 Tony, big news out of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, what happened and how significant is his death? It is very important because whatever his sons were, they're not symbols of power. They did not hold the tribal coalitions together. They did not manage the state. And what makes this different from any other similar case in the Arab world is the sheer eccentricity of the Gaddafi regime. For nearly three decades, he imposed his own personal, rather strange view of economics, of how a government should operate, of how you should have security in the state and run a justice system. The fact he's gone, the fact that he can't catalyze any opposition from the outside makes a tremendous difference. The problem is, his very success, at the economic level, the reporting was this is an oil state, not really a rich oil state in terms of per capita income, but yet had a 30 percent poverty level. Roughly a third of the young men were unemployed. There's no political structure in the normal sense or justice structure. So all of a sudden, his death also means Libya has to figure out what Libya wants to be, how united it is, and how to move forward. And that is going to be more of a challenge than for any other similar state because there is no regular economy or political system to build upon. Does this incident give any closure to the Libyan conflict? Does it validate the mission of NATO ISAF going in there? Well, there are two completely different questions. One is closure. Closure to whom? Is there going to suddenly be everyone in Libya supporting this? No. For many people, Qaddafi was the only thing they ever knew. It's what they grew up with. For others, it was a source of special privilege. Their tribe, their faction, their family benefited in ways other Libyans didn't. Is there unity among the rebels? No. Have there been tensions and clashes? Have there been basically failures to obey orders or create any kind of unified structure? All of those things have already occurred. Can this be a case where al Qaeda and the Maghreb or other extremist factions arise or take advantage of it? Possibly. We know what's going to happen to the thousands of weapons, including small surface-to-air missiles and portable weapons like that. No, we don't yet, although we reacted, I think, relatively quickly the moment we could to put in U.S. troops and advisors to try to deal with this. So all of these problems are going to play out over time. And I think this is something in what, for many people, is a moment of euphoria that we need to remember. Long before this occurred, every potential Libyan leader was already looking beyond revenge towards ambition. And these are people with no political experience in working together and a long history in some cases of ethnic or tribal tension. As to the success of the NATO mission, I think we need to be very careful here. Was it successful? There is certainly no doubt that it took so long to really react and become effective that it prolonged the uprising by months. At the same time, it was never a clear mission. The U.N. resolution had to be worked around. NATO had to improvise and deal with a host of political constraints that were not from within NATO. Did it succeed in creating an allied effort that had a tremendous impact with relatively limited outside use of force? Did it over time develop the capability to work with diverse Libyan factions and the host country? In that sense, it certainly succeeded. Could this ever have happened without NATO? No. Tony, there will be inevitable comparisons between Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein as you already alluded to. What lessons can we learn from Iraq that should inform us in going forward and potential aid to helping reconstruct Libya? I think that the key lessons we should learn, and they're equally true, unfortunately, of Afghanistan, is we had a host of people who thought they had instant outside solutions to fixing different cultures and different countries who basically took their own ideological beliefs or economic beliefs or political beliefs and thought that was the solution for other societies. And we watched the same thing happen with Russia, for example, after the Soviet Union dissolved, and it not only didn't work. In many cases, it made things far worse than simply allowing the people involved to reach their own solutions by their own standards. So if there's a real lesson here, it is outside aid to help people do what they want by their values can have immense importance. But rushing towards a constitution when nobody really wants or believes in it is not the way to go. Holding elections without knowing whether you have meaningful political parties and without caring who gets elected is not a solution to the problem. Trying to impose some quick, easy economic answer from the outside will reform the whole country. That's not a solution either. And one thing that's been pretty well constant since the end of World War II is rushing in to try to have Western-style formal justice systems and police forces. It worked in Iraq, it hasn't worked in Afghanistan, it hasn't really worked anywhere else, even during the period of decolonization. So is there a real case for aid? Yes. What is the key lesson from our previous efforts? We do need to help them in nation-building, but we can't build the nation for them. And we need to respond to their needs and values and not impose our own. Tony, thank you very much for your time. My pleasure.