anti-friction bearings manufactured in Germany. This concentration of critical production capacity caused the allied chiefs of staff to assign a top priority to the target. At this time the long range fighter had not been developed. Fighters did not accompany the bombers to the target area. This day saw the proof that the heavy bomber could not effectively defend itself and made the development of the long range fighter an essential to our strategic bombing success. Wave after wave of enemy fighters attacked the unescorted bombers. The rocket was intense, but good visibility enabled the forts to make an accurate run. And all 500 tons were dropped and the tillings were demolished by high explosive bombs. There was much fire from incendiaries. However, our flak batteries and fighters shot down 62 bombers, inflicted major battle damage on 17 and damage in varying degrees in 121 more. Personnel casualties in the attacking force must have been large. 599 killed and 40 wounded. A costly day. This had been the heaviest single clash between air forces to date. It's estimated that the enemy lost more than 300 fighter aircraft during the operation. But the fact that this impressive effort to break a vital link in the German war economy failed in actuality is by no means the full measure of its impact upon that economy. It was originally planned to destroy this target in one raid, but the then existing size of our air force could not sustain the great losses inflicted upon it. And so was prevented from taking advantage of a follow-up attack to destroy the ball bearing industry. However, the shattering raid of 14 October shocked the Reich officials into immediate action and led directly to the dispersal of industry from Schweinfurt and other centralized districts. This dispersal of industry made possible the success of the Allied air campaign against transportation and communications, which in turn brought the German nation to its knees. The history of United States air power will always honor the bloody summer of 1943. Because of the very heavy losses in personnel and aircraft incurred during the Schweinfurt attacks, penetrations beyond the range of fighters were suspended. It was clear that the success of future strategic campaigns and the invasion of the continent depended upon the elimination of the Luftwaffe. The P-47 was equipped with wing tanks which extended its range 3 to 400 miles. The long-range P-51 fighter capable of escorting the striking force to and from its objective put in an appearance toward the end of 1943. After a lull during the fall of 1943, when increased numbers of P-51s were being assembled in the United Kingdom, we were completely equipped to effectively carry out the campaign against German fighter production. Attack against airframes was decided upon because airframes as a target system appeared more accessible. Intelligence with regard to engine production was not as thorough. The Erle plant at Heideblik Leipzig was the office and original factory of the complex making 40% of the ME-109 fighters turned out in Germany. The Erle plant was attacked twice during February 1944 and once four months later in June. But attacks also were made against two other plants in the Erle complex, those at Machen and De Leech. After the February raids, 65% of the factory floor space at Heideblik was destroyed. Many completed aircraft and a considerable amount of components were lost at this time. About 450 workers were killed and the many important Erle company records were burned. The Germans made no attempt to restore the buildings at Heideblik. Instead the undamaged tools were moved to dispersal plants and an overall decentralization plan for the aircraft industry was put in effect. The 27 main fighter factories were dispersed into 760 smaller plants. During the spring of 1944, about half of the planned dispersal was accomplished with only minor disturbance to production. And other fighter companies were now compelled to rely upon rail and truck transportation to implement smooth operation of production. German volatility was beginning to grow. By the end of March 1944, when final plans for the Allied invasion of Europe were being drawn up, about 30% of the total petroleum available to Germany came from the refineries at Ploeste in Romania. American air power operating from North Africa made a daring but costly attack upon the Romanian refineries. Eight months later this attack was followed up by a systematic campaign of destruction from Italian bases, carried on over a period of five months and reduced production at Ploeste to 7% of its normal capacity. With the loss of Ploeste the synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr in central Germany and in Hamburg became critical. In May 1944 these were made primary targets. The synthetic oil plant at Leuna was the objective of 22 strategic attacks planned to deny oil to the German armed forces. During the whole period between the first attack on 12 May 1944 and the last attack on 4 April 1945, the average daily production of the plant was only 9 or 10% of normal. However by planning top priority and manpower and equipment, plants that had been knocked out completely were brought back into production in relatively few weeks, thus necessitating renewed attacks. All during the heavy bombing raids a rapid rate of recuperation was achieved and in general repeated air attacks rather than the severity of any single raid gradually resulted in the almost complete breakdown of German oil production. The military consequences of the oil attacks were immediate. The shortage of available fuel necessitated a severe cut in daily sorties by the Luftwaffe and gasoline allocations for the army decreased steadily. The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90%. Those were the words of Reichsminister Speer, czar of all German production, and the letter to Hitler dated 30 June 1944. Von Rundstedt too admitted that lack of fuel was a major factor in the defeat of Nazi armies in the December Arden offensive. In effect, the oil campaign proved to be the most immediately catastrophic for all German hopes. Home front sent us more bombers and fighters and more well trained pilots and our fleets grew mightier by the month. But the enemy first line operational strength maintained and increased numerically was thrown into the breach in a desperate effort to stand the air offensive. To seek the enemy instead of waiting for him and above all to follow him to his destruction. A gigantic fighter battle raged across the European skies with victories by our fighters alone of 60, 85 and over 100 enemy aircraft destroyed each day. It was a crucial battle, both sides fighting hard with air domination itself at stake. Decisive, the Luftwaffe disappeared from the skies and the day arrived when a huge bomber mission with full fighter escort flew around trip to Berlin without challenge by a single enemy fighter. Fighters returning from unchallenged escort missions were ordered to seek targets of opportunity. Since the enemy did not come up to fight, down they went to blast his planes and burn them in his air drones. It was the most savage and devastating fighter attack on record and the wreckage of Nazi aircraft littered the fields of Europe until the German Air Force was broken forever. Redress for invasion day, the sky looked down on the greatest amphibious operation in the history of modern warfare. After the successful landing on the continent, the Allied Supreme Command decided to use strategic air power against German industrial systems the loss of which would most rapidly and directly weaken the enemy for the final Allied ground assault. During August, September and October of 1944, the Allied strategic air forces attacked the majority of motor transport producers in Germany and damaged nine out of 13 main tank and armored vehicle centers. After the disastrous Ardenne breakthrough and the failure of a German counterattack on the Eastern Front, it was realized that the Nazis would have to bend every effort to increase tank production for use inside Germany. At the beginning of February 1945, attacks on tank plants again were authorized. The plant of Voigtlander Maschinenfabrik AG, Vomag, located at Plauen in Saxony, was producing about 150 tanks monthly. Approximately 25% of the total German production of the Mark IV tank. In March 1945, a series of attacks on Vomag was begun. Three attacks that month caused damage to machine tools amounting to 16%. There were heavy losses to stocks of finished motors and main transmission assemblies waiting for mounting into tanks. Another attack on 8 April brought about almost complete disruption of the activities of the Vomag factory. After these four attacks, 56% of the floor space devoted to tank manufacture was destroyed or heavily damaged. This and other attacks on tank and motor vehicle plants early in 1945 undoubtedly contributed to the disorganization and collapse of the German ground forces by making tank replacements impossible. The earliest directive of the combined British and American chiefs of staff relating to air policy stated that from time to time heavy bomber forces would be diverted from their main strategic objectives if other objectives of political or military importance presented themselves. Before the United States entered the war, Berlin was subjected to many night raids by RAF heavy bombers. These attacks were supplemented by fast British mosquito raids. Beginning in March 1944, the United States Air Force also sent numerous missions against the targets inside the city limits. The attacks were designed to disrupt the war industries and the transportation system of this most highly industrialized area in Germany outside the Ruhr. It was further intended to harry and disorganize the German high command. During both February and March 1945, three large-scale attacks were made on the German capital. The large rail centers near the governmental area were specific targets. These attacks materially lowered the morale and will to resist of the German people and their leaders. Transportation is the lifeline of war economy and the vital factor in mobility of military forces. German rail transportation was becoming particularly vital as the results of strategic bombing forced the widespread dispersal of production facilities. During March, April and May of 1944, strikes were made against French marshaling yards in preparation for the coming invasion. In the middle of February 1945, a plan was worked out which called for the destruction of all railroad workings in the Ruhr and surrounding areas. On 22 and 23 February 1945, Allied Air Operation Clarion was carried out against all small and medium rail points in Germany by more than 7,000 aircraft from all the American and British Air Forces. This resulted in the saturation of repair capabilities of the German rail system and precipitated a general disorganization of transport. Allied heavy bombers continued to strike at marshaling yards. Gießen was bombed in spite of bad weather with devastating results to both the link between the Ruhr and southern Germany and a rail connection between the Koblenz area of the Rhineland and Leipzig and Berlin. The cumulative effects of concentrated pounding of rail systems caused unbelievable disruption to production of all war materials at the widely dispersed factories of the Reich. The efforts to thwart the Allied strategic forces of centralized targets now caused the final complete breakdown of the German war economy. Fighters sought targets of opportunity. Anything and everything that moved on the German earth was either bombed or strafed. It was only a matter of time. The spear production ministry has stated At the moment when the attacks were carried on systematically against the railroads, it was all over. Field Marshal von Rundstedt The dislocation of Germany's railroad system by air attack is one of the principal reasons for the loss of the war. Reich's Marshal Gehring Attacks on marshaling yards were most effective. Low-flying planes had terror effect and caused great damage to our communications. The success of the invasion was made possible by Allied air power. Without the United States air forces, the war would still be going on elsewhere but not on German soil. No cost analysis is made. It will show that the $27 billion price paid by the United States for the strategic bombing campaign in Europe was only an approximate 11% of our overall war expense up to December 31, 1944. Of all the wars varied in Titanic investments, there was surely no sounder one than this. If war investments can ever be calculated on a simple dollar and cents basis, hence of technological developments resulted in the ultimate in firepower. The atomic age will see the further development of airborne devices beyond the conception of man. Because of the mobility, speed and potency of weapons to be, air war, the third dimensional aspect, must be recognized as the primary determinant in attaining a military victory.