 Things have moved quite quickly over the last couple of weeks or so and this is already a pretty late intervention into the ongoing debate. So instead of starting from scratch I thought I just briefly summarise what the CAA does and then respond to some of the core arguments that have been put forward in defence of the CAA. And of course there are two issues. One is the link between the CAA and the NPR and the NRC which is something I wouldn't address now. So I think the independent reasons, independent of the NPR and the NRC that require us to critique and to oppose the CAA and that's what I'll be talking about in brief. So three issues I'll address. One is the law exclusionary or is it inclusive? Secondly, what kinds of discrimination does it bring about and why it's a constitutional issue? And thirdly, the manner in which it privileges religion over other forms of persecution and why that's a constitutional problem within the framework of the Indian constitution. So to start briefly there are three sets of criteria that the amendment puts forth for people to qualify within its protective scope. The first is it picks out certain countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh. The second is it picks out certain communities, six religious communities, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Christians and so on. And the third is it has a cut off date. So 31 December 2014 the individual must have come to India before that. So this is not a law that seeks to grant prospective immunity to people who might now come to India fearing persecution in these countries. What it does is it takes Indians or it takes persons who have been in India before 2014 and divides them up based on their countries of origin and the religious community. So that's in a sense what the law is about. For those who fall outside its scope, the old 2011 SOP regime applies in which you must establish on a case to case basis your persecution in your country of origin and then you will qualify for a long-term visa. So this amendment basically has a two-tiered structure. If you fall outside it, you have a less beneficial regime that applies to you. And if you fall within it, you get a greater benefit under the new regime. So that's the kind of difference it brings about. And that of course raises an Article 14 issue. Is this equal treatment? Because Article 14 applies to all persons in India, not just citizens. So whenever the state draws a classification and picks out certain people for favourable treatment, that attracts Article 14 and that becomes an Article 14 issue because equality of course is a universal concern, not just limited to citizens already. With that in mind, let's address these three issues. So first of course is that this law, so the argument is that it is inclusive. It brings in certain communities that have been facing persecution and gives in protection. Now to the extent that it picks these communities, obviously it is inclusive. But it also excludes communities that have faced similar kinds of persecution. Obvious examples being the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar who have been subjected to genocidal levels of oppression, Tibetan political refugees, Tamils in Sri Lanka and so on. These are arguments that have been heard for a long time now. So therefore the law is both inclusive and exclusionary as well. And it's the exclusionary aspects which are troubling. So the complaint is not that why are you extending immunity and citizenship to certain communities. The complaint is why are you leaving some out. And so the argument therefore is for more inclusiveness and not less. That's the first issue. The second issue and this is the really core constitutional issue is that when this law picks out religion and country of origin as the twin basis of extending immunity from prosecution as illegal immigrants and the citizenship path, what it does is that it discriminates between people on the basis of characteristics that they cannot control. So which country I come from, what community I was born into are two factors that completely beyond my control, much like race, caste and so on. And so when you pick out these really core categories and single them out and use them to give beneficial and non-manificial treatment, that creates an equality problem because effective you're telling people that based that if you were lucky enough to belong to a certain community or to a certain country, then this law will protect you. And if not, you go out. And so independent of all other aspects, independent of all concerns about the politics of it, the religious character of it and so on, just the simple fact of dividing people on the basis of characteristics they can't control is what causes an Article 14 issue, an equality problem and a constitutional matter for concern. So that is really the core issue. Now one thing that has been brought forward often is the argument that if a law is merely under-inclusive, that can't be a ground to challenge an Article 14. So the state can have discretion to pick certain people, it can have discretion to not protect everybody at the same time. And so mere under-inclusion cannot be a ground to challenge a law on Article 14 basis. Now it's true that the court has in the past said that under-inclusion is not in itself, may not always be a basis to challenge a law. But the courts also said under-inclusion must be nominal. So if you are trying to bring about a reform law and because the law is a blunt instrument, language is a blunt instrument, so you can't draw precise lines and therefore there might be some things that fall on either side of the line. That kind of under-inclusion, yes, the court can let it go because that is inherent in the exercise of lawmaking, it's inherent in the limitations of language. But this isn't the case of that kind. This is a case where you're taking individuals, groups and communities and saying, look, you don't qualify but you qualify. So this isn't simply a case of imperfect drafting the complexities of the world causing an issue of under-inclusion. It's a clear separation between categories and groups, privileging some and not others. On basis, they can't have control over. And that's why this whole argument that simple under-inclusion is not a good enough ground for a constitutional challenge is clearly misplaced because the ground here is that people in India are being treated differently on unjustifiable bases and grounds and that's why Article 14 becomes important. Now the third and last point is this privileging of religious persecution over other kinds of persecution, which is also an issue. So now of course the act itself does not mention religious persecution. But if you go back to the passport orders and the foreigners or rules which the act refers to, then you get a clear sense that the objective, stated objective of the act is the assumption that minority communities in neighboring countries that have a state religion are subjected to religious persecution and that gives them a specific claim to immunity and citizenship. Now this whole idea of there being other communities that have also persecuted and that's been debated multiple times. I think and that of course is a valid argument. But I think beyond that, the core issue here is that persecution can take many different forms, which is why the refugee convention talks about a well-founded fear of persecution giving a ground to asylum claims. Persecution can be social, it can be caste-based, religion-based and many other forms as well, gender-based and so on. And so when this law picks out religion as a form of persecution that is particularly salient and deserving of a protection other forms are not given to, then that is what strikes at the secular character of both the law and the constitution. Because there's no reason why a Tibetan who's been subjected to political persecution in Tibet, a persecution that is every bit as severe and has every bit as severe consequences and other kinds of persecution is told you are not worthy of the state's special protection, but others are. And that's why when you make religion as the basis of granting special claims to citizenship and to humanity, you are striking at the secular character of the constitution and that's why this is a problem beyond just the picking out of certain communities, the picking out of certain countries and these are our problems. But even beyond that is a deeper issue of making religion as the arbiter of persecution that is worthy of the state's protection. Just to sum up then the three points. The first is that the law is inclusive to an extent but the problem with it is not inclusive enough and in not being enough it excludes groups and people that are worthy of protection and should be brought under the ambit of this law. The second is that it discriminates on the basis of characteristics that we have no control over, countries of origin when they came to India fleeing from persecution and the religion and when you discriminate on those bases that becomes an equality issue, not simply an under inclusion issue. And the third is that by making religion as the basis of a special claim over other kinds of persecution and suffering that undermines secularism as a fundamental value. So I think that going beyond existing debate these three issues are additional reasons why we should oppose the CAA on constitutional and humanitarian grounds.